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PREFACE
The whole world is covered with nations of which we know only the names, 
yet we dabble in judging. … Let us suppose a Montesquieu, a Buffon, a Diderot 
… traveling in order to inform … by observing and describing … Turkey … 
the interior of Africa … China, Tartary … Mexico, Peru, Chile, and fi nally the 
Caribbean. … Let us suppose these new Hercules … then wrote at leisure the 
natural, moral, and political history of what they would have seen; we ourselves 
would see a new world … and we would thus learn to know our own. (Rous-
seau, in Lévi-Strauss 1976: 34)
In an essay about the origins of anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss cred-ited Rousseau with a delineation of the discipline. The idea behind Rous-
seau’s anthropology was to send ‘new Hercules’ out and about, “traveling 
… to inform” compatriots about different people in the world, the better 
“to know our own.” This book is Rousseauian in spirit. It is a real trip, a 
journey to other peoples and places to know the United States and its global 
entanglements. A word on how this peregrination came about is in order.
I received a draft deferment to attend an Ivy League university in the 
1960s and so avoided the Vietnam War. In 1968, as a privileged graduate 
student, I went instead to live among the Barma in Chad—then as isolated 
a place as existed on the globe—to conduct research into descent groups. 
There I went from person to person, asking, “So, what about clans?” They 
didn’t know. Chad, it turned out, was in the midst of civil war. One evening 
in 1969 in a tiny village, two months into fi eldwork, Musa woke me with the 
words “Malatol debgé kidé,” which translated as “The masters of killing have 
come” or maybe as “The masters of killing are coming—soon!” We waited 
for them under the old bili tree where the road into the village stopped and 
under which the chief held court—a motley crew of six, all over sixty except 
for the guy swollen from elephantiasis. We were armed with a shotgun (no 
shells), an ancient sword (pretty short), and a fi shing lance (jagged).
They did not come that night, but they kept coming elsewhere. At a 
roadblock a few years later, a soldier maneuvered the barrel of his auto-
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matic weapon to push up my companion’s sunglasses, the better to see 
his face—and the better to kill him (if necessary). After some very fast 
talk, the gun was removed and the glasses slid back into place. During one 
period in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital, if you woke up in the morning and 
saw birds in the tree, you knew there had been fi ghting near the Presiden-
tial Palace the previous night. At the time a friend recounted how an old 
man near the palace had raised his arm above his shoulder, brandishing 
a knife, and been machine-gunned by soldiers who then approached the 
body and threw hand grenades at it. “They blew him into mini-pieces,” he 
said, and kept repeating, “mini-morcaux, mini-morcaux. Why?” This led 
me to understand that unilineal descent groups—then the regnant anthro-
pological conceptual boytoys—were not of pressing signifi cance to Chad-
ians, whereas understanding why portions of their agnates kept fl ying off in 
blasted, bloody chunks was.
This realization was followed by another. Maybe Chad was not so iso-
lated. Americans and Europeans were involved in the violence. After all, 
in that fi rst village an old American World War II fi ghter plane, piloted 
by a Frenchman, would fl y out of the eastern dawn, bank sharply over the 
village at strafi ng level—the pilot’s silver glasses glinting in the sun—and 
head northward. Once, on the way to a funeral, I drove through a line of 
French legionnaires retreating from the area where the funeral was to be 
held. In 1970 at a parade in N’Djamena’s Independence Square, celebrants 
of the tenth anniversary of Chad’s independence watched a tank roll by. 
Actually, it was Chad’s only tank, the Gaurang. Standing in the Gaurang’s 
main turret, facing and saluting the reviewing stand, was a Chadian sol-
dier; at another opening up front, a European offi cer stared straight ahead, 
saluting no one. Fast-forward ten years: on one battlefi eld in the 1980s 
there were reports of a “Bob,” said to be a CIA offi cer. Fast-forward another 
quarter of a century: there was still warfare. As we traveled to the small city 
of Abeché near the Sudanese border, high, high above a French Jaguar jet 
left a contrail pointing east, toward the hostilities.
Such memories are disquieting—Bob and Europeans haunting imagina-
tion’s shadows. But as readers will learn, Bob and the Europeans doing their 
thing in Chad was not a singularity. Rather, they were, and are, a global im-
perial phenomenon characterizing our times. I had gone to Chad to study 
Chadians’ worlds, and in so doing had learned “our own” world was part 
of theirs. Bob and his compatriots—“masters of killing” who “have come” 
or “are coming—soon!”—were out there. Among other matters, this text 
provides theory and evidence to argue that since the end of World War II, 
a New American Empire has emerged in our world to choreograph Bob 
and his allies’ operations in other worlds across the globe.
Preface
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GLOSSARY
Actions: the strings of an individual actor.
Actors: a type of force resource composed of persons with particular forces 
and powers. The more force and power they have, the greater their agency.
Agency: use of the brain to combine different force resources, creating a 
force with an outcome, with power.
Authority: a type of force resource based on the rights of actors to choreo-
graph specifi c force resources in different perceived situations.
Autopoetic: having or relating to a social being’s power to reproduce and 
maintain itself.
Being, human: a sector of reality; that of humanity in all its interactive 
aspects.
——, social: the most complex structural form of human being. These 
are articulated systems, roughly equivalent to society. Social beings are 
open, autopoetic, and refl exive—always in motion, always doing.
Coalescence: increasing co-occurrence of contradictions.
Choreography: the designing of sequences of movements in which the 
motion of objects and people are specifi ed in space and time.
Concatenation: the particular co-occurrence of contradictions that may 
be increasing or decreasing in intensity.
Conservation of délires: the principle that social change moves iteration 
by iteration, with iterations understood as similar ways of doing the same 
thing.
Contradictions: are logics that give a social being, or a portion of it, 
the power to move toward its limits, threatening its reproduction and 
autopoesis.
——, political: a contradiction within or between political systems.
——, imperial: a contradiction between two or more empires.
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——, dominator/dominated: a contradiction between the dominators 
and the dominated in imperial social beings
——, economic: a contradiction with or between economic systems.
——, cyclical: economic contradictions that cycle between growth and 
decline.
——, systemic: economic contradictions moving economic systems to-
ward their limits.
Culture: a force resource consisting of learned and shared signs bearing 
information of the times; required for choreographing (see also technical 
culture, ideology, worldview).
——, perceptual: signs indicating what is.
——, procedural: signs bearing information about what to do with 
what is.
——, neuronal: signs embedded within neuronal tissue in I-Space.
——, discursive: signs forming the basis of information transmitted in 
E-Space.
——, positional: signs shared by those in different positions within so-
cial beings.
Délires: the intentions and the emotions supporting them of elites.
Elites: upper-class actors who occupy positions with considerable author-
ity over considerable force resources. They are the “tip of the spear” in 
class confl ict.
——, subject: elites found in colonies or client states who are super-
vised by imperial handlers.
——, advantaged: elites found in advantaged client states.
——, hybrid: elites found in ordinary client states who have positional 
culture from both their own state and that of the imperial core to which 
they belong.
Empires: social beings doing domination especially in other countries and 
other regions as their elites amass force and, with force, power.
E-Space: structures external to humans.
Experimental fi xation: different attempts to address a particular vulnerability.
Force: generally, any cause of outcomes or effects. It is specifi c to social 
forms. Any outcome or effect is due to the exercise of force resources.
——, exercise of: utilization of force resources.
——, violent: force resources exercised to break things.
——, constructive: force resources exercised to make things.
Force resources: instruments, land, actors, culture, and authority that, 
when choreographed together, cause effects.
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Formal: describes a group whose procedural culture is explicit (with stan-
dardized, written procedure)
Global warring: strings involving overt or covert, direct or indirect, exer-
cise of violent force managed by security elites of an imperial state against 
a colony, client state, or region of interest somewhere other than the impe-
rial core.
Hermeneutic: a choreographic message from technical culture, ideology, 
or a worldview that informs actors what is and what to do about it.
Hermeneutic blindness: inability to recognize vulnerabilities.
Hermeneutic deception: fi xes said to relax vulnerabilities that actually do 
not relax the vulnerabilities.
Hermeneutic politics: generally, any debate over the understanding of 
some aspect of being; specifi cally, debates between elites over what public 
délires to authorize to resolve reproductive vulnerabilities.
Hermeneutic puzzles: generally, any aspect of being that demands under-
standing; specifi cally, any vulnerability that elites apprehend as needing 
fi xing.
Hermeneuts: illuminati, educational or cultural elites who bring the mes-
sages of what elites desire to everybody else.
Hermetic seal: actors sealed into thinking and feeling X, and sealed out of 
thinking and feeling not-X.
Ideology: large systems of cultural information that is normally contested; 
e.g., there are conservative and liberal ideologies.
Imperial handlers: core elites who manage the administration of client 
states. Security elites are a form of imperial handler.
Imperialism: the reproduction of empires, with elites doing whatever it 
takes to keep them going (simple reproduction) and, when possible, to 
grow them (extended reproduction).
Informal: describes a group whose procedural culture is not entirely ex-
plicit (not completely standardized, not written)
Institutions: co-occurring, interrelated practices.
Instruments: A type of force resource consisting of things—both material 
(e.g., machines) and immaterial (e.g., capital)—used by actors in exercises 
of force.
Intensifi cation: movement of a contradiction toward its limits.
I-Space: structures internal to humans.
Iteration: a specifi c fi x, or a number of different fi xes, of a reproductive 
vulnerability.
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Land: a type of force resource; raw materials.
Limit: the point at which an action or social form can go no further.
Logics: abstract accounts of the powers of strings.
——, multiple: logics of institutions or systems operating to produce 
more than one power.
——, hierarchical: where some logics need to occur for other logics to 
occur.
—— of disorder: logics directed toward the limit of contradictions
—— of social constitution: logics directed toward the fi xing of repro-
ductive vulnerabilities.
Open: describes the power of social forms to connect with other forms, 
including natural structures.
Operations: strings and practices authorized by actors in formal institutions.
Play of forces: the contradiction between the logics of disorder and social 
constitution.
Power: any outcome or effect of an exercise of forces.
——, intended: effect that was premeditated by actors.
——, unintended: unpremeditated effects.
——, extensiveness: the number of actors a particular actor has power 
over.
——, density: the number of power actors have over other actors.
Practices: a number of individual action strings choreographed together 
to do something.
Public délires: elites’ resolution of their desires to solve their weaknesses 
that takes the form of authorizing solutions to these vulnerabilities (in 
laws, decrees, etc..) Public délires, once authorized, serve as a means of 
interpretation by which elites decide what is and what to do about it.
Refl exive: describes the power of actors in social beings to refl ect upon 
events and alter actions and practices to strengthen reproduction and 
maintain autopoesis, the refl ection being both cognitive and emotional; 
i.e., actors think about and feel effects of being.
Regions, macro-: notions referring to structural characteristics of entire 
social beings.
——, meso-: notions referring to actors operating within social beings.
——, micro-: notions referring to structures within actors that operate 
on the actors, who operate in their social being.
Relaxation: movement of a contradiction away from its limits.
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Reproduction: generally, the re-creation of form; specifi cally, the re-cre-
ation of social forms.
——, simple: re-creation of form with no growth; value extracted by 
elites at subsequent times roughly equal to that at at antecedent ones.
——, extended: re-creation of form with growth; value extracted by 
elites at subsequent times exceeds that at antecedent times.
Reproductive fi x: the relaxing of contradictions
Reproductive vulnerability: situations where contradictions have moved 
toward limits, possibly causing reproductive problems.
Shultzian Permission: the granting by security elites of consent to exercise 
violent force to fi x vulnerabilities once they believe nonviolent fi xes have 
failed.
Shape-shifting: transformation of social form.
Social constitution: transformation of hermeneutics into public délires, 
whose implementation results in social forms.
Social form: any structural unit in human being: practices, institutions, 
systems, social beings.
Social refl exivity: how humans achieve autopoeisis by solving hermeneu-
tic puzzles during hermeneutic politics that results in public délires.
String: a series of events where cultural messages have choreographed 
force resources to make the events occur.
Systems: actions articulated into practices that are part of institutions 
connected with other institutions.
Tasks: strings and practices occurring in informal institutions.
Technical culture: learned and shared information about how to achieve 
certain powers. E.g., recipes are part of the technical culture of cooking, 
which is about making the power of different dishes to eat.
Tenet’s Tenet: the tendency of actors in similar positions to have similar 
desires and positional cultures
Windows of authority: the different situations in which an actor has the 
right to exercise force resources.
Worldview: resembles Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Pertains to large 
systems of cultural information where much of the information is taken 
for granted, not contested; for example, the idea in Western culture that 
there are men and women in the world. Worldviews move toward ideolo-
gies when their information becomes contested. In the past it was believed 
women should marry only men. Now this view has become contested and 
is part of ideologies for or against homosexuality.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ACOTA Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
AIOC Anglo Iranian Oil Company (which would become British 
Petroleum)
AMBO Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Corporation
AOPIG African Oil Policy Initiative Group
AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
BP British Petroleum (began as the Anglo Iranian Oil Company)
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
COIN Counterinsurgency warfare
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
CPC Chinese Communist Party
CSI Christian Solidarity International
CSNPD Comité de Sursaut National pour la Paix et le Démocratie
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DOI CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence
ELN National Liberation Army
FAN Forces Armées du Nord
FARC-EP Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Peoples’ Army
FARF Forces Armées pour le République Fédérale
FAT Forces Armées Tchadiennes
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Fedecámaras Federation of Chambers of Commerce—Venezuela
FON freedom of navigation
FROLINAT Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad
FUC United Front for Democratic Change
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GWOT global war against terrorism
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H&K Hill and Knowlton Strategies
HSM Holy Spirit Movement
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IDF Israel Defense Force
INC Iraqi National Congress
IPC Iraqi Petroleum Company
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISG Iraq Study Group
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JFK John F. Kennedy
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command
JSOTF-P Joint Special Operations Task-Force Philippines
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KMT Chinese Nationalist Party—Kuomingtang
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNF–I Multi-National Force—Iraq
MNSTC-I Multinational Security Transition Command—Iraq
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED National Endowment for Democracy
NFAC National Foreign Assessment Center
NFSL National Front for Salvation of Libya
NLA National Liberation Army
NGOs Nongovernmental organizations
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NSA National Security Advisor
NSC National Security Council
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
NVA North Vietnamese Army
NWG Nationalities Working Group
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIG Offi ce of the Inspector General
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPS Offi ce of Special Plans
OSS Offi ce of Strategic Services
PD Presidential Directive
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLF Palestine Liberation Front
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PRC Policy Review Committee
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RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RFC Rally of Democratic Forces
RMA “Revolution in military affairs”
ROK Republic of South Korea
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UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
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INTRODUCTION
A peregrination is a lengthy journey, often slogged on foot. Deadly Con-tradictions is such a journey—a walkabout with a Rousseauian pur-
pose, to understand other worlds to better “know our own.” Moreover, 
the voyage is conducted to help solve two mysteries. The fi rst of these is a 
murder whodunit. The United States is a Great Power, one the New York 
Times has judged to be “the most powerful country ever” (Herbert 2011). 
Since the end of World War II American greatness has repeatedly involved 
the exercise of violent force; which is a way of saying the US has often gone 
to war in other countries and in so doing has killed many. So a fi rst mystery 
to be explored is: Why has the US killed so many people in war?
The second, more general and abstract mystery derives from the intel-
lectual infrastructure erected to address the fi rst. To investigate why the 
US has killed so many in its wars, it was necessary to develop a theory of 
the particular being that is the US, in all its martial fi nery. The theory ad-
vanced is one of global warring in empires. However, this theory was itself 
dependent upon formulation of a research framework concerning how in 
general to analyze human being. This framework is critical structural real-
ism. The second mystery, then, is the puzzle of human being: what it is, 
how it works or does not. Critical structural realism and its application in 
global warring theory suggest a solution to this second mystery. Readers, 
consider yourselves the very best sort of intellectual tourists on an expedi-
tion to solve two mysteries. Consider me your humble guide.
Empires and Modernity
Before describing this journey, I will indulge an aside about why empires, 
imperialism, and modernity play roles in Deadly Contradictions. Dana Priest 
reports that Donald Rumsfeld, when he was George W. Bush’s defense sec-
retary, commissioned a “private study of great empires” (Priest 2004: 30). 
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The study was completed just prior to the US invasion of Iraq. Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s intentions in ordering the study are unclear. Perhaps he and his 
subalterns were curious about how other empires worked and how the US 
compared to them.
A vast number of attempts to understand imperial social forms had been 
made prior to Secretary Rumsfeld’s, beginning in Enlightenment times with 
Edward Gibbons’s The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). Demandt 
(1984) recorded 210 theories to explain Rome’s fall alone. Since 9/11 and 
the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, a deluge of books and articles 
have debated American imperialism.1 Why another text focusing on em-
pires and imperialism?
Throughout the twentieth century, from Hobson (1902) to Lenin (1917) 
to Harvey (2003), scholarly attention has emphasized the economics of im-
perialism—and usefully so, because empire and economic accumulation are 
conjoined. But, as the pages of this text will demonstrate, empires and im-
perialism have equally involved the violence of war, and have done so for a 
very long time. Deadly Contradictions argues that imperial social forms have 
been extremely important since deep in antiquity, and addresses an intellec-
tual black hole in their study by giving the gore of war a theoretical place.
Consider, next, modernity. While debates about modernity may not be 
as old as those concerning imperialism; they are extensive, often vitupri-
tive, and lacking in common sense, with this phrase used in a Peircian 
manner (Peirce 1955: 290–301); meaning that there is little ‘sense’ among 
knowledgeable folk about what modernity might be. Two strands in moder-
nity debates stand out: the fi rst concerns what modernity is and, second, 
whatever it is, has it already passed. Some regard the “is” of modernity as 
a cultural or a conceptual notion. Jonathan Friedman (2008: 9), for ex-
ample, considers modernity “the cultural fi eld of commercial capitalism.” 
I prefer not to view modernity as a cultural phenomenon associated with 
social forms. Rather, it is the reverse: social forms that may be associated 
with certain cultural systems. So framed, “modernity” is a time whose reg-
nant social forms are capitalist ones articulated by governments within 
imperial state structures, plus the cultural notions associated with these 
structures. Modernity has a beginning: around AD 1410 and the Portuguese 
conquest of Ceuta in Morocco, when the rise of European capitalist and 
governmental institutions began. In this optic modernity is European in 
origin, though rapidly spreading to those regarded as others by Europeans. 
Actually, Chapter 2 will argue that modernity retains an organizational 
design from antiquity.
If modernity has a beginning, does it have an end? Here is where post-
modernists come in. For them, modernity passed like a kidney stone from 
the body politic into oblivion somewhere around 1979, the year of publica-
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tion of Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition. It does not take very 
deep research to discover that capitalism and states are still very much with 
us. However, there is reason to believe that the postmodernists may have 
stumbled upon something, so one of the topics explored in Deadly Contra-
dictions is whether these are end times for modernity. With the preceding 
noted, it is time to introduce a metaphor used throughout out the text.
Imagine the United States of America as a recent version of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan. Hereafter, the trope “US Leviathan” will stand for the structure 
that is the US. Picture modernity as the seas in which the Leviathan swims. 
Give this seascape a melodramatic fl ourish by envisioning those seas as 
stormy because of contradictory waves sent roiling by the Leviathan’s own 
prodigious force. Finally, add danger to the melodrama by visualizing the 
tempest as one that might overwhelm and drown the Leviathan, and with 
it other creatures of the sea of modernity. In this sense, the book’s per-
egrination is an excursion from the highlands where the US Leviathan 
is theoretically modeled, to the sea, where it is observed sailing the tur-
bulent waters of modernity. Next, readers, I provide the itinerary of your 
peregrination.
The Itinerary
In the highlands, at the beginning of the theoretical section, chapter 1 
formulates the text’s approach to contemporary warfare. The chapter is 
divided into two parts. The fi rst develops a critical structural realism; the 
second formulates global warring theory. The chapter’s goal is to defi ne the 
basic concepts of the approach and, in some cases, to reconceptualize them 
in order to better address the fact that humans are constantly in motion 
and that those motions occur on an extraordinarily complex, intercon-
nected globe.2
I formally introduce the notion of the “social being” to replace concepts 
of society. The idea is that human social forms are not static structures, but 
open, refl exive, autopoetic beings in continual motion—now/here, then/
there—and shape-shifters, changing their organization like the moving 
frames in a fi lm. The US Leviathan is a trope of a variety of imperial social 
being. Social being dynamics are propelled by the interconnected macro-, 
meso-, and microregions of organization, which collaborate to produce 
motion. “Macro-regions” pertain to the entire social being; “meso-regions” 
to individual actors who operate the social being; and “micro-regions” to 
the structures within actors that operate the actors that operate the social 
being. Global warring theory is largely formulated on the basis of macro- 
and meso-concepts that explain the US Leviathan’s dynamics.
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Theories can be usefully thought of as structures composed of concepts 
exhibiting two parts: what is explained, the “explanandum”; and what does 
the explaining, the “explanans.” The explanans is connected with the ex-
planandum because its concepts explain those in the explanandum. Recall 
the fi rst mystery that Deadly Contradictions addresses: Why does the US 
war and kill so many people? The US Leviathan’s wars will be shown to be 
of a type termed global warring. The preceding means that the explanan-
dum of global warring theory is a solution to the fi rst mystery, and an an-
swer to the question of why the US so frequently conducts global warring.
The explanans of the theory can be divided into two interrelated parts: 
one concerning the world actors fi nd themselves in, and the other address-
ing how actors deal with this world. Thus, the fi rst category of concepts 
applies in macro-regions. These notions are about the realities actors in-
habit and include formulations of ideas about force, power, logic, strings, 
contradictions, and reproduction. This is because the actualities in which 
actors reside are those that need to be represented as structures of force 
and power, riven by contradiction and needing to reproduce. The second 
part of the explanans involves concepts in meso-regions that account for 
how actors act upon what is happening to them in their macro-realms. The 
terms employed here might be said to be those of a hermeneutics—not a 
literary hermeneutics like Clifford Geertz’s, but a pragmatic variety. The 
major notions are social refl exivity, hermeneutic puzzles and politics, and 
public délires (elite-instituted desire): actors confront hermeneutic puzzles 
of force, contradiction, and reproduction with social refl exivity that in-
volves them in hermeneutic politics to create public délires.
The actors examined in Deadly Contradictions are in a special category 
of elites—those involved with security, who judge questions of war and 
peace. The concepts of the fi rst part of the explanans are examined to 
explain the state of the structures of force and power in which US security 
elites fi nd themselves. Those of the second part are examined to see how 
those actors, employing a pragmatic hermeneutics, act upon the structures 
of force and power in which they fi nd themselves to, among other things, 
open the gates of global warring hell.
Chapter 2 takes the theoretical tools formulated in the previous chapter 
and applies them to theorizing imperial social beings. In imperial beings, 
which exercise different forms of economic and violent force, readers will 
discover shape-shifting things, Nietzschean “monsters of energy.” Having 
slogged through theoretical highland, the text’s narrative descends to em-
pirical seas to explore the theory’s plausibility.
How might these seas be imagined? One way is to see them as oceans 
of space and time upon which human social forms sail. Different empiri-
cal space/time places are different seas, there being, very broadly, ancient, 
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medieval, and modern seas. Two seas are visited in chapters 3 through 10. 
The fi rst is that of the US Leviathan, roughly from its beginning up to the 
middle of the twentieth century. Here readers learn of the development 
and nature of a New American Empire. The second area reconnoitered is 
the roiling seas of the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-fi rst cen-
turies, when the New American Empire is seen in action doing its global 
warring. Chapter 3 examines the US from its beginnings until the last year 
of World War II to judge how long it has been an imperial social being. 
Chapter 4 investigates the fi ve years from 1945 to 1950. The world in 1945 
was one of daunting international disorder—old empires dying, America 
ascendant. This chapter details the actual institution of the New Ameri-
can Empire. Of course, it is not easy being an empire. In chapter 5 the ar-
gument travels to observe the disordering contradictions that have vexed 
the empire since World War II, provoking reproductive vulnerabilities and 
with them hermeneutic puzzles about how to plot an imperial course in 
turbulent seas. The chapter identifi es two general types of political and 
economic contradictions provoking reproductive vulnerabilities.
The argument in the next fi ve chapters travels to the violent places of 
US global warring. The discussion reveals the role of contradiction and 
reproductive vulnerabilities, showing how security elites wrestle with the 
hermeneutic puzzles and politics provoked by these vulnerabilities. The 
fi ghting considered is more than the conventional confl icts where the 
US overtly and directly sends troops into combat with enemies. The New 
American Empire has been a sly Leviathan, fi ghting covertly and indirectly 
by sending other countries’ boys off to fi ght and die for it.
Chapter 6 examines US global warring between 1950 and 1974. The 
chapter includes an overview of the wars of this period, as well as fi ve in-
depth examinations of important deadly quarrels: the Korean War, the Iran 
Coup, the Guatemalan Coup, Cuba and the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and the 
Vietnam War. Chapter 7 analyzes US global warring from 1975 until 1989. 
It documents a time of change, especially in the contradictions troubling 
the empire. In light of these changing contradictions, the chapter investi-
gates US global warring in Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet invasion; 
in the Iran-Iraq War through the 1980s; and in Libya, also in the 1980s.
Chapter 8 reports on a coalescing and intensifi cation of contradictions 
facing the US Leviathan after 1990 that resulted in a perfect storm of 
contradiction. Chapters 9 and 10 document how US global warring, or 
preparation for such warring, spread after 1990 to become world warring 
in sixteen violent places in fi ve theaters in the Middle East, Central Asia, 
Africa, Latin American, and the Pacifi c. For each case of hostilities, it is 
argued that imperial America sought to violently fi x the vulnerabilities 
provoked by the storm of contradictions.
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Finally, at journey’s end, chapter 11 looks back to judge whether the 
perigrination has offered solutions to the two mysteries that were the rea-
son for the trip in the fi rst place.
Time and Technique
The time analyzed in the book and the techniques used to study it deserve 
comment. Fernand Braudel, in his classic The Mediterranean ([1949] 1972), 
proposed that there have been different varieties of time that scholars can 
explore—specifi cally, three different “planes”: la longue durée, l’histoire so-
ciale, and l’histoire événementielle (Braudel 1972: 20–21). The longue durée 
was “the slow unfolding of structural realities,” “whose passage is almost 
imperceptible” (Braudel 1972: 23, 20). L’histoire sociale was “the history of 
groups and groupings” (Braudel 1972: 20), whereas l’histoire événementielle 
was “brief, rapid, nervous fl uctuations,” “individal time,” and the “history 
of events” (Braudel 1972: 21). Two sorts of criteria distinguished Braudel’s 
temporal planes: they involved short or long time periods (i.e., l’histoire 
événementielle versus la longue durée); and the actors in the planes could 
be structures or individuals (i.e., la longue durée and l’histoire sociale versus 
l’histoire événementielle.) Two questions arise about this conceptualization. 
Why, if there were long and short temporal planes, was there no medium 
plane? And when was the object of study in temporal planes likely to be 
that of individuals, or likely to be that of structures?
To address these questions, one might suggest that history can be studied 
in terms of seas of space and time that may have short, medium, and long 
time-frames. “Short time-frames” very roughly correspond to Braudel’s 
l’histoire événementielle. They are “moments” of time, occurring briefl y, last-
ing from weeks to a few years. Ethnographers often work in such stretches. 
Scholars of the Manchester School—one thinks of Gluckman’s (1958) fi ne 
study of the opening of a bridge in Zululand or Victor Turner’s (1957) “so-
cial dramas”—were masters of short time-frame ethnographies. Individu-
als are easily observable in the moment. However, short time-frames are so 
short that it is diffi cult to observe structural trends.
“Medium time-frames” have no real Braudelian correspondence. They 
are periods of decades to a century or so that have within them different 
“moments.” They have normally been studied by historians or historically 
inclined social thinkers, and are long enough to allow structural trends 
to be distinguished, though generally not so long that the results of those 
trends can be known. Because structural trends are observable in medium 
time-frame studies, it is possible to analyze how individuals react to them. 
Even though Braudel did not conceptualize a medium time-frame, his 
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two-volume The Mediterrean is actually such a study of the time of King 
Philip II of Spain (1527–1598). Walter LaFeber’s The New Empire (1963) 
is a classic medium time-frame account of the rise of US capitalism and 
empire between 1860 and 1898; while Arthur Schlesinger’s The Crisis of 
the Old Order (1957) is an equally distinguished account of how that cap-
italism got into trouble between 1919 and 1933. All in all, studies over 
medium time-frames are “teasers,” in that they indicate the direction in 
which the story is going but do not actually reveal its ending because it has 
not yet occurred.
“Long time-frames” correspond approximately to Braudel’s la longue 
durée and l’histoire sociale (if observed over centuries). They extend over 
grand time periods—veritable spatiotemporal oceans—in which structural 
trends have begun, matured, and fi nished; and they are composed of the 
medium time-frames that are themselves composed of different moments 
in short time-frames. Long time-frame researches have typically been the 
domain of historians or archeologists. Nineteenth-century evolutionary 
anthropologists such as Lewis Henry Morgan (1877) and E.B. Tylor (1871), 
as well as mid–twentieth-century neo-evolutionists like Leslie White 
(1959) and Julian Steward (1963), conducted long time-frame researchs. 
More recently, Eric Wolf’s (1982) Europe and the People without History and 
R. Brian Ferguson’s (1995) Yanomami Warfare each offer long time-frame 
narratives of the entire world and of that of the Yanomami during moder-
nity. Long time-frame studies often emphasize structural change, as times 
are so great that individual actions become lost in a fog of the past. How-
ever, where individual data is still available it can be interesting to analyze 
individuals’ responses to structural transformation. Long time-frames can 
be a gratifying fi eld of study because they contain the “end of the story” 
both for structures and the persons who compose them.
Deadly Contradictions, though it sketches the entire history of the Amer-
ican polity, is concentrated in a medium time-frame—the moments of the 
US Leviathan between 1945 and 2014. This period might be envisioned as 
part of the epoch of late modernity, and its examination might be thought 
of as providing clues as to how the story of modernity might end. Anal-
ysis begins in 1945 because a series of changes that were instituted that 
year transformed the Old into the New American Empire. It terminated 
in 2014, by which time President Obama had announced that US military 
strategy “will … move away from large-scale ground warfare that has dom-
inated the post-9/11 era” (Pilkington 2012), leaving many to wonder: what 
comes next?
Research for Deadly Contradictions was conducted partially through par-
ticipant observation and primarily through examination of primary and 
secondary written material. Bronislav Malinowski’s guidance as to what 
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constituted proper data analysis is helpful in grasping how both partici-
pant observation and written material were analyzed. In Argonauts of the 
Western Pacifi c, he insisted that “acceptable Ethnographic work” should 
consist of observations of “the totality of all social, cultural, and psycho-
logical aspects of the community” (1922: xvi). He wanted data on the 
“totality” of a community because its different parts were “so interwoven 
that one” cannot be “understood without taking into consideration all the 
others” (ibid.). This codifi cation of the “acceptable” in fi eldwork became 
the ethnographic standard, though different schools have gathered varying 
amounts of cultural and social information.
It is certainly important to know how things “fi t together.” Of course, 
things that fi t together are continually in motion in particular directions. 
Things change, and observationally ignoring this fact leads to epistemic 
holes. Knowledge of change requires data analysis that reveals what is con-
nected with what else, but also discloses what came before in some space at 
some time, what will come subsequently in some space at some time, and 
how the subsequents and antecedents are connected. As much as possible, 
Deadly Contradictions has sought such analysis.
One sort of ethnographic experience has been very useful for the par-
ticular concerns of Deadly Contradictions. As a consultant for the United 
States Agency for International Development (1973–1993), I have known 
an assortment of US government offi cials—diplomats, soldiers, admin-
istrators. These mid-level operatives (who were mostly men) gave me a 
“feel” for the offi cials who man (and now woman) the ship of state.
Primary and secondary written information was gathered at libraries or 
from the Internet. The Internet has been a remarkable resource. First of 
all, it holds an extraordinary amount of material. It has allowed people 
who might otherwise have been voiceless to publish on the web, where it 
is globally available to almost everyone. Often their data is the most up-
to-date account of events. Additionally, a surprising amount of material 
available online—some from formerly secret sources like the CIA—con-
cerns the thoughts and actions of elites responsible for the US government 
and economy.
The cases of US global warring analyzed in the text are not derived from 
random sampling. Such sampling is currently not possible—fi rst because 
so much US military intervention has been covert and is not known; and 
second because, as discussed later in the text, I do not believe the US mil-
itary establishment actually knows how many hostilities it has engaged in. 
Thus, exactly what universe should be used as a basis for sampling remains 
unclear. However, the cases analyzed in the text are representative of the 
type of warring that occurred in each time period investigated.
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Readers are no doubt aware that the material used to warrant the the-
oretical views in this text, and for that matter in any text, comes from 
people with particular biases, including myself. However, not all prejudices 
are equal. I am acutely aware that if the information supporting Deadly 
Contradiction’s arguments is tendentious, then it conclusions will be re-
jected. One of my biases, then, is to base arguments as much as possible 
on evidence that is as reliable as possible. Certain areas discussed, espe-
cially those concerning recent hostilities like those in Iraq or Syria, are 
emotional minefi elds of confl icting opinion and hidden action. Given this 
actuality, I have sought whenever possible to make information bias known 
and to express any opposing views. It is time to begin the peregrination by 
climbing to the theoretical highlands to build a critical structural realism 
and global warring theory.
Notes
1. Harvey (2003: 225–226) provides references to literature concerning contemporary 
imperialism.
2. Deadly Contradictions’ concepts are abstract and general and, consequently, sometimes 
hard to fathom. My rhetorical mentor has been the early novelist Daniel Defoe, who encour-
aged a “plain style.” A glossary of important terms is included in this volume. When concepts 
are fi rst defi ned they are placed in quotation marks.
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A Critical Structural Realist Approach
A traveler on a journey needs a map to tell her or him where to go. A scientifi c traveler’s map is a theory, which tells her or him where to go 
to fi nd the evidence that supports the theory. Of course, mapmakers know 
there are different methods of making maps, just as theoreticians recognize 
diverse approaches (paradigms or problematics) for constructing theories. 
This chapter has two parts. The fi rst presents critical structural realism, 
an approach to formulating theory. The second then applies this approach 
to construct global warring theory, which accounts for the New American 
Empire’s propensity for belligerence. Crucial to the chapter’s intellectual 
work is the conceptualization of human being in terms of structure and 
contradiction, with these latter terms reconceptualized in terms of force 
and power.
Critical Structural Realism
In the early 1970s, Clifford Geertz (1973: 20) suggested that the heart 
of anthropology should be “ethnographic description.” Actually, anthro-
pological research had utilized such description since Franz Boas, though 
Boas was careful to encourage the use of other techniques, especially those 
permitting observation of vast areas over long times. US archeology origi-
nated for this reason. But by the mid 1980s, the infl uential Writing Culture 
crew (Clifford and Marcus 1986) had taken Geertz’s suggestion to heart, 
banishing from the discipline anything that was not ethnographic and 
further decreeing, “Ethnographic writings can properly be called fi ctions” 
(1986: 6). Then, nearly two decades after the publication of Writing Cul-
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ture, Marcus (2002: 3) noticed something alarming: ethnographies were 
“objects of aestheticism and often summary judgment and evaluation” that 
were “judged quickly,” used “to establish reputation, and, then … often 
forgotten.” An intellectual discipline whose major production is “often 
forgotten” is itself in danger of extinction. In what follows, the goal is not 
to eliminate ethnography but to suggest an additional, more epistemically 
robust and ontologically macroscopic anthropology based upon critical 
structural realist foundations to help make anthropology less forgettable.
Realism
Realism is to be distinguished from positivism. Positivism, which occurs 
in several varieties, is a philosophy of science that in Auguste Comte’s 
version holds theology and metaphysics to be imperfect epistemologies, 
compared to science. Deadly Contradictions takes no stand on positivism, 
though it hardly seems promising to insist theology or metaphysics is a 
more promising way of knowing reality than science. Realism is equally 
distinguished from idealism, which holds that being is “dependent upon 
the existence of some mind” (Fetzer and Almeder 1993: 65). Realism is the 
belief that reality, or being (the terms are used interchangeably), is onto-
logically independent of mind (cognitive structures, conceptual schemes, 
etc.). Scientifi c realism—supported by Leplin (1984), Niiniluoto (2002), 
Psillos (2005) and Sokal (2008)—is the view that science has reliable tech-
niques for seeking truth, and that the being explained by scientifi c approx-
imate truths is the real world, as far as it is knowable.1
Realism is of interest due to an ontological underpinning based upon 
the principle of suffi cient reason (PSR). This principle is powerful, contro-
versial, and ancient, with expressions in both non-Western and Western 
thought. PSR assumed its modern, Western form in the work of Spinoza 
and Leibnitz (Pruss 2006). It states: Everything must have a reason or 
cause. If ontology is the study of the nature of reality, then what makes 
the PSR powerful is its conceptual immensity. Everything—all being, all 
reality—must have a cause. What makes the principle controversial is that 
there can be complications in answering the imperative “Prove it.” My own 
support for the PSR comes from the still older principle that ex nihilo, nihil 
fi t (from nothing, comes nothing). Reality is not a universe of nothing: it is 
full of somethings, and if somethings cannot come from nothing, they must 
have come from (i.e., be caused by) something else. This suggests that the 
nature of reality consists in vast structures of somethings connected by 
causality with other somethings, reaching through all places and all times 
in all universes. The task of scholars is to seek the approximate truth of this 
structure of causal couplings. Deadly Contradictions undertakes its journey 
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to explore the structuring of human being. Consider, now, the structure in 
critical structural realism.
Structure, Force, and Power
It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a nec-
essary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the 
energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could 
possibly have resulted from it. (Hume [1739] 2003)
In the quotation above David Hume announced the view that material 
things, including people, are “actuated by a necessary force,” a “cause” 
that has its “effect.” Actually, the Enlightenment-era Hume (1711–1776) 
was restating the older view of Hobbes (1588–1679; in Champlain 1971) 
that human power can be understood as the operation of causality. Un-
derstanding power as causality is a useful way to rethink structuralism as a 
method for analyzing structures as phenomena that are always in motion, 
always dynamic.2 Let us turn to a French Mandarin of structuralism in 
order to formulate this reconceptualization.
As the structural Marxist mandarin Louis Althusser (1970: 36; empha-
sis in original) put it, “The real: it is structured,” in the sense that being, 
including human being, exhibits parts in some relationship to some other 
parts. This is a realist position. The objects of study in such an ontology 
are the realities of different sorts of structures. The structures I am inter-
ested in are not those imagined by the 1940–1960s French structuralists 
that, except in the work of the structural Marxists, ultimately concerned 
structures of the mind.3
Instead, critical structural realism studies “human being.” What is such 
being? Consider the following event, which took place in the American 
West but could have happened anywhere. An elderly couple who had been 
married for more than a half century pulled out of a store’s parking lot onto 
a heavily traveled road. The husband, the driver, did not see that a car was 
bearing down upon them, and there was a collision. When help arrived at 
the scene, they found the dying couple holding hands. In all places and 
in all times, that is what humans do. They hold hands, which is a trope 
for making connections. In this optic, a connection is doing something 
together, even if, as in the case of the elderly couple, it is the last thing 
they do.
“Human being” is a sector of reality—that of humanity, where humans 
reach out to connect with others. Structures are connected parts. They 
may be small and intimate—a dying couple reaching out to hold each 
other’s hands—or vast and impersonal, like transnational corporations’ 
thrusting of their hands into profi t-making in all corners of the globe. In 
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this reality of human being it is force that has the power to make con-
nection. Force and power are discussed at greater length below; for the 
moment, understand “reaching out” as the force that has the effect—the 
power—of “holding hands,” and consider the sorts of connections humans 
make.
A “social form” is any organization of connections in human being. It is 
heuristically understood to include practices, institutions, systems, and so-
cial beings. Persons using their force to do things in some sequence will be 
termed “actors” with regard to the things they do, the powers they create. 
Actors are the atomic parts of social forms. Actors in motion interacting 
with other actors, doing things, achieving particular forces and powers, 
will be understood as “practices” (as in surgical or dental practices). “In-
stitutions” are co-occurring, interrelated practices (as in the institution of 
medicine). “Systems” are actions articulated into practices that are part 
of institutions connected with other institutions (as in political or eco-
nomic systems). “Social beings” are the most complex forms of human be-
ing. They are articulated systems, whose connections may be within or 
between state social forms..
The different social forms in human being are generally “open” in that, 
in some way and at certain times, they interact with other structural units 
in human being, as well as animate and inanimate structures beyond it. 
They are also generally “autopoetic” in the sense that they are capable of 
reproducing and maintaining the social being. Finally, they are “refl exive,” 
that is, capable of refl ecting upon events and altering actions and practices 
in accord with the information provided by refl ection, to effect reproduc-
tion.4 Human refl exivity is social, a point developed further later in the 
chapter.
Agency: Human actors and the structures they operate exhibit agency, 
here understood as a particular human faculty that attains power. Power 
is discussed more fully later; it can be provisionally understood here as 
outcomes, things done. Human power structures are composed of mate-
rial things: people, living objects, and nonliving objects. A rock is a thing. 
In the absence of people it just sits there. Rocks do not plan what to do 
with themselves—to pop in on Granny, or do some shopping. People plan. 
They scheme—as in, “Let’s throw that rock!”—because they have a type 
of structure (the brains) that allows them to do this. Things like rocks lack 
brains and are plotless. Plotting is people’s use of the brain in order to use 
other materialities—people and things—to do something, that is, to have 
powers. Reality consists of things with brains and things without them, and 
it is useful to conceptualize their differences. Agency, a term whose func-
tion is to clarify this difference, is the use of the brain to combine different 
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material objects and humans to create a force that leads to an outcome, a 
power. Brainless objects lack agency.5
Bruno Latour insists that “Objects Too Have Agency” (2005: 63); for 
him, the domain of objects includes nonliving physical ones. Objectively, 
this is questionable (at least regarding the nonliving physical objects): by 
giving such objects agency Latour confl ates them with people, obscuring 
that humans have brains and can plot, whereas nonliving objects lack 
brains and cannot. A conceptualization of being that eliminates existing 
difference is not especially accurate. Critically, Latour confuses infl uence 
with agency. “Infl uence” is a more general term; it is any force that can 
have, or contribute to having, an outcome. Agency is a particular type of 
infl uence: force that involves human plotting to achieve its power.
Humans use their agency in choreographing regular and repeated re-
lationships with other people and things. The key term “choreographing” 
is generalized from its meaning in dance to denote the designing of se-
quences of movements in which motion of objects, including human ob-
jects, is specifi ed in time and space. For example, fi rst I pick up the stone, 
then I throw it. My relationship to the stone is a structure consisting of two 
parts (me and my stone) and might be thought of as a force that has an 
outcome: the power of a stone thrown. Now imagine that I am in some oc-
cupied territory amongst oppressed people. Somebody says, “Throw stones 
at the police.” When this is communicated from one brain to the others, a 
larger structure and force is created, that of a number of people practicing 
stoning the police. Objectively put, “agency” is working of human brains 
to choreograph other actors and their objects together in different spaces, 
doing different things at different times to achieve some force with some 
power. Human agency so understood is a condition of human being.
E-Space, I-Space, and Hobbes: In this ontology of human being composed of 
power structures, there are two structural domains: one based upon struc-
tures found in “E-space” (often termed the objective), including structures 
human and otherwise external to persons; and the other found in struc-
tures observed in “I-space” (alternatively the subjective) including biolog-
ical forms internal to individuals, importantly the nervous system (Reyna 
2002a). Though E- and I-space are indeed two structural domains, these 
domains are something of a monad. This is true because the brain is in the 
body and the body is out and about in the external world of social forms.
Component structures in this monad can be represented by conceptu-
alization of empirical and theoretical realms of analysis. At the “empirical” 
level, structural realities are described in terms of what is observed to hap-
pen, when in time, and where in space. For example, it might be perceived 
that in the summer a builder bought two tons of cement, a ton of bricks, 
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and three workers working forty days to construct a house he sold at three 
hundred thousand dollars in the fall. At the “theoretical” level, more gen-
eral and abstract terms should be induced or deduced from happenings ob-
served on the concrete level. One way this can be done with the previous 
example is to recognize more abstractly that the builder’s action can be ex-
plained in terms of capital and labor investments made to achieve a profi t. 
Concepts regarding large amounts of space and time in E-space of an en-
tire social being are macro-regions; those representing individual actors 
within a social being are meso-regions, and ones concerning what happens 
within individuals’ I-space represent micro-regions. Deadly Contradictions 
is largely interested in how macro-and meso-regions infl uence each other.
E- and I-space monads are organizations of force and power. Now it is 
time to bring Hume’s predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, more fully into the 
picture to present his view of power (Reyna 2001, 2003b). Hobbes (1651) 
saw power as the fl ow of causality in reality, with causes being forces having 
the capacity to produce effects, powers. An important rejection of such 
an approach is said to come from postmodernists, many of whom discard 
causality (Rosenau 1992). However, this was not the case for Michel Fou-
cault, who broke away from Althusser to become essential in creating post-
modernism. He claimed in 1975 that “in fact, power produces” and that 
among other things, “it produces reality” ([1975] 1991: 194). If something 
produces something else, then it can be said to cause it; and power, in 
Foucault’s view, “produces” something vast, “reality.” Foucault’s position 
was shared by the philosopher of science Wesley Salmon (1998: 298), for 
whom causal events “are the means by which structure and order are prop-
agated … from one space-time region … to other times and places.”
Thus, reality is structured (according to Althusser). The structuring is 
the work of causality (according to Hobbes, Hume, Foucault, and Salmon). 
Earlier (Reyna 2002a), I argued that in this ontology relationships can be 
established between cause/effect and force/power. Force (cause) in an 
antecedent time and space has power (effect) in a subsequent time and 
space. This is a fi rst property of causality, one that Hume long ago called 
“constant conjunction” (1739: 657). How is constant conjunction possi-
ble? One answer is that what connects cause to effect is something that 
intervenes between them and has the effect of “producing” (Bunge 1959: 
46–48) the conjunction. The ontological signifi cance of the preceding 
warrants further examination of force and power.
Force
Force, as I use the term, is not necessarily solely physical coercion or vio-
lence; rather, it is employed in a more general sense, as cause. But cause, as 
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I here imagine it, contains within itself those materialities that do the “pro-
ducing” of conjunction, connecting antecedent causes with subsequent ef-
fects.6 These materialities are “force resources”: in causes what connects 
with effects. There are fi ve varieties of resources whose utilizations are “ex-
ercises of force.” The fi rst involves “instruments”—tools, monies (capital), 
technologies, and so on—things individuals have devised that, when used, 
make things happen. The second force resource is “land,” the raw materi-
als that people use when they make things happen. A third force resource 
is “actors,” individuals performing practical or discursive action. “Discur-
sive” action is use of the body to write or speak. “Practical” action is use of 
the body, usually with tools, to get something done. Labor, of course, has 
been a particularly important sort of practical action in economic groups. 
Actors using instruments on land can make things happen, if they have 
the fourth and fi fth force resources, that is, cultural and authoritative re-
sources, which are discussed next.
Culture and Hermeneutic Puzzles
“Culture,” a fourth force resource, involves signs of the times learned and 
shared by people. Such signs are representations of being, or representa-
tions of representations that may or may not be about being. Humans lack-
ing culture may experience reality but they don’t know it, and what they 
do not know they cannot communicate to others. Consider, for example, 
the case of Sarah Palin, the 2008 Republican Vice-Presidential candidate. 
On one occasion in the 2008 campaign,
members of her traveling party met Palin at the Ritz-Carlton near Reagan air-
port, in Pentagon City, Virginia—and found that, although she’d made some 
progress with her memorization and studies, her grasp of rudimentary facts 
and concepts was minimal. Palin couldn’t explain why North and South Korea 
were separate nations. She didn’t know what the Fed did. Asked who attacked 
America on 9/11, she suggested several times that it was Saddam Hussein. And 
asked to identify the enemy that her son would be fi ghting in Iraq, she drew a 
blank. (R. Adams 2010)
The purpose of this example is not to deride Ms. Palin (many people are 
ignorant of lots of cultural information), but to recognize that she did not 
know important aspects of her culture—for example, what the Fed (the 
most important fi nancial institution in the US) does, or who attacked on 
9/11 (it being diffi cult to oppose an enemy if you do not know who it is). 
The problem with not knowing one’s culture, or parts of it, is that one does 
not have information about being—of what is or what to do about it.
A distinction (Reyna 2002a) has been made between “neuronal” 
(I-space) and “discursive” (E-space) culture: the former is “enculturated” 
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(some now prefer “embodied”), that is, learned and stored in cortical mem-
ory networks; and the latter externalized, contained in speech or writing. 
Further, “perceptual” is distinct from “procedural” forms of neuronal and 
discursive culture, the former being information about what is and the lat-
ter being information about what to do about it. Cultural signs are assembled 
to provide information that contains messages. Cultural messages contain 
both perceptual and procedural cultural meaning, and may be widespread 
and enduring, or restricted and fl eeting in populations. In the Trobriands, 
the interpretation of a certain necklace as a soulava was a perceptual cul-
tural message; giving it away in the kula for a mwali armband was a pro-
cedural cultural message. In the US, a diagnosis is a perceptual message; 
a treatment is a procedural one. The term desire needs to be introduced 
because it is closely related to culture.
In Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing, a comedy of errors whose 
protagonists get swept away by their feelings, Benedick, one of the play’s 
main characters, explains: “for man is but a giddy thing, and this is my con-
clusion” (1623). Right on, Benedick! Humans are not rational but giddy, for 
a neuroscientifi c reason.7 The invention of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging enabled observation of the interconnection between cognition 
and emotion. Damasio (1994) and Rolls (2013) provide an introduction 
to research on this topic. Two conclusions might be drawn from it. The 
fi rst is that human behavior does not arise solely from the neural networks 
that perform inductive or deductive calculation: emotional networks are 
always there too. Accordingly, “cognition and emotion are effectively inte-
grated in the brain” (Pessoa 2009). This means that what a person intends 
to do is associated with some affect about doing it. Action, in this sense, is 
not so much rational as giddy. I term this fl ow along neuronal networks of 
cognition and affect “desire” (Reyna 2002a).8 Elsewhere I have termed the 
particular structure of neuronal networks that produce desire and action 
a “cultural neurohermeneutic system” (Reyna 2002a, 2006, 2012, 2014).
Because humans are subject to desire, they do not so much “make deci-
sions” as go with the fl ow. This is because actions are the result of the fl ow 
in the cultural neurohermeneutic system of affective and cognitive infor-
mation along neural and hormonal networks that eventually stream into 
the motor cortex, whose transmissions move body parts, thereby making 
actions. Such transmissions, I believe, are accurately depicted as a giddy 
fl ow of desire. Consequently, perceptual and procedural culture normally 
tells you not only what is, but what you feel about it. See a big, furry thing, 
perceive it as a “lion”; proceed to run away, feeling really scared. Cultural 
hermeneutics, in this sense, does not understand only the perceptual and 
procedural meanings of cultural terms, but equally their affective valence. 
Consider, next, different varieties of cultural messages.
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Three Types of Cultural Messages: Heuristically, three sorts of messages can 
be identifi ed: technical, ideological, and world-view. These are distinct in 
terms of their scope, the social positions of those holding them, the com-
bination of perceptual and procedural cultural messages they contain, the 
desires these nurture, and the degree to which their messages are likely 
to be contested or taken for granted. “Technical” messages typically have 
the lowest scope—that is, they are likely to concern the smallest realms of 
being, to be held by relatively few actors in small-sized groups; to contain 
more procedural messages; and not to be taken for granted. Examples of 
technical messages are administrative procedures of businesses or govern-
ment; knowledge about how to perform technical processes (a barber’s 
knowledge of how to cut hair or a surgeon’s knowledge of how to cut bod-
ies). Systems of law tend to be technical messages of broad scope in state 
systems. Technical messages might be thought of as the largely procedural 
messages of people in different social positions, be they barbers, surgeons, 
or lawyers. Actors responsible for implementing technical messages gen-
erally desire to do so. Otherwise they know they might make terrible mis-
takes about which they would feel bad.
“Ideological” messages are those of particular social positions in a popu-
lation, advocating particular views that they desire to be widely accepted. 
Ideologies tend to have both metaphysical and epistemological elements; 
that is, notions about the nature of what is and of how to know what is. 
These elements tend to set actors’ desires by specifying values, what is 
good and bad. Certain nationalist ideologies value “my country, right or 
wrong,” so the adherents of such an ideology desire to support a country no 
matter what it does. Particular ideological messages may vary in their scope 
and in the number of groups espousing them. The anti-abortion ideology 
is of relatively limited scope, as its message is limited to the undesirability 
of abortion. However, it is an ideology favored by those in a fair number 
of social positions, at least in the US. Meanwhile, Marxism, an ideology 
with a vast scope including messages about the nature of natural being, 
economics, and politics, is favored by relatively few, in a small number of 
social positions, in the US. Anti-abortionists believe abortion is an evil, 
and feel really bad about women who have abortions. Ideological messages 
are likely to be contested. Pro-abortionists think anti-abortionists are mis-
directed; neoconservatives are apoplectic about Marxism.
“World view” (or what some might term cultural hegemonic) messages 
are those of the broadest scope. Like ideologies, they tend to make onto-
logical and epistemological claims. They are widely shared by groups in 
different social positions. They may specify procedural detail, but are very 
much about broad perceptual features of being, especially understanding 
of the nature of that being. The sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956: 222), 
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for example, speaking of the 1950s, insisted there was a “military meta-
physic”—a “cast of mind that defi nes international reality as basically mil-
itary”—that was widespread among powerful Americans. “Metaphysic” is 
an older term for “ontology”; hence Mills was advocating that a “military 
ontology” was the basis of the mid twentieth-century US world view, at 
least among those in powerful positions.
Equally, world views are concerned to stipulate what is valuable in a so-
cial form and should constitute its desires, as well as specify the reverse. In 
the American military world view, being is about winning and losing, you 
desire to win, and winning is a martial matter. World view messages often 
have powerful emotional meaning. For example, Americans with the mili-
tary world view feel terrible about planning not to win a war. Often, though 
not invariably, world view messages are so strongly believed that they are 
taken for granted. For example, every modernist knows there are “people” 
and “animals” in the world. However, the Mundurucu, a people of Bra-
zil’s Xingu River Basin described by Robert Murphy, had a different world 
view. Mundurucu believed there were “Mundurucu” and “pariwat”—hunt-
able creatures, including animals as well as other humans who were not 
Mundurucu (Murphy 1960). It should be understood that the boundary 
between large ideologies and world views is not entirely clear. Are science 
and liberalism ideologies, or are they world views?
Finally, social forms seeking widespread powers in social beings possess 
and propagate world views and/or ideologies favorable to their positional 
cultures. For example, I will show how certain powerful actors used the 
economic crises that started in the 1970s to formulate a neoliberal ideol-
ogy whose perceptual and procedural cultural messages infl uenced people 
in various social positions to perceive and act on these crises in ways that 
contributed to the economic power of actors in the position of fi nancial 
elites (Duménil and Lévy 2004: 17). Five cautions need to be recognized 
concerning these different types of cultural messages.
The Five Cautions: First, the messages in technical, ideological, and world-
view culture are not invariably consistent. For example, liberal ideologists 
believe capitalism and equality are great values to strive for, even though 
capitalism, by its very nature, is a system of inequality. Many with an Amer-
ican world view believe they are fi ghting for peace, which if not moronic 
is oxymoronic. Second, different cultural messages are not equally shared. 
Gynecologists know a lot more about women’s genitalia than do math-
ematicians specializing in Boolean algebra. Third, cultural messages are 
not immutable forms of cognitive and affective information. Rather, they 
are variable. For example, the term “reform” sent a progressive ideological 
message in the state of Wisconsin in the early twentieth century, when 
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“Fighting Bob” La Follette was the Republican governor (1901–1906). In 
the early twenty-fi rst century, the Republican governor of Wisconsin, Scott 
Walker, was using the same term to send a reactionary, anti-union message.
Fourth, within their I-space people may enculturate cultural messages 
hailing from different social beings. For example, in Chad some individuals 
with whom I was acquainted had incorporated a fair amount of a particular 
Islamic brotherhood. However, at the same time they retained views about 
witchcraft that originated not in Islam, but from different African groups. 
Further, in their attire they adhered closely to French messages about what 
was à la mode. Dressed like Parisians, they were orthodox Tidjaniya who held 
African ideas about sorcery. These people were hybrids, and the attaching 
of different peoples’ cultural messages in the neuronal culture in a particular 
groups has come to be termed “hybridity” (Canclini 1995). Some have argued 
that hybridity is a “cultural logic” of current globalization (Kraidy 2005). I 
suspect some hybridity is, and has been, widespread in all populations.
Fifth, and most signifi cantly, many people believe their cultural mes-
sages to be true. Some anthropologists have even been heard to insist: “If 
a people believe some cultural item to be true, then it is true.” This over-
simplifi es matters. Thinking something is true does not make it true. Some 
cultural information may be true, but other information may be untrue 
regardless of what the culture bearers happen to think about it. Among 
Malinowski’s Trobrianders, for example, a tokwaybagula was a good farmer, 
and farmers who worked hard and tilled lots of land were awarded this title 
(1922: 60–61). Trobrianders also believed that in the development of a 
newborn, “it is solely and exclusively the mother who builds up the child’s 
body, the man in no way contributing to its formation” (1929: 3), which ig-
nores the role of the father’s DNA during gestation. Franz Boas, especially 
through his study of race, made the analysis of the truth of cultural truths 
a central practice of cultural anthropology.9 Finally, what is so signifi cant 
about cultural messages?
Culture is about force. Sending cultural messages is the sine qua non of 
the choreographing of force resources. This act communicates information 
concerning what to do about what is from certain actors using their discur-
sive culture, to other actors’ neuronal culture in their I-space. Of course, 
“what is” are other force resources of action and tools. Cultural messages 
specify who the actors are, what their tools are, and how to use them, in 
particular exercises of force. A Chadian Arab sees a fi l approaching. He 
yells to a bunch of children, “Fil fi ! Jara, jara!” (There is an elephant! Run, 
run!). Fil is the perceptual culture (an elephant); jara the procedure (run). 
Communication of the Arab’s message, “Fil fi ! Jara, jara!” choreographs 
the children’s action, giving the man agency to have the power of making 
the children run. This example may help to distinguish between the chore-
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ography and exercising of force. Transmission of the cultural message is the 
choreographing of force. The Arab, his choreographing, the children run-
ning from one place at an earlier time to another place at a later time—this 
is the exercise of force. Without cultural force, the other force resources 
cannot be used. But without the other force resources, cultural force is just 
babbling in the wind. The contention that cultural messages make chore-
ography of force resources possible raises an additional question: How is it 
that actors actually come to do their choreography?
One clue to answering this question is to recall Job. Old Testament Job 
suffered a series of disasters, horrendous puzzles to which he sought un-
derstanding. Life out in E-space throws problems at everybody, creating 
series of puzzles that need solving. Hermeneutics is often considered the 
interpretation of the meaning of texts, widely defi ned as everything from 
comic books to what happens to people. Earlier I have indicated that I 
take a cultural neurohermeneutic approach to hermeneutics, where what 
is at issue is not the meaning of texts but how the brain solves the puzzles 
thrown at it by specifying what is happening, how it feels, and what to do 
about it. “Hermenueutic puzzles” are the brain fi guring out how to solve 
the problems thrown at it.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical example. John Ondawain, an actor 
in decline, is ambling down a street in Barcelona, humming to himself: 
“The rain in Spain falls mainly on the plain.” John is ideologically a veg-
etarian. He sees Juan’s Steak House and Conchita’s Vegan Paradise, and 
makes a perceptual cultural interpretation, “two restaurants.” At roughly 
the same time his stomach grumbles. He feels “hunger,” an emotional in-
terpretation. These interpretations construct what is; and by doing so they 
create a puzzle: what to do about what is, or in this instance: Where to eat? 
To solve this puzzle, Mr. Ondawain turns to a hermeneutic.
A “hermeneutic” is a choreographic message from technical culture, 
ideology, world view, or—as will be elaborated later—a public délire. The 
choreographic message involves a “perceptual/procedural pair” that in-
form actors about “what is” and “what to do about it,” thereby forming a 
desire choreographing force resources in space and time. A hermeneutic is 
an artifact of analysis that is discovered when a research observer identifi es 
a perceptual/procedural pair in, say, an ideology. In a vegetarian herme-
neutic, an important perceptual pair is “perceive vegetarian restaurant/
proceed to it.” Remarking Conchita’s restaurant, Mr. Ondawain, choreo-
graphed by his vegetarian hermeneutic, desires to enter Paradise. Actors 
choreograph actors and objects in space and time by solving hermeneutic 
puzzles. In sum, cultural messages help solve hermeneutic puzzles, thereby 
allowing choreography of other force resources to produce powers. It is 
time to discuss the fi fth force resource.
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Authority: “Authoritative” force resources are a particular type of cultural 
resource. They consist of the right, in some way institutionally granted, 
to choreograph specifi c force resources in specifi c perceived situations. 
For example, Henry VIII (1491–1547), the very model of a modern major 
monarch who is said to have executed 72,000 people during his reign (in-
cluding two of his wives), noticed that the monasteries were corrupt (a per-
ceptual cultural judgment). This posed a hermeneutic puzzle to Bluff King 
Hal, as he was called: What should be done about the monasteries? Henry 
authorized their “dissolution” (as king, one of his authoritative resources 
was the right to terminate institutions). This authorization choreographed 
a string of events implemented by Vicar-General Thomas Cromwell, occa-
sionally with resort to violent force, which removed the monasteries from 
church ownership and placed them in private (aristocratic) hands, making 
Bluff King Hal an early-modern privatizer.
Authoritative resources are unequally distributed in contemporary pop-
ulations. Many individuals possess few authoritative resources. A few pos-
sess such resources in vast abundance. The term “window of authority” 
denotes the quantity of force resources to be exercised in the number of 
situations allocated to an actor. Those with lots of authoritative resources 
possess “large” windows; those with little authority have “small” windows. 
Generally, the size of actors’ windows of authority relates positively to the 
level of their positions within an institution: the higher you are, the big-
ger your window. The window of authority held by a janitor in a bank’s 
positional basement is tiny, compared to that of its president up in the 
positional penthouse. Clearly, the larger an actor’s window of authority, 
the greater is that actor’s agency. Now consider the difference between 
constructive and violent force.
Constructive and Violent Force: Constructive and violent forces can be dis-
tinguished in terms of the powers created by force. “Violent” force resources 
are exercised to have the effect of breaking things, the broken things being 
human bodies and material objects. Different police and military institu-
tions are the most common variety of violent force. Equally, force resources 
are sometimes exercised to have the effect of building things. This is “con-
structive” force. Enterprises that make goods and services, parliaments 
that make laws, and schools that make educated people are all examples 
of constructive force. It is tempting to imagine that destructive and con-
structive forces are completely opposed, but this is not invariably the case. 
The family that rears children (an exercise of constructive force) may raise 
them to be soldiers (who exercise violent force). Conversely, sometimes 
violent force is exercised so that constructive force can become possible. 
The thirteen British colonies in North America conducted an insurgency 
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against the English government (1776–1783), an exercise of violent force 
that made possible the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia (1787), 
an exercise of constructive force that resulted in the US constitution. It is 
time now to consider power.
Power
Power is any effects or outcomes of exercises of force. The emphasis on 
“any” is deliberate. Certain renderings of power, famously Parsons’s (1963), 
emphasize goal attainment. Mann (1986: 6) adopted such an understand-
ing when he said that “power is the ability to pursue and attain goals.” 
A goal is the intentional side of desire, and it is certainly true that ac-
tors exercise force intending to do something (i.e., attain goals). However, 
sometimes the something attained was unintended, and to ignore these 
somethings is to condemn a whole category of powers to analytic obliv-
ion. “Intended” powers are effects that were premeditated by actors cho-
reographing the forces that brought on the effects. “Unintended” powers 
are effects that were unplanned by the actors exercising the forces that 
brought on the effects. Wellington’s victory at Waterloo was an intended 
power; Napoleon’s defeat was bitterly unintended.
Kinetic and Potential Powers: It is useful to distinguish between the total 
power social forms may possess and the actual powers they achieve when 
exercising force. The “potential power” of a social form is the total powers 
it is hypothetically capable of, given the total amount of force resources it 
possesses. The “kinetic power” of this social form is the intended powers 
it achieves when it actually exercises certain of its force resources. Clearly, 
the US has enormous potential power, France has less, and Chad the least. 
The relationship between potential and kinetic power is not invariably 
positive. A social being may have great potential power but not be espe-
cially good at exercising force resources to acquire great kinetic power. For 
example, the US certainly has greater potential power than Finland. How-
ever, in a comparative evaluation of the quality of education systems, the 
US ranked seventeenth among developed countries, while Finland ranked 
fi rst (“Best Education” 2012). The US’s kinetic powers in education seem 
less than would be expected, given its overall potential power.
Strings and Logics: It is time to introduce a notion of strings and logics into 
the analysis of power. Strings and logics are the placement in time and 
space of connected kinetic powers. So understood, strings and logics are 
history. History at the empirical level is the discovery of strings. At the the-
oretical level it is the logics of these strings. A “string” is a series of events 
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in space and time where cultural messages choreograph force resources 
to make a series of events occur. An “event” is a particular exercise of 
force that produces a particular power. Humans, then, possess not only the 
power to make events, but the still greater power of linking events together 
in strings. Farming might be thought of as a string. In Event 1, cultural 
messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, a tractor, and a plow) to 
prepare the land, with the power of producing a fi eld ready for cultivation. 
In Event 2, cultural messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, the 
tractor, some seed potatoes, and a planter) to plant the fi eld. In Event 3, 
cultural messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, the tractor, and 
a harrow) to weed the fi eld. In Event 4, cultural messages choreograph 
force resources (the farmer, the tractor, and a potato harvester) to harvest 
the fi eld.
The motion in social forms, it should be recognized, is their strings. In-
dividual strings of actors are “actions.” A number of recurring strings of 
individuals choreographed together in different regions of human activity 
to do something is a “practice.” “Tasks” are strings and practices resulting 
from procedural culture in informal social groups. An “informal” group 
is one whose procedural culture is not especially explicit (i.e., standard-
ized and written). “Operations” are strings and practices resulting from 
authorization by offi cials in formal groups. A “formal” group is one whose 
procedural culture is explicit (i.e., possesses standardized procedures that 
are written). Prior to the 1900s getting married was quite a task among the 
Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1951). Now that many Nuer have joined Protes-
tant churches, getting married can be an onerous operation. The strings 
in co-occurring, interrelated practices may be termed “institutions,” which 
may be formal or informal; strings in interrelated institutions are “systems”; 
those in systems coupled with other systems are “social beings.” These are 
the largest sorts of social beings that humans create, and some of them 
have global reach.
Certain strings follow a logic of social constitution, a term whose use 
here differs slightly from that in Malinowski. In Argonauts a social consti-
tution is “the rules and regulations” of social life (Malinowski 1922: 11). In 
this sense of the term, the American constitution is literally the US Con-
stitution. In Deadly Contradictions the concept is understood differently, 
as a particular type of logic that exercises constructive force to institute 
strings intended to create social order. In Malinowski’s view a social consti-
tution is a fi xed set of rules that organize social forms. As understood here, 
social constitution is not the rules themselves, but the logics that make a 
type of a rule called a public délire. The relationship between the concepts 
of social constitution and public délires is discussed further following the 
discussion of logics.
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“Logics” are abstract accounts of the powers of strings.10 Buying and 
selling involves two strings—those purchasing and those vending. Capital 
accumulation is a logic of buying and selling. A logic of order is one whose 
strings seek to reduce vulnerabilities, especially those that (we shall later 
learn) come from contradictions. A distinction can be made between mul-
tiple and hierarchical logics.
“Multiple” logics occur when the logics of institutions, or systems, oper-
ate to produce more than one power. Families, for example, follow multiple 
logics of sexual reproduction, enculturation, and consumption. Multiple 
logics may also be hierarchical; this generally happens in complicated insti-
tutional settings where numerous institutions’ powers are integrated into 
complex systems. In these situations some logics need to be performed for 
other logics to occur in the system. Logics that are the conditions for the 
performance of other logics are termed “sub-logics.” For example, consider 
a fi rm selling shoes. It needs at least one institution to make the shoes, one 
to get them to shoe stores, and one to advertise the shoes’ fi ne qualities; 
which is to recognize that the fi rm needs to have institutions performing 
production, distribution, and marketing sub-logics to achieve its capitalist 
logic of capital accumulation. The different tasks or operations of different 
strings that exhibit different logics are choreographed by different herme-
neutics in peoples’ technical culture, ideology, or world view to be exercises 
of force that cause certain powers.
Logics may also be distinguished in terms of the extensiveness and den-
sity of their powers. “Power extensiveness” refers to the number of actors 
other actors have power over. Extensive logics are those where some actors 
have power over large numbers of other actors. The US Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), with the power to extract taxes from more or less every 
worker in the country, has extensive power. “Lesser” logics are those where 
some actors have power over small numbers of other actors. Parents in 
families have power over their children and each other, usually fewer than 
ten people. Parents are lesser powers. “Power density” refers to the number 
of powers actors have over other actors. “Dense” logics are those where 
some actors have many powers over other actors. “Sparse” logics are those 
where some actors have few powers over other actors. The IRS can only 
collect taxes. Parents can sleep with each other, educate their children, and 
endlessly guide and discipline them. Thus, though the IRS has far more ex-
tensive power than do families, its power is far sparser. Your local IRS agent 
cannot go to bed with you. Power extensiveness refers to the size of the 
social being, whereas power density refers to the number of powers actors 
have in a social being. The strings considered in this text will largely involve 
different operations. The logics will tend to be multiple and hierarchical, 
involving extensive and dense powers of a particular type of social being.
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This ends the introduction to structuralism. Its empirical scope ranges 
beyond Lilliputian narratives of ethnographic fi ctionalism toward large ac-
counts of social being in all spaces and times. Indeed, the present work, 
consistent with this project, inspects the most powerful social being ever. 
Finally, what is the “critical” in critical structural realism?
The Critical
The form of critical thought I fancy hews closely to that of Max Horkheimer 
(1937) in the Frankfurt School. Critical judgment concerns assessment of 
technical cultures, ideologies, and world views as well as the social beings 
found with them, with an eye to knowing them in order to improve them. 
Without question, such judgment presupposes an ethic: it is good to im-
prove things for all people as much as possible, and it is wicked to improve 
things for only a small number of already privileged individuals. Making 
an ethical evaluation is exacting and a bit like solving a murder mystery. A 
murder has been perpetrated. Nobody knows who did it. There are lots of 
possibilities. The detective’s job is to fi gure out exactly what is the case—
who did it and why—and only then can the accused be brought to judg-
ment. A more general implication of this situation is that if you do not 
know what is happening, you cannot know if it is good or bad. This means 
that the realist practice of truth-seeking is a condition of moral judgment 
because it allows moral referees to know as accurately as possible what is, 
allowing them to judge whether it can be improved. Let us leave the em-
pyrean heights of conceptualization for a closer look at a specifi c instance.
President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 
2009. Remarkably, the lecture he chose to give accepting this honor was a 
justifi cation of war. The president wanted his audience to know: “I face the 
world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American 
people. Make no mistake, evil does exist. A nonviolent movement could 
not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaida’s 
leaders to lay down their arms” (Obama 2009: 1). His general position 
was that US military killing was good because it could “bend history in 
the direction of justice” (ibid.). He was so enthusiastic about the virtue of 
war-making that he urged it upon all states, counseling that “all responsi-
ble nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can 
play to keep the peace” (ibid.). I take Obama’s point—“evil does exist”—
but must raise a question addressed in this book: Who are the evil whose 
practices’ reform will lead to improvement of the human condition?
Having introduced rudiments of a critical structural realist approach, 
this chapter now turns to applying it to constructing a theoretical map 
explaining US warfare.




Since 1945, US warfare has occurred throughout the world. So the the-
oretical map to explain this belligerence is termed global warring theory. 
Elsewhere (2009b), I have argued that Kajsa Ekholm Friedman’s and Jon-
athan Friedman’s perspective is pioneering because for the fi rst time in 
anthropology, it made global social beings, which they term global systems, 
the object of analysis by taking concepts from structural Marxism (orig-
inally used to analyze modes of production) and applying them to social 
forms of global dimensions.11 The social being we are investigating is a 
creature of global dimensions, which explains why the somewhere that 
global warring theory comes from is the one explored by the Friedmans.
The starting point of the Friedmans’ work was a problem with the mode 
of production, specifi cally that production processes were themselves “de-
pendent upon larger reproductive processes” (Friedman 1994: 17) that 
frequently operated beyond particular countries. This meant that social 
reproduction provided the theoretical foundations of global systems the-
ory. In fact, worldwide reproductive processes created “global systems” 
that were “historical systems of shifting accumulation and empire forma-
tion” (Friedman 1978: 43); with imperial reproductive systems vulnerable 
to contradictions, understood “as the limit of functional compatibility be-
tween structures” (Friedman 1998: 48). Consequently, they understood 
“global history” as largely the “history of expansions and contractions of 
hegemonies, not unusually in the form of imperial organization in which 
the military component has been crucial” (James and Friedman 2006: 
xiv–xv). The global warring theory is an addition to global systems theory 
because it explains global warring in terms of reproduction, contradiction, 
and empire, concepts at the base of the Friedmans’ perspective. However, 
it differs from the Friedmans’ in that it starts from a different problem. 
Their theoretical starting point was frailties in the concept of mode of pro-
duction. Global warring theory, consistent with critical structural realism’s 
emphasis on force and power, is concerned with reproductive vulnerabili-
ties due to contradictions.
In order to formulate global warring theory and address the problem of 
contradiction, it is necessary to elucidate the concepts that compose the 
theory.
Global Warring
The fi rst of these terms, “global warring,” is what the theory explains. It 
is strings involving overt or covert, direct or indirect exercise of violent 
force managed by the security elites of an imperial state against a colony, 
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neo-colony, or region of interest someplace else on the globe. A “global 
war” is a particular instance of global warring.12 Global warring is about 
imperial reproduction and occurs when security elites perceive—correctly 
or incorrectly—that violent force is useful to create, maintain, or enlarge 
the imperial state’s dominion, including any and all of its value-accumulat-
ing powers. Global warring may include situations where an imperial state 
conducts a number of global wars simultaneously or near simultaneously. 
A “colony” is a territory formally incorporated into an empire. A “neo-
colony” or a client state is a territory in some way informally incorporated 
into an empire. Global warring is “colonial” where there is formal imperial-
ism and “neocolonial” where there is informal imperialism.
Global warring is like throwing gasoline into a fi re. It is a warfare ac-
celerant that makes small wars bigger, because making global wars moves 
imperial violent force from the core to the colony or neo-colony. A colony 
or client may have X quantity of violent force prior to a global war. Then 
some imperial power moves Y amount of violent force to wage the global 
war, so that there is now X plus Y violent force, and a small war has grown 
bigger. Global warring coming from empires with huge accumulations of 
capital has the power to add enormously to the violent force in a colony 
or neo-colony. When civil war in Chad began in 1966, it was a small local 
confl ict. The Chadian central government had the equivalent of a few 
million dollars per year to spend on fi ghting. I remember one Western dip-
lomat expounding: “The rebels are a thousand kilometers away in Wadai. 
The government has only four trucks in N’Djamena. Two are broken, and 
who knows how much gas they have? How the hell are they going to even 
get there to fi ght them?” When, as readers will learn in Chapter 7, the Rea-
gan administration intervened in this warring in the 1980s, it was reported 
to have injected $100 million, while the French—the US’s neocolonial 
clients—were said to have supplied about $500,000 per day from 1983 to 
1986 (Reyna 2003b). A small local war had become a greater global war 
because the tiny X of the Chadian government’s violent force had been 
enormously augmented by the Y of the imperialists’ violent force.
Some scholars insist that warring only occurs after a certain number are 
killed (Singer and Small 1972). This seems arbitrary. Why is it that 1,000 
rather than 1,001 combat deaths per year separates war from nonwar? If an 
empire operates to exercise violent force that kills any of the enemy, then 
it is warring. Occasionally, practices like raiding or organizing coups are 
not considered warring. But if an empire goes to the trouble of conducting 
raids or coups that kill people, then it is warring. Additional acts of war 
include blockades, embargos, or sanctions that kill not with weapons but 
by denying access to food or medicines. Finally, although some scholars do 
not include covert, indirect confl icts in accounts of warring, the fact that 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 32 –
Deadly Contradictions
killing may be hidden and performed by a proxy does not make it any less a 
war. Consequently, imperial operations of overt and direct as well as covert 
and indirect warring that causes fatalities are classifi ed as global warring.
Imperial operations that prepare for overt and direct or covert and in-
direct combat, but where no fatalities have occurred, will be termed “pre-
liminary global warring.” The building of bases, pre-positioning of supplies, 
and troop movements are forms of preliminary global warring. Imperial op-
erations that in some way support another country’s warring will be called 
“secondary global warring.” Provision of different forms of violent force 
resources—weaponry, intelligence, transportation—is the hallmark of sec-
ondary global warring. This brings us to explication of the concepts needed 
to explain global warring. Discussion begins with contradiction.
Contradictions
And do you know what “the world” is to me? … a play of forces and waves of 
forces, at the same time one and many … a sea of forces, fl owing and rushing 
together … out of the play of contradictions … 
—Nietzsche, Will to Power
‘… crises exist because … contradictions exist’ 
—Marx, Theories of Surplus Value
This section argues that Marx was correct in his understanding of the re-
lationship between contradictions and crisis. However, before making this 
argument, I suggest an approach to contradiction that is infl uenced by 
Nietzsche and compatible with critical structural realism, which concep-
tualizes contradictions as a particular “play of forces.” Why propose such 
a conceptualization?
One reason, a weighty one, is that Marxist dialectics, including the con-
cept of contradiction, are often dismissed as of little utility—a “Hegelian 
monkey,” as Marvin Harris (1968) opined, on the back of rigorous social 
theory. Karl Popper (1940) authored a famous dismissal of Marxian di-
alectics. Jon Elster (1985: 37), a more sympathetic critic who analyzed 
Marx’s different usages of the dialectic, believed Marx dealt with dialectics 
in “vapid terms.” Yet the old monkey hangs in there, especially in a version 
that emphasizes comprehending dialectics in terms of contradictions (e.g., 
Harvey 2014). It does so even in the ruminations of those who might be 
expected to be opposed to it.
For example, Barron Youngsmith (2010: 6), no Marxist he, noted when 
talking about the Soviet collapse in 1989 that it was of course due to “inter-
nal contradictions.” Daniel Bell (1976: 10), another non-Marxist, declared 
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there were “contradictions within society.” Elster (1985: 37) believed that 
of all the different varieties of dialectics Marx employed, only that which 
dealt with social contradiction could be “an important tool for the theory 
of social change.” Structural Marxists who had come to a similar conclu-
sion somewhat earlier than Elster were developing a view of contradiction 
that they believed coincided with “advanced scientifi c practice” (Godelier 
1972: 90). A version of this view forms the basis of the notion of contra-
diction used in this text.
Louis Althusser and Maurice Godelier, important developers of the 
structural Marxist version of contradiction, viewed contradictions as con-
ditions of human structures. Further, Godelier (1972: 90) believed that 
“what causes a contradiction to appear is the appearance of a limit, a 
threshold, to the conditions in which a structure does not change. Beyond 
this limit a change of structure must occur.” From the standpoint being 
formulated, the “structure” Godelier refers to is the social forms discussed 
earlier. Such social forms exercise force. In Nietzsche’s terms such exercises 
are “plays of force” (1885: 12503), but they are a particular type of play 
that moves social forms toward their limits. The concept of limit employed 
here is not from calculus but rather denotes some point, edge, or boundary 
that an action, practice, institution, system, or social being exercising force 
cannot exceed. “Contradictions,” so imagined, are plays of logic whose 
component strings move social forms exercising force toward their “limit 
of functional compatibility” (Friedman 1994: 48), beyond which there is 
disorder. The notion of “incompatibility” refers to the existence of condi-
tions in a structure of force resources where parts that formerly interacted 
in exercises of force to produce powers are less and less able to achieve 
their former power. The parts in a social being are its force resources—
land, action, instruments, and various forms of cultural and authoritative 
choreography—distributed to its component social forms. Parts become 
incompatible when those formally present disappear; when they become 
too few or too many; or when they are altered in a way that makes them 
defective. At the point of incompatibility structures become disordered 
and are therefore obliged to change.
Marx’s analyses of contradictions have been interpreted (Godelier 
1972) as involving emerging incompatibilities during the exercise of forces 
within and between the productive forces and relations of capitalist sys-
tems. Mao Tse Tung (1937) and Althusser (1977) broadened the location 
of contradictions, extending them into political systems. Here, two im-
portant types of contradictions can be distinguished. First are those arising 
within and between political systems, called “political.” Intra-polity con-
tradictions can occur between a central government and different regions, 
or between opposing institutional groups. The former existed in the US 
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prior to 1860, when irreconcilable relations between Washington and the 
South resulted in the Civil War (1860–1865). The latter exist today in the 
US between Tea Party groups that favor policies to eliminate government 
intervention, and liberal groups that support policies involving interven-
tion. Inter-polity contradictions have very often existed between compet-
ing empires, when operations in one empire are incompatible with those 
in others. For example, the Norman Empire’s aspiration to acquire land in 
the Anglo-Saxon Empire in the eleventh century was incompatible with 
the English desire for the same land. Contradiction between empires will 
be termed “inter-imperial.”
The second variety of contradictions, called “economic,” includes those 
that exist within or between economic organizations. Two sorts of eco-
nomic contradictions exist in capitalist systems: “cyclical” ones, where the 
contradiction produces alternation between growth and decline; and “sys-
temic” ones, where the contradiction is such that its intensifi cation threat-
ens the ability of an economic system to reproduce.
When contradictions worsen, moving toward their limits, they “inten-
sify.” They may also worsen because they “coalesce,” which refers to an 
increasing co-occurrence of contradictions.13 Coalescence increases in-
compatibilities by having more strings in more places that hamper each 
other’s operation in different parts of the social being. Such coalescence 
may be so extensive that social being–wide incompatibilities emerge. For 
example, a conundrum of Marxist thought has been to explain why the 
1917 revolution against capitalism came in Czarist Russia, the least cap-
italist of European states. One answer to this puzzle was that Russia was 
a site of an increasing coalescence of contradictions. There were contra-
dictions pertaining to feudalism (between lords and serfs), to capitalism 
(between capital and labor), and to colonialism (between imperial core 
and its colonies) (see Althusser 1977).
Different social beings at roughly the same times may exhibit different 
collections of contradictions. Equally, the same social being at different 
times may have different collections of contradictions. The set of contra-
dictions and their degree of intensifi cation at any moment in a social being 
may be said to be its “concatenation.”
A word about the epistemological status of contradictions: They may be 
said to be representations of incompatible being at different levels of ab-
straction and generality. Macro-contradictions are those at higher realms 
of abstraction and generality in E-space. Meso-contradictions are those at 
lower such realms in E-space. Micro-contradictions, which occur within 
I-space, are not considered in this text. Marx’s contradictions—for exam-
ple, that between labor and capital—are macro-contradictions. Labor and 
capital are abstract notions, each always seeking to extract as much value as 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Global Warring Theory
– 35 –
possible from the other; hence they are in contradiction. Land and capital 
will be shown to be a macro-contradiction in chapter 5. Meso-contradic-
tions may be less abstract and general instances of macro-contradictions. 
For example, in chapter 7 an oil company/petro-state contradiction is 
identifi ed between the enterprises that produce oil and the states in whose 
lands it is found. The oil companies and petro-states each try to accumu-
late as much value from oil as possible, meaning the more value the oil 
company gets, the less the petrostate gets, and vice-versa, which puts the 
two in contradiction. As will be shown, the oil company/petro-state con-
tradiction is a particular instance of the land/capital contradiction.
So, in sum, contradictions are incompatible plays of force whose logic 
is toward disorder. In this sense Marx was absolutely correct: crises exist 
because contradictions provoke disorder. Introducing the notions of repro-
ductive vulnerability and fi xes is a fi rst step to understanding how humans 
respond to crises.
Reproductive Vulnerabilities and Fixes
Reproduction is, generally, re-creation of form, any form. Social reproduc-
tion, the type of reproduction considered in this text, is the re-creation 
of social forms. (Hereafter the term reproduction denotes social reproduc-
tion.) Human reproduction is autopoetic. Certain social forms, or parts of 
social forms, exist to reproduce the larger social whole. Marx ([1867] 1909, 
Chapters 23 and 24), talking about capitalist systems in the fi rst volume of 
Capital, distinguished between “simple” and “extended” reproduction, the 
former being economic operations involving no growth and the latter being 
ones where there is growth. Marx clearly did not see extended reproduction 
as necessarily freeing economic systems from contradictions—indeed, he 
argued, on occasion it intensifi ed contradictions. I understand simple and 
extended reproduction more generally as situations with or without growth 
or growth in any social form. What links contradiction to reproduction?
This question has a one-word answer: sensation. Actors caught in 
storms of contradiction sense something is wrong and, fearing they will 
go down with the ship, desire to relax the storm by fi xing it. A notion of 
a reproductive fi x aids understanding of the relaxing of contradiction, but 
to understand such fi xes one has to know about reproductive vulnerabil-
ities. Though structural-functionalists throughout the twentieth century 
strove to deny it, Marxists knew that social forms got into trouble because 
intensifying contradictions led to problems in reproducing, which eventu-
ally could become disorderly crises. Marx, however, appears to have had 
no word for reproductive diffi culties in general. So when these occur, and 
when actors sense them, I will call such a diffi culty a “vulnerability.” 
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A social being with reproductive vulnerabilities due to contradictions 
is not hermeneutically vulnerable (despite being actually vulnerable) until 
actors in it sense diffi culties. Actors insensitive to diffi culties are herme-
neutically blind. Actors sensing reproductive vulnerabilities tend not to 
interpret them in terms of intensifying contradictions, but to understand 
them in terms of thoughts and feelings in their neuronal cultural memory 
that emerge in their I-space due to the sensations they have of the vulnera-
bilities. For example, certain conservative capitalists dismiss workers in the 
capitalist/proletariat contradiction as “lazy”; whereas some workers dismiss 
capitalists as “rich assholes.”
“Reproductive fi xes”—what actors do about vulnerabilities—are her-
meneutically derived choreographies that actors use to organize force 
resources to fi x vulnerabilities that are sometimes minor and sometimes 
full-blown crises. Fixes applied to large systems in social beings are not one-
off, catch-as-catch-can actions. They are public délires, choreographies 
with authority: policies, programs, laws, administrative pronouncements, 
imperial orders. For example, one fi x for the energy crisis is fracking, a 
procedure authorized by governmental authorities that involves a complex 
technical culture of injecting water under pressure into rock formations so 
they will fracture and release oil or gas trapped within. This leads to a key 
question: How do actors respond to reproductive vulnerabilities and create 
fi xes? The answer is that they get refl exive.
Getting Refl exive
“Getting refl exive” is what an actor does by refl ecting upon sensations of 
reality employing already-existing interpretations of it. When actors get 
refl exive they give social beings the possibility of autopoesis. “Refl ecting” 
reality is the realm of consciousness—the brain thinking about being, 
feeling it—and actors think and feel about reality in terms of their neu-
ronal culture, that is, what is already remembered in their neural tissues 
concerning what to think and feel about being, and what the pre-existing 
interpretations of it are. Reproductive fi xes are choreographies resulting 
from actors refl ecting upon contradictory being, or in other words using 
hermeneutics derived from their positional culture to organize force re-
sources to resolve plights. Such fi xes instituted in some way by elites are 
public délires. Fixes are not invariably formulated once and for all, though 
this may be the case if the fi x works. More often, though, fi xes do not ini-
tially work, or they work only partially.
In such situations actors, especially elite ones, tend to become involved 
in “try-and-try-again” situations, or more accurately, refl ect-and-refl ect-
again situations. Long ago Lewis Henry Morgan ([1877] 1985: 258) ob-
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served that societies solved their needs by attempting and reattempting 
ways of addressing them. He called information gained from such repeated 
attempts “experimental knowledge.” President Franklin Roosevelt was 
certainly aware of this in 1932, as the US suffered the vulnerabilities of the 
Great Depression, when he said: “The country needs, and unless I mistake 
its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. … It is 
common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and 
try another” (in Balz 2008).
Morgan’s experimental knowledge might be rethought in terms of sit-
uational and experimental fi xation. Certain situations occur and reoccur, 
and reoccur again. When this happens, the situation tends to cause peo-
ple to refl ect upon it. Refl ection upon reoccurring events may be said to be 
“situational fi xation.” For example, if you get a toothache that lasts for ten 
minutes and then goes away, you do not think much of it. However, if that 
toothache continues for several days; then it is something you fi xate upon 
and want to do something about. Generally, the more pleasing or painful a 
reoccurring situation, the more you fi xate upon it. “Experimental fi xation” 
is the desire to fi x something upon which actors are situationally fi xated; for 
elites such fi xing amounts to instituting public délires. Generally, the greater 
the vulnerability revealed in situational fi xation, the stronger the experi-
mental fi xation. Different procedures to fi x the same vulnerability are said to 
be different “iterations” of public délires, and actors involved in such events 
are said to be “fi xated.” For example, as chapter 6 will explain, US military 
elites in Vietnam who were experimentally fi xated on their military’s poor 
performance instituted a number of iterations designed to win the confl ict.
No matter how often actors refl ect upon the vulnerability they experi-
ence, fi xes may fail to work because they involve either hermeneutic de-
ception or blindness. “Hermeneutic deception” refers to interpretations of 
situations that are intentionally partially or completely incorrect, causing 
actors to have trouble fi xing problems associated with the situations due to 
erroneous understanding of them. For example, some US politicians inter-
pret the problem of poverty as the result of poor people being lazy, knowing 
full well that this is untrue. An outcome of this hermeneutic deception is 
to recommend reduction of welfare programs, which unsurprisingly does 
not fi x poverty. “Hermeneutic blindness” refers to interpretations that are 
unintentionally incorrect and thus also lead to situations where actors are 
hard put to fi x problems they do not understand. For example, bleeding—
long the reproductive fi x for many illnesses—was a case of hermeneutic 
blindness, because its practitioners were blind to the causes of the diseases. 
Let us proceed to understand how refl exivity is related to reproductive 
fi xes by linking the notion of reproductive vulnerability to hermeneutic 
puzzles and hermeneutic politics.
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Pragmatic Hermeneutics: A “hermeneutic puzzle” arises when actors fi xate 
upon any vulnerability they sense needs fi xing. Some vulnerabilities may 
not rise to the level of contradictions. However, others will develop from 
contradictions, and powerful actors whose windows of authority pertain to 
them will be obliged to address them. Hermeneutic puzzles are ultimately 
in I-space, in the realm of conscious brain.14 They are what actors compre-
hend about contradictions. The nineteenth-century steel industry titan 
Andrew Carnegie may not have known that the 1892 Homestead work 
stoppage was a manifestation of the capitalist/proletariat contradiction, 
but he certainly knew he was vulnerable to a “strike” and faced the puzzle 
of how to end it. An “individual” hermeneutic puzzle is anything an actor 
perceives needs fi xing about her- or himself. Billie, a testosterone-drenched 
teenager, looks in the mirror before his big date with Doreen and compre-
hends a large pimple. The horror! An individual hermeneutic puzzle stares 
him in the face. A “social” hermeneutic puzzle pertains to social forms; it is 
the perception that arises when a particular vulnerability is present due to 
some contradictory situation. Billie, now a stockbroker, looks into the face 
of Doreen, now his secretary, who tells him the stock market has fallen fi ve 
thousand points. Quelle horreur! A social hermeneutic puzzle stares him in 
the face. This leads us to ask how hermeneutic puzzles are solved.
They are solved through politics. “Hermeneutic politics,” generally, are 
struggles between actors, or networks of actors, over the desirability of dif-
ferent interpretations of hermeneutic puzzles. With regard to the privileged, 
they are struggles between elites over what public délires to authorize. Global 
warming, as we shall see later, presents a serious reproductive vulnerability. 
The puzzle of how to resolve this vulnerability has led to experimental fi xa-
tion and a hermeneutic politics dominated on one side by those interested 
in market and on the other by those attracted to government fi xes.
Hermeneutic politics tend to hermetically seal actors on opposing sides 
into particular interpretations. The notion of the hermetic seal, a concept 
related to that of groupthink or group mind, accounts for why collections 
of actors think and act alike. Specifi cally, “hermetic seal” is the operation 
of strings of events choreographed to enter actors’ I-space and make them 
think and feel X, in conjunction with the operation of strings of events 
choreographed to make them ignore not-X. Such strings stimulate desire 
for thinking and feeling X, and loathing for thinking and feeling non-X. So 
for example, in the families of US Republicans, children are taught nice and 
naughty: “It is nice to be a good Republican” and “It is naughty to be a cra-
pulous Democrat.” Consequently, the hermeneutic puzzle of what to be po-
litically for these children is solved; they are sealed into being Republican.
Actors sense the world as their organs of sensation in their I-space rep-
resent it. They interpret their sensations in terms of their neuronal cultural 
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messages. Actors, then, do not generally refl ect upon the world in terms 
of contradiction and reproduction (unless they are Marxists). Rather, they 
refl ect on their sensations in the only terms they can, the cultural mes-
sages of the different hermeneutics of the technical cultures, ideologies, 
and world views into which they have been enculturated. Remember, this 
enculturation is positional, so people in different positions tend to be her-
metically sealed into those positions. A middle-class white cop in Los An-
geles and a poor gangbanger are likely to interpret the hermeneutic puzzle 
of drugs rather differently. Autopoeisis, in sum, involves individual actors 
solving hermeneutic puzzles by employing their cultural neurohermenetic 
systems, and then taking their interpretations into bouts of hermeneutic 
politics that lead to the instituting of public délires.
The interpretation of hermeneutic puzzles leading to hermeneutic pol-
itics that result in public délires is here said to be “social refl exivity,” about 
which three points should be stressed. First, social refl exivity—with its 
production of public délires that are tested and retested, and with different 
iterations of those délires—is a procedure (and not necessarily an espe-
cially accurate one) for producing knowledge of vulnerability-provoking 
realities. Second, the cultural neurohermeneutic system, specifi cally the 
material structures of the brain that sense reality, perceive what it is, and 
decide what to do about it, can be studied according to realist canons of 
neuroscience. Finally, human autopoeisis, being reliant upon social refl ex-
ivity, involves a “pragmatic hermeneutics” in which what is at issue is not 
the meaning of texts, but the effectiveness of practical action.
Clearly, not all actors bring equal powers to pragmatic hermeneutics. 
Contemplating privileged actors with more force resources at their disposal 
leads to a discussion of elites.
Elites as Tip of the Class Spear
C. Wright Mills (1963: 25) observed that “the history of modern society 
may be readily understood as the story of the enlargement and the cen-
tralization of the means of power—in economic, in political and in mili-
tary institutions.” Mills’s “means of power” is our “force resources.” What 
might the persons authorized to determine operations of force resources 
in important institutions be called? Mills (1956: 3–4) understood elites 
to be actors “whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary en-
vironments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make 
decisions having major consequences.” Though I am comfortable with this 
defi nition, which is consistent with critical structural realism’s emphasis 
on force and power, it seems helpful to elaborate on how is it that elites 
come to have “major consequences.” In this optic, “elites” are actors who 
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enjoy substantial agency because they occupy positions authorized to cho-
reograph operation of large amounts of force resources, including those 
resources constituting fi xes to resolve reproductive vulnerabilities. So they 
are the actors with the largest windows of authority in a social being, who 
address major hermeneutic puzzles.
It has been argued that elite and class analysis were opposed (see Higley 
and Pakulski 2009). Certain classic elite thinkers—Pareto (1900), Mosca 
(1897), and Michels (1915)—saw themselves as anti-Marxists, believing 
that actors did not become elites for reasons of class, and that elites gov-
erned society. Others, however, have argued for the convergence of elite 
and class theory (Etzioni-Halevy 1997: xxvi). This is the position adopted 
here: elites are considered to be class actors though the notion of class used 
is broader than that in classical Marxism, which restricts it to only economic 
actors. “Class” relations in the present perspective are those that exist be-
tween actors because of differences in their control of force resources (not 
just Marx’s productive ones). Upper classes control the greatest amount of 
force resources and use this control, among other things, to direct as much 
value as possible to themselves. Elites are those members of the upper class 
whose positions give them authority over the largest amounts of force re-
sources. Lower classes are those with the least control over these resources, 
who struggle for as much value as possible with their lesser force resources.15 
Consequently, classes are in contradiction, and the “elites” who control vast 
amounts of force, are the tips of the upper classes’ spears in class confl ict.
Classic Marxist thought insisted upon a complex relationship between 
class, consciousness, and action. Specifi cally, it held that a class position 
produces class consciousness, which in turn is responsible for class action. 
There is an enormous literature on this topic, a fair portion of it negative. 
Max Weber (1958) warmed liberal hearts with his critique of Marxist class 
analysis. Erik Olin Wright (1997) has presented a skilled Marxian class 
analysis. My understanding of the relationship between class and con-
sciousness is based on the judgment of a CIA chief. George Tenet (2007: 
xxi), the CIA Director during the Clinton and Bush II administrations, 
once quipped, “Where you stand on issues is normally determined by where 
you sit.” Those sitting in the same situation sense similar actualities. These 
will impose on them certain desires, which will be expressed in broadly sim-
ilar positional culture. This, then, is Tenet’s Tenet—the ex-CIA director’s 
recognition that the Marxists were right about class and consciousness.
Apologists for the wealthy often treat class warfare as something re-
stricted to the revolting, meaner masses. Yet, it is the upper classes, sitting 
in their positions controlling most of the forces resources, who conse-
quently have the wherewithal to wage class war. With this in mind, “class 
war” is understood to involve elites exercising force, fi xing reproductive 
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vulnerabilities in ways congenial to their class—especially regarding the 
copious movement of value to themselves, as ordinary people eventually 
come to resist such predations.
Upper classes in contemporary social beings are capitalist elites regu-
lating economic institutions (CEOs, CFOs, UFOs, Vice-Presidents, etc.); 
offi cial elites regulating political institutions (presidents, dictators, minis-
ters, parliamentarians, senior bureaucrats); educational elites (Chancel-
lors, Vice-Chancellors, senior professors) regulating various institutions of 
schooling; cultural elites (religious, museum, and media heads) regulating 
cultural institutions; and, bluntly but accurately, killing elites (generals, 
admirals, chiefs of police) regulating military and police institutions. Elites 
with authority or infl uence over the killing elites control enormous force 
to infl ict violence. Called “security” elites, these latter play a central role 
in the arguments that follow.
Finally, let us remark a category of elites loitering with intent amongst 
other elites in contemporary social beings. These are hermeneuts. Her-
mes was the Greek god who, on winged feet, brought messages from the 
higher gods to lower mortals. “Hermeneuts” are specialized educational 
or cultural elites who bring messages on the winged feet of media from 
the godlike highest elites to illuminate the I-space of others. Hermeneuts 
attach themselves, limpet-like, to these most powerful of elites, from which 
position they bring higher elites’ messages to other lesser elites or to low-
er-class masses. The messages hermeneuts bring are credible because they 
are specialists in producing persuasive communications. Their credibility 
results from their rhetoric or science. “Rhetoric” means that what they 
espouse just feels “true,” the way a piece of fi ction does. “Science” means 
that what they argue appears “true,” because it appears supported by facts.
As rhetoricians or scientists they illuminate the consciousness of oth-
ers. A preacher like Jerry Falwell was for the most part a hermeneut to 
the middling or poorer sort, whose ability to illuminate derived from his 
mastery of “unifying interpretive conventions” governing fundamentalist 
rhetoric (Harding 2000: xi). A military analyst like Albert Wohlstetter was 
a hermeneut to security experts, whose ability to illuminate concerned the 
need to derive “more effective ways” of “using” violent force (Bacevich 
2005: 154) from his manipulation of the interpretive conventions of sci-
ence. Elites produce a particular type of fi x, which is discussed next as the 
narrative returns to the topic of social constitution and public délires.
Social Constitution and Public Délires
So far the fi xing of reproductive vulnerabilities is understood as a conse-
quence of people becoming fi xated and utilizing their hermeneutic selves 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 42 –
Deadly Contradictions
to solve the hermeneutic puzzles posed by their fi xation. When a solution 
has arisen to the level of being generally approved in public discourse, it 
may be termed a public desire. The desires of elites become something else 
called public délires, and it is these that they employ to fi x contradictions. 
Let us fi rst discuss similarities between public desires and délires.
Both are “means of interpretation” helping actors know what to do 
about what is, that is, to choreograph being. This is because both desires 
and délires have their hermeneutics: they contain certain perceptual/pro-
cedural pairs informing actors “what is” and “what to do about it.” Public 
desires and délires do not always correspond, and it is an empirical matter 
to show when the two diverge. Public desires and délires, as means of inter-
pretation, are “focus” prompters.16 Reality is messy. Lots of things happen, 
and what to concentrate upon and when are not clear. Moreover, humans 
confront cluttered reality with a noisy clamor of differing hermeneutics 
from technological, ideological, and world views with often incompatible 
messages. Public desires and délires focus attention on a selected number of 
perceptions and procedures.17
Public délires, to distinguish them from desires, are authorized desires to 
choreograph what elites desire to be done to fi x something. However, their 
implementation normally involves not only elites but also larger numbers 
of ordinary people, called the elite’s “public,” throughout different systems 
in a large social being. Further, elites fortify authorization by allocating 
force resources to implement the desire. Ordinary actors may not want 
elite délires, but want them or not, délires are going to be forced upon them.
Authorization of public délires may take many forms. They may be laws 
voted in by legislatures, administrative decrees from top management in 
business, executive branch orders, dictators’ dictates, the Pope speaking ex 
cathedra, Islamic clerics declaring fatwas. Because elites’ desires are so pow-
erful, they are not simple desires. They are über-desires, authorized choreo-
graphing of many peoples’ desires in conformity with elite desires. They are 
full-blown “frenzies” or, in French, délires.
Elites do two things with public délires: institute them and implement 
them. The institution of a public délire is its social constitution. When elite 
hermeneutic politics occur to understand how the reproductive vulnera-
bilities of contradictions are to be perceived and fi xed, the winner in the 
politics creates the public délire. During droughts in the US, for example, 
local elites sometimes face a contradiction in the use of water: irrigating 
lawns is in contradiction with using water to do other things, such as irri-
gate food crops. If lawns are watered, then agriculture becomes reproduc-
tively vulnerable, posing the hermeneutic puzzle: What to do in times of 
drought? In this situation, social refl exivity oftentimes operates in the town 
council deliberations that lead to the voting in of ordinances regulating 
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the public’s water use. Usually these ordinances enjoin the public from wa-
tering their lawns, and people who do receive a stiff fi ne. Such ordinances 
are public délires. Their hermeneutic is perceptual, in that unlawful water 
use is perceived; then procedural, in that fi nes are imposed upon ordinance 
violators. The voting in of the ordinance is the social constitution of the 
délire, and sending police to enforce rules about citizens’ water use is its 
implementation. What public délires are instituted depends upon who wins 
in hermeneutic politics.
How elites engage in hermeneutic politics and who wins depend upon 
the specifi cs of the social being determining institution of délires. These 
specifi cs vary from case to case and need research to be theorized. How-
ever, it might be noted that in monarchies the sides in the politics might 
be court factions, and the winner might get a royal proclamation. In a 
democracy the sides would likely be different parties or factions within the 
parties, and winning often occurs via elections, legislative votes, and/or ex-
ecutive orders. In a business enterprise the sides might be composed of par-
tisans of different bosses, such as the CEO versus the CFO, and winning 
might be by administrative decree. In contemporary social beings more 
generally, the winning fi x is the one whose partisans persuade the actor or 
actors with the highest authority to institute public délires that theirs is the 
better hermeneutic.
Public délires vary in their scope, ambiguity, and degree of compulsion. 
A délire is low in scope and ambiguity if its perceptual/procedural pair re-
fers to small amounts of social being and does so without vagueness. A 
délire is high in scope and ambiguity if its perceptual/procedural pair refers 
to large amounts of social being in ways that are perceptually or proce-
durally unclear. The degree of compulsion of a public délire is the extent 
to which elites whose windows of responsibility open on the social being 
covered by the délire are obliged to implement its procedures. A law spec-
ifying that a stretch of road will have a speed limit of 30 kilometers per 
hour is a public délire of low scope and ambiguity. The Monroe Doctrine 
(1823), announced during a State of the Union address by President James 
Monroe, forbid European attempts to colonize land or otherwise interfere 
with states in North and South America, and further warned that such in-
terference would be perceived as aggression that the US would eliminate. 
Clearly, the scope of the Monroe Doctrine is vast—European meddling 
in the Western hemisphere. Equally clearly, it contains ambiguity—what 
constitutes “interference” in the New World? Ambiguity allows US gov-
ernmental elites some freedom in judging whether to proceed to elimi-
nate European meddling. For example, nineteenth-century US authorities 
turned a blind eye to the UK’s intervening via heavy investment in certain 
South American countries.
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Immanent in the hermeneutic puzzles and politics just presented is an 
underlying Nietszchean play. Recall from the quotation that opened this 
section that Nietszche, in his posthumous work The Will to Power (2012), 
asked, “And do you know what “the world” is to me?” and responded that 
it was a “play of forces … a sea of forces fl owing and rushing together.” 
Human being is subject to a continual play of forces. The fi rst play is of the 
logic of disorder, marching according to the dictates of contradiction. The 
second play is of the logic of social constitution, counter-marching accord-
ing to niceties of social refl exivity.
It might be appreciated that this play is reactive and iterative. Contra-
dictions strengthen, provoking new social vulnerabilities. Logics of social 
constitution operate. Security elites refl ect, and refl ect again and again, 
fi xated upon hermeneutic puzzles posed by recurring vulnerabilities. Her-
meneutic politics emerge and re-occur, making new iterations of old public 
délires. Actors are jiggled this way and that as new iterations are instituted 
and implemented. All this gives the play of human being a herky-jerky 
quality. Attention turns now to some nasty play: elites getting violent as 
part of the logic of social constitution.
Getting Violent
Neither elites nor anybody else is innately, solely violent. Human biology 
makes people capable of both peaceful cooperation and bloody violence 
(Fry 2006). Actually, up to a point, elites seem a bit like the central char-
acter in Munro Leaf’s classic children’s book The Story of Ferdinand (1936). 
Ferdinand was a big, strong bull, but he did not enjoy fi ghting. He liked to 
sit under a tree, picking the fl owers. Elites, like Ferdinand, enjoy relaxing 
in the shade of privilege, smelling the fl owers of their valuables, and gen-
erally having a swell time. In part this is because raging bulls incur high 
costs and big risks. The bulls running post-9/11 wars are said to have spent 
trillions upon trillions of dollars. Of course, the key risk is that violent bulls 
can lose the family jewels and fi nd themselves without valuables, dead, or 
injured. Normally, there are tried and true peaceful fi xes for reproducing 
elite valuables. Generally, when you go to war, the expenses of violent force 
are added to the expenses needed to acquire valuables. So, to diminish 
risk and cost, elites fi rst try peaceful reproductive fi xes. However, make no 
mistake, elites are not total Ferdinands. They can rage, especially when 
their privilege and valuables appear threatened. When this occurs it is 
time to kill.
Elite violence so understood may be treated as a function of the elimi-
nation of the usual, peaceful ways of reproducing elite classes. Nonviolent 
experimental fi xations are likely to be perceived as faltering when contra-
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dictions intensify and coalesce. This suggests the following relationship 
between elite reproduction and violence: the more security elites produce 
peaceful iterations of reproductive fi xes that miscarry, the more such fi xes 
become perceived as unworkable, and the greater the délire for violent 
fi xes. The intensifi cation and coalescence of contradiction is perceptually 
a situation where different iterations of reproductive fi xes are understood 
to falter, leaving as the alternative violent ones; so, lacking peaceful alter-
natives, what else can they do?
George Shultz (1993: 678), one of President Reagan’s secretaries of 
state, put the matter baldly when commenting on an occasion when the 
Reagan administration resorted to violence: “If nothing else worked, the 
use of force was necessary,” the “force” here being understood to mean vio-
lent force. Let us call this “Shultzian Permission”—the principle that secu-
rity elites will transform themselves into raging bulls, granting themselves 
permission to exercise violent force as a reproductive fi x, when peaceful 
fi xes appear to have failed.18
Shultzian Permission is granted when the actors granting it believe that 
peaceful fi xes have failed, not when this has actually been demonstrated to 
be true. Belief that nonviolent fi xes have been futile is normally established 
through hermeneutic politics, where elites offer varying interpretations of 
attempts at peaceful fi xes. Hermeneutic deception and blindness may op-
erate in the fi xing of belief. For example, on 2 and 4 August 1964, the US 
Navy reported that it had been attacked by the North Vietnamese Navy in 
the Gulf of Tonkin. These attacks, which appear to have been deceptions, 
nonetheless led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (7 August 1964) that au-
thorized President Johnson to enormously escalate global warring in Viet-
nam. The fi ctitious Gulf of Tonkin incident was a hermeneutic deception 
warranting the granting of Shultzian Permission. There may be no formal 
moment when Shultzian Permission is granted; rather, security elites may 
just all come to the same understanding: “We tried peace. Now it is time for 
war.” When a polity enters an ongoing war, Shultzian Permission tends to 
be granted because the fact of hostilities means that nonviolent fi xes have 
failed. So why is global warring likely to occur? This leads us to the theory.
The Theory
Contradiction, reproduction, and global warring are a theoretical system 
because they are joined in a relationship such that alteration in the fi rst 
variable produces alterations in the others: Increased intensity and coales-
cence of contradictions results in more severe reproductive vulnerabili-
ties, which cause global warring. Hermeneutic politics and public délires 
link the fi rst two concepts to the third. They are refl exive concepts in 
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a double sense: fi rst, they involve imperial elites refl ecting upon contra-
dictions in order to create public délires to fi x vulnerabilities provoked by 
the contradictions; second, they involve these same elites in hermeneutic 
politics over whether particular situations can be interpreted as requiring 
implementation of particular public délires. The more peaceful fi xes are 
perceived to fail, the more Shultzian Permission will prevail. War is the 
failure of peace, in this optic. Peace often fails in empires because, as later 
chapters will show, empires are vulnerable to contradiction. So fi nally, the 
telos of global warring theory is forbidding. Lots of people die.
Expressed more formally, the theory consists of six statements:
1.  Intensifi cation and coalescence of an empire’s political and eco-
nomic contradictions increase its reproductive vulnerabilities.
2.  The greater these vulnerabilities, the greater the hermeneutic puz-
zles they pose and the more the hermeneutic politics of imperial 
elites create hermeneutics and public délires whose choreography 
fi xes the vulnerabilities.
3.  Because of the high costs and risks of violent fi xes, initial fi xes are 
likely to be peaceful, but the more there are fi xless peaceful repro-
ductive fi xes, the more the hermeneutic politics of imperial elites 
grant Shultzian Permission to institute public délires that exercise vi-
olent force to achieve the reproductive fi x.
4.  The selection of a particular public délire to implement is aided by a 
hermetic seal favoring that délire.
5.  The instituting of violent public délires turns colonies, neo-colonies, 
or regions of interest into violent places, producing global warring.
6.  When the spatial dimensions of intensifying and coalescing con-
tradictions grow, then the number of violent places throughout the 
globe grows, producing increased incidence of global warring.
It is important to recognize that not all actualities involved in the vi-
olence of global warring are analyzed in the text. Any warring involves a 
number of social beings as opponents in the violence. Consider the ex-
ample of the French and Indian War (1754–1763), when the Iroquois al-
lied with the British against the Hurons, Abenakis, and French. Complete 
analysis requires observation of all the different protagonists in the vio-
lence—a daunting empirical enterprise. This book’s explanatory scope is 
not so ambitious. The concern is rather to understand why the US did the 
violent things it did, and whether this was consistent with the theory of 
global warring. This chapter has formulated the theory of global warring, 
which concerns imperial social beings. It is time now to think theoretically 
about such beings.




1. Reyna (1994) has argued that no better way of knowing reality than science has been 
found, and has suggested ways (2004, 2010) that approximate truth might be found.
2. Regarding causality and power, Hobbes said: “correspondent to cause and effect, are 
power and act” (italics in original, in Champlain 1971: 68). Bourdieu conceptualized structure 
in terms of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97–99). However, rather than call this text 
Bourdieuian, one should note that both Bourdieu and Reyna are Hobbesian.
3. Marshall Sahlins has said the present is an “anti-structural age” (2013). It may be, but 
Bruno Latour (2005) has nonetheless published a book about Reassembling the Social. Con-
cepts like assemblage, network, rhizome, and social machine are ultimately structural ideas.
4. The terms open, autopoetic, and refl exivity come from systems theory (see Luhmann 
1995). Maturana and Varela (1973) introduced the notion of autopoeisis. The refl ection in 
refl exivity involves brain operations of inputting information from external reality and then 
processing it emotively and cognitively.
5. Animals with developed central nervous systems have agency, but to a lesser degree 
than humans.
6. The forces analyzed in the text always involve humans. As such they are “social” as 
opposed to inanimate force. When readers read “force” on a page, it really means social force.
7. Economists have been abandoning the sinking ship of human rationality. For example, 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Nobel Prize winners in economics, recently argued the importance 
of “animal spirits” in economic behavior. 
8. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize desire in Anti-Oedipus (1983). However, the under-
standing of desire in this text is not theirs but comes from neurobiology, which understands 
desire as brain operations producing intention and the feelings associated with intention. 
9. Let us reject one view of culture: that of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). He ar-
ticulated the view that a volk (a “people”) has a single, uniform culture shared by effectively all 
its members (Herder 2002). Precisely put, this means one people, one culture, and (for racists) 
one race. However, recognition of the four attributes of cultural messages discussed in the text 
play havoc with Herderian culture. They indicate it is inaccurate to insist that each people has 
its culture. There is no Trobriand culture and there is certainly no American culture. What 
peoples have is a plethora of changing cultural messages—some technical, some ideological, 
some world view—often hybrid. The consequent recommendation is not to follow the Herder. 
10. Widespread in social thought, the term logic is sometimes ambiguous. As used in this 
text, logic concerns powers: it is an abstract way of representing the powers of strings. Formal 
logic is an argument that goes in a certain direction, the conclusion. In critical structural real-
ism, logic is the direction taken by the powers attained by different strings. E.g., the direction 
taken in the logic of capitalism is capital accumulation.
11. On the left, Ekholm Friedman and Friedman began formulating their global systems 
theory in the 1970s at roughly the same time that Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) was develop-
ing world systems theory. Eric Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History, published in 1983, 
sought to explain the sweep of modern history throughout the globe in terms of Mandel’s 
views on capitalism. David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity (1990) investigated the 
global implications of a post-Fordist capitalism practicing fl exible accumulation while expe-
riencing space-time compression. Globalization became a topic among liberal thinkers in the 
1990s. Thomas Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999) popularized it as a good thing. 
12. Modelski and Morgan (1985) introduced the notion of global war, making it roughly 
equivalent to world war. I prefer the defi nition of the term offered in the text because not all 
global wars are world wars. Paskal (2010) also employed the term, apparently unaware of its 
earlier use. 
13. The notion of the coalescence of contradictions owes something to Althusser. Fol-
lowing Lenin, he spoke of the “fusion” of an “accumulation” of contradictions producing rev-
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olution (1977: 99). It is observed that contradictions often co-occur. When they do, they 
accumulate, which means that problems provoked by each contradiction add to those of every 
other co-occurring contradiction, i.e., they are fused together. This is coalescence, which 
produces a variety of instabilities that may include revolution.
14. The term consciousness is “loaded with fuzzy meanings” in part because although it is 
known that consciousness is the result of brain operations, what these are is not clear (De-
haene 2014: 8). However, the consciousness brain generates sensation, perception, cognition 
and emotion.
15. The text’s approach to class is a broadening of orthodox Marxism, in which class is 
about command over the economic means of production. However, in the present approach 
the means of production are but one sort of force resource capable of producing power. A com-
plete investigation of power requires consideration of all force resources in E-space capable 
of producing powers. Classes in this optic are categories of persons controlling different types 
and amounts of force resources.
16. Symbolic interactionists might observe that public desires and délires “frame” situa-
tions. I agree but emphasize that this framing process takes place as part of a political struggle 
to control interpretation.
17. The notions of public desires and délires resemble Goffman’s (1974: 10) notion of 
frames as “the defi nitions of a situation.” Public desires and délires do defi ne situations, in 
the sense of interpreting them. However, Goffman’s frames tend to be located in “subjective” 
realms (ibid.). Public desires and délires, though they may have been created in I-space, exist 
in E-space as discourse and behavior containing understandings.
18. Other US security elites have articulated the need to seek Shultzian Permission. After 
the Second Gulf War, for example, General Colin Powell (2012: 210) said: “War is never a 
happy solution, but it may be the only solution. We must exhaustively explore other possible 
solutions before we make the choice for war. Every political and diplomatic effort should be 
made to avoid war while achieving your objective.” 




“A Monster of Energy”
I cut their throats like lambs. I cut off their precious lives (as one cuts) a string. 
Like the many waters of a storm, I made (the contents of) their gullets and en-
trails run down upon the wide earth. My prancing steeds harnessed for my rid-
ing, plunged into the streams of their blood as (into) a river. … With the bodies 
of their warriors I fi lled the plain, like grass. (Their) testicles I cut off, and tore 
out their privates like the seeds of cucumbers. (Description of Assyrian Em-
peror Sennacherib’s [704–681 BC] military exploits. In Belibtreu [1991: 11].)
The severed hand on the metal door, the swamp of blood and mud across the 
road, the human brains inside a garage, the incinerated, skeletal remains of an 
Iraqi mother and her three small children in their still-smoldering car. … Two 
missiles from an American jet killed them all—by my estimate, more than 20 
Iraqi civilians, torn to pieces … (Chronicle of civilian deaths following the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, roughly 2,700 years after, but not so far from, the scene 
of Sennacherib’s military triumphs. [Fisk 2003]).
imperialism and empire: A system of domination of states and peoples main-
tained and extended by another state. Imperialism often involves territorial 
expansion but can also imply less direct forms of economic and political domi-
nation. … A consensus among scholars on the precise characteristics of impe-
rial systems has been more elusive. (Calhoun 2002)
Contemplate the above quotations. The chronicler of Assyrian Emperor Sennacherib’s reign recorded that the emperor “tore out’ the “pri-
vates” of his slain foes like “seeds of a cucumber.” A chronicle of civilian 
deaths during US warring in Iraq 2,700 years after Sennacherib’s rule, but 
not so far from it, has children “incinerated, skeletal remains.” Warring, 
with all its violence, is what imperial elites do, from Sennacherib to George 
W. Bush. This chapter offers an understanding of empires and imperialism, 
which, as Calhoun above reports, has been “elusive.”1
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Specifi cally, I propose a critical structural realist approach to empire, 
fi rst by presenting basic components of the term; next by distinguishing 
premodern from modern imperialisms to give readers some idea of the di-
versity of imperial domination; and fi nally, having established some knowl-
edge of imperial variety, helping readers to discover a particular matter 
that has been absent from recent understandings of empires and their im-
perialism. This discovery leads to Friedrich Nietzsche.
Imperialism as a Dynamics of Domination
One reason imperialism is so hard to pin down is that there were, and are, 
many sorts of empires and imperialisms.2 The ancient imperialisms of the 
Assyrians and Romans or the Shang Dynasty in China come to mind, as do 
the medieval imperialisms of the Carolingians in France, the Ottonians in 
Germany, the Plantagenets in Britain and France, as well as the more pow-
erful Ottomans in the Middle East, Moghuls in India, or Yuan and Ming 
Dynasties in China. After AD 1400, the European modern imperialisms 
included the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and 
British Empires, upon which it was said that the sun never set (though it 
did after 1945). Following World War II, a “new” imperialism arose, with 
the US the key example. Let us begin at the beginning.
In roughly BP 6000, no place on the globe was under imperial domina-
tion. People were organized into different forms of bands, tribes, and chief-
doms. By 1900 the entire world was effectively under, or had been under, 
imperial domination. This clearly shows the importance of imperialism in 
the strings of events that twist through human history. Mills, as we saw in 
the last chapter, observed that modernity was about the “enlargement and 
centralization” of economic, political, and military institutions. But it is 
possible to be more precise and suggest that since the invention of the state 
soon after BP 6000, the major power dynamic has been the “enlargement 
and centralization” of force resources in the economic, political, and mil-
itary institutions of different empires. The preceding brings us to a com-
plaint concerning Michel Foucault’s notion of power.
Foucault had it exactly wrong when he said, “Power is everywhere; not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” 
(1990: 93). “Comes from everywhere”—a fi ne thunderbolt of rhetori-
cal melodrama! However, did the gentleman really mean “everywhere”? 
Power may be everywhere, but does he not know that power comes from 
somewhere; that the somewhere is the location of the force resources that 
somebodies in the somewhere control, and that these somebodies are nor-
mally the elites in the economic, political, and military service of imperial 
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states? If one wishes to study the power dynamics of the most powerful so-
cial being in E-space over the last six millennia, one must study the some-
where—the social forms of imperial governance—that are the abode of 
elites with the force to dominate, which brings us to domination and value.
Domination, Force, and Value
There have been different sorts of imperialisms, but all the variants share 
one attribute. All are systems of force and power in which one state has 
the force to achieve the power of “domination,” as Calhoun pointed out, 
over other “states and peoples.” Here “domination” is broadly understood 
as structures where some (dominating) actors or social forms have some 
powers over other (dominated) actors or social forms. This power is far 
from complete, especially in earlier empires, where domination tended to 
be extensive but not especially dense, which is to say that such empires 
tended to dominate relatively large numbers of people in few areas of their 
lives.
In empires, the state is the social form whose operations perform dom-
ination. The state doing the dominating is “imperial.” It is the empire’s 
“core.” States and dominated peoples are the imperial state’s “dominion” 
(or empire). Less dominated states and peoples are said to be on the “pe-
riphery.” Empires tend to have “fused” (Harvey 2003: 23) economic and 
political systems and thus may be termed social beings. Domination is not 
automatic. Agents of domination—elites and their myrmidons—work day 
in and day out in imperial institutions to insure domination. Hence, the 
strings of empire are exercises of force with a specifi c logic aimed at achiev-
ing the power of reproducing domination, raising the question: What gets 
dominated in imperial systems?
In this area matters get elusive. In non-Marxist understandings of the 
term empire what tends to get dominated is the politics. For example, Mi-
chael Doyle (1986: 12) defi nes imperialism as a relationship, formal or 
informal, in which one state controls the “effective sovereignty” of an-
other. Marxist understandings stress the economics of domination (Brewer 
1980). Lenin, for example, insisted that “imperialism is the epoch of fi -
nance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving 
for domination, not for freedom” ([1917] 1963). More generally, Marxist 
understandings of domination stress that it involves the power to extract 
economic value from the dominated and its accumulation by the domina-
tors, imperial elites. As understood here, imperial domination is the ability 
of states to reproduce by exercising force to have power over other states 
or territories; also understood is that one of the most important of these 
powers is that of extracting force resources.
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Monies, assets, and equities possessing use and/or exchange economic 
value are understood as the type of force resource earlier termed instru-
ments. If “use-value” is the needs satisfi ed by a thing and “exchange value” 
is what can acquired for that thing, then it follows that the more that 
value is possessed, the more things can be acquired to satisfy more needs. 
Because economic value can be exchanged for the other forces resources, 
facilitating imperial reproduction, it is an especially attractive instrument 
for imperial elites.
This suggests that imperial dynamics require two systems: economic 
ones based on institutions with force resources that have the power to pro-
duce economic value; and political ones based on institutions with forces 
resources that have the power to ensure that economic extraction is sup-
ported, whether by peaceful or violent means. In the premodern world, 
economic and political institutions were often undifferentiated and cen-
tered on logics that extracted value largely from agricultural enterprise. An 
empire’s elite extracted surplus agricultural labor and products, employing 
different revenue institutions. That very same elite also provided the sup-
port to ensure that revenue extraction proceeded smoothly. The modern 
world witnessed imperial differentiation with the emergence of economic 
elites running capitalist institutions to extract money-value from the eco-
nomic system, supported by and distinct from government elites in state 
regimes in the political system. In this view empires are social beings doing 
domination especially in other countries and other regions, as their elites 
amass force and, with force, power.
Imperial dynamics, then, are about force administration, whose mana-
gerial work can be expressed as follows:
1.  Imperial operations involve logics with the power to produce domi-
nation by states over other states or territories;
2.  Achievement of domination produces extraction of force resources, 
controlled by elites;
3. Extraction of force resources requires prior exercise of force resources;
4.  Thus, imperial dynamics involve the production and reproduction 
of force.
5.  The more the reproduction of force is insuffi cient to produce previ-
ous force levels, the greater the imperial reproductive vulnerability
Imperialism, so comprehended, is the dynamics of empire—the production 
and reproduction of imperial social beings, with elites doing whatever it 
takes to keep them going (simple reproduction) and, when possible, to 
grow them (extended reproduction). 




As already noted, the work of domination is the conduct of exercises of 
force. Two sorts of exercises of force can be distinguished: those that do 
not utilize violence, and those that do. Nonviolent force is likely to achieve 
its intended powers when those to whom the force is applied desire what 
is intended for them, or at least do not oppose it. But when those who are 
to be dominated do not desire what is intended for them, they are likely to 
resist. In such situations, when nonviolent ways of making actors do what 
they resist have failed, violence is the recourse. It works by either eliminat-
ing those resisting domination, or terrorizing them into submission.
Now, if you make something you generally want to keep it, and do with 
it what you want. This suggests a generalization: actors who create value 
normally desire to keep it, exchange it for other valuables, or enlarge it. 
Elites within imperial social beings extract value from those who made it. 
Because what these elites do is take from those who made, they base their 
domination on frustration of the dominateds’ desires. Follow the reason-
ing here: imperial reproduction involves value extraction, threatening the 
desires of the dominated. Frustrated desire is likely to provoke resistance 
against those doing the frustration. Resistance can threaten the domina-
tors’ value extraction, intensifying the dominator/dominated contradiction, 
raising the specter of reproductive vulnerability. This means that empires 
are subject to a fundamental contradiction: a dominator/dominated contra-
diction, where the more value dominators get, the less the dominated get, 
and vice versa. Between empires there is an imperial contradiction, in which 
different empires seek to dominate and extract value from each other. This 
is actually a version of the dominator/dominated contradiction in which the 
social forms doing domination and being dominated are empires.
When imperial elites’ force extraction is threatened, they work to relax 
the dominator/dominated contradiction, sometimes by reducing the ex-
traction, often by devising ideological and world view messages to hermeti-
cally seal the dominated into the view that they really desire the extraction 
of their value, which is a bit like convincing people they really enjoy ex-
traction of their teeth. But if resistance continues, at some point such mes-
sages become unconvincing, and other nonviolent means of reducing their 
vulnerability fail. When this occurs, it is time for imperial elites to become 
raging bulls and violently oblige submission. In order to do this they must 
evolve structures for the exercise of violent force—standing armies, potent 
navies, ferocious weapons, specialized killers to work the weapons. Con-
sequently, imperial social beings may have peaceful institutions of value 
extraction (buying and selling or systems of taxation), and they may have 
peaceful institutions of desire manipulation (religious or other forms of 
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mass media). But if they are to reproduce for any substantial period, they 
must have enduring institutions of violence.
Thus, the basics of imperialism are fi vefold: (1) state domination of 
other states or regions (2) by elites in political and economic institutions 
in the dominating state, so that (3) the political and economic institutions 
of the dominating state reproduce through the extraction of value, (4) cre-
ating a dominator/dominated contradiction that, (5) when intensifi ed and 
resistant to peaceful means of relaxation, requires dominator elites to ex-
ercise violence. In this view of imperialism, violence is not just something 
that happens when you have empires. It is a part of the anatomy of the so-
cial being—what it does some of the time to reproduce. With this in mind, 
let us develop a more complete account of imperial diversity, distinguishing 
the imperialism found in modernity from its premodern predecessors.
Imperial Diversity
When considering modern empires, it is helpful to contrast them with their 
premodern counterparts and then describe their transformation. To do so, 
consider the premodern exemplar of England during the time of Planta-
genet rulers (1154–1485).
Premodern Imperialism and Its Transformation
The Plantagenets began with Henry II, included his sons Richard the 
Lion heart and John Lackland, and died out in the dynastic struggles of 
the Wars of the Roses.3 There was the empire itself, and places beyond it. 
The empire itself consisted of a hierarchy of vassals in reciprocal relations. 
Monarchs invited members of their entourage to swear fealty and gave 
those so swearing a fi ef (a territory) in return; or nobles held fi efs by virtue 
of inheritance. Such nobles (dukes, barons, earls, etc.) were the king’s vas-
sals. Vassals with large fi efdoms created their own vassals by offering fi efs 
from their own lands to favorites from their retinue. At times sub-vassals 
found sub-sub vassals whom they enfi efed. Vassals, sub-vassals, and sub–
sub-vassals owed allegiance and military service to their lords, who in turn 
provided vassals with protection and advancement. The system expanded 
territorially—that is, experienced expanded reproduction—when the 
monarch or some large vassal organized their vassals into armies that were 
used to acquire territory from places not in the empire. Under the Planta-
genets these places were in France or on the Celtic fringes of the British 
Isles, and the resulting empire, at its height under Henry II, included much 
of the current UK and Western France.
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The empire extracted and accumulated force resources in the form of 
goods and labor service deriving from the land. In principle, the monarch 
was the landowner, with his rights of ownership conferred on his vassals. 
Those who farmed the land did so either as free laborers or as serfs bound 
to a particular vassal’s lands. All vassals, by virtue of being landowners, 
were entitled to some portion of the agricultural produce and/or labor of 
the agrarian laborers. Fees paid for the use of a natural resource are a rent. 
Land is a natural resource. The amount of agricultural products or labor 
provided to nobles by an agrarian worker was a rent. Generally, the more 
land a monarch or vassal had, the more agrarian laborers he or she had, 
and the greater the rent that could be accumulated. Crucially, the units 
of government were those that accumulated rent. Political and economic 
systems were undifferentiated.
But this was not the whole story. Premodern empires also had markets 
where goods and services could be exchanged. When a seller received a 
sum of money for a product or service in excess of what it had cost, then 
that seller had made a monetary profi t, that is, had accumulated capital. 
So premodern empires had two forms of value accumulation: rents and 
capital, the former predominating.
However, a reversal of the dominant form of value accumulation be-
gan with Western European imperial expansion in the fi fteenth century. 
At fi rst, when warring overseas, the Portuguese and Spanish attempted to 
transplant their medieval institutions of rent to newly acquired colonies, 
which generally withered. They then, like the Dutch, English, and French 
who followed, increasingly sought to accumulate force from other sources. 
Initially, this was through what Marx ([1867] 1909: 784–866) in Capital 
had termed “primitive accumulation”: the taking of objects with exchange 
value, especially gold and silver, by uneconomic means. Thereafter, force 
was increasingly acquired through trade from the sixteenth through the 
early eighteenth centuries. This time, sometimes called the Mercantilist 
Period, involved an expanding commercial capitalism based on great trad-
ing companies (such as the British East India Company and Dutch East 
India Company).4 This meant a proliferation of nongovernmental enter-
prises whose sole business was capital accumulation, which produced the 
differentiation of the economic from the political system.
The late eighteenth century saw the start of huge amounts of capital 
accumulating via an expanding industrial capitalism and the emergence 
of great industrial empires, especially those of the English, Germans, and 
Japanese.5 Next, as fi rst recognized by Rudolf Hilferding ([1910] 1981), 
emphasized by Lenin ([1917] 1963), and seemingly borne out by recent 
fi nancial history, starting in 1900 increasing quantities of capital were ac-
cumulated by expanding fi nancial enterprises. This meant the economic 
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system was increasingly differentiated into commercial, industrial, and fi -
nancial capitalist branches. In sum, whereas in premodern imperialisms 
elites managed undifferentiated governmental and economic systems that 
extracted force in the form of agrarian rents, their modern replacements di-
rected highly differentiated economic and governmental systems to extract 
force as either commercial, industrial, or, increasingly, fi nancial capital.
There is an implication here that needs to be made explicit. Bruno La-
tour (2012) has written a clever book, We Have Never Been Modern, whose 
title contains its thesis. I think him correct, though for reasons he might 
not recognize. If modernity, as defi ned in the introduction, is a time of 
concatenation of capitalist and state systems; and if these systems are im-
perial; then the human being of modernity is the hurly-burly of empires 
going about their business of force extraction. But, as the reader grasps, the 
history of pre-modernity since the origin of the state has equally been that 
of the vicissitudes of imperialism. So, make no mistake about it, Latour’s 
claim of the non-modernity of modernity is spot on because something 
ancient—empire—is part and parcel of modern states, with their differ-
entiated economic and political systems and their commercial, industrial, 
and fi nancial forms of capitalism. Further, it is helpful to recognize that 
modern imperialism, suffused with antiquity, has had either formal or in-
formal structural alternates.
Formal and Informal Imperialism
The term “formal” was explicitly introduced into social thought by Max 
Weber when he wrote that a “formal organization” is “an association (be-
trieb) with a continuously and rationally operating staff” (1922: 52). By 
“staff” Weber meant the personnel of bureaucratic organizations. By “ra-
tionally” he understood a staff operating according to written governmen-
tal or administrative rules. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953) 
famously distinguished between formal and informal imperialisms. “For-
mal” imperialism concerns making “colonies”: territories with imperial ad-
ministrative staffs governed by executive, legislative, and administrative 
laws incorporating them into the empires’ governance structure as either 
core or colonial offi cials. Gallagher and Robinson developed the notion 
of informal empire based on their interpretation of the UK’s economic 
and political activities in South America during the nineteenth and fi rst 
half of the twentieth century. “Informal” imperialism has perceptively been 
termed the “oblique mode” of empire making (Kiernan 1978: xv)—oblique 
because such imperialism does not directly and formally institute colonies, 
but rather organizes “neo-colonies” (“client states”), that is, territories 
that are not incorporated into core states’ structure but whose political 
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economy is controlled to facilitate cores states’ domination, especially with 
regard to force extraction. This, Gallagher and Robinson observed, was 
exactly how Great Britain dominated nineteenth-century South America.
Formal empire is more transparent than its informal counterpart. Its 
administrative apparatus of domination is out there for everybody to see. 
There are ideological messages that glorify the domination. There is a Co-
lonial Offi ce. There are colonies that say they are colonies, with showy pa-
rades of plainly visible imperial soldiers, police, administrators, capitalists 
or their compradors, judges, missionaries—all colorful, all privileged, all 
dominating, all the time.
Of course, as already observed, formal domination stimulates the de-
sires of the dominated. Many of the dominated loathed their dominators 
and learn from them how to revolt, intensifying the dominator/dominated 
contradiction. Since the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783), the 
contradictions of formal empire have been pretty revolting. Latin Amer-
ica followed the US into revolution throughout the nineteenth century. 
During the fi rst half of the twentieth century much of the rest of the world 
developed nationalist or socialist independence ideologies—some violent 
(Chaliand 1989), others not (such as Gandhi’s Quit India campaign)—
directed against imperial dominators.
Informal empire is opaque. Nobody calls dominated states colonies 
any more. They have their “independence” and “sovereignty.” There is 
no panoply of formal imperial institutions and actors. Imperial elites are 
withdrawn from the colonies, so everyday life appears untouched by their 
meddling. Consequently, a dominated state looks like any state, with its 
particular politics, its own economy, colorful stamps, a nice fl ag, and a 
rousing national anthem. 
However, a closer look reveals them to be “neo-colonies,” a term coined 
by Nkrumah (1966), the fi rst president of Ghana, after he recognized that 
the formal independence graciously being granted by the old imperial pow-
ers in the 1960s was just a new form of the old domination. Some scholars 
prefer the term “client state”; Gavan McCormack (2007), for example, 
has called Japan a client state of the US. Client states or neo-colonies are 
countries in which the imperial core has an enduring interest because the 
country is in some way useful to the core’s reproduction.
As elites well know, no trip would be agreeable without the assistance 
of luggage handlers to manage the baggage over there. When economic 
and political elites, themselves in the core of informal empires, deal with 
client states, these elites may be imagined as a sort of high-class baggage 
handlers. Their job is to handle the “baggage” in dominated countries to 
the satisfaction of the core. Let us call these persons “imperial handlers.” 
In economic systems they are the high executives in business, fi nance, and 
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the media; and in the governmental systems they are senior-level govern-
ment offi cials, ambassadors, and military offi cers. Equally, there are eco-
nomic and political elites in the dominated countries themselves whose 
chore is to assist in this domination. The elites in client states or neo-
colonies who assist imperial handlers in their domination occupy key po-
sitions in the dominated country’s economic and political institutions as 
presidents, prime ministers, generals, and the like. They are termed “sub-
ject” elites, because they are subject to their handlers. Many subject elites 
are “hybrid” actors, a notion discussed in chapter 5. In Afghanistan in the 
summer of 2010, for example, President Hamid Karzai was a subject elite 
supervised by three main handlers—Karl Eikenberry, the US ambassador 
to Kabul; US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard 
Holbrooke; and General David Petreaus, commander of US and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. There is no formal institution of subject elites and 
their handlers in informal empires. Rather, subject-elite/handler networks 
are designed ad hoc to handle each particular situation.
Subject elites tend to receive handsome rewards from their imperial 
handlers. Consider, for example, the case of President Kurman Bakiyev 
(2005–2010), former president of Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia. Bakiyev be-
came something of a US client following the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005 
that brought him to power, in which US involvement was reported (Spen-
cer 2005). Despite competition for Bakiyev’s services from Russians seek-
ing his assistance to re-establish infl uence in their former Central Asian 
territory, the US successfully recruited him because “Washington just 
bought up the Bakiyev family lock stock and barrel” (Bhadrakumar 2010). 
It did this by making “the Bakiyev family … a huge benefi ciary of contracts 
dished out by the Pentagon ostensibly for providing supplies to the US air 
base in Manas near the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek.” Some estimates put “the 
fi gure that the Pentagon awarded last year (2009) to businesses owned by 
members of the Bakiyev family as US$80 million” (ibid.).
Subject elites who rebel against their imperial handlers are punished. 
This was the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam in the 
1950s and early 1960s. The administration of President Kennedy became 
increasingly disenchanted with his ability to prosecute the war against 
North Vietnam. Accordingly, with the support of the CIA, a 1963 coup was 
planned with elements of the South Vietnam military, and Diem was “ter-
minated with extreme prejudice” (the CIA’s euphemism for assassination).
Informal empire became more sustainable in the twentieth century be-
cause of “space-time compression” (Harvey 1990). Economic and govern-
ment elites are now able to communicate instantly and to move various 
forms of economic or violent force rapidly to areas of the world as needed. 
Such a technology increased informal empires’ practicability, as political 
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and economic elites do not have to be there all the time. They can get 
there “just in time.” Increased sustainability made informal empires prefer-
able because they were—and are, as earlier indicated—more nearly invis-
ible and hence less susceptible to rebellion. The world never really knew 
that Saddam Hussein had been something of a US client. Then, when he 
began to act independently, the Bush I regime was able to rush in just in 
time with “shock and awe” to replace him.6 Thus, since the end of World 
War II the lesser visibility of informal empires, conjoined with greater pow-
ers of space-time compression, made them appear more sustainable than 
their formal counterparts. The reconceptualization of imperialism is al-
most complete. Nevertheless, something important requiring emphasis will 
lead us to Nietzsche and a monster.
Nietzsche and a Monster
This world: a monster of energy.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power
What is missing in our understanding of imperialism is the obvious thing. 
Sennacherib went around tearing out the “privates” of his foes in the Mid-
dle East. Twenty-seven centuries later, US imperial generals in the same 
area went around leaving its children “screaming and crying.” Everywhere 
and at all times in empires, according to Burbank and Cooper (2010: 2), 
“Violence and day-to-day coercion were fundamental”, because every-
where and at all times imperialism, as Timothy Parsons (2010: 4) put it, 
involved “a conquering power.” Why?
When the state was invented, as we saw, institutions that specialized in 
infl icting violence were developed in the governmental system. What an 
invention these violent institutions were. They combined large numbers 
of specialized ferocious actors (warriors) and large numbers of violent in-
struments (swords, lances, axes, etc.) with a specialized technical culture 
that conveyed knowledge of how to choreograph violent force resources. 
Armies were born, and a real appreciation emerged: killing people with 
such institutions was an excellent way to acquire valuable force and lots 
of it, even if those who created it did not want to give it up. You attacked 
a people, you defeated them, you took some of their wealth, and you kept 
on taking. If they didn’t give, you killed some more, and then they gave. 
Missing, then, from the understanding of imperialism is recognition of the 
connection between killing and force extraction. The invention of military 
institutions controlled by governmental elites made killing a force resource 
with the power to acquire, maintain, or expand force extraction.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 60 –
Deadly Contradictions
Now Nietzsche enters. Added violent force is an instrument easily com-
bined with other force resources to make added power. Power can be used 
to make more force. More force, more power. There is no social form better 
able to make more force and power than the fused economic and govern-
mental systems of an empire. Of course, force and power get things done 
in social beings, so they are the “energy” that Nietzsche spoke of in the 
quotation that began this section. “This world” is “a monster of energy” 
because empires seek to continually add force and power.
Empires have been around for a long, long time, their imperialisms op-
erating far back into antiquity. And empires do what empires do. Among 
other things, they kill lots and lots of people so that a few elites can control 
enormous value, force, and power. This means we have never really been 
modern. Rather, since invention of the state, human being has been in 
thrall to a social form that is a thing whereby elites dominate everybody 
else. As such, empires might be imagined as monsters of Nietzschian en-
ergy—Leviathans swimming in the seas of human being.
Finally, it has been posited that these Leviathans swim in contradictory 
seas. But does the empire itself, doing what it does, create those contradic-
tions? Are empires social beings that, in constructing themselves, decon-
struct themselves? Deadly Contradictions aims to address this question, and 
will do so by moving from the theoretical highlands guided by the map of 
global warring theory into empirical seas, in order to see whether the US 
Leviathan is observed to do what it is theoretically supposed to do. The 
two chapters in the next section, Plausibility I: The New American Empire, 
argue the plausibility of American empire.
Notes
1. One reason imperial understanding has been “elusive” is that the concept is highly 
contested. Another reason is that imperial phenomena are complex, and defi nitions have 
been opaque.
2. Timothy Parsons (2010) and Burbank and Cooper (2010) have investigated empires 
throughout the globe from ancient to modern times, discussing their emergence, logics, cul-
tures, and confl icts. Darwin (2008) provides an overview of modern empires from 1400 until 
the present. Owen and Sutcliffe (1972), Mommsen (1980), Chilcote (2000), Harvey (2003), 
and Callinicos (2009) are theoretically useful. 
3. A useful overview of Plantagenet England can be found in Prestwich (2005).
4. Wallerstein (1974) insisted that the seventeenth century witnessed the beginning of the 
replacement of imperial systems with that of single world system. This assertion is implausible. 
The rise of European imperialisms over larger and larger spaces of the globe began in the sev-
enteenth century. Different empires were the structural units within and beyond which space 
was globally organized.
5. The degree of capital accumulation in premodern empires is a subject of debate. It is 
true that the great fairs of the thirteenth-century Europe were important mercantile enter-
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prises. It is equally correct that some medieval empires, such as that of the Vikings in the early 
middle ages or the Venetians in the later middle ages, emphasized trade. However, these em-
pires fl ourished due to trade between great empires that themselves were largely based upon 
agrarian rents. Thus, the Viking empire in the east connected Northern Europe to Russia and 
the Middle East, while the Venetian empire was part of a world system that connected the 
Occident with the Orient (Abu-Lughod 1991). 
6. Roger Morris, a National Security Council staff member during the administrations 
of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, wrote that “according to the former Ba’athist leader Hani 
Fkaiki, among party members colluding with the CIA in 1962 and 1963 was Saddam Hussein” 
(in D. Morgan 2003). 
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You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. 
—Jesus, Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5:14–16
For we must consider that we shall be as a city on the hill, the eyes of all people 
on us …
—John Winthrop, ‘A Model of Christian Charity’. 1630
America is a shining city upon a hill whose beacon light guides freedom loving 
people everywhere.
— President Ronald Reagan, ‘Farwell Address’
And thus has suddenly arisen in the World, a new Empire stiled the United 
States of America. 
—William Henry Drayton, 1776, ‘A Charge on the Rise of 
the American Empire’. (In Van Alstyne 1960: 1)
This chapter and the next make the case for US empire, from its very beginning at independence in 1783 up to the present. But our story 
begins much earlier with the Sermon on the Mount, in which Jesus told 
his followers that they were a “light” and a “city set on a hill,” endowing 
them with a holiness. John Winthrop, the fi rst governor of the small Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony, in what amounted to a early form of the tweet, ap-
propriated this sanctity, telling followers on the Arabella, the ship bringing 
them to the New World, that the realm they would build would be “as a 
city on the hill.” That utterance is said to be the beginning of US “excep-
tionalism,” that is, the conviction that America was something sacred that 
emanated the holiness of the Sermon on the Mount. President Reagan, 
a Hollywood entertainer become Washington performer, continued this 
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exceptionalism, confi rming that the country that sprang from John Win-
throp’s colony was indeed a “city upon a hill” whose “beacon light guides 
people.” This chapter and the following address the question, What is this 
American social being that asserts a holiness to “guide”?
In 1776 the Honorable William Henry Drayton, Chief Justice of South 
Carolina, had an idea about this. Even before the fi ghting that would make 
the thirteen colonies a country started, Drayton had decided that they 
were a “suddenly arisen … new Empire.” Later, after the US had been 
around for a few centuries and there was some record bearing upon this 
possibility, the editors of Life, Time, and Fortune magazines in 1942 and 
scholars in their academic tomes (Williams 1959; LaFeber 1963; Kiernan 
1978; Harvey 2003) declared the honorable judge had got it right—the US 
has a “new Empire.” I concur.
But this chapter’s argument is that America was an old, formal empire 
for two-thirds of the nineteenth century and then, in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, experimented with both formal and informal 
empire. To make this argument, let us situate it in the context of debates 
over the US’s imperial status and explore what is meant by shape-shifting.
Empire Deniers and Shape-Shifting Empires
No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American 
sentiment, thought, and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change 
under a tropical sun. They go with the fl ag. (McKinley 1898, in Eland 2004: 1)
We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. (Bush II, 2004 in 
Eland 2004: 1)
US presidents occasionally deny any American empire, sometimes at awk-
ward moments. For example, President McKinley declared that America’s 
“priceless principles” precluded “imperial designs” as the US was invad-
ing and annexing Cuba in 1898. Similarly, President Bush II repeated this 
denial after he invaded Iraq in an attempt to make it into what certainly 
looked like a neo-colony in 2003. Many American political scientists ral-
lied to profess their denial of empire, especially in the 1950s through 2001, 
when they either ignored or rejected the possibility of empire.1 The US, 
they said, was “hegemonic” if it was anything (for a review of hegemony 
literature see Webb and Krasner 1989). States that were hegemonic were 
those that had global “control over raw materials, control over sources of 
capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the produc-
tion of highly valued goods” (Keohane 1984: 32). A hegemonic stability 
theory was proposed, positing that fi nancial and other sorts of stability de-
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pended upon their being a single hegemon (Kindleburger [1973] 1986; 
Keohane 1980). This was the empire deniers’ fi nest moment, because it 
released the US from the opprobrium of being an empire while affi rming 
that it brought global stability. Thank you, American hegemon—“city on 
a hill”—for guiding humanity to peaceful stability.
Since 9/11 and the “city on the hill’s” subsequent belligerence, scholars 
of all political stripes have begun to argue for, or against, the existence of 
US imperialism. Actually, at least one of the central hegemonic theorists 
recognized its possibility even earlier. This was Robert Gilpin (1981: 23), 
who insisted “a theory of international political change must of necessity 
also be a theory of imperialism,” it being understood that any such theory 
included the US. Later on the right-wing historian Niall Ferguson (2003) 
reviewed the case for US hegemony versus empire in the foreign policy 
elites’ preferred journal, Foreign Affairs, and came down on the side of em-
pire. So even though empire denying is an enduring pastime among US 
political hermeneuts, there is reason to explore the legitimacy of such dis-
avowals. The following analysis shows how America was a shape-shifting 
empire from its very beginning. However, prior to making this argument 
the notion of shape-shifting needs exploration.
One black evening in an Arab village in the Chadian bush, we men and 
boys sat in a circle around a glowing charcoal brazier, speaking of hyenas, 
donkeys, dogs, and sorcerers. Feeling frightened in the immensity of the 
dark night, I told how I had heard the hyenas howling late, far out in the 
bush, challenged by the braying of the donkeys at the edge of the village, 
whose braying was answered by the village dogs barking from their places 
guarding the villagers’ thatched huts. “It makes me feel safe,” I announced. 
Old Umar thought a moment, as if weighing the effect of disabusing me 
of my comfort, and answered: “Not safe! The hyenas are close to the vil-
lage. They are sorcerers. Evil things, they shift their shapes from men to 
hyenas. Cut into their stomachs, you will fi nd the rings they wore as men.” 
Donkeys braying and dogs barking were not sounds of reassurance but 
warnings of shape-shifting evil lurking in the darkness. “Shape-shifting,” 
the transformation of social form, is frightening when something becomes 
something else again.
Shifting from sorcerers to states, recall that the historian Walter Nugent 
(2008: xv), in his Habits of Empire, concluded that America “has always 
been an imperial nation, and [remains] so, but the shape of empire has 
shifted over time.” A curious amalgamation: America and hyenas, both 
shape-shifters, with the US shifting to different structural varieties of em-
pire. Nugent (2008: viii) distinguished three shapes of empire: old, new, 
and old/new. His “old” empires are what we earlier termed formal ones; his 
“new” ones were called informal.
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Formal empire, according to Nugent, occurred in the years between the 
founding of the US (1783) and the acquisition of Alaska (1867). It was 
a continental empire from the Atlantic to the Pacifi c in North America, 
instituted in certain ways along Roman lines. Next, informal/formal empire 
took shape more or less in the years after the Civil War through the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. Following a hermeneutic politics over what sort 
of empire fi tted America, this imperial fl exibility fi rst led to the instituting 
of a formal, Caribbean and Pacifi c off-shore empire, and then to its aban-
donment during the Great Depression. Finally, a new shape of informal US 
empire emerged after World War II and continues through the present; 
it is discussed in the following chapter. The present chapter begins at the 
beginning of US imperialism.
“Calculated … for Extensive Empire”
The American War of Independence (1775–1783), an expression of the 
dominator/dominated contradiction, began in the violence of terrorist 
groups like the Sons of Liberty (P. Davis 1996) and was resolved due to 
timely French military interventions in favor of the American rebels (Dull 
1975). It resulted in a rare structural moment. Independence meant that 
American elites—that is, commercial elites in the northern colonies like 
John Hancock and John Adams together with slave-owning gentry in the 
southern colonies like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson—who 
were formerly dominated by British elites, were free to institute a new orga-
nization for the thirteen rebel colonies. Violence had granted them a par-
ticular agency and constructive power—that of structuring a social being. 
The question, of course, was what it would be like.
At this point an ideological inconsistency appears. On the one hand, the 
victorious elites understood their new state as something sacred. On the 
other, they were infl uenced by a prevailing, largely secular ideology. The 
US had gained its independence at a time when central Enlightenment 
hermeneuts challenged the view that reality was simply divine. Rather, 
they argued, nature was the product of natural forces, and that reason and 
science could help humans control nature, thereby giving humanity godly 
powers to achieve progress, as the title of Frederik van Leenhof’s book ex-
pressed it, in the form of Hemel op Aarde (Heaven on Earth) ([1703] 1704). 
The term “Founding Fathers” is commonly used to designate those elites 
who seized the structural moment and instituted the nascent US govern-
ment in the 1780s in order to build van Leenhof’s Heaven on Earth. They 
were moved by an Enlightenment hermeneutic voiced by Benjamin Frank-
lin, whose perceptual understanding was that the world was a place of 
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matter, which imposed the procedural ethic of choreographing the “power 
of man over matter” (in Kiernan 2005: 4). The problem was, what sort of 
government brought Heaven on Earth?
At its offi cial founding (1783), the nascent US was a democratic re-
public. However, David Ramsey, a member of the Continental Congress 
from South Carolina, at an Independence Day celebration two years after 
the Declaration of Independence in 1776, mused: “What a substratum for 
empire! Compared with which the foundation of the Macedonian, the Ro-
man, and the British sink into insignifi cance” (in Maier 2006: 1). George 
Washington, the fi rst president, referred to the US in a 1799 letter to John 
Quincy Adams as “this rising empire” (1999: 321). Second president John 
Adams (father of John Quincy), wrote in a 1755 letter to Nathan Webb, a 
cousin, of his view about historical cycles:
If we look into history, we shall fi nd some nations rising from contemptible be-
ginnings, and spreading their infl uence till the whole globe is subjected to their 
sway. When they have reached the summit of their grandeur, some minute and 
unsuspected cause commonly effects their ruin, and the empire of the world is 
transferred to some other place.
Of course, a major question was, where would empire be “transferred” in 
Adams and his cousin’s times? “It looks likely to me,” Adams speculated, 
that there would be a “transfer” of the “great seat of empire into America” 
(1961, I: 31).
Other important Founding Fathers agreed with the fi rst two presidents. 
Patrick Henry, one of the more radical advocates of the American Revolu-
tion, distinguished by his cry “Give me Liberty, or give me Death!” is less 
well remembered for his plea “Some way or other we must be a great and 
mighty empire, we must have an army, and a navy” (in Tucker and Hen-
drickson 1990: 20). Alexander Hamilton, the fi rst secretary of the Treasury, 
wrote in the fi rst The Federalist Paper that the US was “in many respects 
the most interesting … empire … in the world” (in N. Ferguson 2004: 34). 
Thomas Jefferson (2004: 169), the third president, confi ded to James Mad-
ison, the fourth president, that “we should have such an empire for liberty 
as … never surveyed since creation: and I am persuaded no constitution 
was ever before as well calculated as ours for extensive empire …”.
These imperial délires were not kept a secret among elites. Rather, they 
were widely communicated, often by ministers or educators. For example, 
in 1789 Jebediah Morse, a Puritan minister from Boston, published Amer-
ican Geography, which sought to bring knowledge of the newborn country 
to ordinary citizens. Reverend Morse explained that the reason for writing 
his geography was that the United States “have risen to Empire,” so cit-
izens should not rely on Europeans for knowledge of their own country 
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(in Van Alstyne 1960: 9). Hugh Henry Breckenridge, perhaps America’s 
fi rst novelist, educated readers through his various writings. At Princeton 
University’s commencement in 1771, he recited a poem co-authored with 
fellow student Philip Freneau, “The Rising Glory of America.” It promised 
a united country that would rule North America from the Atlantic to the 
Pacifi c. Seventeen years later, when that country had emerged, he told 
readers, “Oh my compatriots … you are now citizens of a new empire: an 
empire, not the effect of chance … but formed by the skill of sages. … Who 
is there who does not spring in height? … For you have acquired superior 
strength; you are become a great people” (Maier 2006: 1–2).2
Certainly there were revolutionary leaders, like Samuel Adams and 
Thomas Paine, who believed the US ought to be a democratic republic 
and nothing more, but the preceding has revealed a enthusiastic current 
of opinion among the founding elite that America should be, in Jeffer-
son’s terms, “calculated … for extensive empire.” Implicit in this discur-
sive délire was the view that the Enlightenment ideal of Heaven on Earth 
could be achieved with an “empire for liberty.” Jefferson seems not to have 
been bothered that the conjoining of empire and liberty was something 
of an oxymoron. After all, empires were, and are, places of domination, 
and those dominated lack liberty. However, as opposed to contemporary 
empire-deniers, the Founding Fathers were hermeneutically sealed into a 
délire for empire. They got their wish, as we shall see, in a formal, Roman 
shape.
Territorial Expansion (1783–1867)
American history from the Treaty of Paris (1783), when the British Crown 
and parliament formally granted the United States its independence up to 
the acquisition of Alaska (1867) involved territorial expansion, by military 
force or negotiation, from east to west against Native Americans or Euro-
pean imperial powers including Great Britain, France, Russia, and Spain.3
Why was there territorial growth? This might be laid at the door of a ter-
ritorial hermeneutic of Enlightenment statecraft: perceptually, if there was 
a state to govern, then procedurally, as Tucker and Hendrickson (1990: 
24) put it, “‘the fundamental rule of governments’ was ‘the principle of 
extending territories.’” Different presidential administrations instituted 
policies to expand, and to the degree they did so the territorial hermeneu-
tic became a public délire. For the nonelite remainder of the populace this 
meant there was a procedural cultural message legitimating expansion. To 
explicate this message, note that in the summer of 1845, when the burning 
issue of the day was whether to welcome Texas into the Union, the pop-
ular New York paper the Democratic Review addressed the Texas issue by 
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urging, “It is time now for opposition to the annexation of Texas to cease” 
because its addition to US territory embodied “the fulfi llment [sic] of our 
manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for 
the free development of our yearly multiplying millions” (in D. Howe 2007: 
703). Manifest Destiny in this optic is an iteration of the Enlightenment 
hermeneutic that understood perceptually that “Providence” provided a 
“continent” on which, procedurally, Americans were to “overspread.”
However, there was a qualifi cation to this expansionism. John Quincy 
Adams—eighth secretary of State and sixth president—was a cosmopol-
itan gentleman who had grown up largely overseas, traveling with his fa-
ther, second president John Adams, on diplomatic business. John Quincy 
was not averse to the empire’s expansion in continental America, but he 
was reluctant to support US involvement in overseas wars and warned 
the young country not to go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” 
His fear was that if America did seek foreign “monsters,” then “she might 
become the dictatress of the world” (1821). John Quincy’s warning might 
be called the “John Quincy Adams Exception” to the hermeneutic of ter-
ritorial expansion.
Expand the US did, though respecting, at least for a while, the John 
Quincy Adams Exception. During 1782 negotiations in Paris over the terms 
of new country’s independence, Jefferson, Franklin, and Jay demanded it 
include an area called Transappalachia. At the time, there were few colo-
nists on this land between the western side of the Appalachian Mountains 
and the eastern bank of the Mississippi River. The Americans had not 
captured it during the fi ghting. It was only ambiguously part of the original 
thirteen colonies. Nevertheless, the American negotiators claimed these 
western lands, and in the Treaty of Paris the British acquiesced. Conse-
quently, technically, the US territorially expanded even before it had a 
territory to expand.
Next Jefferson, a “pacifi c imperialist” (Tucker and Hendrickson 1990: 
3) because of his policy of territorial growth by diplomatic negotiation, pur-
chased Louisiana from France in 1803 in an illegal deal (whose corruption 
is documented in Nugent 2008: 63–69). This added a huge territory—
23 percent of the current US—from the Mississippi River to the Rocky 
Mountains. Subsequently, General Andrew Jackson ravaged the two Span-
ish colonies of East and West Florida, which led to the Florida Purchase 
from Spain in 1819. The same year witnessed the signing of the Transcon-
tinental Treaty with Spain, negotiated by John Quincy Adams, which for 
the fi rst time extended US territory all the way to the Pacifi c Ocean. The 
Annexation of Texas (from Mexico) in 1845 was followed by the Oregon 
Treaty (and the annexation from England of much of the Northwest) in 
1846. The year 1848 saw acquisition of much of the southwest US and 
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California following war with Mexico, and in 1867 the Alaska Purchase 
(from Russia) was negotiated. By the late 1860s the US had achieved its 
North American continental core boundaries.4
A Roman Logic
This expansion occurred in a sequence of events that exhibited a Roman 
imperial logic. First, American settlers would move into an area. Next the 
area would be acquired. For a time thereafter the region did not have status 
as a full-fl edged “state” in the US. Rather, it had a distinct legal and admin-
istrative institutionalization as some sort of “territory” and was in effect a 
colony, making the US a formal empire. At different times there were the 
Louisiana Territory, the Texas Territory, the Oregon Territory. More settlers 
would move into new territories from existing states in search of inexpen-
sive land, replicating the governance structures of their home states.5
Settler colonialisms involve migration of imperial core peoples to the col-
onies, with the core migrants given preference for ownership of the colonies’ 
resources. Such colonialisms tend to be cruel (Wolfe 2006), as indicated by 
British Mau Mau troubles in East Africa in the 1950s, French predicaments 
in Indochina and Algeria during the 1950s and 1960s, and white repression 
in Rhodesia and South Africa through the 1990s. In the US case, settlers 
in the new territories found themselves in confl ict with Native Americans.
After all, the land that settlers acquired was expropriated from Indians 
because the nascent US government continued the British practice of re-
garding Native American lands as terra nullis—free and ownerless. These 
confl icts led US military authorities to “pacify” the “savages.” By the early 
nineteenth century, due to depopulation from disease and earlier wars, Na-
tive Americans were only about 3 percent of the population (N. Ferguson 
2004: 35). Additionally, they were generally poorly armed. So with the ex-
ception of occasional defeats, notably General Custer’s 1876 debacle at the 
Little Big Horn, fi ghting was calamitous for the Indians—a “holocaust,” 
according to Stannard (1992), of terrible mortality rates, removal from 
their lands, and concentration in reservations. Then, with the “savages” 
pacifi ed and governance structures in place, the settlers would petition for 
statehood. Their petitions were eventually granted, and new states were 
welcomed into the country.
At any given time during the 1782 to 1870 continental expansion, the 
US consisted of an eastern core with settler colonies on its western periph-
ery. As time went on, the core gradually expanded and settler colonies be-
came fewer. Those familiar with the ancient Mediterranean will recognize 
that this process of expansion resembled that of the Roman Empire, which 
evolved from an original core around Rome by fi rst acquiring territories 
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by either negotiation or conquest and making them into “provinces” (pro-
vincia, provinciae [pl.] in Latin) with formal Roman provincial laws and 
governmental apparatus. Over time Rome gradually incorporated prov-
inces into the core by granting their inhabitants Roman citizenship. Con-
sequently, at any point in time the Roman Empire was a core surrounded 
by colonies being gradually incorporated into a core (Le Glay et al. 2009: 
312–313; M. Mann 1986: 254). In this way, the original US empire fol-
lowed a Roman logic of formal imperialism, one that submitted Native 
Americans to holocaust, excluded women from the vote, and enslaved 
enormous numbers of blacks. It is time to begin exploring the extended 
reproduction of value in this empire.
Extended Reproduction in the Nineteenth-Century Territorial Empire
As defi ned earlier, extended reproduction involves growth of social forms; 
including that of an increase in value extracted. Territorial expansion fa-
cilitated extraction of value in a number of ways. For example, with regard 
to Transappalachia,
By the 1740s … the lands over the mountains beckoned as investment op-
portunities for … speculators or developers. Colonial governors … Franklin 
himself and the movers and shakers of Philadelphia, the Livingstons and Jays 
of New York, Washington and other Virginia planters, even some investors in 
New England, dabbled and planned and chartered land companies of huge 
extent in the Ohio Valley. (Nugent 2008: 22)
Hence, by acquiring Transappalachia, Franklin increased his and other de-
velopers’ speculative délires, allowing them to increase value extraction by 
increasing their opportunities for land speculation.
The Louisiana Purchase was more about the realization of value of ag-
ricultural commodities by Americans who used the Mississippi River to 
transport their products for sale in New Orleans. Value is realized when a 
product is sold. If products cannot be sold, then value cannot be realized, 
and a reproductive vulnerability appears. Jefferson recognized New Orle-
ans’s importance for value realization when he said in 1802, “there is on 
the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual 
enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths 
of our territory must pass to market” (in Nugent 2008: 58). In October 
1802, Napoleon closed the port of New Orleans to Americans, meaning 
their products could not be sold, nor value realized. How could the farmers 
continue if they could not sell their crops? Here was a true reproductive 
vulnerability. Jefferson fi xed it by offering Napoleon a deal he could not 
refuse and buying New Orleans in 1803.
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Jefferson had another reason for wanting to use the government to ter-
ritorially expand. It had to do with overproduction and its effect on the 
realization of value. This was evident in 1788 in a letter to George Wash-
ington expressing concern about what would happen when the production 
of American commodities exceeded European demand for them—in other 
words, what would happen if they overproduced. What would occur, he 
suggested was that the surplus producers would “be employed, without 
question, to open by force, a market for itself with those placed on the 
same continent with us, and who wish nothing better” (Jefferson 2004, 
XIV: 328). In effect Jefferson was saying that one reason for the govern-
ment to acquire territory was to fi nd markets to address overproduction 
and thereby increase the realization of value. In the late eighteenth cen-
tury Jefferson’s worry about this problem was hypothetical, but a century 
later it would not be.
Of course, the government boosted value acquisition signifi cantly 
through the territory acquired. The original thirteen colonies’ territory of 
360,000 square miles had grown ten and a half times to about 3,790,000 
square miles by 1867. This expansion in the force resource of land was 
so great that it provided “unrivalled natural resources” (North 1961: vi). 
Land could be, and was, choreographed with myriad other economic force 
resources to produce enormous quantities of goods and services. In fact, 
“on the eve of the Civil War the United States had already achieved rapid 
and sustained economic expansion” and was “an industrial nation second 
only to Britain in manufacturing” (North 1961: v).
In return, growth in the economic system supported the governmental 
system by providing it with revenue—the force resource of capital—from 
various forms of taxation. The governmental elites used this capital to aug-
ment governmental violent force, among other things. A comparison of 
the military resources available to the US government at the time of the 
Revolution and the Civil War (1861–1865) indicates the extraordinary 
growth in violent force. The Revolutionary Army was an underfed, under-
armed, ragtag organization that numbered 16,782 men at its largest. During 
the Civil War the Union Army enlisted 2,666,999 men (Weigley 1967: 
42). Further, at that time the US government instituted the “fi rst large-
scale military application of three technological advances, telegraph, the 
railroad, and the rifl e” (ibid.: 233). The Quartermasters Department’s wa-
ter transportation expenses likewise point to the magnitude of growth in 
violent force. These expenses included purchase and construction of 183 
ocean steamers, 43 sailing vessels, and 86 barges, as well the rental of 753 
ocean steamers, 1,080 sailing vessels, and 847 barges (Weigley 1967: 222). 
US government violent force during the Civil War was on the level of large-
scale, semi-industrial warfare.
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In sum, the original territorial empire fl ourished in a time of extended re-
production, during which the US governmental system grew the economic 
system with huge increases in land force resources while the economic 
system grew the governmental system with enormous increases in revenues 
that vastly developed its violent force. The two fused systems operated to 
acquire so much constructive and violent force that it seemed imperial 
America would never approach its limits. The US Leviathan appeared to 
be building an imperial social being with so much force and power that it 
would be unfettered from any contradictions. But this was not to be.
Old/New: Shape-Shifting Empire, 1870s–1930s
I am an exporter, I want the world. (Charles Lovering, in Williams [1959] 1972: 
27).
Who would have guessed it: starting in the 1870s, imperial America began 
to experience a long-lasting toothach due to pain from jolts of contradic-
tory distress. In response, US elites developed a situational fi xation on this 
contradictory vulnerability and became involved in a hermeneutic politics 
over the shape of empire to be implemented by public délire. The elites 
in the politics in the six decades between the 1870s and 1930s became 
involved in experimental fi xation, fi rst proposing an informal imperial iter-
ation; then instituting the beginnings of an old, formal imperial iteration; 
and just as quickly abandoning it. This time might be characterized as one 
when the US elites were shape-shifting Hamlets muttering “to be, or not 
to be” over which imperial iteration would choreograph fi xes to the con-
tradictory toothache. First documented is the toothache.
Overproduction
After the Civil War, Jefferson’s concern about overproduction became 
a reality. By 1870 the US was in the midst of rapid capitalist industrial 
growth, having achieved “takeoff” in the 1840s and experienced rapid in-
dustrial development (North 1961) by the end of the Civil War in 1865. It 
would become the world’s largest economy by the early twentieth century 
(Hughes and Cain 2010). At this time, according to the historian Walter 
LaFeber (1963: 407), “the nature of American expansion … [began] to 
change. Under the impact of the industrial revolution Americans began 
to search for markets, not land.” These were markets where US capitalists 
could either purchase necessary raw materials for manufacturing, or sell 
agricultural or industrial goods. Markets tended to be beyond the bound-
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aries of the US, hence “off-shore,” and were progressively more crucial to 
burgeoning US capitalism. For example, 
By 1870 the American economy depended so much upon foreign markets for 
the agricultural surplus that the ups and downs for the next thirty years can 
be traced to the success or failure of marketing each year’s wheat and cotton 
crop. No matter how many markets could be found, more always seemed to be 
needed. (ibid.: 9–10)
By the end of the century, commercial elites were urgently expressing 
their desire for markets. A reporter in Iron Age stated in 1877, “As our 
manufacturing capacity largely exceeds the wants of home consumption, 
we shall have to curtail the same by shutting up a great many establish-
ments or we shall have to create a fresh outlet through exports” (in Wil-
liams 1972: 47). Two decades later in 1898, the US State Department was 
aware of the problem reported in Iron Age, announcing, “It seems to be 
conceded that every year we shall be confronted with an increasing surplus 
of manufactured goods for sale in foreign markets if American operatives 
and artisans are to be kept employed the year round” (in Williams [1959] 
1972: 28). The New York State Banker’s Association reiterated the prob-
lem in the same year,
Our capacity to produce far exceeds our capacity to consume. The home mar-
ket can no longer keep furnaces in blast or looms in action. That capital may 
earn its increment and labor be employed, enterprise must contend in the mar-
kets of the world, for the sake of our surplus products. (In May 1968: 194)
The key phrase in this quotation is “our capacity to produce far exceeds 
our capacity to consume.”
Hence, by the 1890s certain post–Civil War economic elites in both 
the government and the economy had sensed a disjunction between pro-
duction and the realization of the value of production through its sale. 
They had encountered the overproduction that Jefferson had worried 
about. “Over-production” is “a situation in which various individual capi-
tals … experience diffi culty in selling their entire output leading to a gen-
eral condition in which total output exceeds total demand” (Bottomore 
1983: 358). It is a characteristic of over-accumulation because it occurs 
when there is “a surplus of capital relative to opportunities to employ that 
capital. Such a state of over-production of capital is called the ‘over-accu-
mulation of capital’” (Harvey [1982] 2006: 192). Over-accumulation is a 
manifestation of a contradiction where the need to produce much to make 
profi ts leads to producing too much to realize good profi ts, as evidenced 
by declining rates of profi t that indicate an enterprise is moving toward its 
limits of accumulation.
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The long-running litany of complaints documented in the previous para-
graphs suggests that by the end of the nineteenth century, US economic 
entrepreneurs sensed that over-production hampered their enterprise. Were 
their beliefs accurate? Duménil and Lévy (2004) collected information about 
US business from 1870 through the early 1900s and found that these years 
exhibited a declining profi t rate, that is, an indicator of over-accumulation. 
Caught in contradiction, capital was reproductively vulnerable. US capitalist 
titans knew they had a toothache and situationally fi xated upon it.
Hermeneutic politics over how to fi x the vulnerability fl ourished. The 
Massachusetts textile tycoon Charles Lovering captured the emotional 
délire of such a situation when he wailed, “I am an exporter, I want the 
world” (in Williams [1959] 1972: 27). To gratify such a “want,” Lovering 
and other US capitalists had to go off-shore. Preston A. Plumb, senator 
from Kansas in the 1880s, showed willingness to assist Lovering on the part 
of at least some in the political establishment when he said, “We are now 
on the threshold, in my judgment, of a development outward, of a contest 
for the foreign commerce of the world” (in ibid.: 20). Part of these de-
bates concerned whether informal or formal offshore imperialism would or 
would not provide the needed reproductive fi x. By the 1890s the debates 
were resolved in favor of a formal empire. Mr. Lovering, the old Yankee 
capitalist, was to be given his want—“the world,” or at least a chunk of 
it. However, certain unintended consequences of the fi x led to a retreat 
from the formal imperialism by 1934. Let us examine these debates. They 
will lead to a forgetting of the John Quincy Adams Exception and a new 
imperial ideology with an associated public délire.
Forgetting the John Quincy Adams Exception
US extended reproduction had thrived on territorial expension. So the 
hermeneutic politics about how to fi x overproduction led the US to more 
terrirtorial expansion; this time overseas—“going abroad in search of mon-
sters.” Critical participants in these politics were Carl Schurz, Albert J. 
Beveridge, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Walter Page, and John Hay—
respected gentlemen at the highest levels of the US offi cial and military 
elite in the late nineteenth century. Schurz was a popular writer, politician, 
and secretary of the interior (during the administration of Rutherford B. 
Hayes)—author of the patriotic credo “My country, right or wrong”—who 
helped conceptualize American attitudes toward expansion. He put the 
matter as follows in an 1893 article in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine,
There is little doubt that we can secure by amicable negotiation sites for coal-
ing stations which will serve us well as if we possessed the countries in which 
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they are situated. In the same manner we can obtain from and within all sorts 
of commercial advantages … [And] all this without taking those countries into 
our national household on an equal footing … without assuming any responsi-
bilities for them. (in LaFeber 1963: 201)
Schurz was clear. During expansion, there was to be no taking of “coun-
tries into our national household,” meaning there were to be no colonies. 
Expansion would occur by “amicable negotiation.”
Albert J. Beveridge was a senator from Indiana in the 1890s, another 
leading champion of US foreign expansion. He recognized that “American 
factories are making more than the American people can use.” Here was 
blunt recognition of US capitalism’s reproductive diffi culties. He suggested 
a fi x, declaiming,
Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours. 
… We will establish trading posts throughout the world as distributing points 
for American products. … Great colonies, governing themselves, fl ying our fl ag 
and trading with us, will grow up about our posts of trade. … And American 
law, American order, American civilization, and the American fl ag will plant 
themselves on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, but by those agencies 
of God henceforth to be made beautiful and bright. (In Niall Ferguson 2004: 
43–44)
Beveridge was proposing much the same thing as Schurz, though in 
more extroverted terms. He was imagining a global commercial domi-
nation—“the trade of the world … shall be ours.” It would result from 
the setting up of trading posts. Beveridge’s “trading posts” are Schurz’s 
“coaling stations … with commercial advantages.” But note that although 
Beveridge calls these trading posts “colonies,” they would be “governing 
themselves”—they would not be formal colonies. Schurz and Beveridge 
proposed a global empire where expansion would be achieved through 
“amicable negotiation.”
Admiral Alfred Mahan, celebrated for his insistence on the centrality 
of naval force in imperial states in his The Infl uence of Sea Power on History 
(1890), wrote about what to do if amicable negotiation was not fruitful. 
LaFeber, summarizing Mahan’s position, says he believed that
the foundation of an expansive policy is a nation’s productive capacities that 
produce vast surpluses; these surpluses should preferably be sold in non-colo-
nial areas in order to lessen political irritations; and sea power in the form of 
battleships enters the scheme to provide and protect lines of communication 
and to settle the confl icts which inevitably arise from commercial rivalry, thus 
ensuring access to markets for the surplus goods. (1963: 93)
In this quotation, Mahan indicated that any “confl icts” arising during in-
ternational trade should be addressed with “sea power” that would take 
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“the form of battleships,” the most technologically advanced violent tech-
nology of its day. In effect, Mahan recommended violent force to substitute 
for colonial administration as a means to “settle confl icts” in ways benefi -
cial to US capital accumulation.
The following conversation between British Foreign Secretary Sir Ed-
ward Grey and Walter Page, the American Ambassador to London at the 
time, gives a further clue as to how some elites imagined utilizing the US 
military. The two gentlemen had been discussing how the American gov-
ernment might respond to situations it did not approve of in Latin Amer-
ica. Their conversation went as follows:
Grey: Suppose you have to intervene, what then?
Page: Make ’em vote and live by their decisions.
Grey: But suppose they will not so live?
Page: We’ll go in and make ’em vote again.
Grey: And keep this up 200 years.
Page: Yes. The United States will be here for two hundred years and it can 
continue to shoot men for that little space till they learn to vote and rule them-
selves. (In Niall Ferguson 2004: 53)
There is an authoritarian tenor to the ambassador’s discourse about how to 
treat people in foreign countries. He will “make ’em” do things. Grimmer, 
he says the US will “shoot men” for “two hundred years” until they do the 
right thing. The thing they are supposed to do is “rule themselves,” but the 
tone of Page’s language is that they had better do so in the American way.
Hay—the gentleman remembered for enthusing about the Spanish-
American War as a “splendid little war”—had been Lincoln’s secretary 
during the Civil War and later a diplomat and journalist who became Pres-
ident McKinley’s (1897–1901) secretary of state. As secretary of state, he 
had to address the commercial rivalries the US experienced in China with 
more fi rmly entrenched, older European empires (England and France) 
and newly emerging Eurasian empires (Germany, Russia, and Japan). Hay’s 
way of doing so was to offer in 1899 what became known as the Open 
Door Notes, which were policy protocols concerning Chinese trade. The 
Notes stated all countries should “enjoy perfect equality of treatment for 
their commerce and navigation” to “safeguard for the world the principle 
of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire” in order 
to “preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity” (Hay 1899).
The Notes expressed views like those of Schurz and Beveridge but went 
one step further, effectively taking these from the realm of mere délire and 
making them US government policy, public délire. China’s “territorial and 
administrative entity” would be preserved. It would not be incorporated 
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into anybody’s formal empire. Further, in order for any country to do busi-
ness in China, there must be “perfect equality”—meaning “equal and im-
partial trade” for all countries—to Chinese markets. In fact, no other nation 
formally agreed to Hay’s Open Door Notes. But as US government policy, 
the Notes were a public délire and a gauntlet thrown down to European im-
perialisms in the business of formal empire. The US would do without such 
empire by insisting on opening the door to free markets. William Appleman 
Williams argued in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy ([1959] 1972: 50–
51) that this Open Door policy has shaped US global economic policy since 
the 1890s. Fifty years later Callinicos concurred (2009: 165). The next few 
paragraphs will draw the pieces of this informal imperialism together.
In a 1900 speech to the US Senate, Beveridge enthused: “God has … 
made us the master organizers of the world to establish a system where 
chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces 
of reaction throughout the earth” (in Lotta 1984: 172). Talk of being the 
“master organizers of the world” meant that American elites were forget-
ting John Quincy Adams’s warning and going in search of monsters. In our 
terms, their discourse concerned an elite ideology to achieve a reproduc-
tive fi x, one designed to bring Enlightenment “progress.”
What was their ideology? First, as expressed by Schurz and Beveridge, 
the US, which needed to expand due to overproduction, would not do so 
by making a formal empire. Rather, second, expansion would occur via in-
formal empire, by implementing the Open Door policy. Third, as voiced by 
Mahan and Page, if need be America would use its available violent force 
to support its enterprises’ profi ts. The hermeneutic of this ideology was 
perceptually that the US faced overproduction, which procedurally should 
be fi xed by informal empire.
Critically, this iteration of empire was “new,” because although infor-
mal empire had been practiced earlier, it had been only a sideline to for-
mal empire. Thus, whereas the UK practiced an informal imperialism in 
parts of Latin America, throughout the rest of the globe its elites worked 
to establish a formal empire upon which the sun “never set.” Only some 
Yankees—Beveridge and company—imagined running a purely informal 
imperialism. Contrarily, however, imperial hermeneutic politics took other 
US elites with other ideas back to a future of old empire—at least for a time.
Old-Time Formal Empire (1898–1934)
Some American elites might have fancied new imperial social beings; but 
it should be remembered that during the last part of the nineteenth and 
the early twentieth century the old empires were dominant, wealthy, and 
expanding, so they too had their attractions. Further, it was a time of in-
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creasing rivalry between these old empires, driven by a series of depressions 
occurring in the US in 1873–1878, 1882–1886, and 1893–1897. Everyone 
agreed that the fi x for the depressions was to expand external markets; and 
formal empires expanded markets the old fashioned-way, by adding terri-
tory through procurement of colonies by conquest. While the Americans 
might imagine an open-door policy, their competitors had been practicing 
closed-door policies as each empire tended, legally or otherwise, to ex-
clude its competitors from its own territories. Alex Callinicos (2009: 152) 
reports that “European colonial possessions rose from 2.7 million square 
miles and 148 million inhabitants in 1860, to 29 million square miles and 
568 million inhabitants in 1914.” By the end of the nineteenth century the 
imperial competitors had conquered most of the world with only a few ex-
ceptions, like Afghanistan, Thailand, and Japan. So by 1900, US capitalists 
found themselves disadvantaged in the search for markets. Otherwise put, 
they were having trouble getting their fi x, according to the “new empire” 
hermeneutic.
Consequently, there emerged among some US elites a fi xation upon for-
mal imperialism instituted in violent fashion. One important member of 
this group was the young Theodore Roosevelt (TR), scion of the New York 
Establishment and Harvard University, where he was a member of the Por-
cellian Club, the most prestigious of Harvard’s exclusive clubs. TR allowed 
that “No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war” 
(in Beale 1956: 40). Concurrently he insisted, “There is no place in the 
world for nations who have become enervated by soft and easy life, or who 
have lost their fi ber of vigorous hardiness and manliness” (in Beale 1956: 
40). Equally belligerent was his Boston Brahmin friend, Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge (also Harvard and Porcellian), who in 1895 announced, “We 
have a record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any 
people in the Nineteenth Century. We are not about to be stopped now” 
(Lodge 1895; in Williams 1966: 345).6 Here was an “old empire” herme-
neutic politics. Perceptually it was a world in which there was “no place” 
for nations that had lost their “vigorous … manliness”; further perceptu-
ally, the US had an “unequalled” history of “expansion”; so procedurally, 
that history of “conquest, colonization” should continue.
These manly elites, like Roosevelt and Lodge, in collaboration with war-
mongering hermeneuts, most stridently William Randolph Hearst and his 
New York Journal, convinced President McKinley to declare war on Spain 
in 1898 over its colonial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacifi c. 
This confl ict, the Spanish-American War, ended in a few short months 
(April through August 1898). Spain was humiliated and ceded much of 
the remainder of its empire to the US. Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and part of Samoa became American territory. In the years that fol-
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lowed these territories were formal colonies of the US for different periods 
of time. For brief periods the US also ruled Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and 
the Dominican Republic as formal colonies. Consequently, by the early 
twentieth century the US government was practicing administration of, in 
Rudyard Kipling’s words, “new-caught sullen peoples, half devil and half 
child” (1899). Otherwise put, it was running an old empire. Here was a 
second iteration of American empire.
Old empire meant “gunboat diplomacy” (Healy 1976) and frequent US 
military intervention, usually naval involving the Marines, in both formal 
colonies and informal client states. According to one source, Washing-
ton “sent gunboats into Latin American ports over 6000 times” (Grandin 
2006: 3). The Marine General Smedley D. Butler, who commanded US 
occupation troops during this period, remembered how closely the fi ghting 
was intertwined with the government system supporting the capitalist one:
I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City bank boys 
to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen central American 
republics for the benefi t of Wall Street. … I helped purify Nicaragua for the in-
ternational banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to 
the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make 
Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903. (1935)
Such interventions were especially calamitous in Nicaragua (1927–
1933) and the Philippines (1899–1913). Indeed, the Nicaraguan insur-
gency led by Agusto Sandino, employing hit-and-run guerrilla war tactics, 
fought the Marines “to a draw” (Grandin 2006: 31). The Philippine-Amer-
ican War, conducted on a larger scale, equally relied upon a peasant gue-
rilla strategy. This confl ict, according to Niall Ferguson, went through 
seven “phases of engagement”:
1. Impressive initial military success
2. A fl awed assessment of indigenous sentiment
3. A strategy of limited war and gradual escalation of forces
4. Domestic disillusionment in the face of protracted and nasty confl ict
5. Premature democratization
6. The ascendency of domestic economic considerations
7. Ultimate withdrawal (Ferguson 2004: 48)
Perhaps the key phase in Ferguson’s discussion of the US’s engagement in 
the Philippines is the seventh and last: “ultimate withdrawal.”
Furthermore, although formal imperialism was intended to back cap-
italist business, it was costly for government. For example, according to 
William Pomeroy, “It would no doubt be safe to say” that in the Philip-
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pines, “military costs of conquest, suppression, fortifi cation, and garrison 
maintenance totaled at least $500 million by the time an Independence 
Act was voted by the US Congress” (1970: 221). In 1901 Massachusetts 
Senator George Hoar—a Harvard University graduate and proponent of 
blacks’ rights and the vote for women—put the fi gure higher, at $600 mil-
lion (ibid.). The Old Imperialism was costly for frugal US elites.
Moreover, even as the US government found formal imperialism expen-
sive, it was actually practicing the new, informal imperialism, especially 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Consider, for example, the case of 
Mexico. Greg Grandin reports, “In the years after the Civil War, both the 
US government and private US interests supplied arms and money to help 
Mexican economic liberals consolidate power and transform their coun-
try into a modern, capitalist state” (2006: 28). These “economic liberals” 
were, in the terms defi ned in the last chapter, the subject clients of their 
elite capitalist handlers back in America. Mexican clients working with
New York and Boston fi nanciers bankrolled the construction of roads, rails, 
and ports, opening up the country’s rural hinderlands to development. By the 
fi rst decade of the twentieth century, more than a billion American dollars 
had been invested in Mexican oil, agriculture, mining and ranching, as well as 
in public utilities like urban electricity. … To continue to attract capital, the 
Mexican government cut taxes, allowed high rates of profi t repatriation, and 
repressed labor organizing. (Grandin 2006: 29)
This was the new imperialism in action. It worked. American enterprise 
fl ourished in places like Mexico (J. Hart: 2006). Further, American cap-
italists’ operations there became a something of a model showing how to 
fi nd overseas regions with accommodating elites, inexpensive labor and 
resources, and gratifyingly large profi ts.
Hay’s Open Door public délire was expanded in the early years of 
the twentieth century because during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency 
(1901–1909), notwithstanding his attachment to “manliness,” the policy 
was extended from China to Africa (Beale 1956). During Woodrow Wil-
son’s presidency (1913–1921), especially under the guidance of Secretary 
of State Charles Evans Hughes, the Open Door policy became a way for US 
elites to imagine US foreign relations in all places (A. Griswold 1938). It 
was part of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points communication to Congress 
on 8 January 1918. This speech was intended to assure nervous Americans 
that World War I was being fought for a just cause and for postwar peace 
in Europe. Its emphasis on self-determination, both for colonies and for 
Russia, then undergoing the Bolshevik Revolution, did not sit well with 
Wilson’s old empire allies (Georges Clemenceau of France, David Lloyd 
George of the UK, and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando of Italy). Consequently, 
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it thrust America into Great Power diplomacy at the end of World War I, 
issuing an American challenge to their old, formal imperialism.
Finally, during Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) presidency (1933–
1945) under his Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Open Door policy, 
now conceived of as applying to the entire world, was championed as a 
way of helping US capitalists through the crisis of the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, which some thought had resulted from overproduction (Eckes 
1973). This is because, as Callinicos explains it, Hull and those of a similar 
mind believed “the solution” to the depression
lay in constructing a liberal international order where US capital and commod-
ities could freely fl ow and from which European Great Power rivalries had been 
banished. The key obstacle to achieving this objective lay in the protectionist 
blocs established by the other leading capitalist states and most notably the 
British Empire. (2009: 167–168).
Importantly, the Open Door policy implied an informal imperialism, 
where the US dominated not by creating formal colonies, but by having its 
superior capitalism control client states’ economies. In the hands of FDR 
and Cordell Hull, the Open Door policy choreographed the confrontation 
with the older, formal imperialisms, a confl ict made explicit in the Atlantic 
Charter (1941), an agreement between the UK and the US intended as a 
post–World War II global blueprint. The charter promised a global capital-
ist system for all, with all peoples afforded the right of self-determination 
(i.e., old colonies would be given their independence), with victors seek-
ing no territorial gains (i.e., there would be no new colonies), and trade 
barriers lowered. What had happened to the Open Door public délire was 
the expansion of its window of authority. Originally, under Hays, it applied 
only to China. But TR, Wilson, and FDR expanded its applicability to the 
entire globe. It became the public délire that was imagined as able to solve 
the reproductive vunerability facing the US and, at the same time, estab-
lish a global informal empire for Washington.
Thus, in the years roughly between 1898 and the start of FDR’s admin-
istration, US elites received a progressive education—progressive in John 
Dewey’s (1916) sense of “learning by doing,” which in terms of hermeneu-
tic politics meant experimental fi xation upon old and new imperial itera-
tions. Capitalists, offi cials, and military elites spent time “doing” both the 
old and the new imperial iterations and, if the Philippines and Mexico can 
be imagined as exemplars of the old formal and the new informal imperial-
isms respectively, then the Philippines led to “ultimate withdrawal” while 
Mexico led to “high rates of profi t repatriation.” So by the onset of FDR’s 
administration and the coming of World War II, many of the Establishment 
would agree with what FDR told his son: 
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The colonial system means war. Exploit the resources of an India, a Burma, a 
Java; take all the wealth out of these countries, but never put anything back 
into them, things like education, decent standards of living, minimum health 
requirements—all you’re doing is storing up the kind of trouble that leads to 
war. All you’re doing is negating the value of any kind of organizational struc-
ture for peace before it begins. (In E. Roosevelt 1946) 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull confi ded to the Japanese ambassador in 
1941, in what was really a summation of the US experience with the old 
imperialism, “In the past we … stationed some soldiers in central America, 
and left them there as long as ten years, but the results were bad, and we 
brought them out” (in Gardner 1971: 47).
Overview
Imagine a camera high in the sky, overlooking the New World and fi lming 
what happened between 1783 and 1944. The resulting fi lm would show a 
rapidly changing US. Starting small, pinned against the eastern seaboard, 
it would fi rst grow and grow, always westward, like an old Roman sort of 
continental empire. Next, at the end of the 1800s, experimentally fi xated 
on overproduction in the youthful ardor of its “manliness,” it began a time 
of rapid experimentation with different shapes of empire: a fi rst iteration, 
that of informal empire; a second iteration, that of formal empire; and 
a third iteration, back toward informal empire. An observer of this fi lm 
might comment that the US was a real imperial shape-shifter.
This observer might also have noticed the presence of the Open Door 
public délire by the 1930s. Contemplate its implication by recalling how the 
founding father President John Adams speculated there would be a “trans-
fer” of the “great seat of empire into America.” Now recognize the sheer 
audacity of US governmental elites just prior to World War II. Their Open 
Door public délire sought to impose an American way of doing business 
upon the entire world. After World War II, John Adams’ “transfer” oc-
curred, and Washington became the “seat of empire” for the entire globe. 
That story is told in the following chapter.
Notes
1. Hardt and Negri (2001) on the left argue that empires are a thing of the past; advanced 
capitalism is organized both politically and economically on transnational lines, making states 
effectively obsolete and confl ict between them a thing of the past. Elsewhere I argue that 
Hardt and Negri (Reyna 2002b) are neither correct nor incorrect, but incomprehensible.
2. Some might object that the term “empire” was employed differently two centuries ago. 
Those quoted referring to empire in the text were citizens, subjects, and often employees of 
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the British Empire. When they used the word they had in mind something like Albion’s em-
pire, which in our terminology is an example of a “formal” empire. 
3. Nugent (2008) provides a history of US expansion from 1782 to 2000. Weeks (1996) 
provides a concise discussion of US expansion between 1780 and 1970. Daniel Howe’s What 
Hath God Wrought richly describes US expansion between 1815 and 1848. Its bibliographic 
essay is useful concerning US growth during the entire period (2007: 856–878).
4. Tucker and Frederickson (1990) explicate Jefferson’s contribution to the building of an 
“empire of liberty,” especially with regard to the Louisiana Purchase. Remini (2001) discusses 
Jackson’s warring and its role in the addition of Florida. Weeks (1992) considers John Quincy 
Adams and the Transcontinental Treaty. Winders (2002) can be consulted for questions of 
territorial expansion in the southwest, including Texas. Stuart (1988) details US expansion 
against British lands, especially in the Oregon Territory; and Jensen (1975) is useful with 
regard to Russian lands and Alaska.
5. Van Alstyne (1960) points out that it is inaccurate to insist that the young US went 
only west. As it drifted westward the US also went south toward Florida, the Caribbean, and 
Mexico; and north to Oregon, Washington, and Alaska.
6. Theodore Roosevelt is a complex case—part thug, part progressive. Edmund Morris’s 
three-volume biography (2010) is good place to start to understand him. 
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Chapter 4
“PRESENT AT THE CREATION”
Constituting the New American Empire 1945–1950
In a sense the postwar years were a period of creation. (Dean Acheson, 1969)
The dapper and witty Honorable Dean Acheson, a gentleman’s gentle-man and President Harry Truman’s secretary of state (1949–1953), 
held the highest positions in US diplomacy during and after World War II. 
The postwar years he refers to in the quotation above are roughly the fi ve 
years following the end of the war in 1945. They “were a period of cre-
ation,” of fi nding the parts and fi tting them together in a colossal struc-
tural project to constitute the postwar US social being. This chapter, then, 
explores the exercise of force to achieve constructive powers, specifi cally 
those creating the post-1945 iteration of American Empire.
First, this chapter documents who did it; next it details the features of 
global human being as Acheson and his peers refl ected on it, in doing their 
constitution. This postwar human being, inhabited by a Bear that was a 
Leviathan (an oddity explained later), presented US elites with a men-
acing hermeneutic puzzle. This puzzle, one of a political contradiction, is 
documented. The chapter goes on to show how the hermeneutic politics to 
resolve the puzzle engendered a series of public délires and institutions that 
constituted a novel social being—a three-tiered rental empire, called the 
New American Empire. Let us begin with actors, specifi cally the security 
elites who did the constituting.
Security Elites 1.0
The “River families” were born to this spacious sense of tradition and of lei-
sure. Their world opened up to them, a solid and pleasant place, in which 
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their task was to carry on and fortify standards they inherited from their father. 
They moved with assurance in the outside world as well. (Schlesinger 1957: 
327–328)
In the culture of postwar Washington, “security” generally referred to the 
military well-being of America. “Security elites” from economic, political, 
and military backgrounds headed government agencies that dealt with for-
eign affairs and defense. Generally they were, and are, referred to as “prin-
cipals,” because their windows of authority gave them strategic command 
over foreign and military affairs. Principals were the agents of postwar US 
imperialism. Presidents, vice presidents, secretaries of state and defense, 
generals, admirals, intelligence chiefs, and all their senior offi cers—all 
were “present at the creation.”
Important members of the security elite after World War II came from 
the “River Families” in New York or their equivalents in other northeastern 
cities. They resided in splendid manors along the Hudson River, elegant 
mansions along the Philadelphia Main Line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
or gracious townhouses on Boston’s Beacon Hill and Commonwealth Av-
enue. The Boston Brahmins thought of themselves as most eminent. They 
were the fi rst American aristocracy, rich from pre-revolutionary commerce 
(including the slave trade) and ever so proper, with a Puritan rectitude ab-
sent in brash New Yorkers. Whether from New York, Philadelphia, or Bos-
ton, all were the Establishment, and though they were not proper nobility 
in the sense of English lords and ladies, they had something their British 
compatriots lacked: money—lots and lots of it—derived from ownership 
of capitalist enterprise.1 Women, blacks, Italians, Orientals, and Hispanics 
need not apply, though a few Irish Catholics like Joe Kennedy, the future 
president’s father, hung around the fringes. Some Jews were tolerated, es-
pecially if they practiced ethnic self-cleansing. For example, Sam Laposki, 
a Polish Jew, changed the family name to the posh sounding Dillon, help-
ing his boy, Clarence Dillon, make it all the way to the top of US fi nance 
as head of Dillon Read and Company, an investment-banking powerhouse. 
The Establishment tended to circulate. Members moved from one elite 
position to others in business and government.
Military elites were less likely to be from the Establishment. Generals Ei-
senhower, George C. Marshall, George S. Patton, and Douglas MacArthur, 
as well as Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, William “Bull” Halsey, and William 
D. Leahy, were from comfortable but not extraordinarily wealthy families 
that had long sent sons into the military. A fair number came from south-
ern backgrounds. The majority were educated at military academies such 
as the Naval Academy, West Point, or the Virginia Military Institute. After 
retirement they generally joined companies doing defense work.
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Establishment elites—including President Franklin Delano Roosevelt as 
well as such high offi ce holders as Dean Acheson, Charles “Chip” Bohlen, 
Averill Harriman, Robert Lovett, George Kennan, James Forrestal, Paul 
Nitze, Edward Stettinius, Henry Stimson, and Sumner Welles—came from 
families that shared experiences, as “their lives had intertwined from child-
hood and school days, from their early careers on Wall Street and in govern-
ment” (Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 19). These were “solid and pleasant” 
experiences full “of tradition and of leisure.” President Harry Truman and 
Paul Nitze were the exceptions to these northeasterners. Truman came 
from a comfortable but not rich Missouri family and never graduated from 
university. Nitze, a professor’s son, hailed from Chicago, though he went 
“back” east to Hotchkiss and Harvard, where he joined the Porcellian, the 
most prestigious of Harvard’s clubs.
Education was important in getting the Establishment “intertwined.”2 
Traditionally, boys in the ruling class who became “old boys” had attended 
private “prep” high schools (e.g., Andover, Exeter, Groton, Hotchkiss, or 
Taft), and then gone on to Ivy League universities (preferably Harvard, 
Yale, or Princeton).3 Prep schools were Spartan. For example,
Groton had been founded on the British model, entering its boys in forms, with 
seniority maintained through a system of student prefects. The students lived 
in tiny cubicles, took a cold shower every morning, washed in black soapstone 
sinks and tin basins. … The curriculum was classical, taught always with effi -
ciency and sometimes with devotion. But it was above all the Rector who put 
his stamp upon the school, infusing the routine and discipline with an awful 
moral signifi cance.
 Endicott Peabody was … dedicated with passion to the idea of Groton School 
as a community—if not, indeed, as a family—that would produce Christians 
and gentlemen. (Schlesinger 1957: 330–331)
Headmaster Peabody, like other private school headmasters, was trying to 
turn out “muscular Christians.” This was a late Victorian movement that 
sought to inculcate in young men cultural messages of vigorous masculinity 
wedded to the pursuit of Christian ideals in private and public life. An old 
boy had to be physically hard, intellectually responsible, and in the service 
of Christianity (Putney 2003). Such a person, as expressed in Tom Brown at 
Oxford, had a “body … brought into subjugation” for ”the subduing of the 
earth which God has given to the children of men” (Hughes [1861] 1885: 
106–107). Old boys were into “subduing.”
Ivy League universities were the old boys’ next stop. The African-Amer-
ican philosopher W. E. B. Du Bois, who attended Harvard in the 1890s, 
marveled that these universities were temples where “Wealth was God” 
(Du Bois 1968: 26). Thus, in the theology of their muscular Christianity, 
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the trinity was replaced by the quatralaterality of Father, Son, Holy Ghost, 
and Money, and by the time they got to university the old boys had got 
their hands on the latter, prompting a lively hedonism in replacement of 
their earlier austerity. Old boys tended to join clubs like Harvard’s Porcel-
lian or Yale’s Skull and Bones and Scroll and Key, in which they congre-
gated exclusively with others in their set. At the Porcellian, for example, 
“Nitze drank martinis with his fellow club member Charles “Chip” Bohlen 
and kept a bottle of rum in his room’s chimney. Members adhered to the 
club’s motto, Dum vivimus vivamus (‘While we live, let’s live’).” (Thomp-
son 2009: 29)
While at university some old boys discovered social Darwinism, a late 
Victorian ideology that justifi ed their wealth (Hofstadter 1955). Social 
Darwinism was Herbert Spencer’s problematic extension of Charles Dar-
win’s thought into social life, where it became a “new philosophy to justify” 
the economic elites’ “political and economic dominance” (Dye and Zeigler 
2009: 59). It was championed in the US by William Graham Sumner, John 
Fiske, and John Burgess. Social Darwinism’s basic tenets were that all of 
life—biological or social—was struggle, which led to the “survival of the 
fi ttest.” Because those that survived were the “fi ttest,” they were “selected” 
for preeminence. Sumner (1963: 157), for example, justifying millionaires, 
asserted, “There is the intensest competition for their [millionaires’] place 
and occupation,” and because of this rivalry, “millionaires are a product of 
natural selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those who 
can meet the requirement of certain work to be done. … It is because they 
are those selected that wealth … aggregates under their hands.” Sumner 
taught at Yale, John Fiske at Harvard, and John Burgess at Columbia, so 
old boys, having acquired muscular Christianity in prep school, were then 
dosed with social Darwinism at university. Medieval knights lived for plun-
der after their opponents’ defeat, and they learned how to go in for the kill 
in jousting yards and tournaments. Old boys learned to go in for their kills 
in prep schools and universities; and their plunder consisted of elite op-
portunities seized and exploited in a social Darwinian, muscular Christian 
manner.
Paul Nitze—whom we shall meet later as director of policy planning 
in the State Department (1950–1953)—explained how the fi ght for elite 
opportunities was waged when reminiscing over a dinner at his soon-to-be 
in-laws’ New York mansion:
It was an elegant dinner party; another guest was Sir Montagu Norman, a distin-
guished British gentleman and governor of the Bank of England. … [H]e said that 
the Great Depression was the result of universal overproduction. I was not over 
twenty-fi ve years old, but that did not stop me from voicing my disagreement.
“Overproduction is not the problem,” I said. …
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There was a moment of silence as my impertinence hung in the air … but Sir 
Montagu was interested. … Our debate dominated the rest of the evening’s 
discussion. (Nitze, Rearden, and Smith 1989: xix)
Relatively few young Americans, and certainly none from the slums of 
New York’s Lower East Side, got to challenge the governor of the Bank of 
England about overproduction. Young Paul remembered that his debating 
got Sir Montagu “interested,” and getting people interested was of course 
a way of creating elite networks and opportunities.
What a world old boys lived in. Consider one tête-á-tête young Paul had 
with Clarence Dillon on a drive through the countryside:
Clarence Dillon took an interest in me and invited me to spend the weekend 
at Dunnwalke, his estate in New Jersey. On the drive out in his Rolls-Royce, 
I asked him whether we were headed for a recession. “No,” he said, “it will be 
the end of an era. … we will not have a recession, we will have a depression.”
…
That is why, he continued, he was disbanding the company’s entire national 
distribution network and would retain only a core of people. … He said he had 
given notice to some four thousand well-trained, good, able people employed 
by Dillon, Read and Co. (Nitze et al. 1989: xvii–xviii)
One does not know whether Clarence was trying to impress young Paul as 
they drove in the big Rolls out to the 1,200 acres of Dunnwalke in the New 
Jersey hunt country, but Clarence certainly indicated one of his powers—
bringing depression early to “four thousand well-trained, good, able people.”
The Achesons, Dillons, Nitzes, and their set made the postwar world. Their 
prep schools and Ivy League universities embedded in their neuronal fi ber the 
world view that if they were tough, the world was theirs for the “subduing.” 
Concerning their achievements, Nitze confi ded, using himself as an example, 
“I have played some role in the affairs of state, working with others to bend 
what otherwise might have been called the ‘inevitable trends of history” 
(Nitze et al. 1989: ix). Meanwhile, his boss in the State Department, Acheson 
(1969: xvii), reported that “the postwar years were a period of creation” in 
which, he modestly admitted, “I shared with others some responsibility.” 
What accomplishments: “bending … history” and “ordering” the world. 
It is time to present the essentials of the world the Security Elites 1.0 “or-
dered” as they went about creation.
Their World at Creation: 
“The whole structure and order … was gone”
The period … 1941 through 1952 … was one of great obscurity to those who 
lived through it. … The signifi cance of events was shrouded in ambiguity. 
(Acheson 1969: 3)
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The old boys discovered that the years around the end of World War II, as 
Acheson makes clear in the preceding quotation, were ones of “ambiguity” 
and “obscurity.” What was this world? Why the ambiguity and obscurity?
On 20 October 1944, as World War II turned decisively against the Ger-
mans and Japanese, FDR (alumnus of Groton and Harvard) gave a speech 
in his fourth, fi nal campaign for the presidency. He declared: 
The power which this nation has attained … has brought to us the responsibil-
ity, and with it the opportunity, for leadership in the community of nations. In 
our own best interest, and in the name of peace and harmony, this nation can-
not, must not, and will not shirk that responsibility. (In Sherwood 1948: 817)
FDR was articulating what the old boys knew: They ran the most powerful 
economic and military institutions in the world.
After all, at war’s end, roughly 50 percent of world manufacturing was 
in the hands of American fi rms. Its “industrial production was more than 
double its annual production between 1935 and 1939. The US was pro-
ducing more steel than Britain and Russia combined. The US economy 
was producing half the world’s coal, two thirds of the world’s oil and over 
half the world’s electricity” (Rees 2006: 41). Its industry produced muni-
tions at vastly faster rates than any other country. For example, airplane 
production went from 6,000 in 1939 to over 96,000 in 1944 (ibid.: 40, 
42). As Sumner Welles bluntly put it in 1945, “The United States [is] 
the greatest Power in the World today” (1945: 115). Importantly, FDR 
had articulated impending US domination as a matter of “responsibility” 
and, as a muscular Christian, declared that the US would “not shirk that 
responsibility.”
However, the old boys also knew that just before the war the US, and 
the world, had experienced a Great Depression. First, as Clarence Dil-
lon was letting his employees go, the stock market collapsed in October 
1929. Both in the US and globally, market failure triggered a decade of 
high unemployment (reaching 25 percent in the US), poverty, low prof-
its, defl ation, plunging incomes, shrunken international trade (reduced 
by one-half to two-thirds), and lost economic growth. All US industries 
suffered, but the most affected were construction, agriculture, shipping, 
mining, and logging, as well as durable goods like automobiles and appli-
ances. The economy bottomed out in the winter of 1932–1933; then came 
four years of modest growth, followed by the Recession of 1937 until the 
beginning of 1939, and a return to 1934 unemployment levels. By 1939, 
though it was not clear the depression was over, it was clear that World 
War II had begun.
The novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald confi ded during this time to fellow nov-
elist Ernest Hemingway that, “The rich are different than you and me.” To 
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which Hemingway wisecracked, “Yes, they have more money.” Of course 
the rich still had more money during the Depression; they just had less 
of more. Some had lots less of it and threw themselves from windows as 
bankruptcies multiplied. To many it seemed as though capitalism was fail-
ing, which created a time of terrible reproductive vulnerability. Here was a 
great hermeneutic puzzle that elites’ were vexed to fi x—as Nitze’s dinner 
debate with Sir Montague, referred to in the previous section, illustrates. 
Overproduction, high consumer debt, poor market regulation permitting 
overoptimistic loans by banks and investors, the lack of high-growth in-
dustry, and growing wealth inequality—all were said, sometimes alone but 
usually in concert with each other, to be causes of the calamity.
Moreover, the old boys never fi xed the Great Depression. It just ended. 
Hoover and FDR, with differing hermeneutic politics, did everything they 
could to fi x it. They failed. War followed, and when it ended the depression 
was over. Clearly, depression threatened capitalism, and the fact they cap-
italists did not have the power to fi x it was depressing. The old boys might 
“have more money” now, but depression was shrouded in “obscurity,” and 
maybe they would not always have more money.
Collapse of the Old Empires
The US had leadership not only because it was so economically powerful, 
but also because formal empires had buckled (further documented in chap-
ter 6). The greatest of these, the British Empire, was terribly overstretched 
by 1945. Actually, some American elites had long realized that imperial 
England was in diffi cult place. In 1900, Brooks Adams told Henry Cabot 
Lodge, “England is sad—to me very sad,” to which Lodge responded, “Like 
you I hope she may revive, but I admit my hope is faint” (in Beale 1956: 
450).
By the end of World War II, other old boys were aware Great Britain 
was in decline because their English counterparts had told them so. Lord 
Beaverbrook, publisher of the Daily Express, at that time the world’s most 
widely read newspaper, in a letter to Harry Hopkins, FDR’s close confi -
dant, lamented, 
Here in Britain we are passing through a strange place in public life. For the fi rst 
time the English are not absolutely sure of themselves. They are anxious about 
their future. And this in some measure is due to the extent to which they have 
had to rely on outside assistance in the war. (In Sherwood 1948: 828). 
The UK had accumulated external liabilities fi ve times its prewar levels, 
liquidated most of its foreign assets, and lost much of export trade (ibid.: 
92). On V-J Day (Victory over Japan Day), the US unilaterally terminated 
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the Lend-Lease program that had loaned supplies to US allies during World 
War II. The UK had received by far the largest part, fully $31.4 billion. The 
termination of Lend-Lease threw Britain into even worse economic misery, 
with Lord Keynes declaring, it a “new Dunkirk” (Campbell and Herring 
1975: 180).
President Truman reported how the British came requesting assistance, 
pretty much hat in hand, because “the postwar ‘austerity’ had forced the 
British economy to cut back to bare essentials … and, as [Prime Minister] 
Attlee put it, ‘we can’t cut back much more; we don’t have any fat to sweat 
off’” (Truman 1956. Vol I: 429). Dean Acheson summarized the situation 
brutally: “Great Britain has lost an empire, and has not yet found a role” 
(1963: 162). Winston Churchill informed Acheson “that the hope of the 
world lies in the strength and will of the United States” (in Acheson 1969: 
729). The old imperial lion Churchill’s communication indicated that the 
UK had found its new role. Its “special relationship” to the US was to be 
that of lapdog.
The situation was worse for the other formal empires. Germany and 
Japan were bombed-out, occupied ruins lacking basic necessities. Average 
caloric consumption in parts of Germany was reported at 1,050 calories 
per day per person in early 1947. Cannibalism was reported (Thompson 
2009: 71). Other European empires were little better off, for the most part. 
Dean Acheson remarked, “In both Indochina and Indonesia colonial rule 
was beyond the power of either France or the Netherlands” (1969: 257). 
Summarizing this global landscape, President Eisenhower said, “Western 
Europe, as a result of the war, found itself in a state of economic collapse” 
(1963: 79), while “in the Far East the defeat of the Japanese Empire left 
chaos … China itself was in a state of confusion” (ibid.: 30). What an 
opportunity for the Security Elites 1.0: the whole world for creation. This 
brings us to the bear that was a leviathan.
A Leviathan Named Bear, and What to Do about It
On 29 August 1949, Joseph Stalin (“Uncle Joe” to FDR’s coterie), General 
Secretary of the Communist Party (1922–1953), announced detonation of 
Joe 1 (as the Americans called it), the Soviet Union’s fi rst atomic bomb. 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg—a Republican who helped formulate Cold 
War legislation—captured some of Washington’s apprehension about this 
explosion when he said, “This is now a different world” (in LaFeber 2002: 
91). The next few paragraphs explore the signifi cance of Vandenberg’s 
observation.
The exploration begins by contemplating German military prowess. At 
the beginning of World War II, the Wehrmacht (army), with its blitzkrieg 
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procedural culture combining infantry, tanks, and air support, was arguably 
the most formidable offensive land force ever seen; however, it depended 
on oil, of which Germany had no domestic source. In Western Europe in 
1940, the Wehrmacht overwhelmed the French and sent the British fl ee-
ing to their island refuge. In June 1941, Hitler turned east and attacked the 
Soviet Union with 4.5 million soldiers in Operation Barbarossa, in part to 
secure Caspian Sea oil. Bad move.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, the Red Army fought defen-
sively, gave ground, and, though rarely, ceded strategic places such as the 
Baku oilfi elds. Then, in December at Moscow, the Germans were stopped 
and set back. They were beaten once more in 1942 at Stalingrad, defeated 
yet again in 1943 at Kursk, and devastatingly routed in 1944 in Belarus. 
Approximately 3.5 to 4 million German soldiers were killed on the Eastern 
Front, while another 3 million became prisoners (Overmans 2000: 265). 
Consequently, when the Americans and English initiated their 1944 Nor-
mandy offensive they faced a Wehrmacht already shattered by the Red 
Army (L. Hart 1968). Accordingly, the US military had every reason to be 
respectful of the Soviet military. They knew who ahd destroyed the Wehr-
macht, whose ruin had made their Normandy invasion possible.
Yet the Soviet Union came out of World War II with enormous losses: 
roughly twenty million military and civilians killed, and the economy se-
verely damaged and in desperate need of recovery funds. So whereas the 
Soviets were militarily strong, they were economically needy. The US, for 
its part, was about to become militarily vastly stronger. The fi rst atomic 
device was tested in July 1945 in a desolate spot of New Mexico desert. At 
this test, J. Robert Oppenheimer, scientifi c director of the Manhattan Proj-
ect that built the bomb, remembered a colossal fl ash of light on detona-
tion, followed by a booming reverberation. Some observers laughed, others 
wept, most were still. “Oppenheimer himself recalled at that instant a line 
from the Bhagavad-Gita: ‘I am become death, the shatterer of worlds’” (in 
Stannard 1992: ix). Pugnaciously giddy at the US’s newly demonstrated 
strength, Truman told a visitor “that the Russians would so be put in their 
places; and that the US would then take the lead in running the world in 
the way that the world ought to be run” (in Williams [1959] 1972: 240). 
Truman was betraying something momentous. He intended to “run the 
world”; which of course was why Vandenburg had said, when the Russians 
detonated Joe 1, that it was “now a different world.”
Consider this world. If postwar human being is imagined as a sea, then 
the other formal imperial Leviathans were fl oundering or gone from it; 
save for the Soviets. The “Bear” is often used as a metonym for Russia. So 
out there in the sea of human being was another “shatterer of worlds”—
the Soviet Bear, an ursine impediment to the old boys “running the world.” 
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This posed a hermeneutic puzzle, and with it a hermeneutic politics: How 
should the USSR be treated?
An old, deep antipathy to the Soviets went back to the Bolshevik Rev-
olution. As President Wilson’s Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby ex-
pressed it in 1920:
The Bolsheviki … an inconsiderable minority of the people by force and cun-
ning seized the powers and machinery of government … and have continued 
to use them with savage oppression. … Their responsible statesmen … have 
declared … the very existence of Bolshevism … depends upon revolution in 
all other countries including the U.S. … The Third International … has for 
its openly avowed aim the promotion of revolution throughout the world. (In 
Hoover 1953: 360).
Colby represented the opinion of a Democratic administration. President 
Herbert Hoover expressed the view of a Republican administration sev-
eral years later when he announced that, from the Soviets’ “own books, 
speeches, and actions,” the administration had “detailed knowledge as to 
Soviet aggressive intentions to destroy the free world” (ibid.: 361).
President Franklin Roosevelt had a different, less apocalyptic under-
standing. He did not believe the Soviets were “trying to gobble up … the 
world” or that they had “any crazy idea of conquest” (in Gaddis 1972: 6). 
“Keenly aware of the realities of power,” as John Lewis Gaddis (1972: 6) 
puts it, 
Roosevelt knew that the United States and the Soviet Union would emerge 
from the war as the world’s two strongest nations. If they could stay together, 
no third power could prevail against them. If they could not, the world would 
be divided into two armed camps, a prospect too horrible to contemplate. 
In order to “stay together,” Roosevelt came up with what the journalist 
Forrest Davis (1943) termed a “World Blueprint” that, as he explained to 
his Saturday Evening Post readers, was a plan to collaborate with the USSR 
in organizing the postwar world. The hermeneutic politics among the old 
boys revolved around the question of the USSR’s appetite: Did it or did it 
not plan to “gobble up” the world?
One side in this politics followed FDR, tending to interpret the Sovi-
ets’ intentions charitably. Chip Bohlen, who had served in Russia prior to 
and during World War II and thus had fi rsthand experience of the USSR, 
assured his security elite colleagues that the Soviets were not interested 
in expansion (Nitze et al. 1989: 98). General Eisenhower, Supreme Com-
mander of the Allied Forces in Europe, “still felt warmly about the Russians” 
(Bohlen 1973: 222). Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (1944–1947), 
later the fi rst secretary of defense (1947–1949), also believed “Uncle Joe” 
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to be a “fi ne, frank, candid, and generally delightful fellow”(1951: 14). 
In February 1945 Edward Stettinius, FDR’s secretary of State at the end 
of the war, reported “a high degree of cooperation on the part of Stalin” 
(Campbell and Herring 1975: 262).
There was another side to the politics. Nitze believed that Chip—his 
old drinking companion from Porcellian days—had it wrong, and that the 
USSR was bent “on extending the Kremlin’s domination as far outward as 
practicable” (Nitze et al. 1989: 96). Forrestal (1951: 47) ran into Averill 
Harriman, the ambassador to Russia at the end of the war (1943–1946), 
who—contradicting Bohlen, his predecessor in Moscow—stated “his 
strong apprehensions as to the future of our relations with the Russians. … 
He said the outward thrust of Communism was not dead.” Forrestal came 
to have second thoughts on the Russians. The editors of his diary report 
than at the beginning of 1946, he “had been fi lling up his diary with re-
ported instances of Soviet aggression and domineering” (ibid.: 127). Even 
FDR, at the very end of his life, became exasperated. Forrestal (ibid.: 50) 
reported that “the President said … he felt our agreement with the Soviet 
Union so far had been a one-way street … if the Russians did not wish to 
join us they could go to hell.” A few months later on 12 April 1945, FDR 
suddenly said, “I have a terrifi c headache” (Sherwood 1948: 869) and died. 
Now the old boys were on their own. They would not fi nally solve the her-
meneutic puzzle of what to do about the Soviets until 1949/50. How they 
would make the solution depended in some measure on their understand-
ing of violence, which is discussed next.
The Old Boys Refl ect on Violent Force
The world built by the ancestors of the Security Elites 1.0 was violent: 
“Within no more than a handful of generations following their fi rst en-
counter with Europeans, the vast majority of Western Hemisphere native 
peoples had been exterminated” (Stannard 1992: 2). After the Civil War, 
lynching of blacks and other minorities with elite connivance was com-
monplace (Brundage 1993). Factory owners and their government allies 
repressed industrial unrest with brutal effi ciency from the 1880s through 
the 1930s (Goldstein 2010). During the time of US experimentation with 
formal empire at the turn of the twentieth century, warfare was continual 
in the Caribbean and Pacifi c. Theodore Roosevelt (TR) was matter-of-fact 
about the need for violence: “In the long run civilized man fi nds he can 
keep peace only by subduing his barbarian neighbors; for the barbarian will 
yield only to force” (1899, in “Special Friday Dead Racist Blogging” 2007). 
The core message of what TR was saying at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury was “peace depends upon violent force.”
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The old boys were hermetically sealed into TR’s understanding. As FDR 
put it in 1944, “Peace … can succeed only where there is a will to enforce 
it, and where there is available power to enforce it” (in Sherwood 194: 
817). Stimson, speaking to Congress in 1945, was clearer about the matter: 
“I realize only too well, the futility of what the Chinese call ‘spears of fi re’ 
and ‘swords of ice.’ In this disordered world, for decades to come, the suc-
cess of a program for peace will depend upon the maintenance of suffi cient 
strength” (Stimson and Bundy 1947: 597–598). And he was quite clear 
that what he meant by “suffi cient strength” was “the use of force … to 
prevent the depredations of an aggressor” (ibid.: 598). Eisenhower (1963: 
445), writing in the early 1950s, said even more unambiguously that “to 
be prepared for war is one of the most effectual ways of preserving peace.” 
However, he added one caveat when he insisted that “the United States 
on its own initiative would never start a major war” (ibid.: 446). Note that 
Eisenhower was talking about “major” confl icts. He did not swear the US 
off minor wars. Finally recall, at the turn of the twenty-fi rst century, that 
when accepting his Nobel Peace Prize, President Obama said, “all respon-
sible nations must embrace the role that militaries … can play to keep the 
peace.” How are these security elite statements to be grasped?
At the entrance to Auschwitz, Nazi offi cials put the phrase “Arbeit 
macht Frei” (Work makes you free), when work at the concentration camp 
actually made people dead. At the entrance to their geopolitics, Security 
Elites 1.0 effectively placed the sign “Gewalt macht frieden” (Violence 
makes peace). Note the hermeneutic of this world view: perceptually, it is a 
vicious world; procedurally, violence makes peace. True to the hermeneu-
tic, on 6 and 9 August 1945, the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were attacked with atomic bombs. The military had cute names for their 
nuclear weapons: Hiroshima got Little Boy and Nagasaki, Fat Man. Pres-
ident Truman, in a radio speech on the day of the Nagasaki attack, told 
Americans, “The world will note that the fi rst atomic bomb was dropped 
in Hiroshima, a military base: That was because we wish in this fi rst attack 
to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians” (Truman 1961: 212). 
Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were civilian targets. Violence does make 
peace—that of the grave.
Consider the human being the old boys were in. The formal empires 
were disappearing. East and West muddled along in “chaos” and “collapse,” 
in whose whirl there were two special eddies of “obscurity.” What would 
the Bear do? What about the return of depression? But what a systemic 
moment: “Only slowly,” Acheson put it, “did it dawn upon us that the 
whole structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was 
gone” (1969: 726). A “whole structure” gone meant a world to be made, 
and America was “the greatest Power.” Its old boys would do the making, 
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and they would infl ict violence. James Burnham (Princeton and Oxford), a 
signifi cant postwar intellectual who had worked for the Offi ce of Strategic 
Services (OSS, the CIA’s predecessor) during the war, predicted that “a 
World Empire has become possible, and the attempt will be made to estab-
lish a World Empire” (Burnham 1947: 58–61). In a 1942 joint statement, 
the editors of Fortune, Time, and Life magazines suggested who should run 
this empire when they called for a “new American imperialism” that would 
“promote and foster [US] private enterprise” (in Panitch and Gindin 2004: 
29). The next section follows the Security Elites 1.0 as they confronted 
a political contradiction and the reproductive vulnerability it produced 
along the way to creating the social being, the New American Empire, that 
fought the Cold War and beyond.
Imperial Contradictions
Recall that imperial contradictions are one form of political contradic-
tions. Imperial contradictions come in two main alternatives: dominator/
dominated, and inter-imperial. These alternatives are distinguished from 
each other by antagonistic structural units. “Dominator/dominated” con-
tradictions are those where the units in contradiction are elite dominators 
pitted against dominated subjects over distribution of the shares of value 
produced in the empire. Such contradictions occur within empires and of-
ten intensify to the level of warring, as in revolts, revolutions, or insurgen-
cies. The American Revolution was an example of such a contradiction: 
the dominated colonists in the thirteen colonies revolted against elites at 
the core of King George III’s monarchy, largely disputing who was going 
to get how much of the spoils of commercial capitalism. Later, in a further 
example of an acute dominator/dominated contradiction, Native Ameri-
can insurgency against encroaching settlers and their protecting cavalry 
during the US’s westward imperial growth was a struggle over who was 
going to get how much of the land. Often these insurgencies were sup-
pressed with grim violence. However, as the following chapter documents, 
the years after World War II were a time of especially successful revolt for 
the dominated.
“Inter-imperial” contradictions are those in which the units in the con-
tradiction are the empires themselves and the confl ict is between empires 
competing to accumulate value. The Punic Wars between Rome and Car-
thage (265–146 BC)—according to one source, the largest wars to have oc-
curred up to that time (Goldsworthy 2007: 13)—were an example of such 
a contradiction: the expanding Roman Empire collided with the already 
existing Carthaginian Empire over domination of the western Mediterra-
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nean, allowing the Romans to accumulate enormous quantities of force re-
sources. The spoils of inter-imperial war can be sweet, to the winner. There 
are such quantities of force resources and so much value at stake that for 
the winners, the question of when to war may come any time in a logic of 
warring to expand, expanding to war more, and so on.
Such a dynamic leads, if successful, to “universal empire”—dominion 
over the entire globe, a dream of imperialists since time out of mind. Sar-
gon of Akkad (2270–2215 BC), one of the world’s fi rst emperors, thought 
he had it in the third millennium BC; however, he suffered from a poor 
geographic understanding and had only a few towns and cities in what is 
now southern Iraq. Alexander the Great came closer to such an empire. 
Below I show how an inter-imperial contradiction emerged and intensifi ed 
after World War II between the US and the Soviets, provoking serious re-
productive vulnerability. The following section explores a reproductive fi x 
that, when implemented, constituted the New American Empire and set 
it sailing toward universal empire.4 It focuses on documenting a US/USSR 
inter-imperial contradiction.
The US/USSR Inter-imperial Contradiction: The US, as we have established, 
had emerged from the Great Depression as by far the strongest economy 
in the world. However, memory of the depression was never far from lead-
ers’ minds; nor was the belief, which as we saw began as far back as the 
1870s, that economic expansion was necessarily the fi x for problems like 
overproduction that provoked downturns. The historian William Apple-
man Williams expressed this mindset when he observed, “By the end of 
1946 … even government spokesmen warned that the US might ‘produce 
itself into a bust’ if it did not obtain more foreign markets and overseas 
investment opportunities” ([1959] 1972: 267). These same “spokesmen” 
judged that “Open Door expansion … was the answer to all problems” 
(ibid.). These spokesmen were correct in the sense that areas that fell 
within the Soviet Empire’s orbit turned out to be largely closed to Western 
economic activities. By 1947 the Soviets, believing the Truman and the 
Marshall Plans were designed to frustrate their own expansion even in 
Eastern European territories where the Red Army was stationed, sought to 
institutionalize their expansion into Eastern Europe. Stalin’s wily Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov remembered of this time that “we were on 
the offensive” because “they (the West) hardened their line against us, but 
we had to consolidate our conquests. We made our own socialist Germany 
out of our part of Germany, and restored order in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, and Yugoslavia … to squeeze out capitalist order. This was the 
Cold War” (in Gaddis 1997: 30). For Molotov in those days, Cold War in 
Eastern Europe was “to squeeze out capitalist order.”
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Unsurprisingly, a perceptual cultural message that hostilities against 
Russia were possible circulated among the US ruling elite. William Bullitt 
Jr. (Yale University, Scroll and Key Society), fi rst US ambassador to the 
USSR and onetime boss of Kennan, expressed this view in a 1947 speech 
when he said, “The fi nal aim of Russia is world conquest” (in Ambrose and 
Brinkley 1997: 77). By the end of the 1940s the National Security Council, 
located in the president’s Executive Offi ce, had become the preeminent 
security institution in the US. Its seventh directive, NSC 7 (1948), rein-
forced this perceptual cultural message, judging that although the USSR 
wanted a period of peace to build up its strength, it “might resort to war 
if necessary to gain its ends” (in Jervis 1980: 565). Military elites chimed 
in: General Lucius Clay, who during the Berlin Blockade had faced the 
Russians as they denied road and rail access to Berlin to the Americans 
and their allies (June 1948–May 1945), declared that war could come with 
“dramatic suddenness” (in Jervis 1980: 564). General MacArthur, US mili-
tary commander in East Asia, said: “Here in Asia is where the Communist 
conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest. Here we 
fi ght Europe’s war with arms” (in Jervis 1980: 124–127).
Importantly, there was a conviction that one US defeat could provoke 
a chain of other defeats. A Truman administration spokesman, testifying 
before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947, expressed this 
as follows:
Anything that happens in Greece and Turkey inevitably has an effect on the 
rest of the Middle East, in Western Europe, and clear around into the Pacifi c 
because all these people are watching what the US is doing. … If the countries 
of the world lose confi dence in us they may in effect pass under the Iron Cur-
tain. (In Jervis 1980: 573)
This was the “domino theory” interpretation of confl ict with the Soviets: 
if one country fell, others would follow, like a line of dominos. Was the 
interpretation valid? By 1950 the Russian Empire (1917), Eastern Eu-
rope (1945–1949), and China (1949) had fallen. Each of these areas had 
tumbled to violent force. The USSR had 21.4 million square kilometers, 
Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Ro-
mania) had 878,000 square kilometers, and China had 9.6 million square 
kilometers. Between 1917 and 1949 a total of 31,830,912 square kilome-
ters had become Communist. The total landmass of the earth is on the 
order of 148.9 million square kilometers. Accordingly, by 1949 approxi-
mately 21.5 percent of the world’s landmass had fallen to Russia and its 
allies, and on average in the thirty-two years between 1917 and 1949 about 
994,716 square kilometers of land were lost for capitalist enterprise every 
year, with all the territorial losses resulting from exercise of Communist 
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violent force. The domino theory seemed not so much theoretical specu-
lation as frightening fact.
In sum, the expansion of the Soviet Union and its communist allies 
occupied 21.5 percent of the globe in the three decades between 1917 and 
1949. This, to old boys peering out of their windows of authority, was a 
hard-to-miss intensifi cation of the inter-imperial contradiction. They re-
sponded in muscular Christian fashion with a reproductive fi x that consti-
tuted the New American Empire and, in so doing, added a “gargantuan” 
quantity of violent force to its governmental system.
The Fix: Onward Security Elites, Marching as to [Cold] War
Before marching on, let us explore what was, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
a heated academic hermeneutic politics about causes of the Cold War 
that is relevant to understanding how the Establishment fi xed the inter-
imperial contradiction at the New American Empire’s creation. Two sides 
engaged in this politics. On one side were Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (Exeter, 
Harvard, and a member of President Kennedy’s administration) and John 
Lewis Gaddis (Yale’s doyen of Cold War scholars). These two hermeneuts 
of the US academic Establishment held that the Cold War was the Soviets’ 
fault, and more specifi cally that the problem was Uncle Joe. Forrestal, who 
as mentioned above considered Stalin a “generally delightful fellow,” was 
not alone: “no American policy-maker in the mid-1940s seems to have 
perceived Stalin’s paranoia” (Hoffmann and Fleron 1980: 214). Neverthe-
less, Schlesinger suddenly discovered him to be insane in 1970 (in Gardner, 
Schlesinger, and Morgenthau 1970: 72–73). Gaddis supported Schlesinger 
and, when the Cold War was over, wrote Now We Know (1997). What 
we now knew was that Stalin was a man of “brutality” who suffered from 
“paranoia” (ibid.: 8).5 So, Gaddis queries: “Did Stalin therefore seek Cold 
War? The question is a little like asking: ‘does a fi sh seek water?’” (1997: 
25).
Opposing the Establishment’s heavyweights were leftist scholars—im-
portantly, the University of Wisconsin historians William Appleman Wil-
liams ([1959] 1972) and Walter LaFeber (2002)—who argued that the 
Cold War was the Americans’ fault. Their central point was that elite US 
governmental policy makers shared an overarching concern with main-
taining capitalism, and it was this anxiety that had provoked the confl ict. 
What are we to make of these two views?
Schlesinger and Gaddis proceeded to argue by calling their opponents 
names. First Schlesinger went after Williams, red-baiting him as “pro-
communist” in 1954 during the McCarthy era (Grandin 2009). Then 
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Schlesinger and Gaddis went after Old Joe, denouncing him as a “bad” 
paranoid (Gaddis 1997: 294). A. J. P. Taylor, the magisterial historian of 
The Origins of the Second World War (1961), argued that blaming this con-
fl ict, or any confl ict, on the actions of an evil maniac oversimplifi ed the 
complex interplay of causes. Schlesinger and Gaddis’s position explains 
away the sources of the Cold War by making it literally a freak show pro-
duced by a bad, mad Stalin.
For their part, Williams and LaFeber take the analysis into the realm of 
the actors controlling the institutions with the most political and economic 
force resources, and hence agency, at their disposal. These actors—sane 
old-boy security elites—were indeed desirous of supporting capitalism. 
They did so by instituting nonviolent and violent institutions and prac-
tices to facilitate its reproduction; thereby constructing the social being, 
the New American Empire. Examining the actors with the authoritative 
resources to choreograph other US force resources seems a useful way of 
examining how the Establishment fi xed the inter-imperial contradiction 
and built the social being that waged the Cold War. What follows is such 
an analysis.
The Hermeneutic that Solved the Unbearable
Hemingway and Fitzgerald had thought the old boys were different. In cer-
tain ways, they were a lot like everybody else. They had to rise and shine 
in the morning, shuffl e off to their ablutions, go to work, sit at their desks, 
and face the day; for, as Acheson preached, “Always remember the future 
comes one day at a time” (Acheson n.d: 1). Here is where the differences 
began. The offi ces of the Security Elites 1.0 featured outsized windows of 
authority that gave them responsibility over vast domains of events. Peering 
into the “chaos” of the postwar world through the windows of their author-
ity, one of the things they noticed was the Russian Bear, and as Acheson 
said, “We groped after interpretations of them ”(1969). Their groping fi nally 
resolved the hermeneutic puzzle of the Bear, resulting in a hermeneutic that 
began the march to the new empire and [cold] war. Let us follow this string, 
starting with the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945.
Yalta and Potsdam: Acheson had said, “the future comes one day at a time.” 
Of course, what “comes” is what security elites directly see as they peep out 
of their windows of authority. The Yalta Conference (4–11 February 1945) 
and four months later the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945) 
were important because in their course, US security elites looked out their 
windows to see their Soviet counterparts staring directly back at them. 
Though there was still fi ghting, the war had been won. The conferences 
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were about how to establish a postwar world or at least start the process. 
The conference leaders were the heads of the three victorious states—the 
USA, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. At Yalta, a frail FDR, Chur-
chill, and Stalin presided. FDR was pleased with the results. His concern 
had been, as much as possible, to ensure that the Atlantic Charter formed 
the basis of planning. An agreement was reached to reconstruct occupied 
countries in ways that, according to the Protocol of the Proceedings of the 
Yalta Conference, would allow them “to create democratic institutions of 
their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of 
all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live” 
(“Protocol of the Proceedings” 1945: 1569). Trade barriers were to be re-
moved, and the Open Door policy instituted. The Soviets too had hopes. 
Advisers to Stalin, such as his chief economist Eugen Varga, assumed that 
the capitalist countries would return to their prewar confl icts over trade 
and colonies. Further, Varga believed there would be a return to overpro-
duction and a consequent recession, inducing the US to offer the USSR 
assistance as a way of investing their way out of overproduction (McCagg 
1978). Both the Americans and the Soviets were to be disappointed. Crit-
ically, the Americans believed that after Yalta the Bear would permit de-
mocracy and the Open Door in Eastern Europe.
What a difference fi ve months made. The Potsdam Conference was 
held after FDR’s death (12 April) and the Germans’ surrender (8 May). 
Potsdam’s goal was to concretely negotiate postwar territorial realities. The 
US representative was the new president, Harry Truman. For the Ameri-
cans, the basis of negotiations was again the Atlantic Charter. The problem 
was that the Bear seemed to be reneging on its Yalta agreements. The Red 
Army occupied Eastern Europe on a north/south line roughly from Stettin 
in the north to Trieste in the south, and seemed indisposed to withdrawing. 
Forrestal (1951: 1) was concerned about the possibility of “disorder and 
destruction,” because the “Soviets, like Hitler, have become victory drunk 
and are embarking on world domination” so that the “situation in Poland 
is becoming increasingly serious.” Furthermore,
Berry’s dispatches from Bucharest and Harriman’s from Moscow indicate that 
the Russians have no idea of going through with the Allied Nations statement 
of policy about Rumania, namely to permit the establishment of free and dem-
ocratic institutions in Rumania. Steinhardt makes strong recommendations 
from Czechoslovakia against the complete withdrawal of American forces. He 
says this will be an open invitation to the Communists in the country and to 
Russian infl uence from without to take over. (Ibid.)
On 23 April—only a few days after taking offi ce—Truman sternly re-
buked Molotov over the USSR’s refusal to allow democratic elections in 
Poland (Gaddis 1972: 243). Harriman, then the US ambassador to Russia, 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
“Present at the Creation”
– 105 –
made a point of seeing Stalin when he arrived for the conference. Seeking 
to be tactful, he politely said, “It must be gratifying … to be in Berlin after 
four bloody years of battle.” Old Joe hesitated for a moment, “thought of 
other Russian imperialists who had pushed even farther west, and replied, 
‘Czar Alexander got to Paris’” (in Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 333–304).
July came, and the Red Army had not budged. Panicked refugees fl ed 
westward. Britain and America protested, but Stalin defended his actions, 
insisting that his control of Eastern Europe was defensive. History sup-
ported the Soviets’ claim. France invaded Russia under Napoleon; the 
Germans invaded during World War I; at the end of that war, the US and 
its Western European allies invaded the nascent Soviet Union; and in 1941 
Hitler invaded yet again. However, to the Americans and British at Pots-
dam, the Kremlin was insisting “on complete domination of the areas un-
der its control” in the name of defense (Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 307).
Worry over the obstinate Soviets came to a head at Potsdam. Ultimately, 
as we have seen, the debate concerned territory and its domination. In the 
territory under which Russia exercised “complete domination” there would 
be no democracy, no Open Door policy. Just fi ve months earlier Uncle Joe 
and the US had been wartime buddies. Roosevelt had promised the Amer-
ican people that Stalin would allow free elections. He did not. The State 
Department, according to one State Department offi cial, was “fl oundering 
about” (in Thompson 2009: 59). The Bear was a hermeneutic nightmare. 
Somebody needed to offer a defi nitive interpretation of what was happen-
ing and what to do. Who could the old boys turn to?
Mr. Kennan Gives His “Interpretive Analysis”: The necessary analysis had 
to be offered by the State Department as the institution responsible for 
US foreign affairs, so the interpreter had to be one of their own. Why not 
George F. Kennan (Princeton), the deputy chief of mission in Moscow and 
the State Department’s top Soviet expert? He was a brainy hermeneut 
and, according to one commentator, a “poster child for the theory that 
mild-to-clinical depression actually enhances one’s ability to analyze the 
world” (Youngsmith 2010: 2). Occasionally he strayed off message—once, 
for example, he informed an audience that “there is a little bit of the total-
itarian” in all people (in Harlow and Maerz 1991: 168) at a time when US 
hermeneuts were pushing the message that only the Russians were totali-
tarians. Critically, according to Nitze (Nitze et al. 1989: 85), he had “inti-
mate familiarity” with the Soviet Union. Iconic of this intimacy was a 1944 
entry in Kennan’s (2000: 90) diary: “The women had broad faces, brown 
muscular arms, and the powerful maternal thighs of the female Slav.” Fan-
tasize on, George. The year 1944 was one of famine in the USSR, and a lot 
of those powerful thighs would have been pretty withered. 
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Nevertheless, the State Department had to work with what they had. 
George was the old boys’ hermeneut-on-the-spot, so in February 1946 he 
was summoned by a State Department cable: “We should welcome receiv-
ing from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of 
future implementation of [Stalin’s] announced policies” ( in Thompson 
2009: 56). He went to work lickety-split and on 22 February cabled his 
5,300-word interpretation back to Washington. Known now as the Long 
Telegram, it went, in the language of the Internet, “viral.” It was 
distributed … throughout the State Department and then rerouted … to every 
embassy in the world. … Averell Harriman passed a copy to Secretary of the 
Navy James Forrestal, who passed copies to hundreds of colleagues. The Secre-
tary of State read it. The President read it. Soviet spies in Washington read it. 
(Thompson 2009: 59) 
What did they read? The text was divided into fi ve parts. The fi rst four 
parts interpreted the Soviets and Communism. The fi nal part proposed 
policy possibilities based on the fi rst four parts. Nothing good was said 
about the Soviet governance or Communism. The government suffered 
from an “instinctive … sense of insecurity.” Its members had a “neurotic 
view of world affairs.” They harbored “disrespect … for objective truth.” 
Their Communism was a “malignant parasite.” The most quoted sentence 
of the telegram stated that “we have here,” in the Soviet Union, 
a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can 
be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the 
internal harmony of our [US] society be disrupted, our traditional way of life 
be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power 
is to be secure. (This quotation and prior ones from the Long Telegram come 
from Kennan 1946) 
The interpretation was clear. The USSR was a neurotic, fanatic, insecure 
beast out to disrupt and destroy the American “way of life,” all of which 
was unbearable. Part of the hermeneutic puzzle had been resolved. Un-
cle Joe was reclassifi ed as paranoid, and the old boys had an enemy upon 
which to practice muscular Christianity.
However, the fi fth part of the Long Telegram had not been especially 
clear about what this practice might be. That lacuna was addressed when 
Kennan was asked to bring the Long Telegram to a wider audience by pub-
lishing it in the journal Foreign Affairs, which he did in an anonymously 
published text and mysteriously dubbed the “X-article.” It was brought to 
ordinary citizens in excerpted versions printed in mass media magazines 
like Reader’s Digest, Life, and Newsweek. It insisted that the Kremlin should 
be handled with “fi rm and vigilant containment, designed to confront the 
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Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show 
signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” 
(Kennan 1947). This “containment,” a term Kennan used three times in 
the X-article, was the missing procedure regarding what to do with the 
Bear: contain it in a cage.
Kennan’s Long Telegram and the X-article instituted a hermeneutic that 
solved the unbearable Bear’s hermeneutic puzzle. The fi rst message of the 
hermeneutic was that of perceptual culture: If you saw the Bear, you saw 
the enemy. The second message was procedural: Contain it with “counter-
force.” Because these two messages existed in written form, they became 
part of the public culture. Learned by large numbers of Americans perusing 
their Readers’ Digests, they became part of the country’s neuronal culture. 
However, this hermeneutic was especially relevant for the old boys, be-
cause as members of the offi cial Establishment they were obliged by their 
windows of authority to deal with the Soviets. Hence, the Long Telegram 
and the X-article might be thought of as shaping how they experimentally 
fi xated upon the unbearable Bear.
Aware of Kennan’s interventions, the Soviets asked their Washington 
ambassador, Nicolai Novikov, to respond by assessing the Truman admin-
istration’s foreign policy intentions. Novikov’s response was cabled to Mo-
lotov in September 1946. The cable’s fi rst line announced:
The foreign policy of the United States, which refl ects the imperialist tenden-
cies of American monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar period by 
a striving for world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements 
by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles; that 
the United States has the right to lead the world. All the forces of American di-
plomacy—the army, the air force, the navy, industry, and science—are enlisted 
in the service of this foreign policy. (Novikov 1946) 
Between 1946 and 1950, as the next section shows, the old boys marched 
on to transform the containment hermeneutic into public délires, thereby 
making Ambassador Novikov’s announcement to be prophetic. In fact, 
they would fi x the inter-imperial contradiction by constituting a New 
American Empire that did seek “world supremacy.”
Instituting the Public Délires of the New American Empire
Instituting empire meant building up the institutions of the economic sys-
tem of capitalist accumulation and fusing them to those of the governmen-
tal system. This choreographing was the work of devising public délires; 
whose implementation made possible performance of force extraction and 
its support. Two sorts of public délires were needed to perform these opera-
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tions: (1) those whose implementation resulted in economic system force 
extraction, and (2) those whose implementation in the political system 
supported force extraction. At the same time, two specifi c sorts of politi-
cal system public délires were necessary: (1) those whose implementation 
peacefully supported the economic system, and (2) those whose imple-
mentation violently supported the economic system. Finally, two types of 
violent public délires were instrumental in violently supporting resource ex-
traction: (1) those whose implementation resulted in violent institutions, 
and (2) those whose implementation guided the level and the direction 
of violence. The next few pages explore the old boys constituting public 
délires and creating empire on the job.
The Economic System: Actually, the economic system was already consti-
tuted and was operating well at the end of the war. US fi rms were in a com-
manding global economic position, as other advanced capitalist states and 
the Russian economy were shattered. Consequently, it was believed that 
American fi rms would invest in foreign places, take over their economies, 
and repatriate profi ts to accumulate back in the US core. This process 
would hasten core US corporations’ progression from national to trans-
national enterprises—and thus establishing global domination of capital 
accumulation. Global capital accumulation would turn out to be no easy 
thing. Not all would go well. However, exploration of this is reserved for the 
following chapter. The remainder of this section documents the construc-
tion of the nonviolent and violent institutions of governmental system.
Developing Peaceful Governmental Support: Old Joe was right—Czar Alex-
ander’s troops, upon Napoleon’s defeat, had made it as far as Paris. How-
ever, Metternich and Bismarck had successfully kept Russia out of Central 
Europe. Stalin succeeded where the czar had failed. After Potsdam, it was 
clear that the Soviets were extending their domination throughout Eastern 
and Central Europe. Unclear, and nerve-racking, was whether there would 
be additional expansion into Western Europe and the Middle East. Es-
sentially, the old boys developed iterations of the Open Door public délire 
to help prevent this development. These iterations involved the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.
In early 1947, the fi nancially exhausted British government informed 
its American counterpart that it would cease supporting the Greek state 
after 31 March of that year. This was ominous. The Greek government was 
engaged in a civil war with its Communists, and cessation of British sup-
port offered the Bear a tempting opportunity. State Department offi cials 
feared that Greece’s fall could have a ripple effect, spreading Soviet power 
throughout the Middle East. President Truman responded by addressing a 
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joint session of Congress (12 March 1947) with a request for $400 million 
to aid both Greece and Turkey. This speech’s substance became known as 
the Truman Doctrine. It did not directly mention the Soviets, but it did say 
that “the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want,” 
with everyone knowing that the Kremlin was the totalitarian regime. So 
the money would contain Soviet expansion, serving as “an investment in 
world freedom and world peace” (Truman 1947).
The Truman Doctrine applied to only two countries. However, the 
following year it was expanded to effectively cover all of Western Eu-
rope. This expansion had begun as a bee-in-the-bonnet of Forrestal, who 
wanted a “face-off” against the Soviets that would directly “pit capital-
ism against Marxism” (in Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 404). The point of 
this face-off was that successful capitalism alone would contain the Sovi-
ets. After all, who would want a decrepit economy like the USSR’s when 
they could have a shiny new capitalist model? Forrestal enlisted two other 
old boys—Clark Clifford, then an infl uential White House counsel, and 
George Marshall, who had just become secretary of State—in his projected 
face-off. Marshall, in turn, gave the job of turning Forrestal’s idea into 
policy to George Kennan, who after his Long Telegram success had been 
made chief of the newly formed (on 7 May 1947) Policy Planning Staff. 
For a time this blandly named unit would be the geostrategic brains of the 
State Department.
Marshall fi rst announced the plan that would bear his name at the Har-
vard graduation on 5 June 1947. He stated:
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist 
in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there 
can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is not directed 
against any country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Any 
government that is willing to assist in recovery will fi nd full co-operation on 
the part of the U.S.A. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy 
in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in 
which free institutions can exist. (Marshall 1947)
Marshall promised “the world” US “cooperation” in its “recovery” so that 
“free institutions,” meaning capitalist ones, would prevail. The USSR and 
its Eastern European allies, now pejoratively called its “satellites,” were 
initially offered participation in the Marshall Plan. They rejected it, fearing 
it was a Trojan Horse meant to weaken socialist economic organization. So 
“cooperation” extended only to Western Europe in the form of $13 billion 
dispensed by the European Recovery Program (1948–1951).
The considerable debate over how to evaluate the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan has ranged from viewing it as an example of US 
generosity to considering it out-and-out economic imperialism (Kolko and 
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Kolko 1972). Both views have their merits, though one questions whether 
US goodwill was all that compassionate. Together the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan were important ways for the old boys to go about 
supporting their economic system.6 Both provided US money to Western 
European governments. This was “goodwill.” But these investments were 
carrots to entice those governments to construct “free,” that is to say, cap-
italist institutions. The preceding makes explicit that money-giving was 
client-making, and that clients would, at least to some degree, run their 
economies in capitalist ways. Thus, US goodwill was not extended out of 
compassion, but as a way to open the door to US businesses. As such, was 
an iteration of the Open Door public délire.
Other policies the old boys implemented at the time further promoted 
the Open Door public délire. For example, Western European states that 
still had formal empires and wished to receive Marshall Plan funding had 
to allow US companies access to their colonies (Kiernan 1978: 285). Fur-
ther, the US government sought to make it possible for US capitalist fi rms 
to conduct business without restrictions in Eastern Europe, in effect at-
tempting to extend the Open Door policy there.
This threatened Soviet domination. Stalin and Foreign Minister Mo-
lotov, as already discussed, insisted that Eastern Europe must remain as a 
barrier against renewed Western invasion, and that these countries would 
be of little use as a buffer if they had capitalist economies. Additionally, any 
implementation of the Open Door policy in Eastern Europe threatened to 
divert economic benefi ts from Soviet to capitalist enterprise. Consequently, 
in the years immediately after Potsdam the USSR began to institute what 
might be termed a Closed Door policy, working in the late 1940s to create 
a relatively autarkic economic and political space in Eastern Europe.7
Thus, by the early 1950s the US, through iterations of its Open Door 
public délire, was providing nonviolent governmental support to its eco-
nomic system, which in Eastern Europe had obliged the Soviet Union to 
withdraw into semi-isolation. Let us now consider the building of violent 
capabilities in the governmental system.
Developing the Institutions of Violence: The War-Making Institutions Public 
Délire: The US military had demobilized rapidly after wars in the eigh-
teenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Initially, World War II 
was no exception. The annual rate of US military spending plunged from 
$83 billion at the end of 1945 to $7 billion in 1945 (“Defense Spending 
and Troop Levels” 2014). The US seemed to be turning pacifi st. How-
ever, about a year and a half after the Long Telegram, and just as Kennan’s 
X-article was being published, Truman signed the National Security Act 
(26 July 1947). Its fi rst line stated, “In enacting this legislation, it is the in-
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tention of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future se-
curity of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated 
policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the 
Government relating to national security” (National Security Act 1947). 
The CIA, in its public “Featured Story Archive,” tells the world: “The 
importance of the National Security Act cannot be overstated. It was the 
central document in the US Cold War policy and refl ected the nation’s 
acceptance of its position as a world leader” (CIA 2008: 1). It was the 
work of many old boys, but Forrestal, even though he initially opposed 
certain portions of it, and Kennan were especially important in bringing it 
to a Congressional vote. It constituted the postwar US security apparatus.
The act merged different military institutions into a common agency, 
the Defense Department, headed by a secretary of Defense. Forrestal, who 
had been worried about a “face-off” with the Soviets, became the fi rst 
Defense secretary. Further, the act formed the National Security Council 
(NSC), which was allocated “the function … to advise the President with 
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relat-
ing to the national security” (National Security Act 1947: 7).8 Advice to 
the president was offered through the issuance of consecutively numbered 
policy “directives.” In the early years of the Cold War, the personnel of the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff did much of the work preparing 
the NSC policy directives.
Finally, the Act authorized the CIA to, “provide overall direction for 
and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the 
United States through human sources by elements of the intelligence com-
munity” (National Security Act 1947: 30).9 Kennan had been particularly 
interested in refurbishing the US’s intelligence and covert action capa-
bilities after Truman terminated the OSS. Kennan confi ded to Forrestal 
that he wanted the CIA to be a “guerilla war corps” (in Weiner 2008: 29) 
specializing in covert operations. Kennan tended to call these operations 
“political warfare.” He regretted the US was defi cient in them because, 
he was convinced, “the creation, success, and survival of the British Em-
pire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of 
the principles of political warfare.” So, he further believed, “we have been 
handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of the basic 
difference between peace and war” (in Thompson 2009: 84). Kennan’s 
view was unsettling: empire depended in part on covert operations that, 
being intrinsically violent, are hidden; hence, they hide war in the illusion 
of peace.
The Defense Department, the CIA, and the NSC were and are the 
anatomy of governmental violence because the fi rst two institutions did, 
and do, much of the warring—covert or overt—and the latter institution 
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does much of the planning of that violence. The National Security Act 
was a “central document,” then, in that it constituted the institutional 
anatomy of US violence. Three additional NSC directives further shaped 
that anatomy.
Several months after passage of the National Security Act, the National 
Security Council issued a directive concerning covert action. This was 
NSC 4-A (NSC 4-A 1947), which specifi ed that covert action would be 
conducted by the CIA and would occur in times of peace as well as war. 
NSC 4-A increased presidential authority by placing covert operations 
within the CIA, which was within the US government’s executive branch, 
overseen by the president. However, NSC 4-A’s defi nition of the CIA’s 
covert activities referred to “psychological warfare,” and this terminology 
prompted hermeneutic debate among the Washington elites as to the pre-
cise meaning of such activities. NSC 10/2, formulated by Kennan’s Policy 
Planning Staff and issued 18 July 1948, replaced NSC 4-A and clarifi ed 
the matter. The directive fi rst ordered that, “a new Offi ce of Special Proj-
ects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and 
conduct covert operations” (NSC 10/2, 1948). It additionally directed that 
such operations
are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are con-
ducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups 
or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and 
executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to 
unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly 
disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifi cally, such operations shall include 
any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive di-
rect action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation mea-
sures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground 
resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of 
indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. 
Such operations shall not include armed confl ict by recognized military forces, 
espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations. 
(Ibid.)
NSC 10/2 made it clear: during peacetime a branch of the US govern-
ment, the secretive Offi ce of Special Projects would conduct hidden war-
fare against enemies.
In sum, the National Security Act of 1947 had constituted overt US 
war-making within the new Defense Department, covert war-making 
within the CIA, and security planning within the NSC. As such, the act 
was indeed a “central document” and can be termed the War-Making In-
stitutions public délire. The act, however, had not clarifi ed what level of vi-
olent force would be at the disposal of the New American Empire, nor the 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
“Present at the Creation”
– 113 –
direction in which this violence would be directed. Kennan would address 
this oversight in another NSC decision.
Kennan Addresses the Level and Direction of Violence: Three months after 
settling the question of covert US violence in NSC 10/2, Kennan addressed 
the issue of the level and direction of violence in NSC 20/4 (23 November 
1948). Here, as had been the case in the Long Telegram and the X-arti-
cle, the argument was made in terms of a Soviet bogeyman. The direc-
tive begins by asserting, “Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly 
demonstrate that the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the 
domination of the world” (NSC 20/4 1948). Paranoid Old Joe wanted the 
world. He had to be stopped. In order for this to happen the US had to 
“develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as 
necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression” (ibid.). Additionally, Amer-
ica had to “maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening 
of our peace-time economy” (ibid.). NSC 20/4 is both clear and obscure at 
the same time. It indicated the direction of US violence by making clear 
that military containment of the Soviets was “necessary.” However, it says 
nothing concerning how much military force was “necessary.”
Perhaps this murkiness was because Kennan was beginning to harbor 
reservations about just how much violent force was needed to militarily 
check the USSR. These hesitations sparked a hermeneutic politics. In a 
letter of 6 April 1948 to the infl uential columnist Walter Lippmann, well 
before NSC 20/4, Kennen claimed, “The Russians do not want to invade 
anyone. It is not in their tradition. … They don’t want war of any kind” (in 
Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 446). This letter was unsent. The Europeans, 
for their part, had their own fears about the Soviets, and on 17 March 
1948 they signed the Treaty of Brussels, which bound Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom in a mutual defense 
pact against Russia. However, because US participation in the treaty was 
thought necessary to make it credible to the Kremlin, talks for a new mili-
tary alliance began almost immediately with Washington. Kennan opposed 
US membership in any such alliance, believing it a needless provocation. 
This reluctance to bait the Bear cost Kennan credibility among other “old 
boys.” McCloy thought Kennan was “too damn esoteric”; Lovett said, “I 
liked him more as Mr. X”; and Acheson fi nished him off with the observa-
tion that he was a “horse who would come up to a fence and not take it” 
(Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 449–450). Kennan suffered from a “muscular 
Christianity” defi cit.
Western Europeans’ negotiation of a mutual defense treaty against the 
Russians progressed smoothly, culminating in the April 1949 signing of 
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the North Atlantic Treaty, which inaugurated the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). The treaty members 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defense will assist the Party or Parties being 
attacked, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force. (NATO 1949)
NATO was signifi cant because it bound the US to militarily support its 
Western European allies. Such military alliances would become com-
monplace throughout the world in the coming years. If the Truman and 
Marshall Plans provided carrots of economic assistance, NATO provided 
another sort of carrot. The US offered to kill for its client states. Who 
could ask for anything more?
Kennan had lost on NATO. In the summer of 1949 he made Paul Nitze 
his deputy at the Policy Planning Staff. Also that summer, he wrote that he 
had begun to feel “like a court jester … not to be taken fully seriously”(in 
Isaacson and Thomas 1986: 474). He had reason to feel as he did. Acheson, 
who had now replaced Marshall as secretary of State, curtailed Kennan’s 
infl uence. In September Kennan informed the secretary of State that he 
wished to be relieved of his Policy Planning Staff duties. He left the State 
Department in June 1950. The court jester had become nobody’s fool.
Nitze succeeded to his post, and very soon was involved in drafting what 
was to become the most important of the NSC directives. In the midst of 
this rearranging of the security elites building the US Leviathan, something 
happened that frightened them, and fear brought a particular perceptual 
“theory” of the way the world could change.
The Bomb and the Domino Theory: As we have seen, the US military was the 
fi rst to acquire nuclear weapons. Thereafter, American killing elites slept 
contentedly at night knowing they could incinerate anybody, anywhere, 
without reprisals. How did they know this? They had done it, cremating 
gratifyingly large numbers of civilians in Japan in 1945—showing the world 
who’s who, militarily speaking. So when the Soviets detonated their own 
atomic bomb (29 July 1949), they created a world where they could do for 
Americans just as Americans had done for the Japanese.
The Security Elites 1.0 now knew dread. They began to interpret what 
defeat might look like, imaging a situation where one US defeat could pro-
voke a chain of other defeats. This was the previously mentioned “domino 
theory”—a perceptual cultural message that the fall of one country to the 
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Communists would lead, like dominoes falling, to the loss of a whole string 
of countries.10 It was not entirely fanciful. Since its inception, the Soviet 
Union had announced its intention of expanding Communism. Gaddis 
recollected how Lenin,
convinced that capitalism required exploitation of colonies for their raw mate-
rials and markets … launched an appeal soon after the Bolshevik Revolution, 
for the “peoples” of the East” to overthrow their masters. He even authorized 
a congress of such peoples, held in Baku in 1920 … at which fellow Bolshevik 
Grigorii Zinoviev called for jihad against imperialism and capitalism amidst a 
frenzied waving of swords, daggers, and revolvers. (1997: 158)
Actually, in the 1920s and 1930s through World War II the USSR did 
rather little to help those in the East “overthrow their masters.” But Mos-
cow never gave up on Asian revolution. Thus, Stalin justifi ed withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from China and Iran in 1946 as a way of exposing British 
and American imperial exploitation, thereby unleashing “a movement of 
liberation” in the colonies (in Gaddis 1997: 158). Hence, the intention to 
expand was announced from the inception of the Soviet Communist proj-
ect, and to American elites this meant elimination of places where their 
capitalism could go about its accumulation.
Consequently, nagged by the double anxiety of the Soviet bomb and the 
possibility of losing territory in domino-theory scenarios, President Truman 
directed his National Security Council to reevaluate US policies toward 
the Soviet Union. The Soviets had immensely augmented their military 
capabilities. How would the US respond? This spawned hermeneutic pol-
itics among the old boys as to whether to up the ante and build a bigger 
bomb, the hydrogen bomb. Nitze strongly favored building it. The “court 
jester” Kennan, almost as his last act in government, argued powerfully 
against it; writing on 20 January 1950 a seventy-nine page document stat-
ing his case and expressing fear that development of the “atomic weapon 
… will carry us to the misuse and dissipation of our national strength” (in 
Thompson 2009: 106). Spending escalating amounts on the military Ken-
nan said would cause “dissipation” because the Soviets would meet each 
military advance with their own innovations. The language was strong: 
the string of events of escalating militarization led to “dissipation.” Eleven 
days later Truman publicly announced his plan to build hydrogen nuclear 
weapons. Thus the old boys responded to fear with a bigger bomb, and 
American schools from sea to shining sea were instructed to institute the 
practice of “duck and cover,” in which, after the bell rang, you ducked 
under your desk and shielded your head with your arms to protect against 
the nuclear fi reball.
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NSC 68: The Global Domination Public Délire: At the same time that 
the hydrogen bomb was being debated, the Policy Planning Staff was in-
structed to prepare a NSC directive that put the H-bomb’s acquisition 
within a larger strategic perspective. By this time Kennan had been re-
placed by Nitze, whose disposition toward violence differed greatly from 
Kennan’s, perhaps due to childhood experience. Nitze’s father had been a 
University of Chicago professor. The neighborhood around the university 
was tough. For a while a gang roughed Nitze up on his way to school. He 
responded by joining another gang, which beat up members of the fi rst 
gang, thereby freeing Nitze from diffi culties with the fi rst gang. The con-
viction that Gewalt macht Frieden had literally been beaten into Nitze. His 
Policy Planning Staff would author NSC 68 and make this point the prime 
national security goal.
NSC 68, issued in 1950, became the old boys’ ultimate resolution of the 
hermeneutic puzzle of what to do about the Soviets in a nuclear world. To 
understand the interpretation taken, fi rst note NSC 68’s rhetorical strat-
egy, which has been described as “apocalyptic” (Youngsmith 2010: 5). Its 
discourse plays on the trope of a “design.” The Soviets had an “evil design,” 
a “design … for the complete subversion or forcible destruction” of the en-
tire non-Soviet world, a “design for world domination” whose implementa-
tion would be “violent and ruthless” (NSC 68 1950: 6,13). This rhetorical 
strategy was set to the substantive chore of arguing that the US and Soviet 
Union were the earth’s two greatest powers and that this world was in “cri-
sis.” The crisis was due to the Soviets, and the Soviets alone, who “unlike 
previous aspirants to hegemony” were “animated by a fanatic new faith, 
antithetic to our own” that drove them to “impose … absolute authority 
over the rest of the world. Confl ict has, therefore, become endemic and 
is waged … by violent and non-violent means” (ibid.). NSC 68’s under-
standing of the Russians was piece of perceptual culture. Moreover, it was 
a hermeneutic break that dispensed with John Quincy Adams’s injunction, 
“America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Nitze had 
gone in search of monsters and had found one in the Bear. If the Soviets 
were the Americans’ Other; Nitze’s NSC 68 made certain they were un-
derstood as a “fanatic” monster-alterity.
Given this interpretation, NSC 68 proposed a procedural solution for 
the “crisis” with enduring global implications for US power. NSC 68 an-
nounced that “our position as the center of power in the free world places a 
heavy responsibility on the US for leadership. We must organize and enlist 
the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace 
which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination” (ibid.).
NSC 68 conjures up a monstrous social being, the Soviet Leviathan. 
Opposing the Soviet Empire is a good social being, “the free world”—
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of capitalism and liberal democracy—which America, as its “center of 
power,” “must organize” to “frustrate.” However, if “the free world” is un-
derstood as a euphemism for US Empire, then NSC 68 calls upon the US 
to “organize” its subordinates to “frustrate” the evil empire’s “design for 
world domination.” Of course, if the US was to “organize” the “free world” 
it would in fact be dominating it, and this domination meant that if the US 
thwarted the Soviets, its only competitor for world domination, then the 
US itself would achieve “world domination.” Ganging up on the USSR, 
according to the text of NSC 68, was to occur through “a rapid and con-
certed [military] build-up of the actual strength of both the US and other 
nations of the free world” (ibid.). The good guys in the free world were to 
arm themselves, big time. Nitze of the Security Elite 1.0 (and Hotchkiss 
and Harvard, via Chicago’s mean streets), proposed that the US organize a 
violent gang on a global scale, call it the “free world,” and set it up to “frus-
trate” the monster-alterity. NSC 68 instituted a particular public délire: 
perceptually there might be threats to US global domination; procedurally, 
these were to be eliminated, violently if necessary. This might be said to be 
the NSC 68 iteration of what was literally a global domination public délire. 
There would be other iterations.
What was, and is, NSC 68’s signifi cance? NSC 68 validated Ambassa-
dor Novikov’s interpretation of postwar America because it affected the 
level and the direction of US violence. John Quincy Adams’s warning was 
summarily jettisoned. The New American Empire would now sail out of 
its territory to all places in the world in search of monsters to slay. Because 
some of these, like the Bear, were very violent, the level of US violence had 
to be even greater. Novikov had said Washington sought “world suprem-
acy.” He was correct, and NSC 68 was an iteration of the global domina-
tion public délire designed to achieve it.
President Truman was alarmed when fi rst informed of NSC 68, realizing 
that it had immense budgetary implications because US violent force had 
to be suffi cient to nullify the Soviets’ violent force. Consequently, rather 
than immediately authorizing NSC 68 Truman initially shelved it, request-
ing further study of its fi nancial implications.
However, over the following years it was instituted. In fact, by the early 
twenty-fi rst century the US security budget was judged to be “enormous” 
(Hartung 2007: 1), a description applicable since the early 1950s. In the 
early 2000s it was estimated to be around a trillion dollars annually (Higgs 
2007). Currently this spending represents roughly half of the world’s total 
military expenditures, and when the expenditures of Atlantic Community 
clients (NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia) are added in, the fi gure 
rises to 72 percent (Hellman and Sharp 2009). Approximately 50 percent 
of US tax revenues are spent on military items. These funds purchased 
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approximately 1.45 million active-duty US soldiers in 2011 (Infoplease 
2011: 1). Additionally, in the 1980s the UK had 344,150 soldiers, West 
Germany had 495,000 soldiers, and France had 500,000 soldiers (LaFeber 
2002: 284).
However, “The crucial military superiority is not nuclear weapons or 
weight of numbers but global deployment and fi repower” (M. Mann 2003: 
20). The US had fourteen bases outside its borders in 1938 (Lutz 2009). 
According to the Defense Department’s annual Base Structure Report for 
2003, the Pentagon owned or rented 702 overseas bases in 130 countries, 
with another 6,000 bases in the US and its territories (C. Johnson 2005). 
If the number of countries in the UN is taken as a proxy indicator of the 
number of countries in the world, then the US had bases in 67.4 percent 
of all the world’s states in 2003. Lutz and Vine estimated there were from 
900 to 1,000 bases throughout the world by 2009 (Lutz 2009; Vine 2009); 
personnel, according to the Defense Department, were in 150 countries 
in 2011 (“US Military Personnel by Country” 2011)—that is, 78 percent 
of the countries in the UN. The New American Empire has not instituted 
formal colonies. Why bother, when your soldiers are there to violently en-
force your interests?
In the 1990s US fi repower was especially enhanced by a “revolution in 
military affairs” (RMA), which refers to “a major change in the nature of 
warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies 
which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and opera-
tional and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and 
conduct of military operations” (M. Mann 2003: 23).11 
The inter-imperial contradiction intensifi ed as the Soviets expanded fol-
lowing World War II. Such a situation promised reproductive vulnerabili-
ties, so the old boys became fi xated on the hermeneutic puzzle of the nasty 
Bear. Between 1947 and 1950 fi ve governmental acts (the National Secu-
rity Act in 1947, NSC 4-A in 1947, NSC 10/2 in 1948, NSC 20/4 in 1948, 
and above all NSC 68 in 1950) instituted the Open Door, war-making 
institutions, and global domination public délires. All this created govern-
mental support for the US imperial social being’s economic system, whose 
capitalist institutions were doing quite well extracting value at home and 
abroad. It is time now to specify the overall structural form and glue of this 
New American Empire.
A Three-Tiered Rental Empire
Since 1945 the US has developed what might be termed a three-tiered 
imperial system. The “imperial core” of the US, with the most force and 
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power, has been at the top of this hierarchy. Beneath the US has been a 
second tier of countries that Dean Acheson spoke of in a radio speech to 
the nation on 18 March 1949, when he said, “North America and West-
ern Europe have formed the two halves of what is really one community,” 
which he called the “Atlantic community” (Acheson 1949). Acheson’s use 
of “community” appears to refl ect to his belief that many people in North 
America and Western Europe broadly shared liberal cultural ideologies. 
The Atlantic Community originally included capitalist Western Europe 
but has increasingly grown to include honorary members such as Japan 
and Australia. Taken together, the original members of the community and 
the later additions might be called the “greater Atlantic community.” Since 
the fi nal elimination of formal empire, the US has tended to utilize certain 
geopolitically signifi cant states in the developing world as sub-imperialist 
satrapies in the sense that they defend US interests in their region. Iran 
under the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1953–1979) was such an ally in 
the Middle East. Considerable strategic rent has been paid to the second 
tier via programs such as the Marshall Plan and NATO.
Second-tier states have considerable force and power; consequently, 
they have some ability to negotiate relations with the core. Their auton-
omy varies. Some, such as France under President De Gaulle, have been 
more independent. Others, like Germany, have been more compliant with 
US demands though at times showing independence, for example with 
the development of Ostpolitik under Willi Brandt in the 1960s, or Ger-
hard Schroeder’s opposition to Bush II’s war in Iraq. Still others have been 
spear-carriers of US imperialism, for example, Great Britain. However, all 
of these second-tier states—Atlantic Community members and others 
alike—basically operate in ways consistent with US public délires. They are 
for capitalism—their own and that of America—and they will defend this 
world with violence if necessary. Because of their privileged position in the 
New American Empire, these states might be termed “advantaged clients.”
The New American Empire’s governmental elite tolerate informal sub-
imperialisms among advantaged clients, so second-tier countries in the US 
empire have regions where they too continue, or try to continue, imperial 
activities. The countries doing this are former formal empires, and the re-
gions they do it in are where they had their colonies. France, for example, 
does this in past sub-Saharan colonies in an informal sub-empire termed 
“Françafrique” (Verschave 1999). A key rule of such regional imperialisms 
is that while doing their own imperial business they should also mind the 
store of the US empire. Consider, for example, that the US government 
desires to weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon because it possesses considerable 
military capabilities, is an ally of Iran, is anti-Israeli, and consequently is an 
opponent of US Middle Eastern interests. France, especially under Presi-
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dent Sarkozy, pursued its interests in Lebanon, including opposing Hezbol-
lah, thereby doing Washington’s work. Israel assisted the CIA in the 2008 
assassination of Imad Mughniyah, Hezbollah’s international operations 
chief (Goldman and Nakashima 2015).
A third tier of client states exists largely in the less developed world. 
These countries possess natural resources or markets coveted by countries 
in the fi rst two tiers of the empire. The more important third-tier clients 
are petroleum-producing countries, especially those in the Persian Gulf 
area and, increasingly, Central Asia and Africa. These third-tier states 
have the least force and power in the tripartite imperial hierarchy. They 
tend to be provided with fewer strategic rents from the core, and to be 
accorded fewer opportunities to negotiate relations with the core. They do 
what they are told. They are the Haitis, Panamas, Dominican Republics of 
the world. They might be termed “ordinary clients.” Although this organi-
zation of imperial core, advantaged clients, and ordinary clients does not 
include all the countries in the world—certainly the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China) in 2010 were not US clients—it does include countries 
in all parts of the world, and is therefore a global empire. The following will 
consider the actors who work with core elites to choreograph operations 
throughout the global New American Empire.
Advantaged and Hybrid Elites: The US requires its handler elites to manage 
its client states’ subject elites, because it is these latter actors who perform 
the chores equivalent to those done by colonial offi cials and compradors 
in the colonies of formal empires. In the countries of the original Atlan-
tic Community, this is not much of problem. English, French, and Ger-
man elites come from families and go to schools that produce actors with 
worldviews resembling those of their American counterparts. Graduates of 
Oxbridge, a grande école, or a German dueling club differ little from their 
Harvard or Yale counterparts. Because of such backgrounds, they are priv-
ileged. These people, once they have grown up and gotten jobs in either 
large transnational corporations or government, should be called “advan-
taged” elites.
Matters are more complicated in the developing world, where the elites 
are culturally different from their American counterparts. To do the job 
of imperial management in the developing world, however, there have 
emerged what Jonathan Friedman (1999: 409) calls “hybrid cosmopoli-
tans.”12 I prefer the term “hybrid elites” because it is not clear that elites 
are all that cosmopolitan.13 They are subject elites in strategic positions 
in developing client countries’ government or economic institutions who 
have been Euro-Americanized because their parents recognized the impor-
tance of sending them to schools and other establishments (camps, clubs, 
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employments, neighborhoods) favored by American or European elites. So 
they attended the “Harvards” and “Oxfords” of the world and during these 
years acquired aspects of old-boy positional culture in addition to their 
pre-existing positional culture. One US offi cial judged Mexico’s president 
to be reliable during NAFTA negotiations because he was Harvard-edu-
cated and so, according to the offi cial, was “one of us” (Rothkopf 2009: 
11). However, these subject elites are hybrids, in the sense that they are 
part of whatever positional culture they came from and part old boy. They 
may root for the Boston Red Sox, but at the same time hold it as a pos-
sibility that Ganesh, “Remover of Obstacles,” made Boston’s 2013 World 
Series triumph possible.
Advantaged and hybrid elites participate in transnational networks by 
working with handler elites in the New American imperial core. The en-
vironment is chummy. They get along in the very best places at work and 
at play, treating each other to desired economic or political opportunities. 
These network opportunity fl ows exhibit reciprocities. When somebody 
gives you an opportunity, you are obliged to give something in return—to 
“scratch the back” of that somebody, in American slang. Consequently, 
if an American handler has given you something, you should reciprocate 
when s/he wants something back. Managing the New American Empire 
thus involves subject elites and core handlers scratching each other’s 
backs, which in economic anthropological terms means they perform gen-
eralized reciprocity (Sahlins 1972). Elites are unlikely to describe their re-
lations as “back scratching,” which connotes corruption. More probably 
they will use the language of friendship and/or kinship, which has virtuous 
moral implications. For example, Hillary Clinton, when President Obama’s 
secretary of State, stated, “I really consider President and Mrs. Mubarak to 
be friends of my family” (in Radia 2011).
To illustrate the nature of hybrid elites, consider Saif al-Islam (literally 
“Sword of Islam”), Libyan President Gaddafi ’s youngest son. On the one 
hand, as his father’s son he shared much of the positional culture of the 
kin network that surrounded President Gadaffi . On the other hand, he was 
a graduate of the London School of Economics who enjoyed the London 
social circuit. Slate reported that this social circuit enjoyed “parties in St. 
James’s Palace and sailed in yachts off Corfu.” The circuit included 
Nat Rothschild, scion of the banking family, who gave a party for Saif when 
he completed his doctorate on “civil society” and “global governance” … Sir 
Howard Davies, director of the LSE and one of Tony Blair’s economic envoys 
to Libya; Lord Peter Mandelson, a former Blair adviser, Cabinet minister, and 
European commissioner, who now advises “companies hoping to expand mar-
kets overseas”; Prince Andrew, who promotes British trade abroad; and, last 
but not least, Blair himself. (Applebaum 2011) 
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The Slate article further explained that “thanks to his [Saif’s] contacts, he 
became the conduit through which British companies invested in Libya—
and through which the Libyan Investment Authority invested in British 
companies” (ibid.).
Saif’s handlers took him to nice parties. In reciprocation, Saif became a 
“conduit” for UK investment. A fi ne bit of back scratching. However, the 
case of Saif illustrates the risks of being a hybrid elite. Currently, Saif rots 
in a Libyan jail, betrayed by his handlers. However, one point should be 
clear: advantaged and hybrid elites in transnational elite networks replace 
the formal empires’ colonial administration, managing imperial operations 
across the three tiers of the New American Empire. It is time now to more 
exactly specify the social constitution of this empire.
Integration by Invitation or Rent? Social constitution is the manner in which 
social forms are integrated, “integration” being understood as the “glue” 
bonding social parts together. In this conceptualization, the analysis of so-
cial constitutions seeks to discover the forces that do the bonding. So the 
current chore is to sniff out the glue that integrates the particular imperial 
shape that the old boys created.
Consider one glue favored by certain liberal political thinkers. The US 
has been described by Lundestad (1986) and Gaddis (1997) as an “empire 
by invitation” where client states “invited” the US “to play” the role of 
an imperial core (Lundestad 1986: 263). This means that the empire was 
integrated by the délires of elites in the different types of neo-colonies, who 
wanted US domination. Thus, unlike the formal empires, where colonies 
were ultimately attached by military compulsion, the US Leviathan was 
glued together by invitation, which took the form of programs like the 
Marshall Plan; other development programs (e.g., those provided by the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961); and bilateral or multilateral military alli-
ances (e.g., NATO or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO). 
However, to insist that the US Empire was, and is, integrated because its 
clients’ elites desired imperial domination is an oversimplifi cation.
This is so for two reasons. To understand the fi rst, consider that the Em-
pire of Bagirmi in precolonial Chad would defeat its opponents, whereupon 
they would ask—quite politely—to become tributaries (Reyna 1990). Fur-
ther, throughout imperial history polities about to become colonies, per-
ceiving the writing on the wall, usually either asked to be colonies or were 
in some way invited to do so. So there is nothing especially novel about the 
US being an empire by invitation. A second oversimplifi cation in judging 
the US empire to be constituted by invitation is that it leaves unanswered 
a key question: What made motivated clients seek invitation? Only when 
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this question is answered does the investigator know what glues it together. 
Thus, attention turns to a search for the sticky glue adhering the US core 
to its clients.
Think carrots. The hybrid and advantaged elites were motivated to seek 
invitation by their handlers’ carrots, which raises the question, What is a 
carrot? One answer is that it is a form of rent. A common defi nition of 
rent is “income from hiring out land or other durable goods” (The Econ-
omist 2010). In premodern agricultural empires, the state (sovereign and 
lords) owned the land. Agricultural workers supplied the sovereign and 
lords with part of their labor or agricultural products as payment (rent) 
for the right to use the land. In modern formal empires, the core state was 
the ultimate owner of the land in its colonies by virtue of its sovereignty 
over the colonial territory. Consequently, colonial offi cials could demand 
income from their subjects—corvée labor, money, or in-kind products—by 
virtue of their ownership of the colonial territory, which meant that the 
subjects’ fees were effectively rents.
However, the US makes no pretense of owning the land of its client 
countries. American elites make no claim of empire or of colony, and they 
insist that client states are sovereign. Nonetheless, as in the formal empires 
a certain type of rent, was, and is, paid in the New American Empire, only 
it goes in the opposite direction, from the core imperial state to the domi-
nated client states. The rent paid is not income specifi cally remunerating 
the use of land or other durable goods. Rather, it pays for general “backing” 
from client states in the form of some of the clients’ economic or violent 
force resources provided for the core’s needs. This type of rent is income 
derived from the hiring out of backing. Such rents were “carrots” earlier in 
this text, but they are more technically described as “strategic rents.” As an 
informal empire, the US pays strategic rents to assure backing.
Strategic rents can be paid in many forms. US payments made to coun-
tries as part of the Marshall Plan were strategic rents. US foreign assistance 
is an important strategic rent. Provision of military assistance is another 
form of strategic rent. Between 1950 and 2000, ten million US military 
personnel were stationed in Germany (Kane 2004). The money that Ger-
many did not have to spend on military force resources during this time 
because the US underwrote its security was a strategic rent paid for its 
backing of the New American Empire. Some US security elites have in-
dicated awareness that the US pays security rents. For example, Charles 
Freeman, US ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Iraq Wars, once con-
fi ded, “The basic bargain of Saudi-American relations was thus simple: 
in return for preferred access to Saudi oil, the United States undertook 
to protect the Kingdom against foreign threats” (in Rutledge 2005: 171). 
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Elmer’s Glue-All held my sons’ model airplanes together. Strategic rent is 
the Elmer’s Glue-All of American Empire.
Let us turn to Malinowski and his understanding of the social consti-
tution of the peoples he reported upon in Argonauts of the Western Pacifi c 
([1922] 1961), which furthers our grasp of the New American Empire’s 
constitution. Malinowski’s Argonauts were the Trobriand Islanders and 
their neighbors in the western Pacifi c. He understood them to have been 
organized by “forms of exchange” ([1922] 1961: 1), one of which, the kula, 
formed the topic of Argonauts. The kula involved exchange of valuables 
(vaygu’a) between men inhabiting the different islands surrounding the 
Trobriands. A type of bracelet (mwali) was given for a type of necklace 
(soulava). A mwali could only be exchanged for a soulava and vice versa. 
The exchange was immediate. When a mwali was given, a soulava had to 
be returned. Technically, this was balanced reciprocity (Sahlins 1972). The 
exchange never stopped, in the sense that a holder could never decide 
to horde vaygu’a: it always had to be re-exchanged. Gifts had to be made 
against equivalent. Thus, the kula was an exchange system based upon 
equal reciprocities. It integrated the Trobrianders and their neighbors by 
connecting them in a network of continual acquisition of valuables.
The US Empire is also constituted as a system of exchange, though it 
differs structurally from that of the Trobriand Islanders because the kula 
did not operate so that one category of actors in the exchange accumulated 
value at the expense of others. Empires do not work this way. The imperial 
core extracts more than it gives. This is the case with the US rental empire. 
American rent-givers want the backing they receive from support-givers 
to provide force resources to fuel imperial projects, ultimately politically 
those of force accumulation or economically those of value accumulation. 
The empire only works when what is received in return for strategic rent 
payments exceeds that rent, that is, when the exchanges exhibit negative 
reciprocity. This is because when an empire receives less in backing than it 
gives out, it suffers decline in the force resources it requires to reproduce 
itself. Seen in this optic, it is clear that if support received does not exceed 
strategic rent paid, then the empire moves toward reproductive vulnera-
bility. For example, money the US provided to the Atlantic Community 
via the Marshall Plan was intended to grow American capitalism by giv-
ing European economies the means to purchase American commodities. 
It succeeded and “fueled a tremendous demand for U.S. exports” (R. Scott 
2002). The New American Empire might thus be viewed as a vast system 
of negative reciprocities whose elites deploy underlings to serve their délire 
of accumulating force resources. Now, drawing the various strands of this 
chapter together, I will respond to the question, what is new in the New 
American Empire?
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Not by Invitation, but by Invisibility?
We proclaimed a dream of an America that would be a Shining City on a Hill. 
(Ronald Reagan’s Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1984, in Michael Reagan 
and J. Denney 1997)
Date: February 21, 2010
Place: Convoy en route to Kandahar
Circumstances: U.S. aerial forces attacked a three-car convoy traveling to 
a market in Kandehar. The convoy had planned on continuing to Kabul so 
that some of the passengers could get medical treatment. At least three dozen 
people were passengers in the three cars. The front car was an SUV type ve-
hicle, and the last was a Land Cruiser. When the fi rst car was hit by U.S. air 
fi re, women in the second car jumped out and waved their scarves to indicate 
that they were civilians. U.S. helicopters continued to fi re rockets and machine 
guns, killing 21 people and wounding 13. 
U.S. /NATO acknowledgement that the people killed were unarmed 
civilians:
Feb 24, 2010—General Stanley McChrystal delivered a videotaped apology. 
(Voices Co-coordinators 2010).
Contemplate two rather different beings: President Reagan’s dream and 
a three car convoy wending its way to Kandahar in Afghanistan. In the 
fi rst quotation Reagan, a skilled hermeneut, evoked Governor Winthrop’s 
ghost. America is, he dreams, that shining city on the hill, representing the 
highest aspirations of humanity. Now consider the second quotation, an 
account of US aerial operations in Afghanistan. This concerns not what 
Americans dream, but what they actually do. In early 2010 US troops 
shadowing a three-vehicle convoy by helicopter opened fi re on it, and 
when women left the vehicles and waved their scarves to signal they were 
civilians, the helicopter returned to rocket them again, killing twenty-one 
and wounding thirteen. Good shooting!
Lest one think this an atypical anecdote, consider what General Stanley 
McChrystal, then commander of US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, had 
to say about such incidents, “We’ve shot an amazing number of people 
… and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat to 
the force” (J. Elliott 2010). On the one hand, some elites insist that the 
US represents the highest of human aspirations; on the other, its soldiers 
butcher women. How might one apprehend the two opening quotations?
First, let us be clear about one matter. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the Har-
vard hermeneut introduced earlier who might be expected to be an em-
pire-denier, endorses the basic premise of the present and the prior chapter, 
insisting, “who can doubt that there is an American empire?—an “infor-
mal” empire, not colonial in polity, but still richly equipped with imperial 
paraphernalia: troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators, 
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all spread around the luckless planet” (1986: 141). Empire-deniers have 
tried to disguise these actualities behind their claim that the US was, and 
is, a sacred, shining city on a hill representing humanity’s “highest aspira-
tions.” This chapter and the previous one have demonstrated how, over 
two shape-shifting centuries, the US has been an aggressively expanding 
imperial social being.
But another question remains: Just what is “new” about the current 
shape of this empire? A helpful way to answer is to clarify what is old about 
it. Like the oldest of ancient empires—the Akkadians in what is now Iraq 
(2250 BC)—the New American Empire is a fusion of governmental and 
economic systems united in the extraction of force resources from domi-
nated populations. Yet despite its ancient structure, it incorporates a nov-
elty: it is concealed behind its informality. Think of this informality as a 
cloaking device, like the one featured in the famous television series Star 
Trek. Its “troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators” are 
not “imperial paraphernalia”—at least, not in any formal sense. They are 
just hardworking elites—American handlers working with their subject 
elites, going about everyday business. When Reagan rhapsodized about 
how America represents the “highest aspirations” of humanity, he was in 
effect acting like Captain Kirk switching on the starship Enterprise’s cloak-
ing device. The novelty of the New American Empire is that it moves 
about not by invitation, but by invisibility, disguising its actors as ordinary 
folk in other peoples’ countries.
But this recognition alone does not do full justice to the originality of 
the American imperialism. Informal empire is not unique to the Amer-
icans. As observed in the last chapter, it was practiced by the British in 
nineteenth-century South America, for example. The difference is that 
the American Empire is entirely informal, whereas the British Empire for 
most of its history was mostly formal.
A further novelty pertains to scale. At its height the British Empire 
occupied roughly a quarter of the earth’s surface (N. Ferguson 2004: 15). 
That was big, to be sure, but US imperialism has striven for world domina-
tion since NSC 68, and following the end of the Cold War such dominion 
seemed realizable in part because of increased force, both economic and 
violent. The US gross national product grew from about $3 trillion in 1950 
to about $15 trillion in 2011. In 1938 the US had fourteen military bases 
outside its borders. In 2009 it had approximately 1,000 such bases operat-
ing everywhere on the planet.
Here then is the full novelty of the being the old boys constituted at 
creation. The US has always been an imperial social being. But what is 
now out there is a triple-tiered rental empire, a global system wielding 
enormous amounts of violent force. This combination of global reach and 
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capacity for violence is the innovation in Acheson’s and the other old boys’ 
work at creation. Bluntly, it is the largest concatenation of human force 
the world has ever seen. In Nietzsche’s terms, it is a truly global “monster 
of energy” cloaked by empire-denying hermeneuts’ insistence that it is a 
“shining city upon a hill.”
The introduction of this volume promised readers a journey. So far they 
have been taken to “a period of creation” in the sea of late modernity and 
have glimpsed constitution of a social being, the New American Empire. 
The journey continues in the next chapter. Readers learn it is not easy 
being an imperial Leviathan navigating contemporary seas. American im-
perialism has toiled against a rising coalescence of political contradictions 
and the one-two punch of cyclical and systemic economic contradictions. 
The next chapter details the contradictory currents the empire itself gen-
erates, and in so doing reveals why it is a world of very late modernity.
Notes
1. Useful discussion of the Establishment in the immediate postwar period can be found in 
Isaacson and Thomas (1986). Burton Hersh (2001) discusses the elites and the founding of 
the CIA. Thompson (2009) explores the roles of Kennan and Nitze in creation of the postwar 
world. Beisner (2006) does the same for Acheson.
2. Gatzambide-Fernández (2009) shows how students at private schools construct elite 
identities. Bird ([1998] 2000: 23–71) provides a rich account of the old-boy upbringing of the 
Bundy brothers, important security elites of the Vietnam War. 
3. A distinction should be made between “good old boys” and “old boys.” The former 
phrase denotes networks of non-wealthy Southern men of rural background. The latter phrase 
is derived from the term used to designate graduates of English private schools. To enhance 
their distinction, graduates of certain American private schools began to also call themselves 
old boys. 
4. Does competition between imperial social beings inevitably progress to warfare? De-
bates over this question are ongoing. Some non-Marxists have insisted that empire is a source 
of peace, as in the Pax Romana of the Roman Empire or the Pax Britannica of the nine-
teenth-century English Empire (N. Ferguson 2004). Marxist scholars, especially around the 
time of World War I, fell into two camps. Those like Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, 
Nicholai Bukharin, and Vladimir Lenin believed that imperialism was a stage of fi nance capi-
talism that led to war, whereas more moderate Marxists like Karl Kautsky argued that this was 
not the case. The text presents an argument explaining when two empires are likely to war. It 
does not address the question of its inevitability. 
Certainly, imperial systems have frequently warred with each other in the modern world. 
The Spanish and Dutch empires fought in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The 
Dutch and English empires battled in the last half of the seventeenth century. The English 
and the French dueled from the seventeenth until the early nineteenth century. Next the 
German and the Japanese Empires took on the French and British Empires, aided by their 
informally imperial US allies, between 1914 and 1918 and then again in 1939 to 1945.
5. Gaddis’s position on Stalin’s mental state is equivocal. In 1972, he stated Stalin had “al-
most paranoid suspicion” but 349 pages later labeled him as exhibiting “paranoia” (1972: 10, 
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359). Later he admitted Stalin exhibited “extraordinary administrative performance” (1997: 
8), something not associated with psychosis. Zubok and Pleshakov (1996: 274–277) revealed 
Soviet documents made available following the Cold War that undermine the case for Stalin’s 
paranoia. 
6. Mitchell (2011) reports that a fair amount of Marshall Plan investment went into trans-
forming Europe from coal to oil energy. Europe had large amounts of coal but lacked oil, which 
was largely controlled by US companies, deepening European client states’ dependency on 
America. 
7. Two major institutions were instituted to do this. The fi rst was the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) founded in 1949. COMECON was the USSR’s reply to 
the formation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation in Western Europe. 
It included the USSR, Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Albania. These countries—the Eastern Bloc—came to be referred to by US au-
thorities as the “Soviet Empire” (Gaddis 1997: 28). COMECON was a centralized agency for 
initiating and directing economic development in Eastern Europe, which among other things 
involved mutual trade agreements. Soviet trade with Eastern Europe, at $380 million in 1947, 
doubled in 1948, quadrupled by 1950, and exceeded $2.5 billion in 1952. Fully three-quarters 
of Eastern European trade took place within Eastern Europe (LaFeber 2002: 75). The eco-
nomic door had effectively shut.
The second major institution was the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assis-
tance established on the USSR’s initiative in 1955 in Warsaw, Poland (hence its usual name, 
the Warsaw Pact). Members of this military alliance promised to assist each other if attacked. 
The Warsaw Pact included the same countries as COMECON, except that Albania was not 
a member. The Warsaw Pact meant that the Soviets would fi ght to keep the closed door of 
Eastern Europe shut tight and, on occasion, to band together exploiting targets of opportunity 
in other areas of the globe.
8. Inderfurth and Loch (2004) and Rothkopf (2006) have written major studies of the 
NSC. 
9. James Carroll (2006) describes the origins of the Department of Defense and its growth 
thereafter. Risen (2006), and Weiner (2008) do the same for the CIA. Alfred McCoy (2006) 
documents CIA use of torture.
10. The origin of the domino theory is unknown. Frank Ninkovich (1994: xvi) believes 
that a general domino theory was ‘fi rst elaborated’ during World War I by President Wilson. 
P. M. H. Bell (2001: 117) suggests that General George Marshall in 1947 was fi rst to advocate 
the idea that communist expansion could be interpreted in terms of a domino theory. By the 
late 1940s it seems to have been diffused throughout the Truman administration.
11. The US government spends enormous sums of money on RMA. The US research and 
development budget for military in 2004 was $69.9 billion compared to $48 billion for all 
nonmilitary projects (Barlas 2004). In the 2000s US universities received on the order of $4 
billion annually for defense research (Ghoshroy 2011). 
12. Friedman’s identifi cation of hybrid cosmopolitans in the 1990s was followed by a series 
of studies of transnational or global elites (Sklair 2001; Rothkopf 2009; W. Carroll 2010). 
These researches are largely restricted to transnational capitalist classes. This, I believe, ig-
nores political elites. 
13. If one meaning of cosmopolitan is openness to difference, I am not certain that any 
elites are at all cosmopolitan. Rather, they are partisans defending their particular class posi-
tions. For example, certain privileged Chileans who took economics degrees at the University 
of Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s went on to work for Pinochet’s dictatorship. Being good 
hybrids, they worked to defend Chile’s upper class-interests using the ideology of Chicago-style 
neoliberalism.
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Contradictions and Reproductive Vulnerabilities
Economic strength at home and abroad is the foundation of America’s hard 
and soft power. Earlier enemies learned that America is the arsenal of democ-
racy; today’s enemies will learn that America is the economic engine for free-
dom, opportunity and development. (Robert Zoellick, 20 September 2001, in 
M. Mann 2003: 49)
Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history 
should remind us that they are fragile organisms. (A. McCoy 2010: 1)
Robert Zoellick, at the time President Bush II’s trade representative, uttered the above quotation in the jittery days immediately after 9/11, 
reassuring everybody that America’s “economic strength” was the “engine” 
of “freedom, opportunity and development.” Assumed in Zoellick’s dis-
course is that the imperial engine has plenty of “power” to go about its 
business. This chapter interrogates that assumption and in doing so sub-
mits that the most powerful social being in history—Leviathan of Levia-
thans—is at the same time, as McCoy put it in the second quote, “fragile.”
Remember two points: fi rst, that three major variables in global warring 
theory (contradiction, reproduction, and global warring) account for the 
power dynamics of empire; and second, that contradictions in this theory 
are supposed to intensify and coalesce, leading to reproductive vulnera-
bility. The past chapter showed how the inter-imperial contradiction had 
led to reproductive vulnerability, which the security elites sought to fi x 
by constituting their imperial Leviathan. If the economic system, as the 
ultimate producer of force, is viewed as the engine of a social being, then 
the present chapter probes the engine of the New American Empire. It de-
tails the relationship between economic contradictions and reproduction, 
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seeking to discover whether contradictions have intensifi ed and coalesced, 
producing vulnerabilities. At issue will be the state of cyclical and system-
atic, economic contradictions.
Up and Down, More Down
“In 1974–1975 the U.S. economy and the world economy as a whole en-
tered a full-fl edged structural crisis,” involving “worsening conditions of 
accumulation” (Foster and McChesney 2009: 9). First it was good. The 
years immediately after World War II until roughly the mid 1970s have 
been called a “golden age” for US capitalism (Marglin and Shor 1992). 
Then it got bad. The years roughly from 1973 though the present have 
witnessed what is termed a “long downturn” (Brenner 1998: i) of the US 
economy—what Foster and McChesney term “a full-fl edged structural cri-
sis.” This section shows how the long economic downturn corresponds to 
the intensifi cation and coalescence of cyclical and systemic contradictions, 
which saddled the New American Empire with a reproductive vulnerabil-
ity. Analysis reveals a double cycling of the US economy since 1945 that is 
up and down—maybe more down than up.1
Cyclical Contradictions
The double cycling of the US and global economy since 1945—a “long 
upturn” followed by a “long downturn” (Brenner 1998: i)—has been dra-
matic. So impressive was the upturn that it has been characterized as “the 
most sustained and profi table period of economic growth in the history of 
world capitalism” (McCormick 1989: 99). During its course, the Nobel 
Prize–winning economist Robert Solow (1970: 410) announced that the 
cycling of capitalist economies had been solved after all: “The old notion 
of a ‘business cycle’ is not very interesting any more.” Solow was wrong. 
Joan Robinson reported that the expansion gradually ended in the late 
1960s and by 1973 had turned into a “leaden age” (1962: 54). The world’s 
annual GDP increase, which had averaged 3.6 percent during the 1960s, 
fell to 2.1 percent in the 1970s, 1.3 percent in the 1980s, 1.1 percent in 
the 1990s, and 1 percent in the 2000s (Bond 2006: 14–15). No serious 
economist challenges this characterization of the economics of the years 
since 1945.
A second cycle in the double cycling, occurring within the long down-
turn itself, has involved alternation between growth phases guillotined by 
fi ve recessions in 1973–1974, 1981–1982, 1990–1991, 2001–2002, and 
2008–2010. In the US economy the 1970s recession inaugurated a time 
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of “stagfl ation”—the conjuncture of high infl ation, high unemployment, 
and economic stagnation. Unemployment rose from 5.1 percent in Jan-
uary 1974 to 9.0 percent in May 1975. Infl ation, which had averaged 3.2 
percent annually following World War II, more than doubled in 1973 to a 
7.7 percent annual rate. By 1979 infl ation had reached 11.3 percent, and 
in 1980 it soared to 13.5 percent. The conservative hermeneut Martin 
Feldstein (Harvard and Oxford), writing at the end of the 1970s, observed: 
“There is a strong temptation to regard the poor performance of the past 
decade as the beginning of a new long-term adverse trend for the Ameri-
can economy. It is, however, too early to know whether such an explana-
tion is really warranted” (1980: 2). It was.
Another recession began in 1980 and continued through 1982. Some 
have argued that this recession was initiated by attempts to deal with stag-
fl ation, especially a tightening of monetary policy by Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Paul Volker. Decline in the US manufacturing sector became 
noticeable during this recession. In the mid 1960s manufacturing output 
was 27 percent of GNP; by 2003, these numbers had fallen precipitously to 
about 13.8 percent (McKinnon 2004: 1). By the 1980s the manufacturing 
sectors in other advanced capitalist countries—Japan and Germany espe-
cially—had rebounded from World War II, provoking serious competition 
with US industry. This competition was “one cause” (Plotnick et al. 2000: 
285) of the deindustrialization that became serious in the 1980s. As a re-
sult of the deindustrialization, “older regions of the country had trouble 
recovering as entire industries collapsed, leaving distress in a wide swath 
that became known as the “Rust Belt” (Galambos 2000: 965) because of 
the severe job loss it suffered. Katherine Newman (1988: ix), writing of the 
1980s, reported, “hundreds of thousands of middle class families plunge 
down America’s social ladder every year.” Additionally, the recession, in 
conjunction with deregulation, led to problems in the US fi nancial sector 
throughout the late 1980s. On the Black Monday of 19 October 1987, a 
stock market collapse of unprecedented size—larger than that of 1929—
reduced the Dow Jones Industrial Average by 22.6 percent, causing banks 
and savings and loan institutions to fail at exceptionally high rates (Law-
rence White 1991). The US economic problems of the 1980s carried over 
into the early 1990s. The panic that followed the 1987 recession led to 
a sharp recession in the US in 1990, and for the next few years the US 
economy exhibited high unemployment, massive government budgetary 
defi cits, and slow GDP growth.
Then, in the mid 1990s, the US economy rebounded. Trade opportu-
nities expanded after the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Tech-
nological developments brought a wide range of new electronic products. 
Telecommunications and computer networking advances led to an ex-
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panding computer hardware and software industry. The Internet was born. 
A dot-com boom began, based on companies’ sales of products and ser-
vices derived from the Internet. Also during the 1990s, at the urging of 
the Clinton administration, the fi nancial sector was further deregulated. 
This led to the invention of novel fi nancial instruments, especially de-
rivatives like collateralized debt obligations or credit default swaps. Wall 
Street prospered greatly, at least for the next few years, and like the fi -
nancial sector, so did the whole economy. Corporate profi ts rose quickly, 
infl ation and unemployment were low, and strong profi ts sent the stock 
market surging as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which had stood at 
just 1,000 in the late 1970s, hit the 11,000 mark in 1999. For this reason 
Joseph Stiglitz (2004: in the subtitle)—another winner of the Nobel Prize 
for Economics, a liberal hermeneut, and a member of President Clinton’s 
Council of Economic Advisors—called the 1990s “the World’s Most Pros-
perous Decade.” Stiglitz was wrong. For the US and the world, the average 
annual GDP growth rate in 1990–1996 was lower both than it had been in 
either 1965–1980 or 1980–1990 (Palley 1999: 3). Worse trouble loomed.
In 2009 Time magazine announced that the US and the world were in 
“the Great Recession” (Gibbs 2009). Trillions of dollars in stock value were 
lost. For a time in 2008, Paul Krugman (2009) wrote that key economic 
indicators—such as world trade and world industrial production—“were 
falling as fast as or faster than they did in 1929–1930. But in the 1930s 
the trend lines kept heading down.” The plunge appeared to have halted 
by 2010. However, “if the Great Recession,” according to Foster and Mc-
Chesney, “leveled off before plunging into the depths of a second Great 
Depression, it nevertheless left the US and world economies in shambles,” 
where “capacity utilization in industry is a shadow of what it was only a 
year ago” (2009: 1).
So there has been a double cycling the US economy between 1945 and 
2010: fi rst upturn, then downturn; and then, within the long downturn, a 
second cycling as the economy ricocheted into and out of fi ve recessions, 
with the last two occurring closer together and the last by far the gravest. 
This cycling, especially that of the long downturn, is explained in chapters 
7 and 8, which will return readers to the overproduction discussed when 
considering US imperial growth at the end of the nineteenth century. Con-
sider the next, systemic contradictions.
“Potential … Collapse”
We’re looking at potential system collapse, politically as well as physically. 
(Dyer 2008: 33)
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Gwynne Dyer, a environmental commentator, believes the world’s ecol-
ogy is at risk of “potential system crisis.” Why? Prior to the present there 
were fi ve major mass extinctions: the fi rst 440 million years ago (mya); 
the second 370 mya, the third 245 mya, the fourth 210 mya, and the fi fth 
65 mya, which did in the dinosaurs. In 1995, E. O. Wilson estimated that 
about 30,000 species annually were being driven to extinction (Eldredge 
2001). A few years later, the American Museum of Natural History (1998) 
in New York conducted a survey among biologists concerning these extinc-
tions and found that “seven out of ten biologists” believed “that we are in 
the midst of a mass extinction of living things, and that this loss of species 
will pose a major threat to human existence in the next century.” Dyer’s 
“system crisis” is a sixth extinction and a “threat to human existence.”2 
The narrative below argues that in some measure, the sixth extinction is 
propelled by a systemic contradiction roiling the US Leviathan. Marx will 
help to make this case.
An Ecological Marx: Marx, as others have observed, might be said to have 
had a love-hate attitude toward capitalism: on the one hand he despised 
what it did to people, but on the other he recognized that its productive 
forces (termed “economic force resources” in chapter 2) were extraordi-
narily powerful, driven as they were to ceaselessly accumulate. This con-
tinual growth, he believed, threatened capitalism with expansion beyond 
its structural limits and self-destruction. He conceptualized this destruc-
tion as a consequence of the contradiction between the development of 
productive forces and productive relations, where capitalists, to maintain 
or improve their position within prevailing competitive productive rela-
tions, choreographed their productive forces as fully as possible, propelling 
them toward their limits. Marx was especially interested in the productive 
force of labor (designated “actors” in chapter 2), believing that to accu-
mulate capital capitalists needed to increasingly exploit the working class, 
motivating it to revolt and eradicate capitalism.
Marx was less interested in contradictions between capitalist production 
relations and the force resource of land (i.e., land/capital contradictions). 
Perhaps this was due to his distress over the fate of the proletariat during 
the development of capitalist productive forces. Perhaps it was also because 
there was little information about the effect of capitalist development upon 
natural resources in the mid nineteenth century.3 Nevertheless, capitalists’ 
délires to continually accumulate capital obliged them to utilize growing 
amounts of land. Capitalist farmers, for example, literally used increasing 
land areas, whereas steel manufactures used more and more iron ore.
Perpetual consumption of land resources could push production toward 
the limits in two ways. In the fi rst, “indirect” way, continual use of a land 
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resource might lead to changes that threaten production. For example, 
farmers might bring all the arable land into production and then over-farm 
it, causing drastic declines in soil fertility. In the second, “direct” way, the 
continual use of a land resource itself threatens production because the 
resource occurs in fi nite amounts. For example, it is possible that steel 
manufactures might use so much iron ore that they run eventually out of 
it. Contemporary capitalism appears to be rushing toward a systemic capi-
tal/land contradiction for both of these reasons.
The problem is energy. Capitalism, as shown earlier, must have energy—
enormous amounts of it. Energy largely comes from burning hydrocarbons 
(i.e., fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal), which are forms of land whose 
combustion releases carbon dioxide. Hydrocarbons are limited, mean-
ing consumption of them pushes capitalism toward its functional limits. 
Should fossil fuels be used up and not replaced by other energy sources, 
then the engine of capitalism might have its parts, but no energy to make 
them work. Further, burning hydrocarbons puts increasing amounts of car-
bon dioxide into the atmosphere, producing global warming, which can 
have dire consequences. Global warming and peak oil emerge as two man-
ifestations of this intensifying capital/land contradiction.
Global Warming: Global warming indirectly infl uences capitalist accu-
mulation, but in potentially calamitous ways. During Marx’s lifetime, 
knowledge that greenhouse gases existed, and that their increase could 
cause global warming, was just beginning to be acquired. Now worldwide 
temperatures are increasing, creating a potential for global “catastrophe” 
(J. Hansen 2009).4 Global warming—sometimes called the greenhouse 
effect—is the process by which absorption and emission of infrared radia-
tion by gases in the atmosphere heats the planet’s lower atmosphere and 
surface. The French mathematician and physicist Joseph Fourier (1824) 
fi rst proposed this in the Annales de Chimie et de Physique, a journal Marx 
was unlikely to have read. After Marx’s death, Svante Arrhenius (1896: 
267) calculated that “if the quantity of carbonic acid [CO2] increased in 
geometric progression, the augmentation of the temperature will increase 
nearly in arithmetic progression.”
Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane, and certain other 
chemical compounds. A greenhouse gas permits solar radiation (sunlight) 
to pass through the atmosphere to the earth’s surface and be re-radiated 
back into the atmosphere as longer-wave energy (heat). Greenhouse gases 
“trap” some of this heat in the lower atmosphere, thereby raising surface 
temperatures. The major greenhouse gases are water vapor, which causes 
about 36–70 percent of the greenhouse effect; carbon dioxide (CO2), 9–26 
percent; methane (CH4), 4–9 percent; and ozone (O3), 3–7 percent.
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN 
agency instituted to scientifi cally evaluate climate change, states, “Warm-
ing of the climate system is unequivocal” (Solomon et al. 2007: 5). Global 
surface temperature increased 1.33 degrees Fahrenheit during the twenti-
eth century. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was at 
190 ppm (parts per million) 21,000 years ago.5 It rose to 280 ppm just prior 
to the Industrial Revolution (c. 1700) and thereafter increased rapidly to 
290 ppm in 1900, 316 ppm in 1959, 363.8 ppm in 1997, and 388 ppm in 
2010. The current level of the “rate of increase” of CO2 is “unprecedented 
in the paleoclimate record” (Houghton 2009: 90). At carbon dioxide levels 
above 350 ppm (Hansen 2009) the earth is believed to experience delete-
rious consequences, and
recent results show that most of the adverse effects of global warming are run-
ning at or above the worst case predictions and records of only a few years 
ago—including the movement of Greenland glaciers, sea level rise, areas un-
der drought and fl ood around the world, Arctic sea ice loss, oceans becom-
ing acidic and warmer and reducing the amount of vital plankton in the seas, 
methane escaping from thawing permafrost in the Arctic, and a reduction of 
plant growth rather than an increase as many assumed. (Braasch 2010)
What made the greenhouse gases burgeon? Most greenhouse gases 
come from the burning of fossil fuels in the energy sector, by far the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases (70 percent), followed by the land use sec-
tor (23 percent), waste management (4 percent), and industrial processes 
(3 percent). Yergin (1993) has documented the enormous increase in the 
fossil fuel industry. As these enterprises grow, more energy is required; as 
more energy is required, more oil, natural gas, and coal are burned; as more 
fossil fuels are burned, more greenhouse gases are emitted into the atmo-
sphere, and the closer the global economy edges to systemic crisis. Clearly, 
“the origins of climate change are deeply rooted in the development of the 
global capitalist economy” (Newell and Paterson 2010: 9). Equally clearly, 
and ironically, capitalism is a force producing an unintended power, insofar 
as it causes “a climate increasingly inhospitable to the very industries most 
responsible for its warming” (Klein 2014). This irony is a contradiction: 
what capitalism does to be capitalism harms capitalism.
What harms can global warming infl ict upon human life? Though re-
spondents to this question are embroiled in heated debate, three general-
izations seem safe. The fi rst is that wealthy, Northern, capitalist countries 
will be better able to mitigate climate change’s effects. The second is that 
wealthy, Northern elites will be less affected. The third is that the rest of 
humanity will likely suffer stark consequences. The Stern review provides 
a respected estimate of economic effects, forecasting that in the absence 
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of serious mitigation, the costs of global warming will have reached 20 
percent of total global output by the end of the twenty-fi rst century (N. 
Stern 2007). Bear in mind that the bulk of these costs would be expe-
rienced in the poor South. Further, it is likely that the “most important 
impact of climate change will be an acute and permanent crisis of food sup-
ply” (Dyer 2008: ix). One report estimated that in the fi rst decade of the 
twenty-fi rst century, global warming was responsible for 300,000 deaths 
and $125 billion in economic losses each year (Vidal 2009). Should global 
warming worsen, humanity could become one of the 30,000 species that go 
extinct each year.6 Global warming, however, is only a half of the capital/
land contradiction, which brings us to peak oil and a more direct assault 
on capitalism.
Peak Oil: The signifi cance of peak oil is made clear by the understanding 
of energy in physics as “the ability to do” or “the capacity to do work” 
(Heinberg 2003: 1). In the terms used in this volume, energy is produced 
by force. It is that which is has the ability to cause certain powers, that is, 
“to do” things. Clearly, actors’ labor has its force, or energy, as do various 
instruments. However, the most important sources of force are those that 
can augment the powers of labor or instruments. This energy is acquired 
by a process that William Catton (1980) has called “drawdown”: the con-
sumption of stocks of energy provided by land. The use of wood to create 
fi re is perhaps the fi rst form of energy drawdown in human history.
Two sorts of drawdown might be distinguished: one utilizing renewable 
sources of energy that, once consumed, can be replaced; and the other 
using nonrenewable energy sources that are irreplaceable after they are 
consumed. Firewood burned to provide heat energy is a replaceable energy 
resource. Nonrenewable energy sources include “coal, oil, natural gas, and 
uranium” (Heinberg 2003: 28). Oil is a good example. According to Ken-
neth Boulding, distinguished founder of general systems theory, “In 1859 
the human race discovered a huge treasure chest in its basement. This was 
oil and gas, a fantastically cheap and easily available source of energy. We 
did, or at least some of us did, what anybody does who discovers a treasure 
chest in the basement—live it up” (in ibid.: 43). 
However, there was a problem. It had been known since ancient times 
that there was oil in the earth. But no one yet knew how to get at it; that 
is, no way of getting hold of the treasure in the chest had been discov-
ered. But in 1859 Colonel Edwin Drake devised a way of drilling into 
the earth to get the oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania. Drake’s drilling was 
successful: he had developed a drawdown technology to get at the trea-
sure in the chest. Then, as industrialization spread throughout the globe, 
capitalist elites lived “it up,” devising ways to use oil to run the various 
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engines of economic activity. In our terms, a drilling technology had been 
invented to acquire oil from of land to provide the force for myriad eco-
nomic practices.
Here it is useful to give an idea of the number and importance of these 
practices. Refi ned oil—diesel fuel, gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, and liquefi ed 
petroleum gas—is fuel. In today’s world, fuel is the most important energy 
source. Petroleum is also the raw material for many chemical products, in-
cluding pharmaceuticals, solvents, fertilizers, pesticides, and plastics. Cer-
tain types of resultant hydrocarbons may be mixed with non-hydrocarbons 
to create other end products—alkenes that can be manufactured into plas-
tics or other compounds; lubricants; wax; sulfur—or useful industrial ma-
terials like bulk tar; asphalt; the petroleum coke used in specialty carbon 
products; paraffi n wax; and aromatic petrochemicals used as precursors in 
other chemical products.
Because these oil products are either the energy or raw material inputs 
in the running of large machines, petroleum is vital to industrial manu-
facturing. As the major fuel, oil is also crucial to transportation, which is 
essential to operation of nearly all industrial enterprise because it is the 
means by which distribution of products occurs, and distribution is nec-
essary for profi t realization and capital accumulation. Transportation in 
the form of affordable cars and cheap gasoline have enabled the subur-
banization—with its associated housing developments, malls, offi ces, and 
parks—that distinguishes residential patterns increasingly found around 
the world. Transportation, in the form of cars, buses, airplanes, and ocean 
liners, underlies the tourism and recreation industries as well. Many fertil-
izers, herbicides, and pesticides are made from petroleum products, so oil 
is likewise crucial to agriculture. Finally, militaries rely upon oil-powered 
planes, helicopters, ships, armored vehicles, and the like—in other words, 
the instruments of war. Without the force resource oil, humans cannot 
grow the food, make the goods, run the armies, and work the educational 
systems and medias that are the economics, politics, and culture of con-
temporary social beings. Oil and gas, then, are force resources that enable 
other force resources to have power. No oil means no advanced modern 
capitalism.
Hence the problem: when Colonel Drake showed how to realize oil 
drawdown, he initiated huge utilization of an effectively nonrenewable 
resource. Most petroleum in the earth was made in the Jurassic period 
(180,000,000 million years BP) as the remains of tiny plants and animals 
were subjected to enormous amounts of heat and pressure. It is true that 
some oil is in the process of being made today, but it will take millions upon 
millions of years for this process to produce new oil. Consequently, the oil 
that is in the ground at present is effectively all there is.
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No one has exact knowledge of the amount of oil and gas in the ground. 
However, estimates of the amount of oil in the ground are based on the 
proven reserves of oil in each country.7 A recent estimate puts this at 1,477 
billion barrels of crude oil (OPEC 2014)—a lot of oil, but at the same 
time all there is. Once consumed, it is no more, and if there is no petro-
leum replacement, there is no capitalism. Currently, despite theoretical 
concurrence that some replacement(s) for oil could exist, theory is not 
yet actuality. No energy source that now exists can replace oil and gas 
(see Kunstler 2006: 100–147). This realization highlights the importance 
of understanding the likely history of oil utilization. At this point the work 
of M. King Hubbert becomes relevant.
Hubbert (1956), a geophysicist and sometime employee of Shell Oil, 
theorized the trajectory of oil’s development. He hypothesized that oil sup-
plies, like other limited resources, would take the form of a bell curve: 
an ascending slope as output increased; a highest point before decrease 
set in; and a descending slope as output decreased. At the high point, 
now known as “Hubbert’s Peak,” oil output stagnates and then declines, 
whereupon economic tribulations caused by dwindling supply commence. 
It was unclear how analysts would know the production peak had been 
reached, though situations where oil demand exceeded supply would be 
a likely indicator that peak oil was approaching or had arrived. Initially 
Hubbert’s position was viewed with disdain. However, his prediction that 
US oil production would peak in the 1970s was borne out to some extent: 
US oil production reached its highest point in the 1970s and thereafter 
declined, until the development of fracking techniques.
Enormous amounts of oil have been consumed since the publication of 
Hubbert’s views in the 1950s. This represents an enormous drawdown on 
Boulding’s “treasure chest in the basement.” An infl uential Department of 
Energy study known as the Hirsch Report evaluated the implications of this 
petroleum consumption, concluding that “peaking will happen” (Hirsch, 
Bezdek, and Wendling 2005: 64). When is “not known” (ibid.: 5), but the 
report foretold “dramatically higher prices” upon its occurrence, producing 
“massive demand destruction” and “protracted economic hardship” (ibid.: 
5, 65). There would be an inverse relationship between the amount of 
petroluem produced and capitalist enterprise, for as the amount of oil pro-
duced diminished, industrial production decline would intensify, damaging 
other sectors of capitalist economies in a cascading effect. Hirsch and his 
co-authors bluntly warned that “the world has never faced a problem like 
this” (ibid.: 64). The Hirsch Report was reluctant to forecast when peak 
oil would arrive. Hubbert was bolder. He predicted it was likely to happen 
around 1995–2000 (Grubb 2011). The inverse relationship just identifi ed 
between petroleum production and capitalist enterprise means an intensi-
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fying land/capital contradiction involving hydrocarbons. As these produc-
tive, land forces are increasingly developed, capitalist enterprise’s capacity 
to survive—let alone accumulate capital—decreases.
One further point concerns the positive relationship between hydrocar-
bon utilization and global warming. As Heinberg (2003: 3) explains, “The 
world’s oil and coal fi elds represent vast stores of carbon that have been se-
questered under the earth’s surface for hundreds of millions of years,” and 
the burning of these petroleum and coal products releases huge amounts 
of carbon into the atmosphere, contributing to global warming. The co-
occurrence of growing global warming and the arrival of peak oil warns of a 
rapidly increasing, systemic capital/land contradiction and the “potential” 
for “system collapse.” There is lively debate over whether humans will be 
part of the ongoing sixth extinction, but no debate about whether this is 
possible. It is time to conclude the present chapter by recognizing where 
we stand in the argument establishing the plausibility of global warring 
theory.
Very Late Modernity
Chapters 4 and 5 explained that the US is and has been a shape-shifting 
empire from its very beginnings in 1783, and that by 1950 it had become 
the New American Empire. This chapter has examined its economic con-
tradictions since 1950. Economic elites choreographed events in the quest 
for capital accumulation. This pursuit resulted in both coalescing and in-
tensifying cyclical and systemic contradictions, raising reproductive vul-
nerabilities. The US Leviathan might be the most powerful social being in 
the history, but its vulnerabilities make it a brittle one.
Next consider the fi rst general proposition of global warring theory—
namely, that
intensifi cation and coalescence of an empire’s political and economic contra-
dictions increase its reproductive vulnerabilities.
Certainly the information in this and the previous chapter support this 
proposition. Later chapters will further document how worsening contra-
dictions, and the vulnerabilities they generate, lead to more heremenutics 
and public délires, and eventually to global warring.
Finally, this chapter clarifi es why the present is a time of very late mo-
dernity. In this book’s introduction, modernity was said to be a period 
dominated by institutions of capitalist logic articulated with imperial state 
forms. This chapter and the last have suggested that the New American 
Empire is a generator of contradictions pushing it toward its limits. The 
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Leviathan is subject to immanent and imminent disordering—immanent 
because the empire’s deconstructing contradictions are within its own 
economic and political systems; imminent because this disordering might 
arrive momentarily. Jonathan Fowler (2013), reporting on the World Me-
teorological Organisation’s data on the growth rate of global warming gases 
in the atmosphere, notes that experts warn that unless more is done soon 
to address greenhouse emissions, “the world faces potentially devastat-
ing effects.” If this is the case, then, this is very late modernity, because 
of the imminence of “devastating effects.” Reproductive fi xes involving 
pragmatic heremenuetics, public délires, and war are urgently required in 
response to such “devastating” vulnerabilities.
The chapters in the next section tell the story of security elites swinging 
into action through the logic of social constitution, among other things 
using violent force to fi x vulnerabilities. So, readers, it is time to go to war.
Notes
1. Brenner, McChesney, and Foster are political economists, and it might be concluded 
that only the left insists a long downturn has occured. The liberal economist Paul Krugman 
(1997) wrote—as the title of his book makes clear—that as of the 1970s it became The Age of 
Diminished Expectations. In the 1970s Edward Denison (1979), a centrist economist, began, as 
the title of his book puts it, Accounting for the Slower Economic Growth in the US.
2. Kolbert (2013) and Hartmann (2013) provide introductions to the considerable discus-
sion of the sixth extinction. MacKenzie (2011) reports on some studies that assert the rate of 
extinctions has been overestimated; Wynne Parry (2012) reports on those arguing the opposite.
3. Foster (2000) has explored Marx and Engels’s ecological views, highlighting their belief 
that capitalism resulted in a “metabolic rift” between people and nature, expressed especially 
in declining agricultural soil fertility. However, it is important to not make Marx and Engels 
into something they were not. Both were primarily interested in the condition of the working 
class, not in soil fertility, so their concern was to explain people-people relations, not people
-land relations.
4. Houghton (2009) provides an overview global warming from the perspective of conven-
tional economics. Braasch and McKibben (2009) consider the topic from an activist perspec-
tive; Foster (2009), from a leftist angle.
5. The ppm measure of CO2 in the atmosphere is the ratio of CO2 molecules to all other 
molecules in the atmosphere. 
6. Global warming might cause a massive release of methane from clathrates—deposits of 
methane produced by bacteria trapped in ice, usually on ocean fl oors or in Arctic permafrost. 
Enormous amounts of methane (an estimated 400 billion tons) are trapped in clathrates, and 
methane is 70 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than CO2. When clathrates melt, as 
they are likely to do as the globe warms, methane is released through degassing, or more collo-
quially “burping,” into the atmosphere. Such burps can greatly raise temperatures. It appears 
that the last major clathrate burp occurred during the third major extinction at the end of the 
Permian Period. This time has come to be known as the Great Dying because approximately 
90 percent of all animal life ceased to exist (Benton 2003). Humanity could cease, should 
global warming lead to another clathrate burp like the one that ended the Permian.
7. Petroleum reserves are guesstimates, and estimates tend to be optimistic.
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Chapter 6
AFTER THE SUNSET CAME THE NIGHT
Global Warring 1950–1974
The work of this chapter and those that follow might best be described by considering the extent of the US government’s exercises of violent 
force since World War II. V. G. Kiernan (1978: 281) cited one study re-
porting that the US “seriously threatened” to use its military to gain “dip-
lomatic advantage” on 215 occasions from 1945 through 1977. This meant 
that it threatened to go to war if it did not get its way about six times a year 
in this period, which was not especially diplomatic. Studies of the actual 
frequency of US military operations since the end of World War II are lim-
ited (Blum 1999; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Z. Grossman 2001; Galtung 
2001). No research systematically includes direct and indirect as well as 
overt and covert US military operations, especially because of the secrecy 
surrounding indirect, covert warring. Consequently, all estimates of the 
extent of US governmental violence are approximate and likely to be low 
due to underreporting.
Istvan Kende (1971), who analyzed existing data from the end of World 
War II through the late 1960s, reported that in that period the US warred 
more frequently than any other country in the world. Forty years later 
Richard Lebow (2011) corroborated Kende, fi nding that the US was the 
“world’s most aggressive state” measured in terms of war initiation. Kevin 
Drum (2013) claimed the US launched a signifi cant overseas assault every 
forty months over the last fi fty years. Drum’s estimate is low because, as 
he acknowledges, it excludes covert operations. John Tures (2003) used a 
“United States Military Operations” data set generated by the Federation 
of American Scientists to estimate the frequency of US military activities 
since 1945. He found that the US engaged in 263 interstate military op-
erations between 1945 and 2002—an average of around 4.6 operations 
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per year. However, 176 of these operations occurred in the eleven years 
between 1991 and 2002, a rate of about 16 operations per year. One con-
clusion from these fi ndings is “that there has been a sizeable jump in the 
number of U.S. military actions since the end of the Cold War” (Tures 
2003: 8).1 Military sources concur, reporting that “the number of military 
deployments has dramatically increased” since 1989 (Castro and Adler 
1999: 86–95).
Back in 1971 Kende noticed something that has been a feature of US 
governmental sub-logic’s violence since the end of World War II. Amer-
ica was, and is, “interventionist” (Kende 1971: 5). Violent force resources 
were, and are, exported from the US core to be exercised in countries 
throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Central and 
Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Pacifi c, and Europe. Because 
the interventions are those of an imperial core in other lands, it means the 
US Leviathan conducts global warring big-time.
Has this warring been consistent with global warring theory? The work 
of the following fi ve chapters is an answer to this query. US global warring 
is studied in three periods. The fi rst of these, covered in the present chap-
ter, is between 1950 and 1974, when for the most part the US economy 
was still basking in its golden age but the New American Empire had to ad-
dress the US/Soviet Union inter-imperial contradiction along with certain 
dominator/dominated contradictions arising from the decline of the Old 
Empires. The second period, analyzed in chapter 7, stretches from 1975 
to 1989, when the inter-imperial contradiction was gradually fading even 
as economic contradictions were beginning to intensify. The third period, 
investigated in chapters 9, 10, and 11, covers the time from 1990 to the 
present, when the US/Soviet inter-imperial contradiction has disappeared 
but the different cyclical and systemic contradictions are intensifying and 
coalescing in an apparently unstoppable fashion.
The hostilities analyzed are not a random sample of US warring between 
1950 and 2014, nor do they include all the interventions in which the US 
fought during this time. Rather, the global wars investigated were chosen 
because they were among most important confl icts of their moment. An 
overview of each of these wars’ violence is presented. Next to be analyzed 
are the contradictions and reproductive vulnerabilities present prior to 
hostility, followed by investigation of the logic of social constitution per-
taining to the wars. The object of this analysis is to show how, through her-
meneutic politics, elites instituted public délires that when implemented 
were violent reproductive fi xes—fi xes conceived of as global warring used 
to solve the hermeneutic puzzles provoked by reproductive vulnerabili-
ties. For now, let us establish the global imperial context in which the US 
warred between 1950 and 1974.
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Sunset: “avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw”
In guerrilla warfare … avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; 
deliver a lightening blow; seek a lightening decision. … In guerrilla strategy, 
the enemy’s rear, fl anks, and other valuable spots are his vital point, and there 
he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. (Mao Tse 
Tung 1937)
Sunrise for the old empires had been in AD 1410 when the Portuguese 
Crown conquered the Moroccan town of Ceuta, beginning six hundred 
years of world imperial conquest. Of course sunset follows sunrise, and the 
years 1950 through 1974 were, as the old boys had already discovered, the 
dusk of the old empires. Make no mistake, imperial domination is a lousy 
lot for the dominated. Many imperial subjects were conscious that they 
were economically disadvantaged, even if they did not know they were “ex-
ploited.” They were cognizant that they were politically weak, even if they 
did not know they were “oppressed.” They were aware they were culturally 
belittled, even if they did not know they were cultural “savages.”2 This 
means that dominator/dominated contradictions tended to be razor sharp. 
It took force to keep the “savages” down. So as reproductive vulnerabilities 
arose for the old empires, the dominated tended to insure their dominators 
were “harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.”
World Wars I and especially II led to vulnerabilities that gravely ham-
pered the old empires’ reproduction. After World War II, as Eisenhower 
had put it, Western Europe was in “economic collapse” because the wars’ 
destruction had stripped the old imperial governments of force resources 
to dominate. Actually, this crisis of the old imperial order had been build-
ing since the end of the eighteenth century. The American Revolution, 
discussed in chapter 3, might be thought of as the beginning of their end. 
Great Britain would recover from its defeat at the hands of the Americans 
and start empire building elsewhere in the nineteenth century, especially 
in India and Africa, but the reality was that it had lost and would never re-
cover the richest part of its imperium. Further, throughout the nineteenth 
century it would withstand substantial rebellion, especially in Afghanistan 
(1842) and India (1857).
However, the truly spectacular nineteenth-century imperial collapse was 
that of Spain. The Spanish economy during this time, thoroughly bettered 
by its capitalist competitors, was largely agrarian and impoverished. Conse-
quently, the Spanish Crown lacked the revenues to acquire suffi cient violent 
force resouces to effectively dominate. From 1800 to the early 1900s Spain 
lost imperial holdings in South America, North America, the Caribbean, 
and the Pacifi c. By the early twentieth century it had only three small col-
onies left, in Africa (largely in the Sahara, where there were few to revolt).
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The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
was an epoch of both growth and decline for the other old empires. On 
the one hand, prior to World War I they had carved out new imperiums in 
Africa, Indochina, and the Pacifi c. On the other, after that war there was 
resistance and rebellion in these places. For example, “by 1919–20, Britain 
was facing revolt almost everywhere in the empire—in Ireland, India, and 
Egypt, as well as Palestine and Iraq” (Mitchell 2011: 94).
Then came World War II, whose losers—Germany, Japan, and Italy—
were stripped of their colonies by the winners while the remaining Eu-
ropean imperial states, especially the English, French, and Dutch, were 
greatly weakened. In this situation the dominator/dominated contradic-
tion became more intense in the sense that, although colonial subjects re-
mained subjects, their dominators’ force had collapsed, so that the balance 
of forces between dominators and dominated swung in the latter’s favor. 
Indigenous elites in dominated colonies faced the following hermeneutic 
puzzle: “What is to be done with our imperial masters?” The perceptual 
response to the puzzle was “our masters are feeble.” Its procedural solution 
was, to appropriate a line from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar: “Cry ‘Havoc!’ 
and let slip the dogs of war.” This they did by forming ideologies of in-
dependence. Along with the ideologies came revolutionary public délires 
instituting national liberation armies that choreographed rebellion along 
nationalist and/or Marxist lines (Moran 2006).
Nikita Khrushchev, who by 1956 had emerged from the jockeying for 
power following Stalin’s death as the Soviet leader, recognized what was 
happening and in January of 1961 told the Higher Party School of the 
Institute of Marxism-Leninism:
Our era … [is] an era of Socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions; 
an era of the collapse of capitalism and of the liquidation of the colonial system; 
an era of the change to the road of socialism by more and more nations; and of 
the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale. (In Gaddis 1997: 183)
Khrushchev got it wrong about capitalism’s “collapse” and the “triumph 
of … communism on a world scale,” but he was correct that it was an era 
of “national liberation revolutions.” However—and this is important, as 
Douglas Blaufarb (1977) observed—there is little evidence that the Krem-
lin actually organized, or even encouraged, local leftist parties to launch 
insurgencies. Rather, the wars of national liberation appear to have been 
a response to the altered state of the balance of forces in the dominator/
dominated contradiction. Revolution by the dominated could now be won.
The two most important wars of national liberation were in China and 
Indonesia, in the former case against a client of the US, the Chinese Na-
tionalist Party (the Kuomingtang, KMT) and in the latter case against 
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the Dutch. Remember that at the end of the nineteenth century, the old 
empires had competed in China while waiting for the Qing dynasty to 
completely collapse before instituting colonization. The Qing dissolved in 
1911.3 Sun Yat-Sen, leader of the KMT, attempted to install a liberal re-
public. Violence followed as the country fractured into territories presided 
over by regional warlords. Sun Yat-Sen initially allied with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CPC) under and attempted to unify the country. He 
died in 1925, and his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, turned on the CPC, 
trying to destroy it. In 1934 the Japanese invaded, seeking to incorporate 
China into their growing empire, and the CPC was obliged to fi ght both 
the Japanese and the KMT. The Japanese fell in 1945, and in 1949 the 
KMT, now allied with the US, was driven from the Chinese mainland to 
the island of Taiwan. China was liberated.
Key to the CPC’s success was its development of a procedural culture 
of insurgency, whose choreography was detailed in Mao’s On Guerilla War 
(1937), quoted at the opening of this section, which encouraged nimble 
practitioners to “avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw.” Such 
fi ghting, also called “irregular” or “asymmetric” war, posed grave problems 
for the old empires’ militaries. Robert Taber ([1965] 2002: 1), in his classic 
account, explained why by observing that 
analogically, the guerrilla fi ghts the war of the fl ea, and his military enemy suf-
fers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and 
agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough—this is 
the theory—the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having 
found anything on which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws.
The old empires soon discovered they were infested with “fl eas,” as guer-
rilla warfare became the chosen choreography in the wars of national lib-
eration (Chaliand 1982).
In 1945 Indonesia, led by Sukarno and other nationalist leaders, de-
clared independence from the Netherlands. The Dutch demurred, pro-
voking the Indonesian National Revolution (1945–1949), in which the 
permuda (youth groups) and the nascent republican army fought largely 
as guerrillas (Cribb 2001). General A. H. Nasution was in considerable 
measure responsible for developing what he believed to be a nationalist, as 
opposed to communist, form of guerilla insurgency, articulated in his Fun-
damentals of Guerrilla Warfare ([1953] 1965). Nasution’s “fl eas” exhausted 
the Dutch, who granted Indonesia its independence in 1949, relieving 
themselves of a territory with the fourth largest population in the world 
and effectively putting themselves out of the imperialism business.
The British, with the largest empire and consequently the most to lose, 
withdrew peacefully from the richest territory in their empire. South Asia 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 150 –
Deadly Contradictions
(what would become India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) was the second most 
populated territory in the world, after China. Resistance to the Raj (colo-
nial rule) had been building there since the mid nineteenth century. By the 
1940s in India this had culminated in the Indian National Congress, which 
adopted Gandhi’s strategy of nonviolence. This choreographed force re-
sources into peaceful strings of resistance. The UK had no stomach for 
military action in such a populated area. Independence came with the par-
tition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947. A year later Sri 
Lanka was granted independence.
Britain violently responded to national liberation movements in areas 
where the distribution of violent force resources seemed more propitious, 
especially in its settler colonies. There was the Malaysian Emergency 
(1948–1960), the Mau-Mau Rebellion in Kenya (1952–1960), the Sec-
ond Chimurenga (1964–1979) in Zimbabwe, and the Aden Emergency 
(1963–1967) in what would become South Yemen. All these confl icts were 
characterized by guerilla warfare. The UK lost them all. Malaysia, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, and South Yemen were independent by the late 1970s.
Perhaps the French fought hard to maintain their empire, especially in 
Indochina and Algeria, where their nationals had settled. Indochina—the 
countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—was the grimmest violent 
place of the last half of the twentieth century.4 Vietnam announced its 
independence in 1945. Ho Chi Minh, head of the Viet Minh (a coalition 
of communists and nationalists), wrote the Vietnamese Declaration of In-
dependence. To emphasize its kinship with the anti-imperialism that had 
begun with the American Revolution, he inserted in his declaration a line 
from the US Declaration of Independence (Ho Chi Minh 1977: 5356) The 
French decided to militarily oppose Ho, and so began the First Indochina 
War (1946–1954).
In the late 1940s the US government began to supply and fi nance French 
military operations, and in the summer of 1950, in his resignation letter 
to Dean Acheson, George Kennan warned, “In Indochina we are getting 
into the position of guaranteeing the French in an undertaking which nei-
ther they, nor we, nor both of us together, can win” (1972: 58–60). The 
Vietnamese, led by Vo Nguyen Giap, initially engaged in scattered gue-
rilla engagements. These developed into a war of maneuver that fi nally 
trapped the elite of the French Far East Expeditionary Force at Dien Bien 
Phu (1953–1954), where it suffered crushing defeat. Kennan had been pre-
scient. French politicians in Paris gave up the struggle, to the disgust of 
much of the French military, and independence was granted in 1954. Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam became independent, Vietnam being divided into 
two countries: communist North Vietnam, ruled over by Ho Chi Minh; 
and noncommunist South Vietnam, increasingly a US client. Kennan once 
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again would be correct when the stage was set for the Second Indochina 
War, known to Americans as the Vietnam War; but understanding this 
awaits the US entry into Vietnam, described later in the chapter.
The year the First Indochina War ended, the Algerian War of Inde-
pendence began (1954–1962). This confl ict was especially brutal (Horne 
1977), in part because the French military sought to avenge its defeat in 
Indochina; in part because of Algerian tactics; and in part because France 
was fi ghting to protect its own. There were 1.4 million French or other 
Europeans settled in Algeria (pieds noirs), composing about 13 percent of 
the population and owning roughly 27 percent of the arable land. For ex-
ample, the novelist Albert Camus was a pied noir. He largely backed French 
attempts to prevent independence; in part because his mother was still 
in Algeria. The Algerian National Liberation Front initially fought using 
Maoist guerilla tactics, but it also employed especially repressive measures 
against Algerians who would not support it, and specialized in terrorist 
tactics against opponents both French and Algerian. The French military, 
for their part, developed an equally ugly counterinsurgency terrorism.
But by the late 1950s and early 1960s the war was destabilizing France: 
six governments had been brought down, and the Fourth Republic had 
collapsed. Communists, a major political force at the time, favored Alge-
ria’s independence. Conservatives, pieds noirs, and the military favored the 
opposite. General De Gaulle, brought to power in 1958 in an attempt to 
stop the destabilization, betrayed his followers by favoring independence. 
The Organisation de l’Armée Secrète formed in January 1961 and began 
attacking French offi cials representing De Gaulle. This was de trop, and to 
end the instability De Gaulle allowed Algerian independence. A million 
Algerians had died in the carnage.
Portugal, as stated earlier, had begun the expansion of the old empires. 
After Algeria’s fall, Portugal soldiered on alone to defend the old empire in 
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde. But in 1974, young 
Portuguese army offi cers imbued with the Maoist ideology of their oppo-
nents staged a successful revolution against the dictatorship in Lisbon. 
Portugal became a democratic republic, and its colonies were liberated. 
After it was all over, I recall standing in blazing sunlight in Guinea Bissau, 
as a ferryman transported me across a river as dark as the River Styx. He 
was one of Taber’s “fl eas,” a veteran of the fi ght against Portugal. As we 
crossed, he nostalgically reminisced about the sweet pleasures of downing 
Portuguese planes. In such ways the sun set on the old imperial dogs of war, 
fatally infested with “fl eas.” What happened next?
As the sun set on the old empires, it rose on the New American Em-
pire—or rather, it didn’t; because what appeared was a phantasmagoric 
light that blinded imperial domination. This fantastic light was the cre-
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ation of mainstream US scholarly hermeneuts who wrote books with titles 
like After Empire.5 Theirs was a rhetorical sunshine that shone down on a 
peaceable US hegemony, allowing political elites, like President Reagan, to 
describe America as a holy “city on a hill.” To know what really happened 
next, we must examine actual events in lands upon which the light of the 
New American Empire shone.
Hal Brands, writing of Latin America in the years this chapter is con-
cerned with (1950–1974), though he could have been speaking of other 
global regions, remarked that US security doctrine in the era “centered 
on the premise that … countries were … menaced by the twin dangers of 
subversion and insurgency” (2010: 79) by the Soviets or their clients. One 
set of events that marked this era is the US’s path to war to combat this 
menace. The fi ve US global wars during 1950–1974 are considered repre-
sentative because they were about addressing “subversion and insurgency.” 
Two of these hostilities were overt (Korea and Vietnam); three were covert 
(the Iranian Coup, the Guatamalan Coup, and the Bay of Pigs Fiasco in 
Cuba). Korea and Vietnam were the two major US wars of the fi rst period 
of post–NSC-68 warring; meanwhile the Iranian and Guatemalan coups, 
along with the attempted Cuban coups, are examples of a type of covert, 
CIA-organized warfare favored by the Americans.6 Analysis begins with 
the Korean War.
War in the Land of the Morning Calm, 1950–1953
Here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their 
play for global conquest. Here we fi ght Europe’s war with arms. (General 
MacArthur, US military commander in Asia; in Jervis 1980: 124–127).
US security elites’ immediate post–World War II attentions had focused 
upon events in Europe. After all, the Russian Bear was incorporating East-
ern Europe. In Italy the Communist Party was the strongest political party 
on the left, attracting the support of a third of voters as late as the 1970s. 
The French Communist Party was vigorous, having participated in three 
governments from 1944 through 1947. Immediately after the war, it held 
159 of the 586 sets in the National Assembly. The Berlin Blockade threat-
ened Western authority within Germany in 1947 and much of 1948. So in 
1949 it was conceivable that Soviet subversion might break into Western 
Europe.
One way the old boys sought to prevent this was through clandestine 
operations. First the OSS and then the CIA began the covert Operation 
Gladio. Timed to coincide precisely with the Marshall Plan’s implemen-
tion, this involved training and arming paramilitary forces that employed 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
After the Sunset Came the Night
– 153 –
terrorism to advance rightist political goals in Western Europe. Operation 
Gladio was especially active in Greece and Italy (Brozzu-Gentile 1994; 
Ganser 2005). In Greece, Neni Panourgia (2009) reported, it mounted 
clandestine actions creating terror via unrelenting exile, torture, disap-
pearance, and murder of leftists, culminating in the Junta of Colonels’ dic-
tatorship from 1967 to 1974.7
However, if the cockpit of old boys’ Soviet angst had been Europe im-
mediately following 1945, General Douglas MacArthur was right: it was in 
Asia that the Communists would “make their play.” Actually, the “play” 
would be made in Korea, the place known as the Land of the Morning 
Calm, which was among the lesser of Washington’s concerns. In the late 
1940s Washington security elites, led by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
had developed a strategy called the Asian Defense Perimeter for protection 
of their Asian clients. Korea was not included as a country to be defended 
in this strategy. In fact, by 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated clearly 
that “the US has little strategic interest in maintaining its present troops 
and bases in Korea” (NSC 8 1948: 8). Consider more closely how this Land 
of the Morning Calm of “little … interest” lost its calm.
The Korean peninsula had been incorporated into the Japanese Empire 
in 1910. Following World War II, a decision taken at Potsdam divided it 
at the 38th parallel, with the northern part to be occupied by the Soviets 
and the southern part by the Americans. In principle, the peninsula was to 
be reunited following free elections. These never occurred. Nine months 
after Mao Tse-Tung’s victory in China, war began on the Korean penin-
sula. On 25 June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea, instigating a 
confl ict that ended in an armistice on 27 July 1953.8 From the Truman 
regime’s perspective, as expressed by the National Security Council, sev-
eral weeks after fi ghting commenced, the “invasion of South Korea came 
as a complete surprise and shock” (NSC Action # 315 1950: 1), a “shock” 
they responded to with direct, overt global war in which the US and the 
United Nations supported the Republic of Korea against the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and its allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China.
Actually, Truman’s old boys should not have been so surprised. Re-
unifi cation of the two occupation zones failed due to non-performance 
of promised free elections scheduled for 1948, sharpening the animosity 
between the two sides. In the South, the South Korean government agreed 
upon a constitution (17 July 1948), elected a president, Syngman Rhee (20 
July 1948), and established the Republic of South Korea (ROK). In the 
North, the USSR established the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
headed by Kim Il-sung. Rhee was a hybrid elite. On one hand, he was a 
member of a yangban (aristocratic), if impoverished, family; on the other, 
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he had received an MA from Harvard University and a Ph.D. from Prince-
ton University. He was a Korean nationalist, but one with an Ivy League 
appreciation of American délires.
According to one source, Rhee was recruited into the OSS by his han-
dler, OSS Deputy Director Colonel Preston Goodfellow, sometime in the 
1940s (Rang 2000). Once president, he showed an authoritarianism that 
expressed itself in the elimination of leftist opponents, revealing his solici-
tude for US interests. Many of those opponents who survived became bitter 
enemies, headed north as refugees and prepared for guerrilla war against 
the US-sponsored ROK government. Nevertheless, in principle the two 
Koreas were still to be reunifi ed, which raised the question of which side of 
the Cold War divide reunifi cation would occur on. This question would, 
it seemed, be answered in favor of the Communists because of the Rhee 
government’s increasing unpopularity.
Cross-border attacks along the 38th Parallel became more frequent as 
1950 approached, including many by the South against the North. Kim 
Il-sung, fearing these attacks presaged a ROK invasion of North Korea, pe-
titioned Stalin for permission to mount his own offensive. In May of 1950 
President Rhee lost an election in the South and was about to lose control 
of the ROK government. For Rhee, this was a time of decision. He had to 
either attack the North, or withdraw from government. At this vulnerable 
time, the Soviets granted Kim permission to attack to reunify Korea (Ba-
janov 1995). However, the Russian approval was qualifi ed. Stalin is said to 
have told Kim, “If you get kicked in the teeth I shall not lift a fi nger” (in 
Offner 2002: 369). North Korean soldiers began an offensive toward dawn 
on 25 June 1949. The Land of the Morning Calm had lost its calm.
Three days after the initial attack, North Korean troops were in Seoul, 
South Korea’s capital. The US mobilized the young United Nations and 
intervened on South Korea’s side. After early defeats at the hands of the 
North Korean military, a US-UN counteroffensive organized by General 
MacArthur drove the North Koreans past the 38th Parallel almost to the 
Yalu River, which forms the border between Korea and China. When this 
occurred, communist China interceded on the side of North Korea. Chi-
na’s entry into the confl ict drove US, UN, and South Korean forces back 
south of the 38th parallel. MacArthur, who had begun advocating invasion 
of China and the use of nuclear weapons, and who was increasingly insub-
ordinate to civilian control, was relieved and replaced by General Matthew 
Ridgeway. Thereafter the fi ghting eventually deadlocked. An armistice 
was signed on 27 July 1953 on the basis of status quo ante. The US did not 
lose the Korean War, but it certainly “did not win” (Pierpaoli: 2000: 15).
Why did the New American Empire fi ght in Korea? Consider fi rst that 
South Korea would have been no more, had the North won. To the New 
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American Empire, this meant that all force resources, and the value they 
might produce, would be lost on the Korean Peninsula. Fully 98,480 square 
kilometers were at risk. This was an intensifi cation of the inter-imperial 
contradiction. With the intensifi ed contradiction, heightened reproduc-
tive vulnerability posed a hermeneutic puzzle: how to relax intensifi cation 
of the inter-imperial contradiction in Korea? The following section dis-
cusses the hermeneutic politics involved in the resolution of this puzzle.
Social Refl exivity of the Korean War
Why did the US fi ght in Korea? Of the several answers to that question, 
two of the more persistent are examined here before the discussion turns to 
the hermeneutic politics that preceded US entry into the war.
A Conspiracy: Perhaps the boldest account of the origins of the Korean 
War was that given by the leftist I.F. Stone in The Hidden History of the Ko-
rean War (1952). Written during the confl ict itself, it argued that the war 
was caused not by the North Koreans and Stalin, but by a conspiracy of 
US and South Korean elites to defeat the North. Evidence recently made 
available by the opening of Soviet Cold War fi les suggests this position is 
simply wrong. Kim Il-sung was worried about South Korean raids into the 
North. He did ask Stalin for permission to counterattack. Stalin initially 
responded negatively but eventually granted permission, which Kim im-
plemented as a large offensive against the South (Gaddis 1997: 71). Soviet 
Cold War archives, however, also make clear that whereas Stalin was not 
displeased by the prospect of an additional communist state, his approval 
was not part of any plan of “unrestrained (Russian) expansionism” (Weath-
ersby 1993: 32). The preceding accounts for why Kim invaded the South 
with 90,000 troops on 25 April 1950, but it does nothing to explain why 
the Security Elites 1.0 counterattacked. A second infl uential explanation 
of America’s entrance into the war might be called the “defense of the 
defense” account.
Defense of the Defense: Yǒng-jin Kim (1973: 30) argued that after China’s 
fall to communism, “Japan itself increasingly appeared as the major East 
Asian prize to be protected”—a “major … prize” because it was the sole 
country in Asia that could counterbalance China. How was such protec-
tion to be extended? Kim believed there was “recognition” among the old 
boys “that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea,” which “led 
directly to President Truman’s decision to intervene” (ibid.). In this view, 
the defense of Japan necessitated the defense of Korea. But a problem with 
Kim’s position becomes clear upon revelation of the interpretations that 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 156 –
Deadly Contradictions
occupied Truman’s I-space, and those of his offi cials, in the few days prior 
to their authorizing intervention. This takes us directly to the hermeneutic 
politics of the Korean War.
“Draw the line”: It is possible to gain insight into these politics because the 
Truman Library has released a series of documents relating to events per-
tinent to the confl ict, called “The Korean War and Its Origins, 1945–53.” 
The documents, especially as the war approaches, do not show the old 
boys soberly contemplating the hermeneutic puzzle of intensifi ed contra-
diction. Rather, they reveal them wrestling with the “surprise and shock” 
of invasion. Korea’s relevance to the defense of Japan is mentioned only 
once in these documents prior to the decision to intervene. This was at a 
meeting held on the evening of 25 June at the Blair House between Presi-
dent Truman and top offi cials of the military and the Departments of State 
and Defense. At this meeting Admiral Sherman, at the time chief of Naval 
Operations, said, “Korea is a strategic threat to Japan” (Memorandum of 
Conversation 1950: 3). The admiral’s statement is cryptic, but what he ap-
parently meant was that should Korea become completely communist, its 
geographic location could serve as a stepping stone to Tokyo. The fact that 
Korea was mentioned only once as important to Japan’s defense in a collec-
tion of documents about the origins of the Korean War is not evidence of 
Kim’s insistence that this consideration “led directly to President Truman’s 
decision to intervene.” It is evidence that it was something on the mind 
of one actor. But there was something else that more “directly” dominated 
the old boys’ I-spaces, far more than protecting Japan.
The striking thing about their decision to go to war was the rapidity 
with which it was made. The North Korean offensive that began on 25 
June was an instantaneous and great intensifi cation of the inter-imperial 
competition. The choice to go to war was made by 26 June, and the White 
House had publicly announced military operations by 28 June. Let us fol-
low events over these three days. North Korean troops invaded the South 
at 4 a.m. local time. Korea is thirteen hours ahead of the US East Coast, so 
Washington received news of the invasion by the morning of the 25 June. 
The fi rst concern of the Security Elites 1.0 was to discover exactly what 
was happening. At 8:45 a.m. Washington time on 25 June, a telephone 
conference was held between military leaders in the US capital and those 
in Tokyo (Tokyo was headquarters for US Asian forces). Washington asked 
its military, “What is your estimate of objective of current North Korean 
effort?” Tokyo replied that “the North Koreans are engaged in an all-out 
offensive to subjugate South Korea” (Note Regarding Teleconference 
1950: 1) and that regarding ROK, “our estimate is that a complete col-
lapse is possible” (ibid.: 3). This, then, was a perceptual cultural message 
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about events in E-space. An “all-out offense” was coming from the North, 
with “complete collapse … possible” in the South. This intelligence was 
transmitted to civilian offi cials in the White House, State Department, 
and Defense Department. These were the stark realities of the North Ko-
rean invasion.
The next evening, 26 June, senior fi gures in Truman’s State Depart-
ment, Defense Department, and Joint Chiefs of Staff assembled at the 
Blair House. The Blair House is the presidential guest house, but at this 
time it was serving as Truman’s residence while the White House was be-
ing renovated. At the Blair House meeting a decision was made to begin 
all military operations, short of committing ground troops. Consequently, 
“Appropriate orders were issued that evening, and a public announcement 
made the next day” (Notes Regarding Blair House Meeting 1950: 1). At 
roughly 9 a.m. on 25 June, US governmental elites had discovered they 
had a reproductive vulnerability. At roughly 9 p.m. the next day they had 
their fi x, and the fi x was war.
After the Blair House meeting fi nished, Truman instructed that certain 
important Congressmen be requested to attend “a very important meeting 
on Korea” at 11:30 a.m. the next day (Notes Regarding Meeting with Con-
gressional Leaders 1950: 1). The following morning, 
the President opened the meeting by stating that he had invited a group of Sen-
ators and Congressman to the White House so he could describe the situation 
in the Far East to them, and inform them of a number of important decisions 
which he had made during the previous twenty four hours. (Ibid.: 2) 
The information he imparted gives a clue as to the old boys’ response to 
the hermeneutic puzzle they faced. Truman told his audience,
The communist invasion of South Korea could not be let pass unnoticed … 
this act was obviously inspired by the Soviet Union. If we let Korea down, the 
Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. 
We had to make a stand sometime, or else let all of Asia go by the board. If we 
were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would 
happen in Europe. Therefore, the President concluded, we ordered our forces 
to support Korea as long as we could … and it was equally necessary for us to 
draw the line at Indochina, the Philippines, and Formosa. (Ibid.: 4)
Elsewhere in his memoirs, remembering the North Korean attack, Truman 
(1956: 378–379) used even stronger language: “Communism was acting 
in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted … earlier.”
Truman had interpreted the North Korean invasion through the lens of 
the domino theory hermeneutic and the global domination public délire. 
The Soviets were a monster-alterity. Communism would conquer territory 
after territory, like dominoes falling, due to an initial push. This was the 
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perceptual solution of the hermeneutic puzzle. The procedural solution 
was to “draw the line,” but because war had already started and peace-
ful solutions to the puzzle were no longer possible, the old boys granted 
themselves Shultzian Permission. North Korea’s invasion had been under-
stood in terms of the global domination public délire: Violence would be 
answered by violence.
There seems to have been no opposing politics among the security elites 
regarding the meaning of the North Kprean attack. Truman’s interpreta-
tion was shared by two key offi cials authorized to respond to it. Secretary 
of Defense Louis Johnson testifi ed before Congress:
The very fact of this aggression … constitute[s] undeniable proof that the 
forces of international communism possess not only the willingness, but also 
the intention, of attacking and invading any free nation within their reach 
at any time they think they can get away with it. The real signifi cance of the 
North Korean aggression lies in the evidence that, even at the resultant risk of 
starting a third world war, communism is willing to resort to armed aggression, 
whenever it believes it can win. (In Jervis 1980: 579)
Again the language was strong. The monster-alterity of “international 
communism” would attack “any time they think they can get away with 
it,” even if this risked starting “a third world war.” Dean Acheson strongly 
supported his Defense Department counterpart and brought the Soviets 
into the picture, “The profound lesson of Korea is that … the USSR took 
a step which risked—however remotely—general war” (ibid.).
So the president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense 
were hermetically sealed into interpreting the North Korean invasion in 
terms of the recent global domination public délire. Perceptually they be-
lieved the Soviet monster-alterity was implementing the domino theory 
and threatened “global war,” thus creating a risk of enormous loss of US 
force resources and value. This interpretation may or may not have been 
accurate (in fact, it was untrue with regard to any Soviet plan for “global 
war”), but what the old boys did know was that if they did nothing, they 
would lose South Korea and all its force resources. So the procedural fi x 
for the hermeneutic puzzle was to “draw the line” and meet violence with 
violence. On 29 June 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacAr-
thur a cable ordering him to support the South Korean forces. This cable 
implemented the procedural part of the global domination public délire, an 
implementation that would be especially gory.9
The Korean War was of utmost signifi cance for transforming the global 
domination public délire from an unfunded and hence unimplementable 
délire into a funded violent fi x to the inter-imperial contradiction threaten-
ing the US Leviathan. Remember, Truman had been shaken by its implied 
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costs when he fi rst saw it in 1949 and had accordingly shelved it. However, 
once he entered the war, as Pierpaoli (2000: 144) makes clear, “He also 
began … to rearm the nation along the lines prescribed in NSC-68.” The 
defense budget quadrupled from a pre–Korean War low of $13.5 billion to 
$50 billion by the end of 1951 (Markusen, Campbell, and Deitrick 1991). 
This was a military Keynesianism: the government was stimulating the pri-
vate (military) economy with enormous infusions of capital. In Pierpaoli’s 
terms, “The United States was now on its way to constructing a perma-
nent national security state and defense economy” (2000: 144). Thus, 
the Korean War and the funding of NSC 68 began the military-industrial 
complex, which gave the New American Empire suffi cient violent force to 
actually be in a position to implement the global domination public délire. 
President Eisenhower, who followed Truman in the presidency, denounced 
the military-industrial complex at the end of his administration, but it was 
there to stay, a permanent structural feature of the US Leviathan.
The year 1953 saw President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s inauguration on 
20 January and the end of the Korean War on 27 July. Within months of 
taking offi ce, the new president would address a major issue in Middle 
Eastern politics by authorizing a covert coup d’état in Iran. Why?
“That Terrible Thing”: The Iranian Coup, 1953
“Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?” she cried out, “We always 
loved America. … But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the 
United States again. … Why, why did you do it?” (Kinzer 2008: xxv)
The speaker quoted in the above citation was an Iranian memoirist who, 
at a book party celebrating her memoir, was asked a question by the Amer-
ican journalist Stephen Kinzer about the 1950s CIA coup that overthrew 
the democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. She 
responded in an “agitated and animated” (ibid.) fashion, calling the coup 
“that terrible thing” and asking, “Why, why did you do it?” The memoirist’s 
question is our own: Why did the US Leviathan do that terrible thing?
The answer has to do with the Republican victory in the 1952 presi-
dential election. It had been a long time coming. Eisenhower’s triumph 
was the fi rst Republican presidential win since 1928. In part, his reason 
for authorizing a coup in Iran concerned the ideological arguments used in 
the hermeneutic politics of the election campaign, which had to do with 
perceptions of the inter-imperial contradiction. Profi ts were to be made 
selling goods to a reviving Europe and Japan. The Korean War, as we have 
just seen, pumped enormous sums into US companies through defense 
contracts for equipment and supplies. Consequently, the 1950s were very 
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much part of the Golden Age of US capitalism. This meant that a faltering 
economy could not be used to bludgeon the Democrats in electioneering. 
The same was not true of national security. Here matters seemed to be 
worsening, especially in the US’s relations with the monster-alterity.
A threesome of bad events, uninvited, clambered into the Democratic 
bed in the fall of 1949: in September the Soviets exploded their fi rst atomic 
bomb; a month later Mao triumphed in China; and in September and Oc-
tober division of Germany into two states formally occurred, effectively 
confi rming Eastern Europe’s loss to the Soviets. Then, the Korean War 
ended with its problematic outcome.
There was no doubt about it in Republican eyes. Democrats were losing 
to the “Commies,” which was a Republican understanding of intensifi ca-
tion of the inter-imperial contradiction. Republican Senator McCarthy 
called it “twenty years of treason” (in A. Fried 1996: 179). “Treason” was 
an abomination the Republicans were pleased to use to savage the Dem-
ocrats. With a snarling disregard for evidence, Joseph McCarthy rose to 
national prominence by, on every day in every way, accusing government 
offi cials of disloyalty, subversion, or treason vis-à-vis the Soviet “men-
ace.”10 Of course, those accused were Democrats. Genial, grandfatherly 
Eisenhower, “Ike” to many, who had defeated the Germans as Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces in Europe and should know a thing or two 
about dealing with bad guys, ran for the presidency on the Republican 
ticket. He promised to take a “new look” at Democratic “treason.” What 
was this new look?
John Foster Dulles was to be the new secretary of state. He had been 
rehearsing for this job since the 1940s, and in War or Peace (1950) had told 
readers how he would take a new look. The book was largely about what to 
do with the Bear. Its language continues the strident tones of NSC 68. The 
Soviets are “despotic,” “fanatical,” and “diabolically clever,” seeking “world 
domination” (ibid.: 2, 224). However, there was a novel recognition. The 
Kremlin does not intend “to use the Red Army as an actually attacking 
force”; rather, it will use “class war” (ibid.: 12). This was “penetration” into 
a country by “intensive radio and press propaganda” to foment “discon-
tent,” “terrorism,” and “civil war,” leading to the country’s subversion into 
the communist camp.
The key to meeting the Soviets’ subversion was not to passively con-
tain them. It was to aggressively “pressure” them, which might lead the 
Bear “into a state of collapse” (ibid.: 252). After all, Dulles had pledged 
in 1949, “We should make it clear to the tens of millions of restive subject 
people in Eastern Europe and Asia, that we do not accept the status quo 
of servitude and aggression Soviet Communism has imposed on them, and 
eventual liberation is an essential and enduring part of our foreign policy” 
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(in Stöver 2004: 98). This was “rollback.” Instead of the USSR being con-
tained in existing areas, it would “collapse.” Implicit here was a notion of 
regime change. The Bear collapsed would be replaced by a regime genial 
to Republican sensibilities. What sort of procedures would do the rolling? 
Here matters were unclear, though Dulles did recommend covert opera-
tions (Bodenheimer & Gold 1989). Rollback might be judged a particular 
iteration of the global domination public délire, differing from the original 
in that it proposed regime change in the USSR. It became part of the Re-
publican Party’s new look in the 1952 campaign.
Following Ike’s victory, Walter “Beetle” Bedell Smith was appointed 
undersecretary of state. Beetle had been Ike’s chief of staff during part of 
World War II, US Ambassador to the USSR (1946–1948), and CIA Direc-
tor (1950–1953); and had acquired a fi erce animosity toward the Soviets. 
Allen Dulles, John’s younger brother, became the head of CIA.11 Together, 
with the elder Dulles, they were the core Security Elites 1.0 that imple-
mented the new look. The fi rst place they did this was in Iran, by roll-
ing back its nationalist government. It is time to investigate “that terrible 
thing”—the coup against Mohammad Mossedegh, Iran’s democratically 
elected prime minister.
The Coup
I owe my throne to God, my people, my army and to you. (The Shah of Iran, in 
K. Roosevelt 1979: 199)
The person enumerating his debts above was Shahanshah (King of Kings), 
Aryamehr (Light of the Artuans), Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran. 
The person he was speaking to was Kermit Roosevelt Jr., Teddy Roosevelt’s 
grandson (Groton and Harvard, like his grandfather). The reason the shah 
was so grateful was that in August 1953 Kermit had led a CIA coup code-
named Operation Ajax that helped place the shah on his throne. The Iran 
Coup was covert and involved largely indirect US operations.12 Operation 
Ajax directed against the government in Teheran was the fi rst CIA new 
look at the world. Additionally, it was the fi rst American attack upon a 
democratically elected government and it was cheap, costing in the order 
of a million dollars. The Korean War had cost between 1951 and 2000 on 
the order of 1,001 billion dollars (R. Miller 2007).
Operation Ajax engineered the toppling of Mossadegh’s government 
at the insistence of, and with assistance from, Whitehall. This permitted 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to govern for twenty-six oppressive years un-
til he was overthrown in the 1979 revolution that swept the Ayatollah 
Khomeni to power.13 Why were the British and the Americans so vexed 
with Mossadegh, a frail septuagenarian from an aristocratic background, 
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Paris-educated, whom the Soviets regarded as a “bourgeois nationalist” 
(in Gaddis 1997: 167)? Under normal circumstances such gentlemen were 
preferred clients of their imperial handlers. The emphasis in the preceding 
sentence falls on “normal,” for in the early 1950s in Iran, especially from 
the UK’s perspective, events were not normal.
What was abnormal to her majesty’s government had to do with oil. 
Great Britain was experiencing imperial sunset. Iran, land of ancient and 
medieval empire, had escaped formal English or anybody else’s coloniza-
tion. Rather, it had survived as a buffer state between expanding Russian 
and British imperialisms. Importantly, before World War II the UK had 
practiced an informal imperialism there, centered on oil. Iran was a petro-
state in possession of enormous oil reserves, and since the early twentieth 
century the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, which would become 
British Petroleum, BP) had exercised a near monopoly, ensuring a com-
fortable accumulation of oil profi ts back in England. This was the British 
“normal” in Iran.
Lamentably for the UK, Iran had been anything but normal since the 
early 1900s. Initially, pesky US majors sought entrance into the oilfi elds. 
The Americans were held off during the inter–World War period. Unfor-
tunately, the British faced severer challenges starting in the late 1940s. 
Iranian nationalists, recognizing the UK’s enfeeblement, demanded re-
negotiation of oil royalties, using Venezuela as a model for how royalties 
should be split—at the time, about 50-50 (Engdahl 2004: 93). The Iranian 
demand for higher royalities represented a signifi cant intensifi cation of 
what was earlier termed the oil company/petro-state contradiction.
Unsurprisingly, AIOC resisted renegotiating their concession, which 
sparked increased Iranian popular agitation for nationalization. The pro-
Western Prime Minister Ali Razmara, a supporter of the AIOC, was as-
sassinated in March 1951. The next month, the Majlis (parliament) leg-
islated the nationalization of AIOC by creating the National Iranian Oil 
Company. The newly elected Prime Minister Mossadegh might have been 
bourgeois, but he was also a nationalist, and as such he vigorously sup-
ported nationalization, believing Iran should enjoy increased profi ts from 
its oil reserves instead of allowing them to nourish English elites. Note that 
the oil company/petrostate meso-contradiction was at the same time an 
expression of the dominator/dominated macro-contradiction between UK 
elites and Iran, the informal client state they sought to dominate. With 
nationalization came intensifi cation of these contradictions.
At least some British elites understood Mossadegh’s oil nationalism 
through a racist gaze, as the work of “incomprehensible orientals” (Elwell-
Sutton 1955: 258). The AIOC represented the UK’s single largest overseas 
investment at the time. Moreover, the loss of Iranian oil endangered the 
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UK’s post –World War II restructuring strategy, which Engdahl (2004: 92) 
explains as follows:
While Britain during the 1950s appeared to be losing her most extensive attri-
butes of empire, she held tenaciously to a reordered set of colonial priorities. 
Rather than stake everything on maintaining the extensive formal empire … 
she regrouped around the far more profi table empire of world oil and strategic 
raw materials. … Thus … a strategic priority … [was] maintenance of British 
interests in the oil-producing Middle East Gulf States, especially Iran.
Winston Churchill, then prime minister, tried a number of nonviolent re-
productive fi xes to reverse Iran’s nationalization: “They fi rst demanded 
that the World Court and the United Nations punish [Mossadegh], then 
sent warships to the Persian Gulf, and fi nally imposed a crushing embargo 
thst devastated Iran’s economy” (Kinzer 2008: 2–3). Mossadegh “was ut-
terly unmoved” by these measures. Their strategic priorities defi ed by “in-
comprehensible orientals,” stiff upper lips quivered in Whitehall. It was 
time to call in the “birdwatchers” (British slang for spies).
Granting itself Shultzian Permission, London turned to the US and de-
manded strategic rent in the form of assistance in staging a coup. President 
Truman refused, but his successor, Eisenhower, whose secretary of state 
was eager to give rollback a try, complied. Two birdwatchers—Kermit Roo-
sevelt Jr. and Donald Wilber (Iranian architectural scholar, oriental rug 
collector, and one-time president of the Princeton Rug Society)—planned 
and executed Operation Ajax, assisted by elements of British intelligence 
and the Iranian military. Iranian politics around the nationalization of 
their oil confronted the Americans with a hermeneutic puzzle: What to 
do about this politics, which produced a reproductive vulnerability of an 
intensifi ed oil company/petrostate contradiction? At this point the social 
refl exivity of the US old boys helps to explain why they did “that terrible 
thing.”
Social Refl exivity: Two Contradictions and One Public Délire
There have been three main answers to the question of why the 1953 coup 
took place. The fi rst was that it had to do with domestic Iranian politics; 
the second was that it addressed a Communist menace; and a third was 
that it was about oil. I suggest a fourth answer that elaborates upon the 
roles of both communism and oil. Let us fi rst consider Iranian politics.
It’s the Ayatollah: Darioush Bayandor (2010) argues that the overthrow 
of Mossadegh resulted primarily from 1950s domestic Iranian politics, 
and that key clerics of the time, notably Ayatollah Borujerdi, the Grand 
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Marja-i-Taqlid (“source of emulation”), played a crucial role in deposing 
Mossadegh. Bayander does not deny that there was a CIA coup attempt 
but argues that it failed, and that only a second attempt organized by the 
clerics succeeded. Bayander marshals evidence well and is possibly correct, 
but his views are not germane to our interest because they answer the dif-
ferent question of why the coup was effective, whereas our question is why 
the Americans did what they did in it. Korea had been all about the inter-
imperial contradiction and containing communist expansion. Might this 
sort of a consideration have played a role in US involvement in the coup?
Communism and the Inter-imperial Contradiction: Donald Wilber (1954), in 
his originally secret CIA report of the events, insisted that Mossadegh’s re-
gime “had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran.” 
Kermit Roosevelt (1979) emphatically supported his co-conspirator in his 
own book Countercoup. So the two CIA birdwatchers who had led the 
coup for the US perceived what was happening in Mossadegh’s Iran as 
communist expansion. This, in our terms, would be an intensifi cation of 
the inter-imperial contradiction.
The phrase “blowing smoke” is American slang for deliberately obscur-
ing something. Spies often blow smoke, and Ervand Abrahamian (2001: 
198) has argued that the two spooks who ran Operation Ajax were blow-
ing smoke. Specifi cally, he insists:
Throughout the crisis, the “communist danger” was more of a rhetorical device 
than a real issue—i.e., it was part of the cold-war discourse. The British and 
American governments knew Mossadeq was as distrustful of the Soviet Union 
as of the West. In fact, they often complained to each other about his “neu-
tralism.” … They also knew that the Tudeh, even though the largest political 
organization, was in no position to seize power. … Despite 20,000 members and 
110,000 sympathizers, the Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 
129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough 
inside information to be confi dent that the party had no plans to initiate armed 
insurrection.
Further, at the time the Soviets clearly were not involved in plans to ex-
pand into Iran. Moscow’s relationship to Mossadegh was “distant and dis-
trustful” (Gaddis 1997: 166).
Nevertheless, it was true that “Iran had enormous oil wealth, a long 
border with the Soviet Union, an active Communist party, and a national-
ist prime minister” (Kinzer 2008: 4). While Mossadegh was by no means a 
communist, he was a social reformer. Further, Tudah might not have been 
in a strong position in the early 1950s, but there was no reason to auto-
matically rule it out in the future. It was entirely possible that Mossadegh’s 
and Tudah’s sympathies might be disposed more to Moscow than to the 
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US. Thus, if he continued as prime minister the Soviets’ position might 
well be strengthened in Tehran, and at worst Iran might become a “second 
China” (ibid.). Consequently, a possibility of expansion of Soviet infl uence 
into Iran existed.14 The inter-imperial contradiction certainly appeared to 
be intensifying. This brings the discussion to the role of oil.
Oil and the Oil Company/Petro-state Contradiction: Concerning oil, Abra-
hamian has said,
the oil was important both for the United States and for Britain. It’s not just 
the question of oil in Iran. It was a question of control over oil internationally. 
If Mossadegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, 
that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans 
as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries 
would do the same. Once you have control, then you can determine how much 
oil you produce in your country, who you sell it to, when you sell it, and that 
meant basically shifting power … to local countries like Iran and Venezuela. 
And in this, the U.S. had as much stake in preventing nationalization in Iran as 
the British did. (In Goodman 2003)
Abrahamian has a point. After all, prior to coming to Washington the 
Dulles brothers had worked for the law fi rm Sullivan and Cromwell, which 
represented the AIOC parent fi rm’s business in the US. They were thus 
familiar with the issues pertaining to Iranian oil and moreover had their 
own ideas as to how the control of the oil might be rearranged. Wilber’s 
(1954: 2) account makes clear what that John Foster Dulles wanted: “Spe-
cifi cally to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government, and bring to power 
a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement.” “Equitable” 
meant that the American oil companies would have to get a big cut of 
the oil. In the 1950s, Iran, as an oil producer, was a petro-state. It wanted 
more of the value of its oil. The UK and the US had oil companies that also 
wanted more of the value of Iran’s oil than Mossadegh was willing to give 
them. Here, then, was an oil company/petro-state contradiction impinging 
upon the Iranian situation in the early 1950s.
The global domination public délire: US hermeneutic politics in the early 
1950s was ruled by a particular hermeneutic. In 1953, at the height of 
Senator McCarthy’s anti-Communist crusade, Americans fi xated on the 
understanding that the Commies were wicked, ubiquitous—even in gov-
ernment—and needful of riddance. Futher, the Republican campaign plat-
form of the just fi nished election had promised such an eradication in the 
international arena in the form of “rollback.” The hermeneutic was clear: 
perceptually, communists of any variety were monsters; procedurally, they 
were to be eradicated.
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In the fi rst three years of the 1950s, the hermeneutic politics within 
the US security establishment vis-à-vis Iran sought to understand the rel-
evance of Mossadegh’s oil nationalization within the context of this anti-
Communist hermeneutic. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in De-
cember 1950, the end of the fi rst year of the Korean War, judged that the 
Soviets had intended to aggressively pursue a global attack on the US’s 
position. NIEs provide medium- to long-term estimates of the intelligence 
community’s thinking about various topics. They were produced by the 
CIA in Eisenhower’s time. The 1950 NIE warned of the Soviets “aggres-
sively” attacking “world-wide” (NIE-15 1950).
A few months later the US embassy in Moscow, in a report entitled 
“Soviet Intentions” (FRUS 1951: 1582), included Iran as a target of So-
viet “attack,” reporting, “Elsewhere along the periphery of the Soviet orbit 
Iran, Yugoslavia, and Germany are the principal foci of attention and any 
faltering in Free World unity & determination might tempt the Kremlin 
to move at these parts.” Mossadegh seemed especially vulnerable be-
cause he governed in a National Front government, and such govern-
ments seemed vulnerable to communist subversion, as had happened to 
Czechoslovakian President Beneš’s regime in 1948. The State Depart-
ment’s Policy Planning Staff (30 July 1952) reported that there was fear 
that Mossadegh could be co-opted in a Czech-style coup, “where the 
communist organization either alone or in coalition with leftist elements 
in the National Front might win control of a deteriorating situation” (in 
Gavin 1999: 27).
At this point oil entered the discussion. During a June 1952 meeting 
of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General J. Lawton 
Collins, representing the Joint Chiefs, declared, “If we are going to hold 
Middle Eastern oil we will have to hold a line in Iran” (FRUS 1952–1954: 
239).15 The Security Elites 1.0 were not thinking that oil and commu-
nism were unrelated. Rather, they understood both were relevant to ap-
preciating the situation because they supposed that Iran was vulnerable 
to communist subversion, and if Iran was lost, then, the military believed 
(according to General Collins), all Near Eastern oil was at risk.
The Washington security elite’s interpretation of the Iranian puzzle by 
the end of 1952 was summarized by another NIE report issued on 15 Jan-
uary 1953:
Iran presents a more pressing problem than that existing in other states of the 
area, owing in part to the proximity of the Soviet Union and the strength of the 
Tudah party, and in part to the more immediate danger of social, political and 
fi scal breakdown. The longer present trends in Iran continue unchecked, the 
more diffi cult it will become to prevent a breakdown of government authority 
which would open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by the 
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Tudah … the Iranian situation contains so many elements of instability that it 
might occur at any time. (FRUS 1952–1954: 340–341)
This NIE might be thought of as the CIA’s perceptual interpretation of the 
Iranian situation. The key understanding was that Iran might go commu-
nist “at any time.” Given such a perception, the procedures to be followed 
included exercising violent force—violent, because Churchill had already 
tried peaceful means of getting Mossadegh to cooperate and these had 
failed. This understanding of the inter-imperial and the oil company/petro-
state contradictions was in terms of the global domination public délire.
NSC 136/1, dated 20 November 1952 and entitled “US Policy Re-
garding the Present Situation in Iran,” declared, “Specifi c military, eco-
nomic, diplomatic and psychological measures should be taken to support 
a non-communist Iranian government or to prevent all or part of Iran or 
adjacent areas from falling under communist domination” (In Gavin 1999: 
34). NSC 136/1 and its command to take “military … measures” autho-
rized implementation of the global domination public délire.
Actually, the decisions taken in the NIE and NSC documents had been 
made during the Truman administration, so when Ike and the Dulles broth-
ers arrived on the scene the reproductive fi x was already in. Moreover, the 
hermeneutic politics on this matter had been entirely one-sided. Wher-
ever Ike, the Dulles brothers, and “Beetle” Smith turned, the recently 
implemented global domination public délire dominated and, under the 
Eisenhower administration, in the more aggressive rollback iteration.
On 3 June 1953, at a meeting held in Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles’ offi ce, Kermit Roosevelt explained how he planned to carry out the 
coup. When he fi nished, Dulles asked what others thought about the plan. 
His brother, the CIA head; Beetle Smith; Secretary of Defense Charles 
Wilson; the assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs; the di-
rector of policy planning at the State Department; and the US ambassador 
to Iran all endorsed it, saying “we have no choice,” whereupon John Foster 
Dulles said: “That’s that then. Let’s get going” (Kinzer 2008: 164). Among 
the principals, it was a hermetic seal. Once they got Operation Ajax “go-
ing,” it became the August coup and the reason why the US Leviathan did 
“that terrible thing.”
The coup, which may well have succeeded due to the reasons given 
by Bayander, was over by 20 August 1953. The next year a meeting was 
held between the US, UK, Iran, and other interested parties, who were 
called “the Consortium,” to divvy up the spoils of Iran’s oil. A Consortium 
Agreement was reached, which specifi ed that (1) for the fi rst time US oil 
companies shared in the control of Iranian oil; (2) Western majors got 50 
percent of revenues, with the US and UK evenly splitting 80 percent of 
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this sum and the remainder divided between French and Dutch interests; 
and (3) Iran was allocated 50 percent of the revenues, an increase from 16 
percent in the original agreement. Thus, instead of Iranian oil becoming a 
lost cause to all oil companies save Iranian ones, American offi cials used 
the coup to arrange a situation that benefi ted friends of the US, inviting 
advanced capitalist clients—the UK, Holland, and France—to enjoy eco-
nomic carrots in the form of oil revenues. The French may have grumbled 
that they got only 6 percent of the loot and the Dutch only 14 percent, 
but they got something. The British may have groused that they only got 
as much as the Americans, but they could otherwise have lost it all. First 
these countries received Marshall Plan Funds; next they got Iranian oil 
revenues. These fl ows of value were strategic rents the US paid to ad-
vantaged clients to attach them to the second tier of the New American 
Empire. Further, the Iranians got more oil revenues than had been the case 
under the old AIOC.
Certain of Eisenhower’s security elites probably thought they were roll-
ing back the Soviets in Iran. However, the Bear was never really there, so 
it only makes sense to think of the coup as a preemptive rollback iteration 
of the global domination public délire. They were preempting something—
Iran becoming a Soviet client—so they would not have to roll it back later. 
Moreover, the Shah, after thanking Kermit for his throne, allowed Iran to 
join the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) along with Iraq, Pakistan, 
Turkey, and the UK, to defend the Middle East against the USSR as NATO 
did in Europe. Accordingly, the CIA coup further challenged the Soviets 
by adding an additional client state to the New American Empire, solidify-
ing the US imperium in an area of the world where oil revenues kept richly 
accumulating while helping to pay rents to its Atlantic community clients. 
Finally, with US military and CIA assistance, the Shah organized a secret 
police that brutally repressed the Tudah, effectively eliminating them as a 
political force in Iran (Abrahamian 1999). Moreover, many ordinary Irani-
ans eventually suffered under the Shah due to Kermit’s fi ne coup. So all in 
all, as the Iranian fi lmmaker Maziar Bahari told US National Public Radio, 
it left “a bitter taste in Iranians’ mouths” (NPR Staff 2013). We shall hear 
from Iran in a later chapter. Now it is time to move on to Banana Land and 
another adventure of the Dulles brothers.
Banana Land: The Guatemalan Coup, 1954
… the people are very polite … ( Journey to Banana Land, a 1950 United Fruit 
Company fi lm, in Brimont 2011).
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In 1950 the United Fruit Company (UFC), which had vast interests in 
Guatemala, produced a fi lm called Journey to Banana Land. Filled with sen-
timental music and condescending assurances that the “people” were “very 
polite,” the fi lm was above all a trip into the UFC’s self-representation, 
whereby the company presented itself as a benign corporation bearing fruit 
for the folk of Banana Land. Another, altogether different trip in Banana 
Land leads to the tentacles of el pulpo (the octopus, a common moniker for 
the UFC among Guatemalans) and another coup.
The 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état was a covert, indirect CIA operation 
that, according to Nicholas Cullather (1994: ix), a historian working for 
the CIA, “delighted both President Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers.”16 
It was called Operation PBSUCCESS and considered another CIA tri-
umph after Iran. It overthrew Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the democratically 
elected president of Guatemala. The following events led to Eisenhower 
and the Dulles brothers’ delight.
During the fi rst half of the twentieth century, Guatemala had been a 
place of informal US imperialism where US companies extracted capital 
from the country. Guatemala’s geography is favorable to tropical agri-
cultural production. Consequently the UFC (most famous for Chiquita 
bananas), starting in 1901 and continuing through the dictatorial presi-
dencies of Manuel José Estrada Cabrera (1898–1920) and General Jorge 
Ubico (1931–1944), gradually came to dominate the Guatemalan econ-
omy. This was especially true under Ubico, who was called “Little Napo-
leon” because he fancied himself as like Napoleon, and whom Tomàs Borge 
(1992: 55) described as “crazier than a half-dozen opium smoking frogs.”
Little Napoleon, the only son of a wealthy landowner and prominent 
political fi gure, was something of a hybrid elite. He was fi rst privately tu-
tored, then educated at Guatemala’s most prestigious schools before fur-
ther education in the US and Europe. Unsurprisingly, he was disposed to 
grant favors to the UFC, which it used to secure controlling shares of the 
railroad, electric utility, and telegraph companies while also acquiring over 
40 percent of the country’s best land and de facto control over its only port 
facility, in the process earning its nickname, el pulpo. However, a period 
of nationalist, social welfare–oriented reform in Guatemala began in the 
1940s.
Little Napoleon met his personal Waterloo in the “October Revolution” 
of 1944, whereupon Juan José Arévalo Bermejo was elected and governed 
until 1951. A new constitution was enacted, permitting land expropria-
tion. This, combined with Arévalo’s belief in “spiritual socialism,” horri-
fi ed Guatemala’s landed elite, who accused him of supporting communism. 
In 1947 he signed a labor protection law whose most obvious target was 
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the UFC. The US embassy in Guatemala became worried and sent cables 
warning of Arévalo’s communist leanings.
Jacobo Arbenz was the next president of Guatemala. His father was a 
Swiss migrant and pharmacist who initially earned enough to provide his 
family with a comfortable life. Tragically, the father became an addict, ne-
glected his business, went bankrupt, and plunged the family into poverty. 
There was no money for Jacobo to attend university, so he attended the 
military academy, to which he was able to win a scholarship. Subsequently, 
Arbenz entered the army as an offi cer and married Maria Cristina Vila-
nova, a landowner’s daughter with a taste for socialism. Instead of travel-
ing north to attend Harvard, cavort with wealthy old boys, and become a 
hybrid elite, Jacobo stayed south, fell in love with a socialist, and became a 
committed advocate of social welfare.
Arbenz’s participation in the 1944 revolution made him a hero. This 
fame helped get him elected president in 1951 as a reformer following in 
Arévalo’s footsteps. Arbenz’s government sought to more completely im-
plement his predecessor’s policies. The Agrarian Reform Law enacted in 
1952 authorized expropriation of private corporations’ unfarmed land and 
its distribution to peasants. In 1953 the Guatemalan government began 
expropriating UFC land, seizing 234,000 acres. A year later it took an-
other 173,000 acres. Arbenz collaborated with members of the communist 
Guatemalan Labor Party to make the land reform program effective. Sub-
sequent to the 1953 expropriations, the UFC began extensive lobbying of 
the US government for its support in their confrontation with Arbenz.
The UFC lobbying was successful. Allen Dulles described what was hap-
pening in Guatemala as the establishment of a “Soviet beachhead in the 
western hemisphere” (in Cullather 1999: 17). No self-respecting Security 
Elite 1.0 wanted “Soviet beachheads” near the US, so a coup was autho-
rized via a series of three events. On 12 August 1953 the NSC authorized 
covert action against Guatemala. Three months later on 9 December, Al-
len Dulles approved and allocated $3 million for Operation PBSUCCESS’s 
general plan. Finally, on 17 April 1954 the Dulles brothers gave the green 
light to implement it.
Howard Hunt, a CIA offi cer who participated in the coup (and was, 
from 1972 to 1974, part of the Watergate fi asco that destroyed President 
Nixon’s presidency), recalled the nature of the coup’s activities in a fi lm 
where he said, “what we wanted to do was to have a terror campaign” (in 
TruthGlobal 2010). PBSUCCESS’s “terror” lasted from late 1953 to 1954. 
It included arming and training a “Liberation Army” of about 400 fi ghters 
under the command of the then-exiled Guatemalan army offi cer Colonel 
Carlos Castillo Armas that was deployed in coordination with elaborate 
diplomatic, economic, and propaganda campaigns. PBSUCCESS was a 
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success. Arbenz resigned on 27 June 1954, terminating a nationalist pe-
riod of representative democracy in Guatemala known as the “Ten Years 
of Spring.” Eisenhower and the Dulleses, as we already know, were “de-
lighted.” Next the social refl exivity of why they did it is analyzed.
The Hermeneutic Politics of PBSUCCESS
The social refl exivity of PBSUCCESS involved a hermeneutic politics 
concerning a particular hermeneutic puzzle: how to address the supposed 
reproductive vulnerability of a Soviet “beachhead” in Banana Land. How-
ever, to be clear: the old boys may have solved a puzzle that could well have 
been, but was not. Consider the following. Stalin had just died on 5 March 
1953, and the ruling nomenklatura (the Russian equivalent of the old boys) 
was preoccupied with arranging the succession. The Guatemalan Commu-
nists would have appreciated some Soviet assistance. In fact, one recalled,
“We were knocking on the Soviets’ door,” one Guatemalan communist later 
acknowledged, “but they didn’t answer.” Pravda and Kommunist did run a few 
optimistic articles …; and the Czechs were authorized to sell the Guatema-
lans—for cash—obsolete and largely inoperable German military equipment 
left over from World War II. Direct Soviet-Guatemalan contacts, though, ap-
pear to have been limited to a visit by a Soviet diplomat interested in bartering 
agricultural equipment for bananas: the deal fell through when each side real-
ized that the other had no refrigerated ships. (Gaddis 1997: 178)
After the coup, the CIA seized Guatemalan archives to fi nd proof of So-
viet support for the Arbenz regime. Historian Piero Gleijeses gained access 
to these archives and searched them. The only evidence he found of Soviet 
dealings with Guatemala were bills from the Moscow bookstore Mezhdun-
arodnya Kniga to the local Communist Party for $23 (1992: 184–188). So-
viet intervention in Guatemala prior to the coup seems limited to a request 
for payment on an outstanding bill.
Still, the US and Guatemala were in a dominator/dominated contradic-
tion due largely to the UFC’s economic imperialism. Arbenz was intensify-
ing this contradiction with his moves against el pulpo. His land reform had 
the potential to weaken the UFC and the old landowning elites, the very 
parties most likely to appreciate Washington’s embrace. Had Arbenz been 
successful, it is entirely possible that Moscow would have sought Guate-
mala as an ally and gradually moved it into its orbit. Perhaps the UFC 
might have been nationalized and its bananas rerouted to the USSR in 
exchange for military hardware. However, as of 1954 there was no “beach-
head.” The notion of the hermetic seal helps account for why the “old 
boys” moved against Guatamala.
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A Hermetic Seal and the Fixing of a Vulnerability that Was Not 
By early 1954 Washington was fi rmly of the opinion that Arbenz was a 
communist. Once the hermeneutic puzzle of Guatemala was reduced to 
the fact that its president was a “Commie,” his country could be treated 
as fair game for US spooks. Of course, Arbenz was not a Communist. He 
was pretty much, in Immerman’s (1982: 182–186) terms, “a middle-class 
reformer.”17 How could the US government have made such a mistake?
The hermetic seal forged by the joint operations of UFC and US govern-
ment actors answers this question. The story of these operations begins with 
the UFC, which was acutely sensitive to what was happening in Banana 
Land because Arbenz’s land reform was swallowing their territory. As this 
was occurring, the UFC public relations department hired two especially 
effective hermeneuts—Thomas Corcoran (whom FDR had nicknamed 
“Tommy the Cork”) and Edward L. Bernay. The Cork had worked with 
FDR during the New Deal and gone on to be the fi rst truly powerful US 
government lobbyist. Bernay, a native of Vienna and a nephew of Sigmund 
Freud, believed in manipulating public opinion using the subconscious and 
was in many ways the creator of US public relations (Tye 1998). Both men 
were hired to communicate the perceptual message “that attacks on the 
company (UFC) were proof of communist complicity” in Arbenz’s regime 
(Cullather 1994: 18). Additionally, the Cork employed Adolf Berle and 
Robert LaFollette Jr. to assist him with his lobbying. The Washington elite 
considered Berle a “wise-man” on Latin American affairs. LaFollette was 
a hero of political progressives in the US. Bernay “laid down a PR barrage 
that sent correspondents from Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, and 
Chicago Tribune to report on Communist activities in Guatemala” (ibid.).
How infl uential the UFC actually was in the CIA’s intervention in Gua-
temala has been debated. Kinzer and Schlesinger ([1982] 1999) argued it 
was decisive. Gleijeses (1992) suggested that UFC’s lobbying efforts were 
not all that pivotal. Certainly the UFC helped in two ways “to create a 
sympathetic audience” for the knowledge that the Arbenz regime was go-
ing Communist (Immerman 1980: 638). First, the likes of the Cork, Ber-
nay, LaFollette, and Berle directly brought this knowledge to the principals 
among Eisenhower’s security elites by visiting with them in their offi ces 
and arguing their briefs. Second, the journalists hired by Bernay saw to it 
that the same knowledge appeared in mass-circulation publications. Appy 
(2000: 200) reports that “every major article about Guatemala” in this 
press “cast the government as pro-Communist.” According to John Pra-
dos (1996: 91–108), CIA offi cers remembered that it was a summer 1953 
meeting between the Cork and Beetle Smith that led to actual planning 
for the Guatemalan coup.18
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At the same time, CIA hermeneuts reported information that replicated 
knowledge coming from the Cork and Bernay. During the early 1950s, 
“offi cers in the Directorate of Planning believed they were witnessing 
something new. For the fi rst time Communists had targeted a country ‘in 
America’s backyard’ for subversion and transformation into a ‘denied area’” 
(Cullather 1994: 2). Equally, offi cers in the Offi ce of Policy Coordination, 
which was part of the CIA but also reported directly to the State Depart-
ment, worried as early as August 1950 about “the rapid growth of Commu-
nist activity in Guatemala” (ibid.: 18). The 19 May 1953 NIE asserted that 
Arbenz’s agrarian reform might “mobilize the hitherto inert peasantry in 
support of the Administration” and consequently “afford the Communists 
an opportunity to extend their infl uence by organizing the peasants as they 
have organized other workers” (NIE-84 1953: 1064, 1700).
Gleijeses (1992: 152) interviewed José Manuel Fortuny, head of the 
Communist Party at the time, about this assertion and found it to be es-
sentially correct: the party supposed that by helping implement the land 
reform, it would be laying “the groundwork for eventual radicalization of 
the peasantry.” However, and this is important, the party also believed that 
Guatemala was in a “feudal” stage of development, which necessitated 
that it should fi rst become capitalist before any socialist transformation 
could occur. Yet by 1952, CIA analysts regarded the Communist threat 
in Guatemala as great enough to warrant clandestine action, which they 
recommended.
Even more hermeneuts in the State Department at this time produced 
knowledge of communist perfi dy in Banana Land. For example, the State 
Department’s desk offi cer for Central America, who was responsible for 
passing information arriving from the different embassies on to higher 
offi cials, cabled that “the trend toward increased Communist strength is 
uninterrupted” (Gleijeses 1992: 22). John Moors Cabot (Harvard and Ox-
ford), of the Boston Cabots, traveled to Guatemala at this time. As the 
assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs and consequently the 
highest ranking State Department offi cial dealing with Latin and Central 
America, Cabot was thought to be an objective commentator because 
even though his family was tied to the UFC, he had initially opposed any 
Guatemalan intervention. In April 1953, he met with Arbenz and other 
offi cials in the Guatemalan administration to negotiate with them about 
issues of compensating the UFC for its expropriated land and suppressing 
the Communists in the government. The negotiations were testy, prompt-
ing Cabot to report:
My talks in Guatemala were highly unsatisfactory. The Foreign Minister was 
a complete jackass. … President Arbenz had the pale, cold-lipped look of an 
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ideologue and showed no interest in my suggestions for a change in his govern-
ment’s direction. He had obviously sold out to the Communists and that was 
that. (In Moultan 2009: 70)
Having met with the president who had “sold out to the Communists,” 
Cabot felt obliged to report that there was no way the Arbenz regime could 
be persuaded to mend its ways. Hence, he recommended, “a CIA-organized 
coup was the only solution” (in ibid.). In effect, this interpretation was 
that Shultzian Permission needed to be granted with regard to Guatemala 
because peaceful attempts at controlling Banana Land’s “direction” had 
failed.
There was more from Foggy Bottom. The formidable Paul Nitze, still 
head of the Policy Planning Staff, worried that Guatemalan communism 
“would be diffi cult to contain” (ibid.: 21). This worry raised the issue of 
the domino effect. Consequently, a draft NSC policy paper insisted in Au-
gust 1953 that “a policy of non-action would be suicidal since the Com-
munist movement under Moscow tutelage, will not falter nor abandon its 
goals” (ibid.: 25). A new ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, took 
up residence in October 1953. Fresh from fi ghting communism in Greece, 
Peurifoy, an admirer of Joseph McCarthy, told Congress, “Communism is 
directed by the Kremlin all over the world, and anyone who thinks differ-
ently doesn’t know what he is talking about” (ibid.: 16). Peurifoy immedi-
ately began reporting back to the State Department that Guatemala was in 
danger of communism “directed by the Kremlin.”19
There is one fi nal actor in this story. Ann Whitman was Eisenhower’s 
personal secretary and the wife of Edmund Whitman, the public relations 
director of the UFC. Ann’s conversations with Ike are discretely not in 
evidence. However, it is possible she whispered the UFC line in the pres-
idential ear: “The Commies are coming, the Commies are coming—to 
Guatemala.” A conclusion emerges from the preceding, if one contem-
plates the bobblehead doll.
“Bobblehead” dolls are toys often seen dangling from rearview mirrors in 
cars or arranged on mantles. They consist of large heads, usually of famous 
individuals, attached by springs to small bodies in such a way that a light 
tap causes the heads to nod vigorously. When this happens, they look like 
they are talking. Eisenhower and the two Dulles brothers were the prin-
cipal Security Elites 1.0 authorizing the Guatemala coup. Wherever Ike 
and the Dulleses turned—to the press, the CIA, the State Department, 
UFC Lobbyists, the Cork, Bernay, LaFollette, Berle, Cabot, Nitze, Peurifoy, 
or the discrete Whitman—there were hermeneuts with heads wagging up 
and down, busy bobbleheads saying identical things: the monster-alterity 
had its “beachhead” because Arbenz was a “Commie,” and if you knew 
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this, you felt you had to act against it. All of which is to assert that the prin-
cipal old boys had made a global domination interpretation of the situation 
in Arbenz’s Guatemala.
Peaceful operations to remove Arbenz were impracticable because at-
tempts to diplomatically fi x the vulnerability, like the Cabot mission, had 
failed. So Shultzian Permission was granted, and by 1952 the CIA was 
working on a violent fi x based upon the global domination public délire. 
The 12 August 1953 NSC authorization of covert action against Guate-
mala; Allen Dulles’s approval for PBSuccess in 9 December 1953; and the 
17 April 1954 joint Dulles brothers “full green light” for the coup all im-
plemented the global domination public délire, because these actors were 
hermetically sealed into a belief in the intensifi cation of the inter-imperial 
contradiction.
Did the reproductive fi x that was PBSuccess fi x a nonexistent vulner-
ability? No and yes. There was no Soviet “beachhead.” Arbenz was not 
a Communist. His regime had no plans to make Guatemala Communist, 
though the local Communist Party did hope the agrarian reform would 
strengthen its position. What was happening in Guatemala was not a 
steep, sudden intensifi cation of the inter-imperial contradiction, but the 
bobbleheads were heremetically sealed into the belief it was. Their her-
meneutic blindness led them into Banana Land fantasy. Still, there was 
another contradiction in Guatemala—the dominator/dominated contra-
diction—and it was intensifi ed by Arbenz’s policies. PBSuccess terminated 
those policies. So although the vulnerability fi xed by the coup did not arise 
from the inter-imperial contradictions, it was an outcome of the domina-
tor/dominated contradiction.
For Guatemala, the consequences of the fi x were grim. The coup pro-
voked long-lasting repression. When a small insurgency developed against 
the government of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, the client installed by 
the coup, his government, with US assistance, developed a counterinsur-
gency program that killed tens of thousands. Armas’s government gave 
way to undemocratic regime after undemocratic regime, and for four de-
cades Guatemala was a land of counterinsurgency involving right-wing 
death squads invariably assisted by the US military. The UN-supported 
Historical Clarifi cation Commission of Guatemala reported in 1999 that 
over 200,000 were killed during this time and assigned blame to the US 
government and the Guatemalan military (CEH 1999).
There was another unintended power of Operation PBSuccess. Ernesto 
“Che” Guevera was in Guatemala during the coup. There he met, and fell 
in love with, the Peruvian militant Hilda Gadea (2008). As they experi-
enced the coup, Hilda helped transform Che from a politically inert person 
who was ethically repulsed by inequality and repression into an activist 
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committed to revolutionary action. The couple fl ed to Mexico, where he 
met Raul and Fidel Castro, and the rest of the story is Cuban history. It is 
time to travel to Cuba to narrate that story, and one of a CIA coup that 
failed.
The Bay of Pigs: Cuba, 17–19 April 1961
It should be borne in mind that the United States is now not at such an inac-
cessible distance from the Soviet Union as formerly. Figuratively speaking, if 
need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket 
fi re. (Khrushchev 1960)
I have previously stated, and I repeat now, that the United States intends no 
military intervention in Cuba. (Kennedy 1961)
The Bay of Pigs invasion occurred at the very beginning of the adminis-
tration of Ike’s successor, John F. Kennedy (JFK). We need to begin with a 
sense of the new presidency, acquired by turning to a poet. The fi rst line of 
Percy Shelley’s poem “To Jane: The Invitation” urges, “Best and brightest, 
come away!” Further inspection of the poem indicates Shelley wanted Jane 
to “come away” into the woods, where they would do God knows what to 
each other’s bodies. David Halberstam (1969) reported that when JFK be-
came president, he asked the “best and brightest” to “come away” with him 
to Washington, and the old boys (especially from Harvard) were delighted 
to accede to the dashing young president’s request. JFK took offi ce from 
Ike on 20 January 1961. Three months later the “best and the brightest” 
were in “deep shit” (US slang for “serious trouble”). Why?
It began with a speech that Nikita Khrushchev, who by the late 1950s 
had established himself as Stalin’s replacement, gave at a teacher’s confer-
ence on 9 July 1960. In this speech, quoted at the beginning of this section, 
he threatened to support the Cuban Revolution with Soviet “rocket fi re.” 
Ike, still president at the time, was not amused. Nine months later, un-
der the freshly inaugurated Kennedy administration, Cuba was invaded by 
CIA-trained, armed, and led Cuban counterrevolutionaries at the Bahía 
de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs).20 The operation had been planned and orga-
nized by the Eisenhower administration’s CIA—largely by the same offi -
cers responsible for Operation PBSuccess—but was implemented by JFK’s 
“best and brightest.” It was a disaster.
Brigade 2506 hit the beach at the Bay of Pigs on 17 April 1961 and 
directly came under intense fi re. By the next day, when Kennedy wrote the 
letter denying US involvement quoted at this section’s outset, the brigade 
had been cut to pieces, effectively terminating the invasion. Our route to 
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explaining this fi asco and its implications for US empire-building leads fi rst 
to understanding the Cuban Revolution of 1959, which in turn requires 
knowledge of the rule of President Fulgencio Batista.
“Our son of a bitch”: Following Spain’s defeat in the Spanish-American War 
(1898), Cuba became fi rst a formal and then an informal US colony. Cuba, 
as the largest and most populous of the Caribbean Islands, promised the 
greatest opportunities for US capitalists. In 1895, US private investments 
in Cuba totaled $50 million. By 1925, they were around $1.5 billion. These 
investments were deeply resented by Cubans who believed the gringos 
(North Americans) were exploiting them. This resentment became espe-
cially intense during the worldwide depression of the 1930s. It prompted 
Cuba’s then President Ramón Grau San Martín to enact legislation that 
reduced the infl uence of the US government and American businesses in 
Cuba. The US responded by supporting Cuban military offi cer Fulgencio 
Batista’s overthrow of the Grau government in 1934.
Batista was a hybrid elite, though not a typical one. He came from mod-
est circumstances, and his early school years were spent at an American 
Quaker School in Cuba. After a rapid political rise beginning in 1933, he 
became Cuba’s president (1940–1944), but then a political reversal precip-
itated his migration to the US, where from 1944 through 1952 he split his 
time between New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel and a home in Daytona 
Beach, Florida. His American sojourn seems to have solidifi ed his sense 
that good things came from accommodating US interests (Argote-Freyre 
2006). In 1952 he led a successful coup that allowed him to establish a 
second presidency, which lasted until he was overthrown in 1959. Earl T. 
Smith, the US ambassador to Cuba just prior to Castro’s victory, explained 
how valuable Batista had been to US enterprise in 1960 Senate testimony, 
declaring “that American business was for the Government of Cuba, be-
cause the Government of Cuba gave normal protection to American busi-
ness” (US Senate 1960).
“Protection” allowed US business to develop until it largely controlled 
the Cuban economy. By 1956, in addition to their extensive sugar hold-
ings, Americans owned 80 percent of Cuban utilities and 90 percent of 
its mining industry (Kraft and Anderson 2004), with fi rms like Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation and Speyer and Company controlling much of Cuba’s 
national resources. The banks, the country’s entire fi nancial system, and 
most industry were dominated by US capital. Additionally, Cuba became 
a major tourist destination, and many of its nightclubs and casinos were 
the property of the American Mafi a. In short, Cuba was a profi table client 
state in the New American Empire, and Batista was a model of a hybrid 
elite dexterously enabling his handlers’ plans for capital accumulation. In 
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the view of Arthur Gardner, another 1950s ambassador to Cuba who spoke 
at the same Senate hearings as had Ambassador Smith, “I don’t think we 
ever had a better friend” (US Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1960).
Batista had initially attempted some social reform, but by the 1940s 
his regime was reactionary, corrupt, and brutal. Thus, while Cuba was 
good business for the Americans, it was bad for business for ordinary Cu-
bans. President Kennedy said of Batista’s Cuba, “I believe that there is no 
country in the world … including any and all the countries under colonial 
domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation 
were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during 
the Batista regime” (in Daniel 1963: 16). These were strong words, and 
at least some of the Washington governmental elites might have agreed 
with Kennedy at the time. Meanwhile, the viewpoint expressed by Wil-
liam Wieland, an important State Department offi cial in the 1950s, takes a 
mournful tone: “I know Batista is considered by many as a son of a bitch … 
but American interests come fi rst … at least he was our son of a bitch” (in 
H. Thomas 1998: 650). JFK was acknowledging that by the end of the Ba-
tista regime, Cuba had become a particularly repressive client in the New 
American Empire. Wieland was noting that the tyrant was the US’s “son of 
a bitch”—a prickly situation likely to raise revolutionary ire, which it did.
“Going wild and harming”: The Cuban Revolution began in 1953 when 
poorly armed Cuban rebels led by the Castro brothers attacked the Mon-
cada Barracks in Santiago. The attack failed, and nearly all the rebels were 
killed or captured. Following the Moncada debacle, the Castros fl ed into 
Mexican exile, where, as we already know, they met Che Guevara, who 
had just come from Guatemala City. Che and the Castro brothers trained 
their own army for a guerilla war against Batista. On 2 December 1956, 
Castro and eighty-two others aboard the boat Granma landed in Cuba. 
Batista’s soldiers quickly reduced their numbers, but most of the important 
leaders made their way into the Sierra Maestra Mountains, where they 
formed the 26 May Movement. Two years of guerilla insurgency followed. 
Eventually, in late 1958, Batista and his generals concluded the situation 
was hopeless. Forsaking his Daytona home, Batista fl ed to Spain on New 
Year’s Day 1959 with a fortune reputed to amount to $300 million. Fidel 
Castro arrived triumphantly in Havana on 8 January.
This handed the old boys in the US government a hermeneutic puzzle: 
What was happening in Cuba? Of course, a fi rst alarm was that the revo-
lution might be due to Communism. Opinion was initially divided on this 
possibility. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for example, initially told 
Eisenhower, “The Provisional Government [of Cuba] appears free from 
Communist taint” (in Gaddis 1997: 179).
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However, Washington elites very soon came to suspect that commu-
nism was playing a part in the revolution. For example, a memorandum 
reporting a debriefi ng between State Department offi cials and the Harlem 
congressman Adam Clayton Powell, who had visited Castro in March of 
1959, reported that
The Congressman has concluded that Fidel is very close to a nervous break-
down or crack-up of some sort. “He has gone haywire.” Many friends and 
staunch supporters of Fidel reported to him this same concern. Also, Mr. Powell 
believes that the Communists are taking advantage of the chaotic conditions 
to move in to positions of strength wherever they can and with disturbing suc-
cess so far. (Powell, Weiland, and Stevenson 1959: 1)
Nine months later, in January 1960, Allen Dulles called for Castro’s over-
throw on the recommendation of Colonel J. C. King, head of the CIA’s 
Western Hemisphere Division, who had concluded that a “far left” dicta-
torship existed in Cuba (in Rabe 1988: 128). Eisenhower seems to have 
accepted the CIA’s interpretation, as in one of two meetings held at Foggy 
Bottom that month he labeled Castro a “madman” who was “going wild 
and harming the whole American structure” (in ibid.).
“For the Russians,” Gaddis (1997: 181) reports, Castro’s victory “came 
as an enormous surprise; one of them remembered it as ‘a completely un-
expected miracle.’” To exploit the “miracle,” the Kremlin signed a trade 
agreement in February 1960, instituting an exchange of Cuban sugar for 
Russian oil, machinery, and technicians. Cuban–Soviet-bloc trade rock-
eted from 2 percent of the island’s trade in 1960 to 80 percent by the 
end of 1961 (LaFeber 2002: 213). On 18 Febuary 1961, Ike told Senator 
Smathers that the Castro situation was “intolerable” (ibid.: 128). In early 
March, a ship bringing arms to the Castro regime exploded. Castro blamed 
the CIA. At an NSC meeting on 17 March 1960, Eisenhower authorized 
a plan developed largely by Richard Bissell and Tracy Barnes, two Groton 
old boys and former PBSUCCESS operatives. The plan, called “A Program 
of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime” (code-named JMARC), was 
designed to eliminate Castro.
Meanwhile, on 17 May 1960 Cuba passed an Agrarian Reform Law that 
threatened expropriation of US businesses’ landholdings. Cuba proceeded 
to nationalize 850 million dollars’ worth of US property and businesses 
by June, prompting the US Senate to hold hearings in August to address 
the situation. The previously quoted Ambassador Gardner informed these 
hearings:
Senator DODD. In your own mind, Mr. Gardner, do you consider Castro a 
Communist tool, or do you think he is an important Communist himself?
Mr. GARDNER. I think he is a tool.
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Senator DODD. Would you agree that insofar as the security and welfare of 
the United States is concerned, it doesn’t make too much difference—it is not 
important whether he is a tool—
Mr. GARDNER. I don’t think it makes any difference.
Senator DODD. What do you think we ought to do? He is confi scating our 
property. He is causing trouble. He has created an espionage beachhead in the 
hemisphere.
Mr. GARDNER. I think we ought to morally support any movement of Cubans 
that is willing to take the job on. And I don’t think there is any question that 
there are such people. I think we can’t do it ourselves, because you know we 
can’t send Marines down. That would be the most terrible thing in the world. 
But we can, under cover, support and let them know that we want to have a 
change. (US Senate 1960)
What had happened with the rise of the Castro regime was a coales-
cence of both the dominator/dominated and the inter-imperial contradic-
tions. Recall that in the former contradiction, the dominator’s acquisition 
of more force resources from the dominated intensifi es the contradiction 
for the dominated; conversely, the dominated’s acquisition of greater force 
resources from the dominators intensifi es the contradiction for the dom-
inators. What happened in the Cuban Revolution, as just described, was 
the latter outcome. Rebels in a dominated state (Cuba) conquered the 
government in that client state, thereby acquiring control over its force 
resources and denying them to the dominator state (the US). In the inter-
imperial contradiction, the contradiction was intensifi ed if one of the par-
ties to the contradiction lost or gained force resources relative to the other 
party. As a result of Castro’s victory, Cuba increasingly drifted toward the 
USSR, putting at risk whatever force resouces the US had previously been 
able to extract from there. Cuba, in Ike’s words, was “going wild and harm-
ing” the New American Empire. Pretty “intolerable”!
Why were negotiations between Washington and Havana not explored 
at greater length? Otherwise put, why was Shultzian Permission granted 
so quickly? Consider Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s responses to the herme-
neutic puzzle of Castro’s Cuba. Gleijeses noted, “Eisenhower and Kennedy 
… agreed that Castro represented a deadly threat to US interests, and that 
the United States had the right to intervene to remove the threat” (1995: 
42). This understanding was possibly seared into Eisenhower’s I-space as 
a result of Khrushchev’s 9 July 1960 warning that he might defend the 
Cuban Revolution with Soviet rockets. This certainly reduced the like-
lihood of peacefully resolving the problem. Ike’s response to Khrushchev 
was simple. The US would not tolerate “establishment of a regime dom-
inated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere” (Eisen-
hower 1960). Kennedy was effectively trapped into accepting this position 
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because during his campaign for the presidency in the fall of 1960, he had 
attacked the Eisenhower administration for letting “a Communist menace 
… arise only 90 miles from the shores of the United States” (in Gleijeses 
1995: 24). Khrushchev’s threat, which led to Eisenhower and Kennedy’s 
responses, made it diffi cult to solve the Cuban crisis through peaceful mea-
sures. Shultzian Permission was in effect granted. Accordingly, the Ameri-
cans attacked on 17 April 1961, and two days later the Cuban military had 
decisively eliminated Brigade 2506. The invasion implemented the global 
domination public délire.
Some months afterwards, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy via 
the White House adviser Richard N. Goodwin, saying: “Thanks for Playa 
Girón [the Cuban term for the Bay of Pigs.] Before the invasion, the rev-
olution was weak. Now it’s stronger than ever” (in Anderson 1997: 509). 
It was not the Kennedy administration’s best moment. His security elites 
seemed far from the best and the brightest. Why? This leads to the murky 
realms of hermeneutic deception.
Hermeneutic Politics: The CIA and Hermeneutic Deception
The argument can be made that the hermeneutic politics ending in the 
Bay of Pigs attack resulted from hermeneutic deception. Chapter 1 ex-
plained that such deception is based on messages whose meanings deceive 
actors about situations in which they have to act. In the case of JMARC, 
the messages the CIA sent to the White House about what was meant to 
happen were not what the CIA understood would happen, and ultimately 
the Bay of Pigs fi asco resulted from this ruse.
The CIA handled the procedural fi x; and Allen Dulles largely assigned 
this task to the two Groton old boys Bissell and Barnes, and those work-
ing for them (David Atlee Phillips, Jacob Esterline, William Robertson, 
and Howard Hunt). This was the old crew from PBSuccess. Peter Wyden 
(1979) has argued that the CIA’s Cuban blunder was due to “group-
think”—another way of expressing the notion of the hermetic seal. But 
the groupthink for those deciding how to bring Castro down involved a 
hermetic seal #2 within a hermetic seal #1.
As a group, the CIA, like most of Washington elite of the time, was 
sealed into the understanding “Castro must go.” This was hermetic seal 
#1. But the Bissell group was further sealed into their vision of how he 
would go. This was hermetic seal # 2, discussed next. It is important to 
grasp that the Bissell team, in formulating how to eliminate the Castro 
regime, did not work with the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DOI). Bis-
sell’s colleagues never told the DOI that they were planning to overthrow 
Castro, which meant that they could not coordinate operations. However, 
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it was the DOI that did the actual intelligence work of the CIA, gathering 
information about what was occurring in Cuba. This meant Bissell’s group 
was under-informed about the most recent Cuban events.
Critically, the Bissell team was unaware of what the Castro regime was 
doing militarily, which was important because of a lesson Che and the Cas-
tro brothers had learned from PBSUCCESS: they realized that Arbenz had 
been defeated because his armed forces were neither strong nor reliable. 
The Castro regime successfully addressed this failing. Bissell’s old boys, for 
their part, knew Castro should be eliminated in the same way Arbenz had 
been removed. That is, they had hermetically sealed themselves into their 
interpretation of the situation. Their understanding was a reiteration of 
their Guatamalan success, where a small counterrevolutionary force sup-
ported by the CIA had defeated the military of a country where the CIA 
desired regime change. Why did Bissell’s men hold this understanding? 
Perhaps it was because the memory that PBSUCCESS had worked was 
sealed in their I-spaces, whereas they had sealed out knowledge that Che 
and the Castro brothers had fi xed what made PBSUCCESS a CIA success.
In the JMARC plan, Brigade 2506 was tasked with doing to the Castro 
regime what the small counterrevolutionary force led by Armas had done 
to Arbenz. Brigade 2506 consisted of 1,297 soldiers who actually landed 
at the Bay of Pigs. Of course, lacking intelligence, Bissell’s plotters did not 
know they would face a Cuban army of approximately 20,000 and a militia 
of 200,000. Brigade 2506 never had a chance: 114 of those who landed 
drowned or were killed in action, and 1,183 were captured. JMARC was 
a fool’s fi x.
“Ships that pass in the night”: Solving the hermeneutic puzzle of Castro’s 
Cuba was the fi rst challenge of the new Kennedy administration, so let 
us get a sense of the qualities of its main actors. Kennedy had once said, 
speaking of the virtues of McGeorge Bundy (National Security Advisor 
1961–1966), “You can’t beat brains” (in Halberstam [1969] 1992: 44). 
There were a lot of “brains” in the Kennedy administration. McGeorge 
Bundy had been a “legend” at Groton, the “brightest boy” at Yale in his 
time, and a Dean at Harvard (ibid.: 47). Secretary of State Dean Rusk had 
been a Rhodes scholar at Oxford. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 
the “star” of JFK’s cabinet, had been a “whiz kid” at Berkeley, graduating 
Phi Beta Kappa and going on to became president of Ford Motor Company, 
where he used his smarts to turn the declining automotive giant around. 
Walt Rostow (McGeorge Bundy’s deputy) had been an undergraduate 
at Yale, became another Oxford Rhodes scholar, returned to Yale for his 
Ph.D., and went on to become a professor at Harvard, where he was a wun-
derkind in the development of modernization theory.21 But if the Kennedy 
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offi cials were so academically accomplished, how, then, with their brains, 
did they perpetrate the fool’s fi x of JMARC?
Gleijeses (1995) argued that the newly elected Kennedy White House 
and the largely Eisenhower era CIA were like “ships that pass in the night.” 
He provided evidence showing that Kennedy’s “brains” assumed Brigade 
2506 would, if it encountered stiff resistance, escape destruction by melt-
ing into the countryside and conducting guerilla warfare. According to 
Gleijeses, the CIA professed the same belief as the White House but tacitly 
assumed that Kennedy would commit US troops rather than let the bri-
gade be overrun. Allen Dulles is reported to have said, “We felt that when 
the chips were down, when the crisis arose to reality, any action required 
for success would be authorized rather than permit the enterprise to fail” 
(in D. Talbot 2007: 47); that is, that JFK would send in the Marines. So 
the brains supposed one thing would happen to save the situation while 
the CIA believed another thing altogether, and neither the administration 
nor the CIA knew what the other thought. These thoughts were ships that 
pass in the night.
Furthermore, in the dark night of secret operations in Cuban waters 
one ship was actually sending false signals to another. This was detected by 
Lucien Vandenbroucke, who discovered certain of Allen Dulles’s papers in 
the Princeton University library. He believes that in these Dulles confesses 
that the CIA tried “to steer past” Kennedy an operation he mistrusted 
(1984: 365–376). Bissell (1996: 173) himself seems to make a similar ad-
mission in his memoirs, written at the very end of his life, where he recalls, 
“Fear of cancellation [of the attack] became absorbing. … It is possible that 
we in the Agency were not as frank with the President about defi ciencies 
as we might have been.” Bissell was worried about “cancellation” because 
there were rumors that Kennedy might appoint him CIA Director when 
Dulles resigned, and he wanted a great success to bolster his credentials. 
So the agency was not “frank.” It hid “defi ciencies.” Evan Thomas’s (1995) 
research among CIA offi cers of the time showed that “some old CIA hands 
believe Bissell was setting a trap to force US intervention.”
In March of 1960 Ike had approved JMARC but not its implementa-
tion. JFK, now President, had the option to authorize implementation. 
In early 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated JMARC, decided it had 
only a 30 percent chance of success, and recommended against it. Ken-
nedy accepted their recommendation, but Bissell immediately revised it, 
papering over its defi ciencies. On 4 February at a meeting held to discuss 
the revised plan, all the old boys with responsibilities toward Cuba were 
present—Bissell and Dulles from the CIA, members of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the two Bundy brothers, Nitze, and McNamara. Senator William 
Fulbright, chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, was also 
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invited. Everyone spoke favorably of the CIA’s revised JMARC, and at the 
end Fulbright was asked to comment. He denounced the plan in vigorous 
terms. A vote was taken: all the brains in the administration voted for the 
revised proposal. JFK accepted their judgment. Here ships passed in the 
night in the sense that one ship (the CIA) sent a message to another (the 
Kennedy administration) that all was clear ahead, when an iceberg was 
looming. It was a hermeneutic deception in which “defi ciencies” of proce-
dural interpretation led actors into dangerous waters, resulting in the Bay 
of Pigs debacle.
The Bay of Pigs invasion was a global warring that occurred after inten-
sifi ed, coalesced dominator/dominated and inter-imperial contradictions 
provoked reproductive vulnerability. The old boys’ perceptual solution of 
the puzzle was consistent with the domino theory hermeneutic and the 
global domination public délire. Perceptually the Castro regime was an-
other falling domino; procedurally they had to go. Shultzian Permission 
for violent force was given because Khrushchev’s threat of Soviet rockets 
in defense of Cuba indicated peaceful negotiations were impractical. Ike’s 
March 1960 authorization of JMARC and JFK’s February 1961 authori-
zation of its enactment implemented the global domination public délire.
The invasion was a debacle for two reasons. The fi rst was that the CIA’s 
procedural solution of the Cuban hermeneutic puzzle was based on Bissell 
and his agents’ being hermetically sealed in a delusional view of Castro’s 
Cuba as like Arbenz’s Guatemala; while the Castros and Che, aware of 
what had happened to Arbenz, made certain it was not. Second, the CIA’s 
hermeneutic deception told JFK’s “brains” that the invasion would be a 
success, when what they really meant was that if it was not a success, then 
Kennedy should send in US soldiers, which he was not prepared to do. 
After it was all over, Kennedy cleaned house at the CIA—Dulles gone, 
Bissell gone, Barnes gone. A few years later when Kennedy himself was 
gone, it was rumored the CIA might have settled the score with the young 
president.22 It is time now to analyze the largest and most violent of the 
1950–1975 global wars, the Vietnam War.
Vietnam: 1961–1975
At the time of the Vietnam War, Vietnamese called the struggle “Chiến 
tranh giữ nước chống Đế quốc Mỹ,” the “Resistance War against the Amer-
ican Empire to Save the Nation.” Americans, especially those who fought 
there, referred to it simply as “Nam.” Some of these “grunts” (ordinary 
soldiers) recalled Nam as a “cluster fuck” (a botched operation), at least 
for the New American Empire. Few dispute this judgment.
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Beginning in 1961 and continuing through 1975, US security elites 
waged overt and covert, direct and indirect warfare throughout Indochina 
(the three countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that had comprised 
French Indochine). Prior to US hostilities in Afghanistan, this was the 
longest single war in US history. Most combat operations were in South 
and North Vietnam, where US forces dropped 8 million tons of bombs, 
400,000 tons of napalm, and 18 million gallons of Agent Orange and other 
chemical defoliants. Additionally, they employed “the ‘Daisy Cutter,’ a 
monster-sized bomb weighing 7.5 tons” that 
destroyed everything in an area equal to ten football fi elds; the AC-47 heli-
copter gunship … armed with three Gatling guns that together fi red 18,000 
rounds per minute … phoshorus bombs, laser guided bombs, and fragmenta-
tion bombs, the latter designed to maximize internal body wounds with fl ying 
fl echettes that tear into the fl esh. (Parenti 1989: 44–45)
Constant bombing, napalming, and defoliating left two-fi fths of Vietnam’s 
land unsuited for forestry or agriculture for a long period. The violent force 
used by the US government in Vietnam “probably exceeded the amount 
used in all previous wars combined” (Gettleman 1985: 461).
Some of this fi repower was intentionally deployed against “slants” (a 
derogatory term for ordinary Vietnamese), especially when grunts, who 
were either “rabbits” (white) or “soul brothers” (black), conducted Zippo 
Raids—called such because Zippo lighters were used to ignite the thatch 
of peoples’ huts—that “massacred whole villages.” At the same time they 
“murdered prisoners of war; set up ‘free fi re zones’ in which all living things 
were subjected to annihilation; systematically bombed all edifi ces, includ-
ing hospitals, schools, churches” (Parenti 1989: 43–44).23 Still this horror 
might be likened to a stately dance.
A Dance of War: Dances have steps. The choreographing of those steps 
began at the Japanese surrender in August 1945. At that time, Ho Chi 
Minh’s guerillas occupied Hanoi and proclaimed a provisional govern-
ment. Ho Chi Minh was a leader of formidable intellect and organizational 
skills.24 In 1941 he returned to his homeland from an exile imposed on him 
because of his anticolonial activities, and in the next year he founded the 
Viet Minh, part political party, part guerrilla force. In October 1945 the 
French returned with an army to reclaim their colony. It became clear that 
the Vietnamese would have to fi ght for their independence, which they did 
in what became the First Indochina War (1945–1954), largely fought in 
North Vietnam. France, economically and fi nancially impoverished in the 
years after World War II, requested US support in their imperial twilight. 
Both the USSR and the new, communist People’s Republic of China recog-
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nized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and China began to militarily 
supply the Viet Minh, largely with American weapons seized from Chang 
Kai-shek’s defeated Nationalist Army in China.
The communists, from the Washington old boys’ perspective, were ex-
panding in two places in Asia at this time—on the Korean and the Indo-
china Peninsulas. We have already analyzed the US response in Korea. 
Washington authorized military aid to the French a month after the Ko-
rean War began, and it continued until the French defeat in 1955. Over 
this period the US paid much of the cost of all French war supplies (Wall 
1991), making the confl ict a US indirect global war.25 In effect, the US was 
using the French to fi ght the Vietnamese in the First Indochina War, as the 
British had used the Iroquois to fi ght the French in the Seven Years’ War.
US assistance notwithstanding, the French were defeated by the Viet 
Minh under General Vo Nguyen Giap, in part because Giap, a formidable 
tactician, was increasingly able to mount conventional military operations 
with Chinese supplies and training. In May 1954 French troops suffered a 
devastating rout at Dien Bien Phu, after which France began withdrawal. 
To decide the post-French disposition of Indochina a conference was orga-
nized in Geneva; its results became known as the 1954 Geneva Accords. 
Among other things, these formalized the division of Vietnam but also 
scheduled a vote in 1956 to decide whether to reunite the countries. Ho 
Chi Minh’s Communists received the North. A regime headed by the 
French-supported emperor, Bao Dai, got the South and installed Ngo Dinh 
Diem as his prime minister. Hanoi instructed approximately 10,000 Viet 
Minh fi ghters to remain in Diem’s South Vietnam.
With the French gone, the Diem regime was the US government’s cli-
ent in the struggle against communist expansion.26 Diem was fi ercely anti-
communist. With US assistance he created a South Vietnamese army to 
eliminate communists. The North Vietnamese responded by using the Viet 
Minh who had stayed behind to create a Peoples’ Liberation Army (the Viet 
Cong, VC) to oppose Diem. The year 1956 came and went without a vote 
to reunify the two Vietnams, heightening the struggle between the two sides. 
Diem’s army was unable to resist the VC, who by the end of 1961 were 
in control of much of South Vietnam’s countryside. In October 1961, six 
months after the Bay of Pigs fi asco, President Kennedy’s young administra-
tion decided to send US combat troops to serve as military advisers. This 
was the formal beginning of direct US intervention in Nam. Thereafter, the 
US fought overtly and directly, committing more and more of its own troops.
McNamara visited South Vietnam in 1962 and reported, “we are win-
ning the war” (History Place 1999). Fantasy! By 1963 most of the coun-
tryside was lost to the VC. South Vietnamese army units could not stand 
before their VC counterparts. At this time US offi cials decided that their 
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problem was Diem, a client they had trouble controlling who was losing 
support throughout Vietnamese society, especially among Buddhists (“The 
Overthrow” 1971, II: 1–2). On 4 July 1963 a Buddhist general contacted 
the CIA in Saigon concerning the possibility of a coup against Diem. The 
CIA and the US ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, agreed to the over-
throw. The coup began on 1 November 1963. Trapped in the presidential 
palace by the mutinous troops, Diem called Lodge and asked, “What is the 
attitude of the U.S.?” Lodge responded to the man he had betrayed, “It is 
4:30 AM in Washington, and the U.S. government cannot possibly have a 
view” (“The Overthrow” 1971, II: 4). Lodge continued the conversation 
by inquiring about Diem’s safety. The next day Diem was assassinated.
Between Diem’s assassination and the end of 1965 there were seven 
successive governments, fi ve in 1964 alone, as coup followed coup. None 
of the different client regimes were effective against the VC. Generals 
Khanh, Nguyen Cao Ky, and Nguyen Van Thieu led a coup in December 
1964. The US ambassador at the time, General Maxwell Taylor, summoned 
the coup leaders to the embassy and reprimanded them, only to fi nd Gen-
eral Khanh complaining in the press that the Americans were practicing 
“colonialism” in South Vietnam (History Place 1999). The general was 
correct: the US offi cials were trying to make Vietnam into a client state. 
The problem was, they were failing.
When a war is being lost, one military iteration, not always the wisest, 
is to add more violent force. Washington elites implemented this strat-
egy for the four years after 1964. US soldiers called new replacements 
“turtles”; because they were so slow to arrive. There were roughly 16,000 
military advisers in South Vietnam in 1964. President Johnson, who had 
replaced the assassinated President Kennedy on 23 November 1964, and 
who promptly orated, “I don’t want any damn Dindinfoo” (History Place 
1999), authorized the use of napalm on 9 March 1965, after which things 
heated up. There were roughly 125,000 US soldiers in Vietnam in July 
1965, 390,000 in December 1966, 475,000 in July 1967, 495,000 in No-
vember 1968, and 543,000 in November 1969. The turtles acted like chee-
tahs, arriving lickety-split.
In reply, the Soviet Union and China provided North Vietnam with 
substantial military assistance.27 The North was able to move North Viet-
namese Army (NVA) regulars south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to en-
ter the fi ght as early as the summer of 1964. The US began bombing the 
trail in Laos and North Vietnam. Between 1964 and 1973 roughly 580,000 
bombing missions were conducted in Laos alone. By September 1968, nine 
hundred US aircraft had been shot down and up to ten thousand NVA 
supply trucks were on the Ho Chi Minh trail every day, replenishing VC 
and NVA soldiers.
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On the evening of 29 January 1968, Bill Forbes took his Boy Scout troop 
for an overnight campout in a park near Saigon’s Tan Son Nhat airport. 
The kids had a great time, though they heard noises in the jungle surround-
ing the park. The next morning Bill marched them out of the park and 
home. A few hours later the VC and NVA marched through the scouts’ 
campground and attacked the airport.28 Then, President Johnson got his 
own “damn Dindinfoo” because the noises the scouts had heard was ma-
neuvering to begin the Tet Offensive (January–March 1968), when com-
munist troops attacked extensively throughout South Vietnam. US forces 
halted the offensive but did not defeat their enemy, which strengthened 
the presumption that they could try again in greater force. In the wake of 
the Tet campaign, Johnson asked Clark Clifford, then secretary of defense 
and a respected statesman, for advice. On 25 March Clifford convened 
the “Wise Men,” a dozen elder statesman and soldiers of unimpeachable 
old boy credentials. After deliberating, they advocated withdrawal from 
Vietnam. This was the end for Johnson. He announced he would not stand 
for re-election.
Richard Nixon, campaigning on a pledge of “peace with honor,” won 
the presidency and would govern for fi ve years (1969–1974). There was 
neither peace nor honor with Nixon and his key foreign policy adviser 
Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, who was respectively Nixon’s national security 
advisor and then his secretary of state, was a German Jewish immigrant 
who attained old boy status, albeit with a Bavarian accent, by performing 
brilliantly in Harvard’s undergraduate and graduate schools, becoming a 
professor there, and eventually teaching McGeorge Bundy’s course in po-
litical science. Nixon, at Kissinger’s urging, authorized the secret bombing 
of Cambodia in 1969–1970. There would be 3,500 bombing raids in one 
year, destabilizing the Cambodian government and leading to the Khmer 
Rouge’s victory (Shawcross 1979). Under Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge 
turned Cambodia into killing fi elds where millions were exterminated, 
about which Kissinger is supposed to have said, “Why should we fl agellate 
ourselves for what the Cambodians did to each other?” (Kawilarang 2004: 
178). Christopher Hitchens (2001) argued that Kissinger was a war crimi-
nal due to his Vietnam War activities.
Secret negotiations had been ongoing in Paris since May of 1968. Under 
the policy of “Vietnamization,” instituted in 1969, South Vietnamese sol-
diers were trained to replace the departing Americans. January 1973 saw 
the Paris Peace Accords signed, offi cially ending the war. Nixon declared 
that “we had won the war” (in Record 1996: 2). US combat troops left in 
March 1973. Thereafter the NVA invaded South Vietnam in force. Viet-
namization failed. By 25 April 1975 the North Vietnamese had surrounded 
Saigon. Five days later they took the city.
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At this juncture, why not contemplate a dance? Consider the pa-
vane—a slow, processional dance of stately steps. Renaissance aristocrats 
throughout Europe favored it for revels. The Vietnam War might be imag-
ined as an unhurried pavane of death: fi rst the Americans killed, then the 
Vietnamese killed, next the Americans killed, then the Vietnamese killed, 
and so on, to the music of fi ring weaponry. But make no mistake about it: 
the dance ended badly for the New American Empire. Its fi nal steps were 
recorded in images of helicopters atop the CIA headquarters in Saigon 
evacuating defeated Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. Met-
aphorically they left millions upon millions dead in the ballroom, posing 
the question of why the old boys went to the ball and did the dance in the 
fi rst place.29
The Social Refl exivity of Vietnam
Is the confl ict explainable in terms of global warring theory? Certainly. 
First, with the loss of North Vietnam to the Communists followed by the 
VC’s successes in South Vietnam, it was clear that the New American Em-
pire was in open global warfare with North Vietnam, which was supported 
by the USSR and China. The fi ghting was over territory, meaning that 
the inter-imperial contradiction was intensifying. Further, because this in-
tensifi cation was due to already occurring military operations, it was clear 
that a peaceful fi x was not possible, so Shultzian Permission was effectively 
granted, enabling a violent fi x in order to relax the contradiction. All this 
information is congenial to global warring theory. However, there have 
been other explanations. Before further making the case for a global war-
ring theory, let us therefore examine three other accounts that have been 
important. Attention turns fi rst to the possibility of plain old loopiness.
The March of Folly: In the US, public opposition to the Vietnam War grew 
throughout the 1960s and was especially strong among American intellec-
tuals (Hixson 2000). A frequent question these opponents posed regard-
ing the war’s proponents was “Are they idiots?” The formidable popular 
historian Barbara Tuchman (1985: 7) addressed this question in her book 
The March of Folly, answering it in the affi rmative and claiming that the 
war’s champions suffered from “wooden headedness.” Halberstam’s The 
Best and the Brightest ([1969] 1992) documented the actions of Kennedy’s 
and Johnson’s offi cials with regard to Vietnam, leaving readers with the 
sense that they did exhibit such folly.
Consider the single, but telling, case of President Johnson, who once 
asked his friend Senator Richard Russell—on the reactionary right—for 
advice on Vietnam. Russell, a rural Georgian, is reported to have coun-
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seled, “We’re just like a damn cow over a fence out there in Vietnam” 
(in McInerney and Israel 2013: 295), which meant the US military was 
in a place it should not be and could not win. LBJ agreed with his old 
friend and replied, “I don’t want to commit us to a war” (ibid.: 294). But 
even though Johnson didn’t want to “commit,” commit he did and with a 
vengeance, increasing the number of US soldiers there by approximately 
500,000. Doing what you do not want is injudicious.
Johnson was not alone in his pessimistic view of the war. As early as 
JFK’s administration, a fair number of high members of the offi cer corps 
warned Kennedy and his security elites that Vietnam was a risky military 
option. During LBJ’s administration, General Earle Wheeler, chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout much of the war (1964–1970), had 
offered an overview of the military situation that concluded in 1967 that 
“the Main force was stalemated … and there is no evidence that paci-
fi cation will ever succeed in view of the widespread rot and corruption 
of the government, the pervasive economic and social ills, and the tired, 
passive accommodation prone attitude of the armed forces of Vietnam” 
(in Buzzanco 2002: 186). Equally, George Ball, under secretary of state 
for both JFK and LBJ, counseled against the war from the beginning as an 
unwinnable quagmire (Halberstam [1969] 1992: 174). Other high offi cials 
reached similar conclusions at the same time. According to W.W. Rostow 
(1996–97: 39), Robert McNamara believed the war to be “a problem with 
no solution” as early as the years 1965–1967. 
On such assessments, Robert Buzzanco commented: “Given such bleak 
judgments it would take a rather great stretch of the imagination to ex-
pect success in Vietnam. Yet the war continued with the White House 
and the military as concerned about avoiding responsibility for failure as 
with actually improving the situation in Vietnam” (Buzzanco 2002: 187). 
Simply put, by 1967, the president, his secretary of defense and the chair-
man of his Chief of Staff, among others, supposed the war was unwinnable 
but persisted in it. Explaining the war as the result of its elite actors’ folly 
clarifi es that what the “best and the brightest” did exhibited their “wood-
en-headedness.” Unexplained is why they danced their stately pavane of 
irrationality in the bloody ballroom of Vietnam.
“The new men were tough.”
Golf had long symbolized the Eisenhower years—played by soft, boring men 
with ample waistlines who went around rich men’s country-club courses in the 
company of wealthy businessmen who were tended by white-haired, dutiful 
negros. … In contrast, the new men [Kennedy brought into his administration] 
were tough. (Halberstam [1969] 1992: 39)
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The role of gender in confl ict has become a topic of interest. Jeffords (1989) 
has extended this interest to the study of Nam. The old boys who con-
ceived and prosecuted the war were indeed all male, raising the question of 
gender’s role in the war. Kay Halle, an old Kennedy family friend, provided 
insight concerning women’s positions at the highest levels of the Kennedy 
administration. When JFK was staffi ng the White House and asked her 
opinion of who might be hired, “Halle suggested that he should choose 
more women. He abruptly changed the subject, for as Halle observed, he 
considered women largely ‘decorative butterfl ies and lovely to look at.’ 
Kennedy was simply not comfortable being in a room with women who 
sought to be equal partners in the political process” (Leamer 2002: chap. 
21). If women were to be absent, what sorts of men were to be present?
As already noted, Kennedy had once said of the virtues of McGeorge 
Bundy that “you can’t beat brains” (in Halberstam [1969] 1992: 44). Ac-
tually, you could. The men in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
were in Halberstam’s words not “soft boring” men, as had been the case in 
Ike’s time; rather, they were “tough.” Robert Dean (2002: 378) expresses 
the matter as follows: “the war managers” in the Kennedy/Johnson ad-
ministrations “used … a sort of scholastic deduction premised on an im-
perial psychology of masculine strength and threat.” They judged acting 
aggressively in fi erce competition with great strength to be the measure of 
a “good man”—virtues learned in their prep schools.
Kennedy, when he came into the presidency, worried about an America 
he thought was getting fl abby, so he “warned of ‘creeping softness’” that 
was “worrisome to him because he identifi ed the strength of male bodies 
with the strength of the state” (in Dean 2002: 370). About Bobby Ken-
nedy, JFK’s brother, Halberstam ([1969] 1992: 273) has said, “Toughness 
fascinated him. … he judged men by how tough they were.” Rusk was “a 
man who believed in force” (ibid.: 307). Bundy’s course at Harvard, Gov-
ernment 180 (the one Kissinger would also teach), concerned US foreign 
affairs and taught what at that time was known as “ultrarealism”: “Its pro-
ponents believed that they were tough, that they knew what the world was 
really like, and that force must be accepted as a basic element of diplo-
macy” (ibid.: 56).
President Johnson expressed his toughness in a language heavily 
scented with sexuality. Speaking of a member of his administration who 
had turned against the Vietnam War, he confi ded, “Hell, he has to squat to 
piss” (in Halberstam [1969] 1992: 532). Remarking on one bombing raid, 
he bragged, “I didn’t just screw Ho Chi Minh. I cut his pecker off” (ibid.: 
380). Defending his decision not to call a bombing halt, he explained, “Oh 
yes, a bombing halt, I’ll tell you what happens when there is a bombing 
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halt. I halt and then Ho Chi Minh shoves his trucks up my ass. That’s your 
bombing halt” (ibid.: 379). In response to criticisms that all this bombing 
might lead to Chinese intervention, he lectured, “I’m going up her leg an 
inch at a time. … I’ll get the snatch before they know what’s happening, 
you see” (ibid.: 379–380). So Johnson spent his time fi guratively “screw-
ing” Ho, while protecting his own “ass” from enemy trucks, all the while 
going for some “snatch.” Tough guy!
Of course, in the 1960s being “macho” was culturally hegemonic for 
men. You were “rock hard” because that was good; you avoided being “soft” 
because that was “queer” and bad. If you were “rock hard” you got rewards. 
Joseph Alsop, an infl uential columnist of the era, rhapsodized about Ken-
nedy, “‘Isn’t he marvelous!,’ he’s got ‘balls’” (in Halberstam [1969] 1992: 
24): here we have the old boys’ cultural ideal as testicular warriors. I sus-
pect that this “rock hard” masculinity was, at least in part, responsible for 
the US’s entrance into the Vietnam War.
This argument may be extended as follows, using Pierre Bourdieu’s 
(1990) notion of symbolic capital. Being tough and aggressive yielded con-
siderable symbolic capital among the elite of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. This meant that in any situation, including Vietnam, a 
real man behaved in a hard, forceful manner. The symbolic capital thus 
acquired overcame any reservations they might have had about the ratio-
nality of committing US troops to Vietnam. In this view, then, Johnson’s 
awareness that Vietnam was not “worth fi ghting for” was overcome by 
reluctance to lose the symbolic capital of his “balls.”
This argument appears plausible as far as it goes, but it does not go far 
enough. Certainly, the JFK and LBJ men had “balls.” Certainly they would 
be tough, but this means that they would be expected to act hard-hitting 
in almost any situation. It explains nothing of the specifi cs of why they 
desired to act tough in the particular situation of Vietnam in the 1960s. 
The fact that the elites were “rock hard” explains why they would want to 
dance dirty in any pavane in which they participated, but not why Vietnam 
War would be the dance they choose. A third, economic reason, explored 
next, has been offered for US participation in the confl ict.
Role of the Military-Industrial Complex: This explanation has to do with the 
economic interests of what Eisenhower had termed the military-industrial 
complex. It was offered by some in the anti-war movement during the con-
fl ict. William Engdahl (2004: 114) expressed it when he wrote:
It was clear that a signifi cant faction of the American defense industry and 
New York fi nance had encouraged the decision of Washington to go to war … 
because the military build up offered their interests a politically saleable excuse 
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to revive a massive diversion of US industry into the production of defense 
goods. More and more during the 1960s the heart of the US economy was being 
transformed into a kind of military, in which the cold war against the commu-
nist danger was used to justify tens of billions of dollars of spending.
In this view, the US fought in Vietnam so that the military-industrial 
complex could be strengthened by a “military Keynesianism”: the state’s 
provision, during economically diffi cult times, of fi scal stimulus to mili-
tary enterprises in order to resolve those diffi culties (C. Johnson 2008). 
Undoubtedly, the Vietnam War offered a sizable fi nancial stimulus to the 
American defense industry.30 Equally, the sale of US Treasury bonds, which 
the government used to fi nance the war, was a source of plentiful profi t 
for Wall Street during the confl ict. However, there is a problem in this 
analysis.
Keynesianism of any sort was a policy tool for addressing economic dis-
tress, but the years from the end of World War II until the early 1970s 
were the golden age of US capitalism. In fact, the years of decision-making 
about warring in Vietnam were the very best years of that golden age. As 
Robert Brenner (1998: 58) reports, “Between 1958 and 1965, GNP grew 
at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent, faster than in any other period of 
comparable length after 1950. … Behind this spurt lay a spectacular rise 
in the rate of profi t.” Washington chose military escalation in Vietnam 
in the years from 1959 through 1965. Therefore, JFK’s and LBJ’s security 
elites decided to get tough with Vietnam in precisely the years when they 
would not have done so as a way of stimulating the economy, because the 
economy did not need to be stimulated. It was roaring along.
Engdahl’s position could possibly be upheld if it is recognized that there 
is a military variety of Keynesianism in which fi scal stimulus is supplied 
to military enterprise regardless of how the economy is functioning. I will 
term this “turbo-military Keynesianism.” (1998: 56) reports that “during 
the 1950’s, approximately 10 per cent of GNP went to military spending.” 
There were both good and bad times economically during the 1950s, which 
means that Washington continually provided military fi nancial stimulus 
to the economy, as NSC 68 had recommended and the Korean War de-
manded. Hence, the US appears to have been committed to a policy of 
turbo-military Keynesianism at this time.
However, such a policy cannot be said to be the cause of the Vietnam 
War, as this would mean Washington fought the war to get the fi nancial 
stimulus to military enterprise, when in actuality the fi scal stimulus was be-
ing supplied regardless of whether or not wars were being fought. New York 
fi nancers and military contractors undoubtedly “encouraged” Washington 
to send money their way during the Vietnam War. It was good business. 
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But it still does not explain why the Security Elites 1.0, rock hard on their 
Viagra of toughness, got so tough in Vietnam. Exploration of the herme-
neutic politics of the tough guys will aid such an explanation.
“Crucifi ed”: The Hermeneutic Politics of Vietnam: The hermeneutic puzzle 
of the Vietnam War had both perceptual and procedural solutions. The 
perceptual solution is addressed fi rst, as follows. After the success of Soviet 
expansion in Eastern Europe and Mao’s victory in China, the two commu-
nist giants contemplated further enlargement. The language of this plan-
ning was belligerent. For example, a lecture broadcast on Radio Moscow 
in 1949 announced:
The plans of the already bankrupt pretenders to world domination who are 
trying to surround the Chinese People’s Republic with a police ‘cordon sani-
taire’ composed of their vassals are built of sand. The powerful movement of 
liberation among the peoples of Southeast Asia testifi es to this fact. Millions 
of workers of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, India, Burma, Southern Korea, the 
Philippines … have become convinced by the experience of the Chinese peo-
ple that only a persistent and consistent struggle against imperialism under the 
leadership of the Communist Party … backed by the USSR can bring about lib-
eration from the oppression of the modern slave owners. (In Sacks 1950: 227)
The speech promised “persistent and consistent struggle” against Western 
imperialism in all of Southeast Asia plus India.
In 1949 Stalin met with Liu Shaoqi, the foremost theoretician of the 
Chinese Communist Party at that time, and together they formulated an 
“elder brother/junior brother” strategy for Asia’s liberation. The junior 
brother, China, would seek to directly take advantage of Western weak-
nesses in colonial areas. The elder brother, the USSR, would provide 
guidance and material assistance to the junior brother’s activities (Gaddis 
1997: 159). Liu (in Sacks 1950: 232–233), in a Radio Peking broadcast 
toward the end of 1949, gave a sense of how well they believed expansion 
policy was going:
The war of national liberation in Vietnam has liberated 90 percent of her ter-
ritory; the war of national liberation in Burma and Indonesia is now develop-
ing; the partisan warfare against imperialism and its lackeys in Malaya and the 
Philippines has been carried on over a long period; and armed struggles for 
emancipation have also taken place in India …
Liu was clear that when he spoke of war, he meant it literally,
It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible a national army which 
is led by the Communist Party, and is powerful and skillful in fi ghting the ene-
mies. … Armed struggle is the main form of struggle for the national liberation 
struggles of many colonies and semi-colonies. 
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So the Soviets and Chinese were preaching territorial acquisition by the 
end of the 1940s and thought they were doing rather well at it.
Of course, the CIA was eavesdropping. In 1949 it warned Washington 
elites that the Kremlin would employ China “as an advanced base to facili-
tate Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia” (in Gaddis 1997: 153). The very 
next year, the CIA’s cautioning appeared vindicated. North Korea invaded 
the South. The junior brother helped the North Koreans with troops, and 
the elder brother provided sophisticated weapons to its junior brothers. 
Militant communism appeared on the march in Asia, just as it had been, 
successfully, in Eastern Europe. This expansion was an intensifi cation of 
the inter-imperial contradiction that presented a hermeneutic puzzle.
Long before the Kennedy and Johnson administration, Washington 
elites had explicitly interpreted such events in accordance with the dom-
ino theory hermeneutic. In 1949 NSC-64 had applied it particularly to 
Southeast Asia, as the following quotation from it makes clear:
It is important to the US security interests that all practicable measures be 
taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. … The 
neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under 
Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dom-
inated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave 
balance. (In Jervis 1980: 586)
An even more specifi c application of this hermeneutic to Vietnam oc-
curred during the Eisenhower administration. As the French were being 
defeated, Ike held a press conference (7 April 1954) to discuss this situa-
tion. A journalist asked Eisenhower,
Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of 
Indochina to the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some 
lack of understanding on just what it means to us.
To which the President responded,
you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 
“falling domino” principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over 
the fi rst one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go 
over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would 
have the most profound infl uences. … 
 Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after 
all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictator-
ship, and we simply can’t afford greater losses.
 But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, 
of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you be-
gin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would 
suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking 
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really about millions and millions and millions of people. (“President Eisenhow-
er’s News Conference” 1954: 382–383)
Thereafter, every US president throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
at some point applied the domino theory hermeneutic to Vietnam. In 1961 
the Departments of State and Defense sent President Kennedy a joint 
memorandum, the product of prolonged deliberation at the highest level. 
William Bundy had written the fi rst draft; Robert McNamara, among oth-
ers, had revised it. It stated:
The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussion about 
the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the 
near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move 
to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation 
within the Communist bloc. (In Sheehan et al. 1971: 150)
In a televised interview just prior to Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Da-
vid Brinkley and the president had the following exchange :
Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called 
“domino theory,” that if South Viet Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will 
go behind it?
The President: No, I believe it. I believe it. (In “The Overthrow” 1971, II: 828)
So, beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the Truman, Eisen-
hower, and Kennedy administrations, the hermeneutic puzzle of commu-
nist military expansion in Asia generally, and Vietnam specifi cally, was 
perceptually solved by the domino theory hermeneutic.31
The procedural solution to this hermeneutic was that the communist 
monster-alterity “had to be stopped.” However, the correct procedural 
solution to the hermeneutic puzzle remained a riddle. Remember that 
Kennedy had decided in 1961 to commit American troops, but they were 
there to be “trainers,” not actual combatants. Procedurally, then, the her-
meneutic puzzle would be solved by the US fi ghting an indirect war as it 
had previously done in the First Indochina War. This solution failed be-
cause the trainers failed, resulting in serious deterioration of the South 
Vietnamese government’s military situation in 1962 and 1963. Then, on 
22 November 1963, Kennedy was assassinated, and a renewed hermeneu-
tic politics ensued over the proper way to prosecute the war—a politics in 
which the hermetic seal had a role.
There were two main sides in this politics: enthusiasts of aggressive, es-
calating military operations, called “hawks,” faced off against advocates of 
less aggressive or no military operations, labeled “doves.” Those closest to 
President Johnson—Bundy, Rusk, and initially McNamara—were hawks 
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who sought escalation. Perhaps the most important of the doves who en-
couraged de-escalation or withdrawal were Averill Harriman, George Ball, 
Roger Hilsman, William Truehart, Michael Forrestal (son of Truman’s Sec-
retary of Defense James Forrestal), and Paul Kattenburg. Johnson himself 
was something of an uncertain actor. He clearly fancied himself a tough 
Texan, but one who harbored serious doubts about success in Vietnam, as 
his talks with Senator Russell made clear. Further, his major political goal 
was implementation of the Great Society: a set of civil rights and anti-
poverty domestic programs designed to extend educational and health 
care benefi ts to the majority of Americans. The politics in Vietnam’s her-
meneutic politics after Kennedy’s assassination concerned whether John-
son would end up a dove or a hawk.
Three strings of events combined to seal Johnson into a hawk position. 
The fi rst of these was elimination of the doves in his administration. The 
elder statesman Harriman was a patrician who was respected for having 
been governor of New York, US ambassador to the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain, and secretary of commerce. Under Kennedy he became the under 
secretary of state for political affairs, where his infl uence was considerable, 
but thereafter it waned in the Johnson administration. In mid 1964 Rusk 
placed him in charge of African affairs at Foggy Bottom, removing him 
from any Vietnam responsibilities.
Hilsman, though a dove, was an actual tough guy who had been a com-
mando in Merrill’s Marauders in the Burma Theater during World War II. 
He became a counterinsurgency specialist for Kennedy, who favored him. 
In 1963, as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, he infuriated 
high-level offi cials in the State and Defense Departments, challenging their 
optimistic assurances of the war’s success. Rusk fi red him in March 1964.
William Trueheart had been deputy chief of mission in Saigon and, at 
times, acting ambassador during the early the 1960s. Consequently, he 
was particularly knowledgeable about the realities of Vietnam. He too cri-
tiqued the military’s rosy accounts of military operations. Trueheart had 
been Hilsman’s protégé, and as Hilsman’s star imploded, Trueheart’s fol-
lowed. Promised the position of deputy assistant secretary of state for Far 
Eastern affairs under Hilsman, he was recalled to Washington in December 
1963 and made desk offi cer for all of Southeast Asia—except Vietnam!
Michael Forrestal worked in the White House as one of McGeorge Bun-
dy’s most important aids. Unfortunately, he was a “known doubter” about 
the war (Halberstam [1969] 1992: 377) and in July 1964 was therefore 
forced out of the White House into a position lacking any responsibility for 
Vietnam. Paul Kattenburg, the State Department’s Vietnam desk offi cer 
in the 1960s and the head of its Vietnam Working Group, had the nerve 
to advocate withdrawal from Vietnam at an NSC meeting on 31 August 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 198 –
Deadly Contradictions
1963, and to be the fi rst known US offi cial to do so. He was subsequently 
relieved of his position in early 1964 and exiled as a counselor offi cer to the 
US embassy in Guyana. He never made ambassador.
Of the doves, this left only George Ball, then under secretary of state for 
economic and agricultural affairs. He had warned Kennedy,
“Within fi ve years we’ll have 300,000 men in the paddies and jungles and never 
fi nd them again,” … But JFK thought he knew better, caustically answering, 
“George, you’re crazier than hell. That just isn’t going to happen.”(Polner 2010: 
1).
So although Ball was a dove, he stayed because, according to Halberstam 
([1969] 1992: 378), in 1963 and 1964 he was more concerned with Euro-
pean affairs and let Harriman deal with questions of Vietnam. Clearly, one 
part of Johnson’s hermetic seal into a hawkish position was the elimination 
of doubting doves to advise him.
Another way the seal was tightened was to add hawks’ voices. William 
“Bill” Bundy was the older brother of McGeorge “Mac” Bundy and the 
son-in-law of Dean Acheson. He had been in McNamara’s Defense De-
partment and was trusted by him to hew to a hawkish line. Roger Hils-
man’s old position as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs went 
to Bill. Though he himself eventually came to doubt the war, in 1964 he 
fi rmly and completely championed the line of his brother Mac, and his 
former boss in Defense. Shortly before he was pushed out at State, Kat-
tenburg got in a “furious argument” with Bill over Vietnam policy (Hal-
berstam [1969] 1992: 370). Bundy was supposed to have insisted “that 
Kattenburg was performing a disservice by his pessimism” (ibid.: 370), and 
it was for reasons such as this that dovish “disservice” was sealed out of the 
hermeneutic politics of Vietnam in 1964.
A third way of sealing Johnson into an aggressive stance vis-à-vis Viet-
nam was to threaten his manhood. JFK had messed up in the Bay of Pigs 
fi asco but redeemed himself a year later during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(October–December 1962). In the summer of 1962, the Soviets began to 
install long-range missiles in Cuba, only ninety miles from Miami. Kennedy 
ordered Khrushchev to remove the weapons. Khrushchev demurred, and 
suggested quite publicly that Washington risked nuclear war. It was high 
noon: Kennedy and Khrushchev faced off like two gunslingers in a cowboy 
movie. The Russian fl inched. Soviet missiles were dismantled and returned 
to the USSR. JFK had proven his virility (though secretly he had disman-
tled missiles targeting the USSR in Turkey).
Now, two years later, another time demanded a hard man. Joe Alsop—
one of the most hawkish columnists, who had ties to the Bundys—began 
to write columns urging drastic action in Vietnam. “For Lyndon Johnson,” 
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Alsop insisted, “Vietnam is what the second Cuban crisis was for John F. 
Kennedy. If Mr Johnson ducks the challenge we shall learn by experience 
about what it would have been like if Kennedy had ducked the challenge 
in October, 1962” (in Halberstam [1969] 1992: 500). Alsop was saying 
that if Johnson did not escalate, he was not the man Kennedy had been.
Johnson was trapped. Wherever he turned, no one was left to argue 
a dovish line, but everyone championed a hawkish line. Wherever he 
turned, he knew he would be said to have “ducked the challenge” if he 
did not take the hawk line.32 Unsurprisingly, Johnson took a hawkish line. 
On 8 November 1964 Rusk cabled Maxwell Taylor, ambassador in Sai-
gon, announcing that “our present tendency is to adopt a tougher program 
both privately and publically against them” (in ibid.: 487). “They” were the 
North Vietnamese: the tough had got “tougher.” Soon the US was bomb-
ing the North. By 5 March 1965 the US Marines had landed as combat 
troops, and by 1968 there were over 550,000 combat troops in-country, 
dying at a rate of 1,000 per month. So the fi nal solution to the procedural 
hermeneutic puzzle of the Vietnam War was to escalate and escalate and 
escalate again; yet it was to no avail. The tough got beat.33
President Johnson had headed the most powerful social being in history. 
Presumably, he was an actor of greatest agency. After leaving the presi-
dency, he told an interviewer,
I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucifi ed either way I moved. If I 
left the woman I really loved—the Great Society—in order to get involved in 
that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything 
at home. All my programs. … But if I left that war and let the Communists take 
over South Vietnam, then I would be seen as a coward and my nation would 
be seen as an appeaser and we would both fi nd it impossible to accomplish any-
thing for anybody anywhere on the entire globe. (L. Johnson 1990: 45)
Knowing he had lost control within the Democratic Party because of Viet-
nam, Johnson chose to withdraw from the 1968 presidential election and 
retired to his ranch in Stonewall, Texas, where he grew his hair long like 
a hippie, drank heavily, smoked like a chimney, and was soon deceased 
(in 1973). Thus died a person who, having possessed the greatest agency, 
nonetheless believed he had been “crucifi ed.” It is time to decide whether 
the evidence from the foregoing discussion is consistent with global war-
ring theory.
First, the inter-imperial contradiction intensifi ed in Vietnam in the late 
1950s and early 1960s as the Diem regime lost chunks of territory to com-
munism, producing a reproductive vulnerability. The fact that the land loss 
went on bloodily for a number of years in hard-fought guerilla operations 
made it impossible for US security elites to overlook, making its fi x more 
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urgent. A domino theory hermeneutic interpretation of the vulnerability 
developed as early as 1950 during the fi rst Indochina War and was contin-
ually reapplied during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administra-
tions. Perceptually, the old boys all agreed that Vietnam might fall and, like 
a domino, push other Southeast Asian countries toward the communist 
monster-alterity. Shultzian Permission was granted because fi ghting was 
already ongoing, ruling out peaceful fi xes. In October 1961, JFK ordered 
commitment of US troops to South Vietnam. This order, as an implemen-
tation of the global domination public délire, might be seen as the Vietnam 
iteration of the global domination public délire.
After Kennedy’s assassination (22 November 1963), however, the pro-
cedural solution of the puzzle led to divisive hermeneutic politics among 
the security elite. Two contestants—hawks and doves—battled over to 
how to proceed in Vietnam. The hawk position, escalation, was hermet-
ically sealed into Johnson’s I-space. On 8 November 1964, Rusk sent a 
cable to Taylor announcing that the administration was getting “tougher.” 
This cable, a further implementation of the global domination public délire, 
provoked an extraordinarily violent procedural solution to the hermeneu-
tic puzzle. Thus the stately pavane of the “best and the brightest” became a 
dance of death. In the end Johnson was “crucifi ed,” and up to three million 
Vietnamese died for his crucifi xion.34 It is time to summarize this chapter’s 
analysis and determine whether the fi ve global wars considered here sup-
port the plausibility of the global warring theory.
Conclusion
The years between 1950 and 1974 are often described as the onset and the 
height of the Cold War, raising the question, what was the Cold War? The 
fi ve analyses of confl icts in this chapter offer an answer to this query. Each 
instance of of global warring involved intensifi cation and/or coalescence of 
the inter-imperial, oil company/petro-state, or dominator/dominated con-
tradictions. The Security Elites 1.0 interpreted the vulnerabilities these 
posed as fi xable via the global domination public délire. For different rea-
sons, Shultzian Permisson was granted in each case. Additionally, in each 
case the global domination public délire was implemented and then fol-
lowed by global warring. This evidence supports the plausibility of global 
warring theory. As for the question of what the Cold War was, it provides 
an answer: it was the playing out of those strings of events explained by 
the global warring theory. Let us move on to the years 1975 through 1989, 
when the times were changing, especially for the contradictions facing the 
US Leviathan.
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Notes
1. Hinkle, Biddle, and Wallis, using Defense Department sources, conducted research for 
the US military on the frequency of its military operations roughly between 1970 and 1995. 
One of their conclusions was that “data are of too poor quality for use in meaningful plan-
ning” (1998: 7). This alarmingly suggests that the Pentagon is ignorant of how often it wars. 
However, Hinkle et al. found that the US annually participates in 6.56 military operations in 
which there is likely to be violence.
2. During the 1950s, especially in francophone areas, a literature developed documenting 
the phenomenology of colonial domination, especially in Fanon (1967) and Memmi (1957).
3. Edgar Snow (1994) and Peter Zarrow (2005) provide accounts of China’s drive to inde-
pendence from the turn of the twentieth century until 1949. 
4. Dalloz (1990) and Fall (1961) provide excellent accounts of the First Indochina War.
5. On April 26 2011 Amazon.com advertised sixteen books with the title After Empire or 
a similar title.
6. Perhaps the most signifi cant victory for US global warring in the period between 1950 
and 1975 was its indirect, covert operation in support of the 1965 overthrow of President 
Sukarno, which helped prevent Indonesia, the fourth largest country in the world, from be-
coming communist (Reyna 1998). 
7. According to Panourgia (2009), of the $3.4 billion in Marshall Plan funds allotted to 
Greece, only $1.2 billion went to economic aid. The remainder was allocated to security.
8. The extensive literature on the Korean War is reviewed in Millett (2007). Cummings 
(1981), Halberstam (2007), Ridgway (1986), and Weathersby (1993) provide useful accounts.
9. There are many, varied estimates of civilian and military deaths during the Korean War. 
According to CNN approximately 2,800,000 North Koreans, South Koreans, and Chinese 
were killed or went missing during the war, and an estimated 1,600,000 of these were civilians 
(CNN 2013). 
10. Scholars speak of the “McCarthy Era” (roughly 1950–1954) as a time when, due in 
considerable measure to Senator McCarthy, “America developed an obsession with domestic 
communism that outran actual threat and gnawed at the tissue of civil liberties” (R. Fried 
1990: 3).
11. The Dulles brothers, Princeton old boys, were from a family with a Christian calling—
their grandfather was a missionary and their father a minister; also, John’s son became a cardi-
nal and his daughter a minister. John focused upon the “spiritual” when fi ghting Communism 
(Dulles 1950: 262–266). Pious the Dulleses may have been, but they were also capitalists 
who during World War II had operated through a network of American oil companies and 
Nazi corporations (Loftus and Aarons 1994). Kinzer (2013) has an excellent biography of the 
Dulles brothers and their times.
12. The CIA’s role in the coup is described by one of its planners in Roosevelt (1979). 
Works that place the coup within its geopolitical context include Kinzer’s journalistic classic 
(2008); also useful are Heiss (1997) and Elm (1994). Abrahamian (2013) argues the coup was 
part of the confl ict between Western imperialism and Iranian nationalism. 
13. There is some debate over the relative importance of the Americans and the British in 
executing the coup. The Americans acknowledge the British played a “pivotal role” (Bowcott 
2000). 
14. Tehran might not have turned toward the USSR during the 1950s because Irano-
Russian relations were strained during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as 
Czarist Russia expanded into Iran’s sphere of infl uence in Central Asia and into Iran itself 
(Heravi [1969] 1999: 25–52). 
15. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established by the National Security Act of 1947 in the 
Defense Department to advise the Defense secretary. It consisted of a chairman, the chief of 
staff of the Army, the chief of staff of the Air Force (established as a separate service by the 
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same act), and the chief of Naval Operations. The Marine Corps commandant was to be 
consulted on matters concerning the Corps but was not a regular member.
16. Streeter (2000) provides a useful review of the literature on the Guatemala coup. 
Kinzer and Schlesinger ([1982] 1999), Immerman (1980), Gleijeses (1992), Cullather (1999), 
and Peter Chapman (2009), are all useful for studying the 1954 CIA coup in Guatemala.
17. No literature demonstrates Arbenz to have been a communist (see Kinzer and 
Schlesinger [1982] 1999), though he had “friends” among Guatalmalan communists 
(Gleijeses 1989: 453).
18. The point argued in the text is not that the US arranged the coup in Guatemala to aid 
the UFC. John Foster Dulles was quite clear about the UFC’s signifi cance: “If the United Fruit 
matter were settled, if they gave a gold piece for every banana, the problem would remain just 
as it is today as far as the presence of communist infi ltration is concerned, That is the problem, 
not United Fruit” (in Immerman 1980, 1982: 739). Rather, the UFC helped get the CIA to 
stage a coup by producing the knowledge that Guatemala was going Communist.
19. Appy (2000: 315) believes that “the prominence of the Peurifoy report in his [Ike’s] 
memoir may have been decisive in persuading Eisenhower to go forward with the plan.”
20. Rasenberger (2011) provides accounts of the events that gave rise to the Bay of Pigs 
invasion. Hunt (1972), already encountered in Operation PBSuccess, gives an account of a 
CIA operative on the ground. Schlesinger’s (1965) account of Kennedy’s brief presidency 
catches Kennedy’s understanding of the fi asco. Farber (2006) offers an interesting rethinking 
of the origins of the revolution. 
21. The topmost Kennedy elite came from a broader, less wealthy background than did the 
members of earlier Cold War administrations. McNamara’s father had been a sales manager 
in California. Rusk was from a poor, rural Georgia background. Rostow was the son of Russian 
Jewish socialist immigrants to New York. Kennedy himself was Irish. His father had made 
money, at least some of it through illegal means, and sent all his children to the best schools. 
But the family certainly remembered when families like Bundy’s (who were Boston Lowells) 
insisted “the Irish were … an inferior race of moral delinquents” (Vorhees 2007: 31).
22. A number of books have argued for CIA involvement in JFK’s death. Douglass (2008) 
is a useful place to start in this literature. Tracy Barnes is one CIA offi cial alleged to have been 
involved in the assassination. He returned to the old boy nesting ground, working for Brewster 
Kingman at Yale University as an administrator dealing with race relations and gender equality.
23. Consider “Bob,” who admitted to killing women and children during a commando 
“raid” he commanded against a tiny village in 1969. Bob insisted his troops had fi red only 
when they themselves came under fi re. However, a woman in the attacked village told an-
other story. Bob’s men rounded up the women and children and shot them. One soldier under 
Bob’s command during the raid corroborated her story. The Bob was Bob Kerrey—later a U.S. 
Senator, a president of a university, a former state governor talked of as a presidential candi-
date (Vistica 2003). Next contemplate “John,” a Swift Boat commander in the free-fi re zone 
of the Mekong Delta responsible for massacring, among others, civilians (St. Clair 2013a). 
“John” was John Kerry—later a senator, a presidential candidate, and secretary of state under 
Obama, known for lecturing others on their morality.
24. Ho’s biographers include Duiker (2000) and Brocheux (2007). Because he rose to head 
the state, he can be described as elite. Further, he was certainly a hybrid elite. Ho’s father, not 
an especially privileged person, was nevertheless a Confucian scholar and teacher, and saw to 
it that his son received a Confucian education. As a teenager Ho attended a French lycée in 
Vietnam; lived in America from 1912 to 1917, acquiring not elite US culture but that of labor 
in the working-class jobs he held; spent time in the UK; and was politically transformed into 
a communist in France between 1919 and 1923. Thereafter he alternated between Russia and 
China until returning to Vietnam in 1941. 
25. A detailed account of US military assistance to the French in the First Indochina War 
from the perspective of the US military can be found in US Offi ce of Joint History (2004).
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
After the Sunset Came the Night
– 203 –
26. Diem was a hybrid elite, but one created by the French for service in their empire. On 
the one hand, he was Catholic, like many French. On the other hand, his father had been a 
Mandarin in the service of the Vietnamese Emperor. Among other responsibilities, the father 
appears to have been Keeper of the Eunuchs (Jacobs 2006). A difference between Diem and 
Ho was that Diem came from an elite class position in Vietnam, while Ho did not.
27. In April 1965, China signed a military assistance agreement with North Vietnam to 
provide for Chinese air defense, engineering, and railroad troops. The Soviets provided weap-
ons, especially for air defense. Approximately three-fourths of the military assistance is esti-
mated to have come from China (Jian 1995; Gaiduk 2003).
28. “Bill Forbes” is a pseudonym. He was an old Yankee.
29. Estimates of Vietnamese civilian and combat deaths range from 1 million to over 3 
million; see Hirschman, Preston, and Loi (1995) for a review of the mortality estimates.
30. Higgs (1988: 2) estimated US military purchases between 1961 and 1975 at 2408.5 
billion 1982 dollars.
31. Discussion of the domino theory can be found in Guan (2001) and Slater (1993). 
32. Some argue that the hawks were less hawkish than previously thought. Bird, for ex-
ample, maintains that “documents show that the Bundys, and other decision-makers regis-
tered deep doubts about the American enterprise in Vietnam” ([1998] 2000: 17). Registering 
“doubts” is not advocating withdrawal. Hawks may have had “doubts,” but they always sup-
ported escalation when decisions were made about how to proceed in Vietnam. Further, 
hawks made certain it was known that the dove position was, as Bill Bundy had put it in his 
exchange with Kattenburg, a “disservice.”
33. There have been other explanations of why the US lost (Record [1998] is a useful 
introduction to this literature). Two have been especially signifi cant: that the US lost because 
of the strength of the anti-war movement; and that the US military was not allowed to fi ght 
with all its resources. Some imply the peace movement was treasonous because it contrib-
uted to restraining the military. I believe both views are incorrect and encourage dangerous 
interventions. The US lost because the tough guys met somebody tougher. The Tet Offensive 
made clear that US ground forces could not defeat their opponents. This left winning to the 
air war, which failed either to interdict North Vietnam’s resupply of its forces in the South, or 
to cause North Vietnam to sue for peace. Imagining that the US lost because it did not fi ght 
hard enough is dangerous in that it implies that if only America fi ghts harder, it will win. As 
tough guys know, sometimes there are tougher guys out there. 
34. Debates about who had it right about Vietnam—the hawks or the doves—have fl our-
ished since the end of the war. Michael Lind (1999: 156) claimed to have examined all sides in 
these debates and discovered the “genuine lessons of the Vietnam War,” which were that the 
hawks were right. The heart of his argument was that the Cold War was a third world war—a 
position also taken by Nixon (1980)—“in which,” according to Lind, “the future governance 
of the international system was at stake, and in which the great powers opposing the United 
States and its allies were the moral equivalents of Nazi Germany” (in Gaddis 2000: 131). The 
Vietnam War was “necessary” for precisely the reasons given by US security elites during the 
confl ict: “to defend the credibility of the United States as a superpower” in the struggle to 
govern the international system (Lind 1999: xv). There are empirical problems with Lind’s 
position, discussed in Gaddis (2000). It rings jingoistic with its denunciations of the Com-
munists as monsters. Mao is likened to “Robespierre” (Lind 1999: 64), and Ho Chi Minh is 
“vicious” (ibid.: 32). The US’s opponents are dismissed as Nazis. Lind does correctly point 
out that the Cold War was a global confl ict between two social beings; however, he overlooks 
that these social beings were empires doing what was necessary, given intensifi cation of the 
inter-imperial contradiction. Finally, Lind regards the US as having fought for “credibility.” 
Credibility does have a place in discussions of Vietnam, because the war’s outcome established 
the credibility of the view that the US could be militarily defeated.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 204 –
Chapter 7
“THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’”
Global Warring 1975–1989
“For the times they are a-changin’.”
- Bob Dylan, 26 October 1963
“Tricky Dicky” (as President Richard Nixon was nicknamed by some, not affectionately) resigned for reasons of corruption on 9 August 
1974. Nine months later, on 30 April 1975, Saigon fell. The Vietnam War 
was over, and many people suspected, in the words one of the era’s musical 
poet, “the times they [were] a-changin’.” After the next three presidential 
administrations (Gerald Ford, 1974–1977; James “Jimmy” Carter, 1977–
1981; and Ronald Reagan, 1981–1989) it was clear: they had changed.
This chapter will explore the change in the relative signifi cance of the 
political and the economic contradictions. By the end of the 1980s, follow-
ing the fi nal fl are-up of the inter-imperial contradiction, the Soviet Union 
was gone and the US Leviathan continued, albeit battered by an intensi-
fying dominator/dominated contradiction. Concurrently, the cyclical and 
systemic economic contradictions intensifi ed to further pound the New 
American Empire.
The chapter begins by presenting the second generation of US security 
elites. Next, it examines the situation vis-à-vis the nonviolent economic 
reproductive fi xes of the economic contradictions in the late 1970s and 
1980s. It continues by exploring the relaxation of the inter-imperial con-
tradiction between the Kremlin and Washington, and what this meant 
for the hermeneutic politics behind its violent fi xing. Then it examines 
three of the period’s global wars: the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) 
and the Iran-Iraq Wars (1980–1988), along with the lesser US-Libya War 
(1981–1988). It explains how a new monster-alterity emerged along with 
new public délires. The goal is to show how each of these confl icts was 
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infl uenced by the time’s contradictions. In the end, it will be clear that this 
was a transitional time preparing the way for the era to follow. Refl ect 
upon the new, imperial security elites—masters and commanders of the 
US Leviathan.
Security Elites 2.0
The original old boys were history by the end of the Vietnam War. Com-
manding the New American Empire were new gentlemen who had not 
been present at the creation but had read about it.1 Certain points charac-
terize these gentlemen. They still were overwhelmingly white men. Women 
and people of color still needed not apply. Meanwhile, old boys were fewer, 
in the sense that they came from the old Eastern Establishment. That is 
to say, fewer of them had graced its schools—the Grotons and Harvards—
and more hailed from the country’s Midwest, South, and Far West.
Richard Nixon, from Yorba Linda, California, was by no means Estab-
lishment. His father had opened a grocery store and a gas station, but, as 
Henry Kissinger (1999: 48) remarked, he wanted to belong and so sub-
scribed to “Establishment orthodoxy.” Gerald Ford, his successor, grew up 
in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The person he knew as his father was a sales-
man. He went to public high school and on to the University of Michi-
gan, where he was a “jock” (football player). Jimmy Carter came from a 
comfortable family of peanut farmers in the tiny Georgia town of Plains. 
His education included Plains High and the Naval Academy, where he 
acquired a technical background in nuclear energy. Ronald Reagan hailed 
from the small city of Dixon, Illinois. His father, like Ford’s, was a salesman. 
He attended Dixon High and Eureka College before attaining Hollywood 
stardom, co-starring with a pongid in the fi lm Bedtime for Bonzo (a fi lm in 
which he taught morality to a chimp).
A few old boys lingered. The wealthiest, Nelson Rockefeller (Ford’s 
vice president, 1974–1977), was heir to John D. Rockefeller’s oil fortune. 
Less wealthy but politically more potent was George H. W. Bush (Bush I), 
onetime head of the CIA (under Ford, 1976–1977), Reagan’s vice presi-
dent (1981–1989), and eventually the forty-fi rst president. Bush I’s father, 
Prescott, had banking interests and had been a senator from Connecticut. 
Bush I went to Andover, Yale (Skull and Bones), and on to Texas, where 
he became something of an oil tycoon. Cyrus Vance, Carter’s secretary 
of State (1977–1980), was something of an old boy. He had attended the 
Kent School and Yale, where he was a member of the Scroll and Key So-
ciety. From there he went to Yale Law and on to serve in security-related 
positions in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
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Some important fi gures had immigrant origins. They tended to be 
“brains.” Kissinger, discussed in the previous chapter, was the most prom-
inent, especially during Nixon’s presidency. Carter’s National Security 
Advisor (NSA) Zbigniew Brzezinski, the other refugee brain, was born in 
Warsaw to a noble family. His father, a diplomat, had sought refuge in Can-
ada in 1938. Zbigniew attended McGill University as an undergraduate; 
moved on to Harvard, where he was awarded a doctorate; and then began 
teaching political science. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski was denied tenure 
(1959) and went on to Columbia University. A fi nal infl uential immigrant 
was Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s fi rst vice president. Less brainy than Kissinger 
and Brzezinski, he rose from a modest Greek immigrant background to im-
portance in Maryland politics and on to the heights of the vice presidency, 
from which he resigned due to charges of extortion, tax fraud, bribery, and 
conspiracy.
A few powerful fi gures from non-émigré backgrounds were also judged 
to have “brains.” Casper Weinberger (secretary of health, education, and 
welfare under Nixon and Ford, 1973–1975; secretary of defense under 
Reagan, 1981–1989), though sickly in youth, was found to be academically 
gifted and enjoyed a stellar career at Harvard. George Shultz (secretary of 
labor 1969–1970 and secretary of the Treasury 1972–1974 in the Nixon 
administration, and secretary of State 1982–1989 in the Reagan admin-
istration) came from comfortable circumstances in New York City. He at-
tended Loomis Chaffee School, did his undergraduate years at Prince ton, 
and acquired an MIT doctorate in economics. He began an academic ca-
reer at MIT and the University of Chicago, where he fell under the infl u-
ence of the neoliberals Milton Friedman and George Stigler. Carter brought 
Harold Brown to Washington to be his secretary of defense (1977–1981). 
Brown, also from New York, excelled at the demanding Bronx High School 
of Science and then took three degrees in rapid succession at Columbia 
University, attaining his doctorate in physics by the age of twenty-one. 
Eventually he became president of the California Institute of Technology 
(1969–1977), until Carter picked him to serve in his administration.
Finally, there were high offi cials who were not old boys, refugees, or 
brains. Bob Halderman, nicknamed “the Brush” for his distinctive fl attop 
haircut, was Nixon’s chief of staff (1969–1973). His father ran a success-
ful heating and air conditioning business in Los Angeles; from there he 
went to the University of Redlands, the University of Southern California, 
UCLA, and thence into advertising at J. Walter Thompson. The Ford ad-
ministration introduced Dick Cheney (White House chief of staff, 1975–
1977, under Ford; secretary of defense, 1989–1993, under Bush I; and 
Vice President, 2001–2009, under Bush II) and Donald Rumsfeld (White 
House chief of staff, 1974–1975, under Ford; 13th and 21st secretary of 
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defense, 1975–1977 under Ford and 2001–2006 under Bush II) to high 
offi ce. Cheney, the son of a soil conservation agent, was born in Nebraska 
and raised in Wyoming. He fl unked out of Yale as an undergraduate but 
managed to graduate from the University of Wyoming. Rumsfeld was from 
a more prosperous background. He grew up in Winnetka, a comfortable 
Chicago suburb, where his father sold real estate and his mother was a 
teacher. The young Rumsfeld went to Princeton, and then to Georgetown 
Law (from which he did not graduate).
As will become clear later in the chapter, these gentlemen, most es-
pecially the Republican ones, were as committed to violence as a policy 
tool as their old boy predecessors had been. Though they had not been 
indoctrinated in “manly Christianity” at prep schools, many were soldiers 
with considerable combat experience.2 However, before examining their 
command of the New American Empire, the chapter analyzes nonviolent 
reproductive fi xing of the vulnerability to the economic contradictions in 
order to establish their relevance to the global warring of this time.
Fixless Fixes: Nonviolent Fixing of 
Economic Reproductive Vulnerability
Being an empire is not easy. Chapter 5 demonstrated the New American 
Empire’s vulnerability to cyclical and systemic economic contradictions. 
Here, a fi rst avenue of consideration concerns attempts to fi x cyclical re-
productive problems over the years from 1975 to 1989.
Attempted Nonviolent Fixes of Cyclical Reproductive Vulnerabilities
The long downturn brought recession in 1973–1974 and 1981–1982. Re-
cessions were, and are, aspects of cyclical economic contradictions, and 
they pose a reproductive vulnerability: what to do about the bad times 
they bring? The years 1975–1989, for example, brought deindustrialization 
in what came to be called the Rust Belt, the industrial heartland of the 
Midwest and parts of the Northeast. Private and governmental elites re-
sponded to this hermeneutic puzzle with a hermeneutic politics that pitted 
hermeneuts who were free market fundamentalists against those favoring 
welfare state economics and Keynesianism. The fundamentalists won, and 
their politics resulted in what might be termed neoliberal fi xation. Let us 
explore neoliberalism.
The Neoliberal Fix: Neoliberalism is variously termed a “stage,” a “social 
order,” and a “strategy” of capitalism (Duménil and Lévy 2011: 5–32). This 
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is confusing. Stages, social orders, and strategies are different matters. I 
understand this liberalism as a public délire in different iterations, derived 
from the liberal class ideology that emerged when economic contradictions 
intensifi ed during the fi rst two recessions of the long downturn.
John Williamson’s “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” (1990) 
was perhaps the fi rst explicit statement of the neoliberal public délire. Wil-
liamson argued for what he called the “Washington Consensus,” a pol-
icy already instituted by capitalist elites in Washington-based institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, US Federal Re-
serve, and US Treasury Department. At its heart, the neoliberal délire is 
based upon the following hermeneutic: perceptually economic problems 
are interpreted as the result of government interference in markets, and 
procedurally it is understood that this requires elimination of welfare 
state economics, by moving control of the economy from the public to 
the private sector. Specifi cally, Williamson’s article proposed ten policy 
recommendations:
 1.  Governments should not run large defi cits that have to be repaid 
by future citizens, because such defi cits can only have a short-term 
effect on the level of an economy’s employment.
 2.  Public subsidies are wasteful, especially those of pro-poor services, 
education, health care, and infrastructure investment;
 3.  Tax reductions for higher incomes and adoption of moderate mar-
ginal tax rates are encouraged for innovation and effi ciency;
 4.  Implementation of market-determined interest rates that are posi-
tive (but moderate) in real terms is encouraged;
 5.  Floating exchange rates are recommended;
 6.  Trade liberalization needs to be practiced with particular emphasis 
on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.) and of 
any trade protection provided by law; and on relatively uniform 
tariffs, thus encouraging offshore outsourcing, competition, and 
long-term growth.
 7.  Liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payments 
is important, allowing people the opportunity to invest in offshore 
outsourcing and allowing foreign funds to be invested in the home 
country.
 8.  Privatization of state enterprises is required, insuring market provi-
sion of goods and services.
 9.  Abolition of regulations of economic practice that impede market 
entry or restrict competition, except for those justifi ed on safety, 
environmental and consumer protection grounds.
10.  Financialization of capital.
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These ten policies were not entirely novel. Rather, they were a reiter-
ating of the nuts and bolts of nineteenth-century liberal public délires. In-
novative, though, was the emphasis on privatization and “speculative and 
predatory” fi nacialization in capitalist accumulation (Harvey 2005: 161). 
Neoliberalism was instituted not in a single authorization, as when NSC 
68 had authorized the global domination public délire, but rather as a series 
of policy decisions. Those in the US came to be known as Reaganomics; 
in the UK they were Thatcherism. The iteration imposed upon the devel-
oping world, which came to be called “structural adjustment,” began later, 
at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s.3 Neoliberalism treats seeking the 
commonweal in social being as risible. Rather, it reduces human sociability 
to choreographed practices of capitalist elites out to clinch the best deal 
they can, using rules of their making, especially with regard to fi nancial 
practices. Everybody else is expected to celebrate them or bugger off. How 
successful has neoliberalism been?
Neoliberalism, according to Duménil and Lévy, has provoked “crisis” 
(2011). In Harvey’s (2005: 19) words, it, “has not been very effective in 
revitalizing global capital accumulation.” In the US and the UK, “To be 
sure, infl ation was brought down and interest rates fell, but this was at the 
expense of high rates of unemployment. … Cutbacks in state welfare and 
infrastructural expenditures diminished the quality of life for many. The 
overall result was an awkward mix of low growth and increasing income 
inequality” (ibid.: 88). The dossier on structural adjustment has been, if 
anything, worse. Joseph Stiglitz, who as a senior offi cial at the IMF assisted 
in its implementation, demonstrated in his Globalization and Its Discontents 
(2003) how structural adjustment had stunted African development in the 
1990s and had a hand in provoking the East Asian (1997) and Argentine 
(1999–2002) fi nancial crises. The problem in these cases was that strict, 
neoliberal monetary and fi scal policies imposed by the IMF, especially on 
Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Argentina, provoked fl ights of cap-
ital from these countries and consequent economic crashes.
However, the neoliberal public délire has done what it was intended to 
do and gratifi ed the upper classes délires by rewarding them with greater 
wealth. In the US, starting in the 1970s, wealth inequality “exploded,” 
with the bottom 90 percent of the population experiencing a “growing 
erosion of wealth,” being unable to save any of their income (Saez and 
Zucman 2014). Two aspects of the neoliberal fi x—offshore outsourcing 
and fi nancial innovation—have seemed especially problematic. These are 
examined next.
The Offshore Outsourcing Fix: American enterprise has been able to de-
territorialize outside the US due to the development of free trade zones4 
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and its ability to abolish economic regulations that impede US companies’ 
overseas market entry, in conjunction with improved communication and 
transportation technologies. Starting in the late 1970s and increasingly 
in the 1980s, initially in manufacturing and later in services, operations 
previously performed at US companies were assigned to other parts of that 
company or other enterprises located elsewhere. This was “outsourcing.” 
For example, a telephone company might outsource its customer service 
division to India. If the outsourcing was done overseas, it was “offshore out-
sourcing”; which at the turn of the twenty-fi rst century was estimated to 
increase businesses’ productivity and competiveness ten- to a hundredfold 
(Corbett 2004). By the 1980s, offshore outsourcing had become a “tidal 
wave” (R. French 2006: 4) and was a cause of deindustrialization. Iconi-
cally, Nike closed all its American sneaker plants by the end of the 1980s 
and turned to producing sneakers in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam.
The evidence of offshore outsourcing’s virtues is disputed. On the one 
hand, neoliberal hermeneuts insist that it benefi ts the US economy, claim-
ing it “is unlikely to have accounted for a meaningful part of the job losses 
in the recent downturn or contributed much to the slow labor market re-
bound” (Mankiw and Swagel 2005: 2). The particular “recent downturn” 
Mankiw and Swagel were talking about was the 2001 recession, which 
leads to an observation: The 2001 recession led to a “phantom recovery” 
(Reich 2010: 6), followed by the 2007–2009 Great Recession of the US 
economy. Thereafter, unemployment rates were still higher than in the 
2001 recession.
Contradicting Mankiw and Swagel is a literature arguing that offshore 
outsourcing indeed harmed US labor through the loss of blue-collar and 
middle-management jobs (Hira and Hira 2005; Dorgan 2007). Further, 
offshore outsourcing has contributed to decline in the levels of income 
generated by the jobs remaining in the US economy. Higher-paying indus-
trial work has been outsourced and replaced by lower-paying service indus-
try jobs at Wal-Mart, McDonalds, and the like (Reich 2010: 53). Michael 
Spence and Sandile Hlatshwayo demonstrate that at present there is a 
“long-term structural challenge with respect to the quantity and quality of 
employment opportunities in the United States” (Spence and Hlatshwaya 
2011). Such evidence indicates that whereas offshore outsourcing brought 
cost savings to US economic elites’ enterprises, it reduced employment 
opportunities, especially for well-paid labor, for everyone else. Consider 
now fi nancial innovation.
The Financial Fix: The tribulations of industry have, one can argue, trig-
gered a fi nancial turn in US capitalism. Manufacturing had been in de-
cline since the 1970s recession, falling from 23 percent of GDP in 1970 to 
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only 11 percent in 2009 (Smil 2011). Manufacturing was a less interest-
ing investment because there was less of it. As a consequence, Foster and 
McChesney (2009: 10–11) report that, “unable to fi nd an outlet for its 
growing surplus in the real economy” (i.e., manufacturing),
capital (via corporations and individual investors) poured its excess surplus/
savings into fi nance, speculating in the increase in asset prices. Financial insti-
tutions, meanwhile, on their part, found new innovative ways to accommodate 
the vast infl ow of money capital and to leverage the fi nancial superstructure of 
the economy up to ever greater heights with added borrowing—facilitated by 
all sorts of exotic fi nancial instruments, such as derivatives, options, securiti-
zation, etc.
…
 The result was the creation of … extraordinary growth of fi nancial profi ts. 
Thus, following the late 1970s deindustrialization, the fi nancialization of 
capital deepened in the 1980s and came to an “apogee” in the fi rst years 
of the twenty-fi rst century (Callinicos 2010: 74). This, then, was neolib-
eralism’s fi nancial fi x, and the “extraordinary” profi ts certainly seemed to 
reduce the vulnerability caused by the long downturn.
It had long been believed that the fi nancial sector becomes increas-
ingly signifi cant as capitalism develops. Rudolf Hilferding ([1910] 1981) 
argued at the turn of the twentieth century that growing concentration 
and centralization of capital led to fusion of banking and industrial en-
terprise under the dominance of the former, creating an era of monopoly 
fi nance capitalism. Critically, Hilferding understood fi nance as investing in 
the “real” economy—manufacturing and infrastructure—and ultimately 
in economic growth. There has certainly been a concentration and cen-
tralization in the US economy, especially since the end of World War II.
However, the fi nancial practices that emerged, as we are about to learn, 
have not integrated banking with manufacturing enterprise. Especially 
since the 1990s, fi nance in the US has instead grown more concentrated, 
greater in value, and more autonomous. The big banks still do the tradi-
tional business of handling ordinary customer accounts (i.e., “retail” bank-
ing), but the bulk of their capital is now used for investments involving 
their own capital, not that of their customers, for their own profi t. It is from 
this “proprietary trading” that their high profi ts are derived.
Additionally, a “shadow banking sector”—hedge funds, private equity 
fi rms, and structured investment vehicles—has been growing. “Hedge 
funds” are investment fi rms—usually available to only a small number of 
affl uent persons who aggressively manage investment portfolios—that em-
phasize exotic fi nancial instruments, such as leveraged derivatives in both 
domestic and international markets, with the goal of generating high re-
turns. “Private equity fi rms” are companies that, through leveraging, ac-
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quire publicly listed companies, take them off the stock market, reorganize 
them to increase their profi tability, and then resell them at considerable 
profi t. A “structured investment vehicle” is a type of fund invented by 
Citigroup in 1988. Its strategy is to borrow money by issuing short-term 
securities at low interest and then to lend that money by buying long-
term securities at higher interest, making a profi t for investors from the 
difference. Both the huge investment banks and the shadow banking com-
munity leverage heavily to invest in exotic fi nancial products, such as de-
rivatives, CDOs, CDS, MBS.5
Critically, this alphabet soup of exotic fi nancial instruments is non-
Hilferdingian. They are not investments in production; rather, they are 
actually bets that already existing assets will achieve certain values. Such 
fi nancial securities—the basis of the neoliberal fi nancial fi x—began to be 
introduced in the 1980s, following falling rates of profi t for both fi nancial 
and nonfi nancial corporations in the 1970s. By the late 1980s they had 
rejuvenated these profi t rates (Duménil & Lévy 2011: 67), increasing the 
wealth of persons owning the new exotic fi nancial instruments. However, 
they did nothing to solve the New American Empire’s other economic 
problems, principally slower growth, stagnant or declining incomes, and a 
deteriorating labor market. In sum, the evidence indicates neoliberalism 
might be characterized as a form of simultainarity boom that is bust, that 
is, booming wealth for the privileged that busts wealth for everyone else.
The neoliberal iteration of the liberal public délire was in place by the 
end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the US economy remained in “crisis,” 
and while the cyclical vulnerabilities continued unfi xed, systemic ones 
emerged.
Attempted Nonviolent Fixes of Systemic Reproductive Vulnerabilities
Our inquiry now focuses upon elites’ attempts to fi x the reproductive vul-
nerabilities posed by the initial intensifi cation of a capital/land systemic 
contradiction, which manifested itself either as global warming or move-
ment toward peak oil. Global warming is examined fi rst.
Global Warming—“Hardly addressed”: In 1958 Charles Keeling developed a 
device to measure the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. A decade 
later, Syukuro Manabe and his collaborators (Manabe and Weatherald 
1975) produced complex computer models that predicted temperature rise 
resultant from CO2 increase. Together these made it possible to precisely 
measure global warming, making it possible to know whether there was an 
intensifying capital/land systemic contradiction.
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Hermeneutic politics as to the meaning of CO2 emissions had begun by 
1975. Broadly speaking, there were environmentalist (eco-activist or the 
green movement) and anti-environmentalist (climate skeptic) sides in this 
politics.6 Environmental researchers, largely from the biological sciences 
and climatology, argued that the earth and humanity were threatened by 
global warming, and that major interventions were needed to reduce this 
danger. Anti-environmental hermeneuts, largely from industry and eco-
nomics, lambasted the environmentalists as “doomsters,” while assuring 
people that markets would fi x the problem.7
The course of their politics has been as follows: Prior to 1975, com-
pelling evidence was lacking that greenhouse gases produced warming. 
There was actually some thought during this time that the world might 
experience a period of cooling. A 1975 National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS 1975) report insisted that climates could change and that there was 
need for more research to explain how. Two UN agencies, along with the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO), were chosen to conduct the NAS-requested 
research. In the middle of the 1980s, a joint UNEP/WMO/CSU confer-
ence issued fi ndings of this research and concluded that greenhouse gases 
“are expected” to cause signifi cant warming in the next century (WMO 
1985). In 1988 the WMO and UNEP formed the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) to conduct research on global warming and 
devise policies for addressing it. In 1989 fossil fuel and other industries 
formed the Global Climate Coalition to inform politicians and ordinary 
folk that climate science was too uncertain to justify any policies the IPCC 
might recommend (Weart 2008: 210). The following year the IPCC pre-
sented its fi rst report. In the years 1959 through 1987, CO2 emissions grew 
from roughly 315 ppm to 349 ppm (CO2Now.Org 2014), at around the 
rate predicted to cause ecological harm. Newell and Paterson (2010: 34) 
testifi ed, “Global carbon emissions continue to grow, largely in line with 
global GDP.” Because the growth of GDP is a measure of the growth of 
capitalist accumulation, this indicated that most of the emissions either di-
rectly or indirectly resulted from capitalism. Capitalism and environmental 
change were, as Adrian Parr (2013: 6) put it, linked in an “earth shattering 
moment.” Here, then, was recognition of grave reproductive vulnerabil-
ity. To address it, the IPCC report recommended “a programme of global, 
comprehensive and phased action for the resolution of global warming” 
(IPCC 1990: 56).
Since that time there have been attempts, in the private and the gov-
ernmental sectors in the US and in other countries, to implement such a 
“programme.” In private attempts to combat global warming, two sorts of 
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fi xes predominate: those of capitalist enterprise and those of nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs). Consider fi rst the NGOs.
There are literally thousands of NGOs against global warming across all 
sorts of political and religious divides. Some are mainstream organizations, 
like the World Social Forum, the National Wildlife Federation, and the En-
vironmental Justice Organization. Others are more specialized: for parent 
activists there is Green Parenthood; for bird-watchers there is Bird Life In-
ternational; for fundamentalist Christians there is the Evangelical Climate 
Initiative; for Zionists there is the Green Zionist Alliance; for those into 
the Internet there are 350.org, DoSomething.org, and StopGlobalWarm-
ing.org; for social networking devotees climatic change can be fought on 
MySpace and Facebook. Finally, for those with erotic inclinations there is 
Fuck for Forest, a Norwegian NGO that raises money to rescue the world’s 
rainforests doing what the name of their organization says they do (Dicum 
2005).
Nevertheless, global warming has continued unabated in the period be-
ing considered (1975–1990). Why? In part this is because the anti-Global 
Warming NGOs participate in hermeneutic politics with limited force re-
sources. They have only enough money, workers, and tools to create and 
transmit cultural messages, little more. But simply producing messages is 
not suffi cient. Notably, global warming opponents lack control over the 
force resources that actually produce global warming. These forces—fac-
tories and the like that emit CO2—are owned by either capitalist corpo-
rations that profi t from production of greenhouse gases, or government 
institutions that have both the authority and the violent force resources 
to terminate this production, but instead support capitalist enterprise. Fur-
ther, corporations responsible for CO2 emissions support climate-skeptical 
NGOs (discussed in Hoggan and Littlemore 2009) to broadcast the oppos-
ing message that global warming is a lie—apparently successfully, because 
as late as 2014 many Americans expressed doubt over global warming 
(Agiesta and Borenstein 2014). In short, if producing a message is a bit like 
blowing a horn, what environmental NGOs have done is blown their own 
horns. Few appear to have heard.
The second private activity that is supposed to reduce greenhouse emis-
sions is capitalism itself. Here the notion has been that carbon markets 
could be created. Newell and Paterson (2010: 24–25) have described how 
such markets might work, explaining that “two main mechanisms are par-
ticularly important” for creating carbon markets:
On the one hand are environmental taxation measures where the government 
imposes taxes on particular pollutants like carbon dioxide. On the other hand 
are emissions trading schemes, where an overall emissions limit is decided, a 
number of permits adding up to this limit are distributed to actors according to 
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some principle of distribution, and then actors are allowed to trade the permits 
amongst themselves. With both measures the main rationale is that they leave 
the decisions about how to achieve particular environmental goals up to indi-
viduals and companies. Governments set either general incentives (in the case 
of taxes) or overall limits to pollution levels (in the case of emissions trading) 
and leave markets to work out who will reduce emissions when and where.
In principle, the idea of creating carbon markets to fi ght global warming is 
plausible; but in practice such markets appear “a bit of a scam” (ibid.: 129); 
the problem being that there may be but little profi t to be had in carbon 
trading unless the tolerated levels of carbon emissions are set so high that 
they do little to limit greenhouse gas buildup. 
The discussion turns now to governmental attempts to constrain global 
warming. There have been two sorts of governmental policies and pro-
grams to address global warming: those coming from individual countries’ 
governments; and those from multinational governmental agencies, espe-
cially the UN. Bilateral attempts to fi ght climate change have been most 
successful in Europe, and less so in the rapidly industrializing economies 
of Asia, notably India and China. In 2007, China surpassed the US as the 
world’s largest emitter of CO2 (Vidal and Adam 2007). In the US the sum-
mer of 2010 looked promising: a comprehensive bill in the Senate would 
have imposed a carbon emissions cap. However, energy industry interests 
opposed it, and a grand bargain was proposed to mollify them: oil com-
panies would be allowed to drill in US coastal waters, where such drilling 
was forbidden, in exchange for accepting a carbon cap. Nevertheless, the 
bill failed, and the Senate continued its bipartisan record of doing nothing 
about global warming. 
What about multinational governmental efforts to combat global warm-
ing? Global attempts to reduce greenhouse emissions have been coordi-
nated by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), which conducts studies and, based upon them, for-
mulates policy it hopes countries will agree upon at international meetings. 
Should agreement be reached on these policies, they will attain the status 
of international law; that is, in our terms, they would form an anti–global 
warming public délire. So far the most important of these climate change 
conferences has been the 1997 Kyoto Climate Conference, where the Kyoto 
Protocol was accepted, meaning the countries agreed to cut CO2 emissions 
back to 5 percent below 1990 levels. The Clinton administration accepted 
the protocol. However, under Bush II the US reversed itself (March 2001). 
Meanwhile, China was never party to it. With both the US and China re-
fusing to cut greenhouse gas emissions, the protocol was effectively dead. 
The 2009 UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen was supposed to revive the 
Kyoto Protocal. It failed. A 2010 UNFCCC summit in Cancun was in-
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tended to remedy the disappointment of the Copenhagen meeting. The 
Cancun conference featured less rancorous participant discourse than Co-
penhagen had, but it too failed. The Paris Climate conference in 2016 se-
cured a global commitment to reduce CO2 emissions, but failed to mandate 
how each country would do so. Multinational attempts to create an anti –
global warming public délire have been characterized by failed iteration 1 
(the Kyoto Protocol), failed iteration 2 (the Copenhagen summit), failed 
iteration 3 (the Cancun conference), and uncertain iteration 4 (the Paris 
conference). 
Peaceful fi xing of the reproductive vulnerability of global warming from 
1975 to 1989 was a chimera. The belching of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere at high levels continued unabated. Neoliberal capitalism was 
“underpinning … massive environmental changes” that included “climate 
change” (Parr 2013: 3). Next we consider attempts to nonviolently repro-
ductively fi x the systemic contradiction resulting from peak oil.
Peak Oil—“Off a cliff”: Recall that chapter 5 explained that if demand for 
oil increased when amounts of oil supplied were stagnant or decreasing, 
then the capital/land contradiction was intensifying. World oil discovery 
per decade peaked in 1959 and declined through 1989 (Ruppert 2009), 
suggesting oil supply problems. Over this time, world demand for oil had 
swiftly increased, due especially to rapid growth of Asian economies that 
began during this period. Clearly, there was evidence of a reproductive vul-
nerability due to intensifi cation of oil moving toward its peak in the years 
1975 through 1989. What has happened as a result?
The result has been ferocious hermeneutic politics. Environmental her-
meneuts broadcast the message that peak oil was coming, and it was not 
going to be nice. Anti-environmental hermeneuts responded that such 
claims were phantasmagoric. As in the global warming hermeneutic pol-
itics, NGOs fi ghting peak oil lacked the force resources to do anything 
other than produce messages. Consequently, neither US private enterprise 
nor the government in the period under consideration confronted the im-
pending arrival of peak oil. President Jimmy Carter was certainly aware of 
it in April 1977, when he began a televised speech by announcing, “To-
night I want to have an unpleasant talk with you.” The disagreeableness 
concerned the fact that “the oil and natural gas we rely on for 75 percent 
of our energy are running out” (Carter 1977: 1, 6). Carter was derided as 
alarmist. Nothing was done to effectively eliminate the unpleasantness—
not by Carter; nor by his successor, Reagan. Accordingly, by the early 
twenty-fi rst century it was judged that “the supply of the world’s essential 
energy source is going off a cliff” (Arguimbau 2010: 1).
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Commodity Chains and Problems of Fixing Peak Oil: An additional vulnera-
bility faced the New American Empire because its ability to nonviolently 
fi x the problem of peak oil, even had it wanted to do so, was reduced 
over the years 1975–1989, as the US lost extensive power over petroleum 
production and distribution. Oil force resources are transformed into com-
modities and circulated in commodity chains, and an understanding of 
these helps to account for the decline in US control over oil.
A “commodity chain” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986) is a particular 
type of a string used by fi rms to gather resources, transform them into 
goods, and fi nally distribute them to consumers. Oil global commodity 
chains have fi ve sorts of spatially and temporally related operations: ex-
ploration (discovering oil deposits), production (removing crude oil from 
the ground), transportation (moving crude oil from production site to re-
fi ning site), refi ning (transforming crude oil into marketable commodities), 
and fi nally distribution (moving petroleum products to various distribu-
tors, who sell them to consumers). Oil commodity chains became global 
in the early twentieth century. Concentration had emerged in them by the 
1930s among a few companies called “the majors.” Predominantly Amer-
ican transnationals, these included Esso (US), Mobil (US), Texaco (US), 
Gulf (US), BP (UK), Shell (Dutch, UK) and the CFP (French). Their 
commodity chains were largely vertically integrated through the 1960s, 
which relaxed competition within them because the different links in the 
chain were part of the same company. US power over oil production was 
considerable because its transnational enterprise effectively owned all the 
institutions in the commodity chains.8
However, there was a contradiction between the majors and the govern-
ments in the territories where oil was produced: the more revenues went to 
the majors, the less they went to governments in producing regions. This 
is the oil company/petro-state contradiction mentioned in chapters 1 and 
6. Payments made for the use of a natural resource are rents. Rents paid 
by petroleum fi rms were generally low through the 1960s. After all, prior 
to the 1960s many of these governments were colonial ones that, being 
appendages of the core governments, saw little reason to interfer with their 
oil companies’ profi ts. Thus, as long as the old empires were strong, the oil 
company/petro-state contradiction was relaxed vis-à-vis the oil businesses.
Two transformations intensifi ed the contradiction and loosened the ma-
jors’ governance of global oil commodity chains. The fi rst of these involved 
nationalism, the key ideological force resource that in the last chapter’s 
discussion was directed by colonies against the old empires after World 
War II. Local elites in oil-producing areas knew of the copious fl ow of cap-
ital to the majors from oil, so their nationalist ideologies aimed to increase 
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their share by stressing oil nationalization and the creation of national oil 
production companies—for example, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in 
Mexico in 1938—or profi t-sharing agreements like the 1943 Hydrocarbon 
Law in Venezuela. Oil nationalism had spread to the Middle East by the 
1950s (Iran nationalized its oil in 1952) and became a veritable fl ood in the 
1970s (Rutledge 2005: 45, 86). Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, largely owned by 
companies that would become ExxonMobil, was nationalized by 1976. Iraq 
started nationalization in 1961 and had completed it by 1972. Kuwait had 
nationalized by 1975. By 1976, twenty oil-producing countries account-
ing for 74 percent of nonsocialist oil had nationalized their oil production 
operations (Kobrin 1985: 3). This meant, according to Ayoub (1994: 57), 
that “between 1973 and 1982, [the majors] lost around 50 percent of their 
share of the crude oil market, from 30 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) 
to around 15.2 MMbbl/d.” Consequently, “during the 1970s … virtually all 
of the oil resources outside of North America passed from international pe-
troleum companies to the governments of the oil producers” (Morse 1999: 
4). At the turn of the millenium, only about 7 percent of the world’s oil 
and gas resources were in countries allowing free rein to private petroleum 
companies (McNulty 2007).9
Hence, national oil companies had replaced the majors as the producer 
link of the oil global commodity chains. The producer link in the oil com-
modity chain had gone from being a force resource of the economic system 
of the New American Empire to being a force resource of petro-states. 
Henry Kissinger groused in 1972 that this reduced the US’s “ability to set 
the world oil price” (in Rutledge 2005: 43). It certainly did, and according 
to Morse (1999: 5), “the balance of power in the market was tipped toward 
sellers,” allowing “oil prices to be raised at the discretion of governments 
[of oil producing countries], which if they so desired could increase rents 
from oil exploitation and force a shift in income and wealth from the con-
suming countries.” Kissinger declared this state of affairs to be an “energy 
crisis” (1999: 696). His attempted fi x of it was diplomatic and featured a 
“Consumer/Producer Dialogue” (ibid.: 697–700), which did not change 
the fact that oil producers, starting in the 1970s, had far greater control 
over their oil.
A second transformation further diminished the New American Em-
pire’s control over oil. This was the emergence of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).10 Founded in 1960, OPEC is a 
cartel whose chief goal has been to coordinate oil producers’ policies to 
better wrest control over oil supply and prices. Though OPEC has not 
been completely successful, it has been infl uential in bringing robust, ad-
ditional revenues to petro-states. By the late 1960s its members’ share of 
oil exports rose to nearly 80 percent of the global total, fortifying its bar-
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gaining clout (E. Rose 2004: 433). OPEC used this clout to further the na-
tionalization of foreign oil assets and oil price increases. For example, “At 
its twenty fi rst meeting in Caracas, in Venezuela December 1970, OPEC 
demanded and got an across-the-board price increase of thirty-three cents 
a barrel for crude oil and a minimum tax rate increase of 55 percent from 
the oil fi rms” (ibid.: 434). Over the next three years, “OPEC dictated price 
increases and the beginning of the widespread movement on the part of 
some of its members to nationalize all or part of the oil companies’ assets 
within their Territories” (ibid.: 434).
Two indicators reveal the loss of US power due to diminished price 
control. One concerns capital fl ows. James Akins (1973: 480) indicated 
something of the magnitude of monies acquired by non-US oil-producing 
companies because of nationalization and OPEC when he reported, “With 
the possible exception of Croesus, the world will never have seen anything 
quite like the wealth which is fl owing and will continue to fl ow into the 
Persian Gulf”—and, he might have added, other areas of oil production 
in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. The second indicator is the 
ability to use oil as a weapon to harm the US. For example, in fall of 1973, 
when the “Yom Kippur” Arab-Israeli War broke out, the US supported Is-
rael. In response, Arab states, through OPEC, organized an oil embargo on 
the US and its Atlantic community clients. Oil prices skyrocketed in what 
became known as the “fi rst oil shock.” This embargo provoked the steep 
1973–1974 recession in the US. A second oil shock occurred in 1979. That 
February the Iranian Revolution (discussed later in the chapter), began, 
whereupon the US oil companies lost access to Iranian oil. Here was a 
second exercise of power over oil supply within six years. Both events pro-
voked steep price infl ation, both hurt the US economy, and both were 
beyond imperial America’s power at the time.
The New American Empire’s sizable loss of the production link in the 
oil commodity chain would have been of lesser importance if US oil pro-
duction had not, for the moment, passed its peak in 1970, more or less 
according to Hubble’s predictions. Thereafter, the US grew increasingly 
dependent upon foreign petroleum, importing roughly 33 percent of its 
oil in 1973, 53 percent in 1998, and 62 percent in 2008 (Kunstler 2006: 
42, 44). Further, “over half of crude oil imports come from unstable or un-
friendly countries” (Center for American Progress: 2008). Hence the US 
acquired the oil supplies necessary for its capital accumulation from com-
modity chains whose production links were in hostile countries with the 
potential to deny supply and thereby compromise capital accumulation. 
Consequently, even if US elites intended to address peak oil by reducing 
the oil supply, they were poorly situated to do so because regulating what 
you imperfectly control is like driving a car with a faulty engine. 




To summarize the preceding discussion, the New American Empire may 
be the most powerful social being ever, but like Achilles, it has its vul-
nerabilities. Between 1975 and 1989 cyclical and systemic contradictions 
intensifi ed and coalesced, contributing to an “inadequate performance of 
the American economy” (Bernstein and Adler 1994). Fixes were sought, 
peaceful ones. They failed. Consequently, during these times of late mo-
dernity the US Leviathan sailed contradictory seas with fi xless fi xes.
Indeed, the times were “a-changin’,” and not for the good. There was 
a sense that the US was in decline. A whole school of scholars called “de-
clinists” emerged to argue this case (D. Snow 1999). A counter-literature 
arose to cheer elites up. One of its hermeneuts, Joseph Nye (Princeton 
Univeristy’s Colonial Club, followed by a Harvard Distinguished Service 
Professorship) reassured everybody, as the title of his book put it, that the 
US was Bound To Lead (1991). But the question was, lead to where? The 
following section begins to answer this question.
Hermeneutic Politics in a Time of Fixless Fixes 
Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring Persian Gulf 
security and stability is vital to U.S. interests. (Brzezinski, Scowcroft, and Mur-
phy 1997: 20)
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy were not 
nonentities. Brzezinski was Carter’s NSA, Scowcroft performed the same 
chores for Bush I, and Richard Murphy was a former assistant secretary of 
state and a Middle Eastern expert. Elite of (security) elites, their Foreign 
Affairs article interpreted what was “vital to U.S. interests”; and “vital” was 
the Persian Gulf—at the time largely unknown to most Americans. The 
Gulf is a body of water fl owing from the Indian Ocean through the Straits 
of Hormuz into the heart of the Middle East. Most of the eastern shore of 
the Gulf is Iran; the western shore is Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates; to the north is Iraq.
Why, when the US economy appeared to be going to hell in an (eco-
nomic) handbasket, did the Security Elites 2.0 suddenly start worrying 
about a nowhere? Furthmore, what had happened during this time to the 
dreaded monster-alterity, the Soviet Union? Answers to these two ques-
tions turn upon the sharpened economic contradictions and the fate of 
the inter-imperial contradiction. Brzezinski and friends (1997: 317) ex-
plained that the Gulf was “vital” because its “oil will continue to be crucial 
to the economic well-being of the industrialized world for the foreseeable 
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future.” If the phrase the “industrialized world” is understood to be the US 
and its imperial clients, then the Gulf was vital because it could provide 
“economic well-being,” attainment of which would relax the economic 
contradictions.
An additional reason US security elites began fi xating upon the Gulf 
and its oil was that another contradiction had largely disappeared. The 
USSR, still fearsome in the 1970s, had by 1989 been largely deconstructed. 
Removal of the old Soviet monster-alterity relaxed the inter-imperial con-
tradiction—but a new monster-alterity arose to terrorize US security elites. 
The hermeneutic politics within this story are told in the next few sections, 
beginning with the Nixon and Ford administrations.
Relaxing the Inter-imperial Contradiction: 
The Nixon Doctrine and the Twin Towers
Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that the US had withdrawn from Viet-
nam on “honorable terms” (1999: 92). Anybody who saw the fi lms of the 
Americans fl eeing the CIA station in April 1975 knew that they had fl ed 
in dishonor.11 Thereafter, the New American Empire itself appeared to be 
in “turmoil” (ibid.: 99). Within the continental US, starting in the late 
1960s and continuing through the 1970s and 1980s, there were riots and 
assassinations. Outside its continental borders, client-nations were ner-
vous about their Washington connections, and foes looked for gains. The 
Nixon administration was especially worried that Moscow might seek “to 
destabilize Europe and other strategic regions” (ibid.). Nixon and Kissinger 
judged the situation to be one requiring threat reduction. Accordingly, 
they sought détente with the Soviets and China (Litwak 1986; Bowker and 
Williams 1988).
Strategic arms limitation talks with Russia were initiated and resulted in 
the SALT I Treaty (1972), which reduced the numbers of nuclear missiles 
menacing the two countries. Additionally, the Helsinki Accords (begun 
July 1973, fi nalized August 1975) were negotiated, guaranteeing post–
World War II European states’ territorial integrity and formalizing their 
agreement to refrain from the threat or use of violence between them. 
With regard to China, the US lifted its trade embargo (April 1971) and 
Nixon visited China (February 1972). Détente between America and its 
monster-alterity reduced the inter-imperial contradiction. But whereas 
one contradiction appeared relaxed, another began to be perceived.
Oil nationalization, OPEC’s growth, and the Arab-Israeli War’s oil em-
bargo all happened during Nixon’s presidency, fl ooding his security elites’ 
I-spaces with the sense that there was a new diffi culty in the world. Kis-
singer put it as follows in a speech of December 1973:
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We must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a 
product of the Arab-Israel war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive 
growth of worldwide demand outrunning incentives for supply. The Middle 
East war made a chronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. 
Even when prewar production levels are resumed, the problem of matching the 
level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain. 
(1982: 896)
Kissinger’s “energy crisis” was a recognition, and interpretation, of the land/
capital contradiction, in the sense that it acknowledged a “crisis” based on 
capital’s great demand for petroleum energy, a demand that might outstrip 
its supply.
Unquestionably, however, the New American Empire still aimed to dom-
inate, which posed a new hermeneutic puzzle. In the era of “energy crisis,” 
while being nice to communists, who, and how, did you plan violence in 
order to dominate? The Nixon Doctrine was an initial answer to this ques-
tion. Announced during a presidential press conference in Guam (1969), 
it specifi ed that “in cases involving [non-nuclear] aggression, we shall fur-
nish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with 
our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threat-
ened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for 
its defense” (Nixon 1969). There were two parts to this doctrine. The fi rst 
said that if a country was “directly threatened,” it would have to defend 
itself with its own “manpower.” Here was a promise to ordinary Americans 
that there would be no more sending of their “boys” to die in jungles.
However, the second part of the Nixon Doctrine meant that allied coun-
tries linked by treaties would receive “military … assistance.” So it pro-
posed indirect global warring and military satrapies in the [developing] 
far reaches of the empire, and in doing so was an iteration of the global 
domination public délire. Michael Klare (2004) has noted that its imple-
mentation initiated US military assistance to the Persian Gulf. The Nixon 
Doctrine, then, answered the question, who do you kill when the Soviets 
become less threatening? The answer was, you choreograph killing of those 
who threaten US control over Persian Gulf oil.
In 1973, during his 4th Report to Congress, Nixon announced that Iran 
and Saudi Arabia had become the “twin towers” of US foreign policy in 
the Persian Gulf. As such, they were a bit like the marcher lords in medi-
eval England, who as proxies for the British crown protected the imperial 
boundaries from Welsh or Scots raiders. Iran and Saudi Arabia, armed by 
the US, would do the same for America’s Middle Eastern interests. Nixon 
told one audience that this policy was desirable because the “assurance 
of the continual fl ow of Middle Eastern energy resources is increasingly 
important to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan” (in Nakhieh 
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1982: 99). However, it would turn out that the Nixon Doctrine contrib-
uted to a US “strategic insolvency” in the Persian Gulf. Such insolvency 
is any situation where the force resources available for procedural cho-
reographing are insuffi cient for the intended operation.12 This insolvency 
emerged in the presidencies following Nixon’s, considered next.
The Carter Administration’s Very Busy Time
Tricky Dicky succumbed to a temptation to steal information about his 
rivals in the 1972 presidential campaign. Due to the ensuing the Watergate 
Scandal over this theft, Nixon resigned the presidency on 9 August 1974.13 
Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon and largely continued his 
predecessor’s policies. This included détente. The Helsinki Accords were 
signed in 1975. Ford lost the 1976 elections to a relative newcomer to na-
tional politics, Jimmy Carter, a Plains, Georgia peanut farmer and governor 
(1971–1975). He would have a busy time of it.
The man from Plains (1977–1981) assumed the presidency as the cy-
clical economic contradictions of the long downturn manifested them-
selves as stagfl ation (high infl ation and low employment). Carter would 
strengthen Nixon’s Persian Gulf policy; wrestle with the Soviet monster-
alterity, which would be fi rst perceived as less threatening and then as very 
much more threatening; suffer the failure of Nixon’s Persian Gulf policy 
because of US strategic insolvency; and, fi nally, devise a fi x of it. All of this 
made for a very busy time of it during his administration.
Sam Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations: President Carter took of-
fi ce in 1977. Immediately thereafter, his NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski set up 
offi ce and invited Sam Huntington, a safe Soviet hand, to be his coordi-
nator of planning. Huntington was a friend from Harvard days when they 
were both young professors denied tenure. Harvard would later repent and 
invite both back. Only Huntington returned to Harvard and a career as 
high-class hermeneut.
The Clash of Civilizations was perhaps his most celebrated text. Here he 
claimed, “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or val-
ues or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence” 
(1996: 51); that is, Westerners killed well. Another affi rmation—the one 
considered most prescient or outrageous—was that civilizations were cul-
tures, and that there would be future confl ict between Islamic and Western 
civilizations because their cultures clashed. Following Carter’s election, 
Brzezinski needed someone to help formulate the administration’s Soviet 
and other foreign policies. Huntington responded by cultivating a new in-
terpretation of the USSR. Additionally, he authored a hermeneutic de-
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ception based on his prediction that the future of US warring involved 
hostilities between Islam and the West. A word is in order concerning what 
was happening to the Soviets at this time.
The economic problems of the Soviet Union parallelled those of the US. 
In fact, the Bear was in far worse shape. According to one study, “Soviet 
growth over 1960–1989 was the worst in the world” (Easterly and Fischer 
1994: 1). As early as 1971 the Soviets were admitting their economy had 
“slowed to a crawl” (Cahn 1998: 18). This period of real diffi culties be-
gan about the mid 1970s, something the Russians themselves recognized. 
Gorbachev called this time an “era of stagnation” and insisted it was “the 
lowest stage of socialism” (Ulam 2002: 275). The downturn might have 
been worse, had it not been for Soviet oil and gas resources.
At the same time that Soviet economic problems were emerging, some in 
the US—elites and ordinary folk—were warming to the Bear. In part, this 
was a fruit of détente. Following a survey of attitudes toward the Soviets, 
Anne Cahn reported, “in 1974, the general mood of the United States was 
positive and upbeat concerning relations with the Soviet Union” (1998: 
7). It was in this context of a faltering Soviet economy and increased US 
tolerance of the Bear that Huntington formulated the new Carter admin-
istration’s security policy. The result was Presidential Directive (PD) 18, 
signed by Carter on 26 August 1977.14
PD 18 began by announcing, “in the foreseeable future, US-Soviet rela-
tions will continue to be characterized by both competition and coopera-
tion” (PD 18 1977: 2). Further, 
In the competition … the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical 
advantages: it has a more creative technological and economic system, its po-
litical system can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies upon freely 
given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends 
who genuinely share similar aspirations. (Ibid.) 
Here was an interpretation of the Soviets that differed from the early 
Cold War one. Nitze’s “fanatic” and “ruthless” USSR was absent in PD 
18, replaced by a social being with whom there could be “cooperation.” 
Huntington’s Bear seemed a Teddy Bear in contrast to Nitze’s nightmarish 
monster-alterity. Huntington’s softened view of the Soviets was backed by 
Carter, who in a 1977 Notre Dame University speech advised that the 
US should eschew “inordinate fear of Communism” (in Brzezinski 1983: 
460). Together Huntington and Carter might be said to have constructed 
a Teddy Bear hermeneutic of the Soviets, in which perceptually they were 
not to be feared, and procedurally there could be cooperation as well as 
competition.
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Nevertheless, even though there was cooperation, the Carter adminis-
tration believed there should be military support for any competition that 
might occur. PD 18’s “Global Contingencies” section declared an import-
ant change in US military policy. It announced that “the United States will 
maintain a deployment of force of light divisions with strategic mobility 
independent of overseas bases and logistical support. … These forces will 
be designated for use against both local forces and forces projected by the 
USSR based upon analyses of requirements in the Middle East” (PD 18, 
1977: 5). Implicit in PD 18 was that the “light divisions” would be used, if 
necessary, to protect US oil interests. Betts (2004: 8), commenting on PD 
18’s signifi cance, states, “The Carter administration was the fi rst to turn 
military planning toward the Persian Gulf and to missions only partly de-
fi ned by the Soviet threat.” Betts is not entirely correct—recall that Nixon 
had announced that protection of Persian Gulf oil would be “increasingly 
important” for the New American Empire, and had inaugurated the twin 
towers as military neo-colonies to do this protection. So it was Nixon’s 
security elites that started Persian Gulf military planning. However, it was 
Huntington, speaking for the Carter administration, who for the fi rst time 
sanctioned sending US soldiers to defend Middle East interests. The Nixon 
Doctrine was an iteration of the global domination public délire instituting 
planning for indirect global warring in the Persian Gulf. PD 18, another 
iteration of this public délire, went a step further and recommended direct 
use of US troops there, though no “light divisions” were ever actually com-
mitted under Carter.
It is at this juncture that the tale of “Huntington’s Hermeneutic De-
ception” can be told. In the early 1990s, following the fall of the Soviets, 
there was curiosity about what a post–Cold War world would look like, 
and Hunt ington’s idea of Islamic-Western confl ict found favor.15 Cultural 
(including religious) identity would be the primary source of post–Cold 
War confl ict, and clashing Islamic and the Western identities would be 
a primary source of war. This view made Huntington into a “rock star” 
hermeneut. He was the seer who had peered ahead and seen the future: an 
Islamic monster-alterity (living, of course, where the oil was).
However, nowhere did Huntington tell readers that in 1977 he himself 
had initiated a plan to send US violent force to the Middle East to assist in 
the defense of the New American Empire’s oil interests there. Withholding 
this information was deceptive because it hid how Persian Gulf confl ict re-
sulted from implementation of a policy begun under Nixon, strengthened 
under Carter, that allotted US violent force to the Middle East where it 
was used in ways Security Elites 2.0 believed would help to control oil. 
The sham in Huntington’s hermeneutic deception is that it attributes US–
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Middle East confl ict to cultural differences, thereby obscuring the fact that 
the confl ict was about the ability to control oil to help in the empire’s re-
production. It is time to move beyond Huntington to changes that bedev-
iled Carter toward the end of his presidency, when one of the twin towers 
collapsed and the Bear went over the mountain.
1979—Bad Times:
Goat fuck: a monumental screwup. (Urban Dictionary, )
Refi ned types might label a bad year “annus miserabilis.” Those of an earth-
ier disposition might call it “a real goat fuck.” Perhaps the latter term better 
expresses the actuality of the third year of Carter’s presidency. His 1979 
miseries were ultimately over threats to the empire’s control over energy.
Early in his administration Carter had given a remarkable nationally 
televised speech (April 1977) suggesting a new energy policy. In that 
speech he announced that America faced “a problem unprecedented in 
our history,” which if not fi xed could lead to “catastrophe” (Carter 1977: 
1). Strong language: “unprecedented” trouble that could lead to catastro-
phe. The problem was that the US was “running out of gas and oil” (ibid.: 
1). Here was a second indication, following the Nixon administration’s 
discovery of the energy crisis, of a growing fi xation upon petroleum re-
sources.16 The catastrophe Carter worried about was believed to be some-
thing for the future. Meanwhile, another sort of oil problem emerged then 
and there in Carter’s third year.
The old Iranian memoirist whom readers have already encountered in 
the analysis of the coup against Mossedegh had opined, “All your trouble 
started in 1953” (Kinzer 2008: xxv). The “trouble” was “blowback” (origi-
nally a CIA term for an unintended power of some exercise of force), which 
started when Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers eliminated Mossedegh 
in favor of the shah. One unintended power generated by the coup—the 
blowback—was resistance to the shah and his repression. On 17 January 
1979, this opposition culminated in the shah’s fl ight. Two weeks thereafter 
(1 February) his strongest critic, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned from 
exile. Two months later, with Khomeini fi rmly in control, Iran became an 
Islamic Republic (1 April). OPEC’s response was to raise oil prices (28 
June) by 24 percent, sending energy costs for Americans sky-high. Two 
months thereafter President Carter, while out canoeing in the bogs of 
Plains, was attacked by a “killer rabbit” (Combs 2010).17
On 4 November 1979, “students” seized the US embassy staff in Teh-
ran, who would end up being held hostage for 444 days. The blowback 
was complete. To make matters worse, at the very end of the year the Red 
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Army crossed the Hindu Kush mountains and invaded Afghanistan (27 
December). Now that they controlled Afghanistan’s high ground, the So-
viets were within striking distance of Persian Gulf oil. At this juncture the 
strategic insolvency of the Nixon Doctrine became clear. One of the mili-
tary satraps supposed to defend US interests had become an enemy. There 
were almost no US violent force resources in the Persian Gulf—there was 
only Huntington’s PD 18 suggestion that such resources should be moved 
there. The oil crisis had considerably worsened for the US Leviathan. Now, 
tied to the actuality that peak oil was approaching, was the fact that the 
empire was doubly politically threatened, for even as Washington had lost 
control over Iranian oil, the Soviets had placed themselves in a position 
more favorable to seizing Persian Gulf reserves.
Carter had other problems too, closer to home. Earlier it was noted 
that on 15 July 1979 Carter spoke to the country in a nationally televised 
speech, warning that the country faced a “fundamental threat,” a “crisis 
of confi dence” (Carter 1979). He had been speaking largely about energy 
problems, but certain Republican elites thought with confi dence that the 
problem was Carter’s, not the country’s. During the 1970s they adapted an 
existing institution to boost conservative hermeneutic politics by offering 
non–Teddy Bear interpretations of the Soviets, which would be used to 
help terminate the Carter presidency. Ponder next the development of this 
institution, the “think tank”—the heavy artillery of hermeneutic politics.
Think Tanks and a Return to the Monster-Alterity Hermeneutic: In 1971 Lewis 
Powell (1971), a tobacco industry lawyer who became a Supreme Court 
Justice, wrote a memorandum to the US Chamber of Commerce urging 
conservatives to “fi nance think tanks, reshaping mass media and seeking 
infl uence in universities and the judiciary.” Think tanks are, and were, in-
stitutions for creating hermeneutics refl ecting some elite group’s interests; 
that is, they were, and are, private agencies conducting policy research 
that brings their hermeneuts’ “expertise” to bear on how to perceive prob-
lems and what to do about them.18
Think tanks had existed prior to the 1970s, but during this period, as 
the US supposedly drifted without “confi dence,” wealthy patrons created 
a number of new ones promoting conservative interests. The Heritage 
Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute were the two most im-
portant. Think tanks could conduct more forceful hermeneutic politics 
for their controllers because they concentrated more hermeneuts upon 
hermeneutic puzzles to better prepare compelling interpretations of those 
puzzles. So what did the Republican think tanks think during the 1970s?
One puzzle they delighted in solving was, how to understand the So-
viets? A new strand of conservative politicians offered a solution to this 
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puzzle. These were the “neoconservatives” (or “neocons”); a term coined 
by Michael Harrington (1973) to describe a brand of US conservatism 
that emphasized aggrandizing US economic and, especially, military power. 
Its origins were in the 1960s and the revolt of certain Democratic me-
dia hermeneuts, especially Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoritz, against 
the then prevailing Democratic Party’s dovish politics.19 Neoconserva-
tism spread rapidly among Republicans during the 1970s, particularly in 
the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute. It infl u-
enced young Ford administration offi cials such as Richard Cheney, Don-
ald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Pearle. The American Security 
Council, a neocon think tank led by John Fisher, created the Coalition for 
Peace through Strength, which warned perceptually that the Bear was not 
a Teddy Bear but the ravening monster-alterity conjured by Nitze. This 
group was in full voice by 1979.
Notable among the hermeneuts who adopted anti-Soviet politics were 
Harvard’s Richard Pipes and the ex-president Richard Nixon, who sought 
to be born again by abjuring détente and converting to the neocon faith. 
In his book The Real War, Nixon claimed the US was already in World 
War III with the Soviets and warned that between the end of the Vietnam 
War and 1979, eight countries in the developing world had been “brought 
under communist domination”—a hundred million people in fi ve years, 
he worried—to which the US must respond by rolling “back the tide of 
Soviet advance by … showing a steadfast determination to do what is 
necessary” (1980: 3, 305). The neocons were warning that the inter-
imperial contradiction was still intense, and that consolidating the ability 
to implement violent reproductive fi xes for this situation was prudent. 
This Republican, neocon hermeneutic was actually a return to the 1950s 
monster-alterity hermeneutic originally formulated by Democratic old 
boys in NSC 68.
Was this hermeneutic questionable? The CIA certainly appeared to 
believe so. Some developing countries—Nixon (1980: 3) named Angola, 
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia, and 
South Vietnam—had adopted “socialist” regimes in the 1970s. Still, how 
much this was due to Soviet action and how much to the countries’ own 
nationalist politics was a matter of debate. Critically, according to CIA 
analysts, it was clear that the USSR was in economic trouble. A 1985 NIE, 
largely the CIA’s handiwork, judged that “the growth of the Soviet econ-
omy has been systematically decelerating since the 1950s” (Berkowitz and 
Richelson 1995). Furthermore, the CIA regularly reported decline in So-
viet growth rate and called attention to the deep structural problems that 
pointed to continued decline” (MacEachin 2007). So the CIA, if unchal-
lenged, suggested that the neocon anti-Soviet hermeneutic was fantasy.
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To counter the CIA, infl uential conservatives managed to convince 
the Ford administration to evaluate the CIA’s interpretation of Soviet 
strength. The group of neocons that made this evaluation came to be 
known as “Team B” and was headed by Richard Pipes with assistance from 
Paul Wolf owitz and Paul Nitze. Team B’s principal fi nding, initially kept 
secret, was that the CIA underestimated the Soviets, who were involved 
in a “drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup” 
(Committee on the Present Danger 1977; see also Pipes et al. 1976).
Today, Team B’s conclusions are dismissed as incorrect. Fred Kaplan, 
for example, reported, “In retrospect, the Team B report (which has since 
been declassifi ed) turns out to have been wrong on nearly every point, 
while the CIA’s reports in those same years look pretty good” (F. Kaplan 
2004; see also R. Morris 2007a: 5). Given such actualities, Anne Cahn, 
who worked for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and wrote 
the most complete evaluation of Team B (1998), declared Team B’s fi nd-
ings of Soviet military strength to be “fantasy” (in Hartmann 2004). Even 
Kissinger had offered “condemnation” of Team B’s report (Vest 2001: 20).
However, as the Ford administration drew to a close, certain neocons in 
it—particularly Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney (then White House chief of 
staff)—defended Team B’s fi ndings, not by demonstrating that the critiques 
of it were invalid but simply by asserting its message to be true. Rumsfeld, 
for example, who has just been seen unfavorably comparing US to Soviet 
military strength, nevertheless insisted that “no doubt exists about the ca-
pabilities of the Soviet armed forces” and that these capabilities “indicate a 
tendency toward war fi ghting” (in Vest 2001: 20). Thus, at the end of Car-
ter’s fi rst term as a new election approached, a fi erce hermeneutic politics 
vied over two competing interpretations of the Soviets. Ronald Reagan, 
the conservative Republican challenger in the 1980 presidential campaign, 
battered Carter with the neocon monster-alterity hermeneutic, promising 
to restore America.
Restoration?
At the 1976 Republican Presidential Convention leading up to the elec-
tion Carter won, Reagan gave a speech vowing “To Restore America.” Ford 
won the Republican nomination that year but lost to Carter. Four years 
later, campaigning on a neocon platform, Reagan—nicknamed Dutch by 
his father, who thought he looked like a little fat Dutch boy—returned the 
Republicans to the White House. Many of his followers believed, and still 
believe, that he was able to successfully “restore” the country. Before con-
sidering this restoration, it will be helpful to know something of Reagan’s 
approach to governing.
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Bob Woodward, one of the journalists who broke the Watergate story, 
interviewed Reagan’s CIA Director, Robert Casey, one of Dutch’s close 
political allies, concerning the president’s management style:
Casey continued to be struck by the overall passivity of the President—passiv-
ity about his job and about his approach to life. He never called the meetings 
or set the daily agenda. He never once told Casey “Let’s do this.” … Casey 
noted in amazement that this President of the United States worked from 9 to 
5 on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday, and from 9 to 1 on Wednesday, when he 
would take the afternoon off for horseback riding, or exercise; and on Friday 
he left sometime between 1 and 3 for Camp David. During the working hours 
in the Oval Offi ce, the President often had blocks of free time—two, even 3 
hours. He would call for his fan mail and sit and answer it. (B. Woodward 1987: 
403–404)
Did Dutch restore the US before or after answering fan mail?20
Restoration was to be through two “core programs”: accelerated mil-
itary spending and Reaganomics (Oye, Lieber, and Rothchild 1987: 5). 
One component of the military budget was the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI or Star Wars), which proposed utilization of ground- and space-based 
anti-ballistic weapons to defend against incoming nuclear missiles. Star 
Wars proposed exotic weaponry—X-ray lasers, chemical lasers, hypervel-
ocity rail guns, and the like—and was criticized by a number of experts as 
technologically unfeasible (FitzGerald 2001).
A second component of Reagan’s increased military spending involved 
what came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine (J. Scott 1996). Boden-
heimer and Gould (1989) credit the conservative Heritage Foundation, 
especially Michael Johns, with developing the ideas behind it. In 1985 the 
doctrine was formally presented in a speech Reagan made to Congress, 
though it had actually been in implementation since the early days of the 
administration. The Reagan Doctrine provided military support, covert or 
overt, to anti-communist rebels in countries that had adopted communist 
governments. The increased military spending, it should be noted, actually 
continued expenditures that had begun late in Carter’s tenure, includ-
ing assistance to anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan. The Reagan Doctrine 
might be seen as another procedural iteration of the global domination 
public délire.
Reaganomics, the second of the “core programs,” was the most com-
plete implementation of neoliberal public délire attempted up to that time. 
Tax cuts for the upper class were central to this neoliberalism, with the 
Economic Recovery Act (1981) reducing the top rate of taxation from 
70 percent to 50 percent of total income and the Tax Reform Act (1986) 
further reducing it from 50 percent to 28 percent of total income. Reduced 
tax payments by the wealthy permitted them to become still richer, fueling 
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inequality between wealthy and the rest. Reduced revenue from tax cuts 
in conjunction with increased military spending obliged sharp increases in 
government borrowing, with the nominal national debt going from $900 
billion to $2.8 trillion during the Reagan administration. Once it started, 
the debt continually developed to such a magnitude that by 2012 it was 
at $16 trillion, exceeding the 2010 US gross domestic product. This debt 
level was said to threaten global economic stability.21 Thus, if one conse-
quence of implementing Reagan’s two “core programs” was initiation of 
a borrowing trend that elevated national debt to dangerous levels, it is 
arguable that Dutch began a string of events increasing the New American 
Empire’s fi scal vulnerability.
Importantly, there was foreign policy overlap between the Carter and 
Reagan administrations. This included endorsement of the strategic im-
portance of the Persian Gulf. As Lieber reported, “Reagan reaffi rmed the 
position of his predecessors in maintaining American interests in the Per-
sian Gulf” (Oye et al. 1987: 183). One way he did so was to follow Carter’s 
lead and “bolster” a US military force capable of handling “possible Gulf 
contingencies” that became known as the Rapid Deployment Force and 
“accounted for substantial increases in the defense budget” (ibid.: 182). 
Let us summarize the chapter’s arguments to this point.
Times ‘A-changin’
Recall that Bob Dylan had said, for the period under discussion, that the 
times were “a-changin’”. The changes had to do with two sets of contra-
dictions. The US was transitioning from economic good times to more 
distressed ones as the New American Empire faced intensifying cyclical 
and systemic contradictions that rendered its reproductive fi xes fi xless. But 
even as the US experienced economic problems, the Soviets faced graver 
ones, throwing US-Soviet relations into fl ux as the hermeneutic puzzle of 
the state of the inter-imperial contradiction became more puzzling. There 
were two responses to this trouble over contradictions. The fi rst was the 
emergence of a hermeneutic politics anxious to address the reproductive 
vulnerability of the increasing economic contradictions by controlling the 
world’s energy. The Near East became recognized as a place to control—
violently, if necessary, since oil was the major energy source and most of 
it was there. This recognition was expressed in the Nixon Doctrine and 
PD 18 iterations of the global domination public délire. However, strategic 
insolvency developed because neither iteration provided suffi cient violent 
forces resources to actually control the Persian Gulf. 
The second response was a hermeneutic politics that also went in two 
opposing directions regarding the inter-imperial contradiction. Nixon’s 
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détente and Huntington’s announcement that there could be “coopera-
tion” with Moscow, in conjunction with the Soviet economic debacle, led 
to the Teddy Bear perception of the Soviet threat. Hermeneuts in neocon 
think tanks responded to this perception with a fi erce counterhermeneutic 
politics that revived the Soviet monster-alterity.
Consequently, the masters and commanders of US imperialism sailing 
the [economically] troubled seas of 1975–1989 worried both about a new 
enemy out there—whoever threatened US control of Persian Gulf oil—
and the old enemy, who might be a Teddy Bear or a monster-alterity Bear, 
depending upon who was talking. This dual-enemy time is the context in 
which the global wars the New American Empire was involved in at this 
time are considered. Let us introduce global warring between 1975 and 
1989.
US global wars during this period refl ect the Security Elites 2.0’s dual-
enemy interpretations of what threatened the US imperial project in the 
roiling contradictory seas of the time. The Security Elites 2.0 entered 
global wars in response to events pertaining to either the inter-imperial 
contradiction or the economic contradictions, and the need to control oil 
to manage them. They directed global wars in the Middle East and Cen-
tral Asia, including the Lebanon Civil War (1975–1990), the Afghanistan-
Soviet War (1979–1989), and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); in Africa 
they masterminded confl icts in Libya (in the 1980s), Angola (1981–1989), 
Mozambique, and Sudan. There were also wars throughout the period in 
the Americas. 22
In terms of magnitude the hostilities fall into two categories. There 
were major wars utilizing huge amounts of violent force over many years 
with tremendous casualties; and there were lesser ones that one observer 
termed a “theatrical micromilitarism” (Todd 2003: 144). Even though the 
theater featured smaller exercises of violent force over shorter times, it often 
involved very considerable killing. The major wars were the Afghanistan-
Soviet War and the Iran-Iraq War. All the others were far lesser.
Three wars of this period are analyzed. They include the two greatest 
confl icts: Afghanistan I, where the Americans sided with Afghan rebels 
against the Soviets; and the Iran-Iraq War, in which the US sided with 
both Iran and Iraq, eventually coming down on the side of Saddam Hus-
sein. These hostilities were about how the US dealt with the inter-imperial 
contradiction (in Afghanistan I) and with the need to control petroleum 
resources due to the economic contradictions (in both Afghanistan I and 
the Iran-Iraq War). Additionally, the Libyan confl ict—one of the more 
“theatrical” of the micro-wars—is considered for its importance in devel-
oping an iteration of the global domination public délire that set the stage 
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for the New American Empire’s violence after 1990. For now, attention 
turns to the remote, rugged land of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan I
 . . . they plotted to personally “give the Soviets their Vietnam” as Brzezinski was fond 
of saying. (R. Morris 2007a: 7)
Warfare in Afghanistan is analyzed twice in this text. The fi rst analysis cov-
ers the years 1979–1989, when the Soviets fought Muslim rebels (mujahi-
deen) who were rebelling against the Bear’s client regime in Kabul. During 
this war, the Americans handed the Soviets their Vietnam, “as Brzezinski 
was fond of saying.” The second treats the time from 2001 to the present, 
when the Americans took on those same mujahideen, who gave US secu-
rity elites a Vietnam all over again. The fi rst war is termed Afghanistan I, 
the second Afghanistan II. Afghanistan II is a topic in a later chapter. 
The story of Afghanistan I is what happened after the Bear went over the 
mountains.
The Bear Went Over the Mountains23
The Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev sent the 40th Army across the Hindu 
Kush to Kabul on 25 December 1979. There it assassinated President Hafi -
zullah Amin and replaced him with Babrak Karmal. Nine years later the 
fi nal Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, ordered withdrawal to commence 
on 15 May 1988. Withdrawal ended on 15 February 1989. Two years fur-
ther on, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.24 Let us fi rst consider why the 
Soviets went over the mountains.
“A Fatal Mistake”: In 1954 John Foster Dulles decreed that Afghanistan was 
of no “security interest” to the US (Kakar 1995: 9)—it was too far away, 
with no obvious natural resources. Consequently, the New American Em-
pire was largely indifferent to it through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The 
only US initiative was a big, 1950s United States Agency for International 
Development irrigation project in the Helmand Valley (Zakhilwal 2009). 
However, Afghanistan had been of security interest to the Soviets since 
Czarist times. After all, it was on their southern border. Here the Russian 
and British Empires had played the “Great Game” competing for Central 
Asian dominance. Great Britain had unsuccessfully tried to colonize Af-
ghanistan starting in 1836, but by the late nineteenth century it had be-
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come an independent country with a monarchy. When the Soviets came to 
power they sought good relations with their southern neighbor.
In 1953, Mohammad Daoud became prime minister of Afghanistan un-
der his fi rst cousin, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, and the country entered 
Cold War politics for the fi rst time. Daoud wanted to modernize his home-
land. The Soviets were interested in supporting him to thwart Afghani-
stan’s entry into the US camp. By the early 1960s Kabul was thoroughly 
“entangled” with Russia in “economic, military, and educational fi elds” 
(Kakar 1995: 10). The Afghan communist party, the People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan, formed in 1965. It came to have two fi ercely opposing 
factions. The Parcham (Flag) was a more urban bloc, more moderate and 
pro-Moscow, whose most important leader was Babrak Karmal. The Khalq 
(Masses) was more rural, radical, and at times equivocal toward the Soviets. 
Its two main leaders were Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafi hzullah Amin.
Daoud was obliged to leave the prime minister’s offi ce in 1963. A de-
cade later he staged what came to be known as the Republican Revolution, 
overthrowing the monarchy and, as President, instituting a modernizing 
republic. All this was done with the assistance of Parcham military offi cers, 
giving them infl uence within Daoud’s government and drawing Afghan-
istan closer to Soviet client state status. The new government’s various 
“modernization schemes” stirred “the emergence of an Islamist movement 
in Afghanistan” that fervently opposed such policies (Kakar 1995: 85). 
President Daoud responded with heavy-handed, repressive anti-Islamist 
measures that provoked a widespread but failed insurrection in 1975. Fur-
thermore, he purged his Parchami colleagues in government. Finally, he 
turned on the Khalq. At this point, Amin instructed Khalq military leaders 
to overthrow the government. This became the 25 April 1978 Saur Rev-
olution (Saur being the Persian name for April). It succeeded. Daoud was 
assassinated, and Parcham’s head, Babrak Karmal, fl ed to Russian exile, 
leaving the Khalq to govern.
Taraki became president and signed a Twenty-Year Treaty of Friendship 
with the Soviet Union (December 1978), greatly expanding Soviet aid to 
his regime by making Afghanistan the Soviets’ “newest client state” (Grau 
and Gress 2002: xxii). It is important to note that the USSR had a particu-
lar public délire bearing upon their clients. This was the Brezhnev Doctrine 
(fi rst articulated in 1968), which asserted that if anti-socialist forces tried 
to move a socialist state toward capitalism, the USSR would intervene 
(Ouimet 2003).
Unfortunately for the Russians, Afghanistan would turn out to be the 
client state from Hell, in large measure because of the two strings of events 
that dominated Afghan politics for the next year and a half. First, by imple-
menting socialist policies the Khalq stoked growing Islamist fury, sparked 
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especially by Taraki’s launching an unpopular land reform (January 1978) 
in addition to permitting women to enter political life and attempting to 
end forced marriage. The Islamist opposition erupted into violence that 
came to be known as the Herat Uprising (March 1979). A second string 
of events, occurring concurrently with the growing revolt, stemmed from 
intensifying intra-Khalq competition between Taraki and Amin over the 
presidency.
The Herat Uprising had been grave. Russians were killed, and Russians 
were required to contain it. After the uprising Taraki traveled to Moscow 
to request additional military support. In a 1979 telephone conversation 
with Taraki, Premier Alexei Kosygin asked about the gravity of the upris-
ing. Taraki responded, “The situation is bad and getting worse” (Kosygin 
and Taraki 1979). Startled, Kosygin next asked, “Is there anyone on your 
side?” Taraki replied, “There is no active support on the part of the popu-
lation” (ibid). The conversation continued as Taraki pleaded for Soviet in-
tervention. Kosygin refused, explaining that “we believe it would be a fatal 
mistake to commit ground troops. … If our troops went in, the situation in 
your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse” (in 
Walker 1993: 253). He was prescient.
At roughly the same time, Taraki and Amin were doggedly launching 
assassination attempts against each other. One of Amin’s succeeded, and 
Taraki was smothered (14 September 1979). Consequently, in the fall of 
1979 Moscow faced a situation in which its client regime had proven dys-
functional due to intra-clique competition, while bloody rebellion spread 
throughout the land. The new president, Amin, was both excessively re-
pressive and desperate to fi nd new allies. A month into his rule he told 
the US chargé d’affaires, “If Brezhnev himself should ask him [Amin] to 
take any action against Afghan independence … he would not hesitate 
‘to sacrifi ce his life’ in opposition to such a request” (in Kakar 1995: 42); 
effectively signaling he was nobody’s client and wanted “independence.”
This situation imposed a hermeneutic puzzle on the Bolshevik security 
elite: What to do about an Afghanistan “spun out of control” (Grau and 
Gress 2002: xxiii)? Minutes of a 4 October conversation between Brezhnev 
and Eric Honecker, the leader of East Germany, indicated Brezhnev’s state 
of mind regarding Amin and the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Brezhnev 
worried that “In some provinces … military encounters continue with the 
hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and 
direct support from Iran, from the USA and from China” (Brezhnev 1979). 
A month later (31 October 1979) the Soviet Politburo registered concern 
that Amin was cozying up to the Americans while also seeking alliances 
with members of the “conservative opposition” (Kakar 1995: 44). Amin 
seemed to be betraying his own revolution. Karmal, in Russian exile, de-
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nounced Amin as “an agent of the CIA” (in Bonosky 1985: 41).25 Thereaf-
ter matters moved quickly.
Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, informed Brezhnev in a memorandum 
in early December that “alarming information” had “started to arrive about 
Amin’s secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the 
West” (Andropov 1979). The exact date of the memorandum is unclear, 
but according to Anatoly Dobrynin, then the USSR’s ambassador in Wash-
ington, it was an important factor in Brezhnev’s decision on Afghanistan. 
Brezhnev called a meeting of the inner circle of the Politburo, attended 
by Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Second Secretary of the 
Communist Party and chief ideologue Mikhail Suslov, and Defense Minis-
ter Dmitry Ustinov. Andropov and Ustinov argued for direct Soviet inter-
vention, justifying such action as a response to the CIA’s efforts to create 
a “new Great Ottoman Empire which would have included the Southern 
republics of the USSR” (Lyakhovsky 1995: 109–112). Four days later, on 
12 December 1979, the Politburo met and decided to replace Amin and 
dominate Afghanistan through Karmal and his Parchami.
For the Soviets, then, the hermeneutic puzzle of Afghanistan was solved 
by the end of 1979. Perceptually it was understood that their worst en-
emy, imperial America, sought to loosen Moscow’s grip on a new client, a 
situation calling for application of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Consequently, 
procedurally, the Bear went over the mountain (the Hindu Kush range to 
be precise), and the 40th Army invaded on Christmas Day. As Kosygin had 
warned, it was a “fatal mistake.”
Rollback: From 1980 to 1985, the Soviets occupied Afghanistan’s cities and 
main communication routes. In response the mujahideen waged a guer-
rilla war, locally organized by regional warlords. After four years of war, 
mujahideen bands were operating from at least 4,000 bases (Roy 1990). 
Most of them were affi liated with, and supplied by, seven expatriate Islamic 
parties headquartered in Pakistan. Major commanders included the brutal 
Gulbuddin Herkmatyar, who led the Hizb party and was favored with CIA 
funding (Bergen 2001: 69); Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the North-
ern Alliance, called the Lion of Panshir because of his fi ghting skills; and 
another skilled guerilla fi ghter, Jalaluddin Haggani, whom Congressman 
Charlie Wilson called “goodness personifi ed” (Crile 2007). Commanders 
typically led three hundred or more men, controlled several bases, and 
dominated a district or subdivision of a province. Massoud was a “deeply 
read student of Mao” (Coll 2004: 116), and his and other commanders’ 
tactics were Maoist in the sense that they sought to “avoid the solid, at-
tack the hollow; attack; withdraw.” Mujahideen operations therefore re-
lied heavily on sabotage, including attacks on Soviet military installations, 
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government offi ces, power lines, pipelines, radio stations, air terminals, 
hotels, cinemas, and the like.
The Soviet Army countered with large-scale offensives against basmachi 
(“bandits,” the dismissive Russian term for their opponents) territories. 
Nine offensives were launched between 1980 and 1985. Six went into the 
strategically important Panjshir Valley, successfully defended by Massoud. 
Heavy fi ghting also occurred in provinces bordering Pakistan that were 
safeguarded by Haggani. Nothing worked for the Soviets. Roughly 60 per-
cent of the country had effectively escaped Soviet control by 1984 (Coll 
2004: 89).
The Soviets were not only faring poorly against the basmachi: at the 
same time, they were also experiencing rapid regime turnover. Brezhnev 
died in 1982 after an eighteen-year reign, followed by Yuri Andropov (12 
November 1982–2 September 1984), and then Konstantin Chernenko (13 
February 1984–10 March 1985). The Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party elected Mikhail Gorbachev the Politburo general secretary and 
head of the Soviet Union on 11 March 1985. He won by a single vote 
over hardliner Viktor Grishin. Change at the top strained policy making—
the Soviet Union had had four rulers in four years, at the end of which 
came Gorbachev, a “new man” (Konchalovsky 2011: 5). He was young, 
the youngest member of the Politburo at the time and the fi rst head of the 
USSR to have been born after the Revolution. Worried about his country’s 
economic stagnation, he advocated innovative ideologies, notably pere-
stroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness, transparency).26
Another new idea of Gorbachev’s was to end the Afghan confl ict within 
one or two years, the 40th Army being granted this much time to win, if 
they could. There followed a “surge” in 1985. Troop strength was raised 
to 108,000 soldiers. Some 2,000 spetsnaz (special forces) were introduced 
in elite commandos supplied with advanced Mi-24D Hind attack helicop-
ters. In response, in September 1986, the US shipped Stinger missiles to 
the rebels, rendering the Hind helicopters vulnerable. The result was the 
bloodiest year of the war.
Nothing worked for the 40th Army. It had been given its chance, and 
after two years fully 80 percent of Afghanistan was under mujahideen con-
trol. The Politburo met on 13 November 1986 and authorized pulling out 
from Afghanistan. On 14 April 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed 
between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the US concerning 
the string of events that would serve as the Russian’s withdrawal. A few 
months later the fi rst troops left. By February 1989, the last troops were 
gone. The Bear had slunk back over the mountains to its lair, itself abuzz 
with perestroika. Secretary of State George Shultz (1993: 1094) rejoiced: 
“The Soviets had been rolled back.”
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The confl ict had been grim. According to Russian sources some 14,500 
Soviet soldiers were killed, between one and two million Afghans died 
overall; about another three million were wounded; and fi ve million were 
made refugees (RT 2014). Concerning the fi ghting, one ordinary Russian 
private announced that he knew “the smell of a man’s guts hanging out; 
the smell of human excrement mixed with blood … the scorched skulls 
grinning out of a puddle of molten metal, as though they had been laugh-
ing, not screaming as they died” (Alexievich 1992: 16; [insert added for 
clarity]). The US got rollback. Ordinary folk got “the smell of a man’s guts 
hanging out.” Politburo elites got a “fatal mistake.” Had it all been the 
Soviets’ doing? Was there American meddling in Afghanistan? Answering 
these questions leads to a hermeneutic politics at the highest levels of au-
thority in the Carter Administration during that goat fuck of a year.
“Open-mouthed shock”: The Hermetic Seal 
in the Hermeneutic Politics of Afghanistan I
Christopher Hitchens (2007: 1) reported that Carter reacted with “open-
mouthed shock” when informed of the Soviets’ Christmas Day invasion 
of Afghanistan. Such a response suggests that indeed, the US had not 
been earlier involved in Afghanistan’s domestic politics and that the So-
viet invasion came as a surprise. Certain information, however, suggests 
another interpretation of Carter’s shock. This evidence bears upon the 
Carter administration’s hermeneutic politics vis-à-vis the Soviets’ Afghan 
adventures. These politics involved three principal security elites with au-
thorities over the exercise of violent force: Carter himself, NSA Brzezinski, 
and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Let us specify the main puzzle of the 
politics.
The 1978 Saur Revolution meant that the US/Soviet inter-imperial 
contradiction was intensifying. After the fall of Saigon, Nixon said seven 
dominoes had fallen. Now there was an eighth, Afghanistan. This posed 
a hermeneutic puzzle: what to do about Afghanistan turning communist? 
The resolution of this problem turned on a hermetic seal that removed one 
of the principals from contributing to its resolution.
“The power to interpret”: The Making of a Lord High Hermeneut:
The Carter Administration was affected by deep divisions on national security 
issues between the “hawks and the doves.” (MacEachin, Nolan, and Tockman 
2005: 9)
During the Vietnam War, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
had been divided between hawks and doves. In the Carter administra-
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tion the same division re-emerged in the hermeneutic politics concerning 
the USSR. Doves during the Vietnam War wanted less aggressive ac-
tion against North Vietnam; hawks wanted more. In Carter’s time doves 
wanted to strengthen the process of US-Soviet détente. Hawks largely ac-
cepted neocon ideology and sought Soviet rollback, violently if necessarily.
Vance was the administration’s chief dove. He told readers in his mem-
oirs, written immediately after leaving offi ce, that “American military 
strength alone, although fundamental … was no longer a suffi cient guar-
antee of nuclear stability” (1983: 26). To ensure this “stability,” he said 
he said he had “supported a policy of regulated competition coupled with 
reciprocity … ‘détente’” (ibid.: 6, 27). Brzezinski (sometimes called Zbig, 
sometimes losing the Z and sounding like Big) was the administration’s 
chief hawk—though a sly one, for at times he cooed like a dove. For ex-
ample, at the beginning of his memoir, he declared that in the early stages 
of his relationship with Carter, “I repeatedly emphasized that détente with 
the Soviet Union was bound to be competitive and that we must strive to 
inject into it some genuine reciprocity” (1983: 50). Brzezinski seems to 
have been echoing his friend Huntington by saying there could be “coop-
eration” if there was reciprocity.
However, there was another Brzezinski, one who believed that in the 
“contemporary world” there were “ugly realities,” the USSR being espe-
cially ugly due to its becoming “more daring” and showing a “growing 
self-assertiveness” (ibid: 42, 146, 56). Specifi cally, he worried about a sup-
posed Soviet military expansion, telling readers on the very fi rst page of his 
memoir, “I had become increasingly concerned about longer-term political 
implications of growing Soviet military power, and I feared that the Soviet 
Union would become increasingly tempted to use its power either to ex-
ploit Third World turbulence or to impose its will in some political contest 
with the United States” (ibid.: 3). In this quotation Brzezinski reveals the 
neocon hawk concealed within the wings of a dove.
The term “rollback” was not in Brzezinski’s vocabulary, nor is it in the 
index of either his memoirs or his later The Grand Chessboard (1997). Fol-
lowing the Saur Revolution, though, he became a master of its implemen-
tation, to Vance’s distress. Brzezinski (1983: 39) noted that the “prevailing 
wisdom in Washington” during the Carter years was that he and Vance 
were “bitter enemies.” Whether their enmity was bitter is diffi cult to as-
sess. However, they certainly were enemies, and Brzezinski was, as we shall 
see, able to hermetically seal his opponent out of participation in interpret-
ing the puzzle of what to do about communist Afghanistan. Let us follow 
their rivalry.
Brzezinski (1983: 17) wrote, “My position in the Administration de-
pended entirely on my relationship with Jimmy Carter.” Carter’s remarks 
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at the swearing-in ceremony for his Cabinet members (23 January 1977) 
indicate what that position was. The new NSA was introduced as the pres-
ident’s “closest advisor in tying together our economics, foreign policy, and 
also defense matters” (in Brzezinski 1983: 17). Carter (1982: 54) wrote in 
the memoirs of his presidency, Keeping Faith, that he and Brzezinski “got 
along well” and that, “next to members of my family, Zbig would have 
been my favorite seatmate on a long-distance trip.” What of Carter’s rela-
tions with Vance? The president once confi ded to Brzezinski “that he was 
frustrated by the inability of the State Department to come up with any 
innovative ideas” (1983: 42)—a big problem, because Carter was in effect 
complaining that Vance’s State Department didn’t help him know what 
to do.
Another problem was deeper and less susceptible to articulation—a 
“guy thing” that the Kennedys would have understood. Zbig put his fi n-
ger on it when he observed that Vance had a “deep aversion to the use 
of force” and that this antipathy was “a most signifi cant limitation on his 
stewardship” (ibid.: 44). Put differently, when push came to shove, Vance 
was not man enough to shove. Nevertheless, Carter (1982: 51) also said 
that Vance and his wife became “the closest personal friends to Rosalynn 
and me” during his administration. Accordingly, Carter “got along well” 
with Brzezinski, and Vance was his “closest” friend.
What advantages did the former have over the later? Vance may have 
been Carter’s “closest” friend, but Brzezinski was his “closest advisor” on 
foreign policy and defense. After all, State did not produce “innovative 
ideas.” Additionally, Brzezinski had far more direct access to the president 
than Vance because his offi ce was in the White House and every morning 
he briefed the president on intelligence matters. This meant, he recalled in 
his memoirs, that on “a typical day, the president would phone me several 
times, asking me to drop by, or to make a factual inquiry” (Brzezinski 1983: 
65). So Brzezinski was Carter’s closest foreign policy guy, physically located 
to exploit this role, and not squishy on violence like Vance.
Another reason Brzezinski was so infl uential with Carter had to do with 
the way Zbig had organized security decision-making within the adminis-
tration to favor himself. It is Vance who tells this story. The National Secu-
rity Council in the Carter Administration handled most foreign policy and 
security matters. It consisted of “only two committees: the Policy Review 
Committee (PRC) … and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC)” 
(Vance 1983: 36). Vance controlled the PRC, which was concerned with 
formulation of policy; Brzezinski, the SCC, which dealt with crisis manage-
ment. However, the SCC’s functions were broadly written to include han-
dling of “cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of 
options and the implementation of Presidential decisions” (in ibid.: 36). 
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The SCC had policy-making authority because policy, by its very nature, 
involves “cross-cutting issues.” Further, “Brzezinski proposed and the pres-
ident approved a procedure for recording the views and recommendations 
coming out of the SCC and the PRC. … Brzezinski would submit a pres-
idential directive (PD) to Carter for signature” (ibid.: 37). The PDs were 
not “circulated to the SCC or PRC participants for review before they 
went to the president” (ibid.: 37).
This allowed Zbig to frame all matters going up to the president from 
the NSC as he saw fi t. Vance, understandably, “opposed this arrangement” 
(ibid.: 37). Carter overrode Vance’s opposition, effectively handing Brzez-
inski, as Vance expressed it in his memoirs, “the power to interpret” (ibid.: 
37). In short, Brzezinski’s backing from his president made him Mr Big, a 
real Pooh-Bah—the lord high hermeneut of foreign policy hermeneutic 
puzzles. In the next section, the lord high hermeneut goes Bear hunting.
The Pooh-Bah Traps a Bear: The 28 April 1978 Saur Revolution meant the 
dominoes were falling again, posing a hermeneutic puzzle: what should be 
done about this? Vance (1983: 385) advised that the US should “continue 
limited economic aid” to maintain infl uence with Kabul. From a hawk-
ish perspective, this was a policy of appeasement. A few months after the 
coup, rumors began to surface from Kabul hinting at the possibility of a 
westward turn. Vance advised that the US “not get involved” (ibid.: 386). 
Vance’s memoirs do not mention what Brzezinski was doing in the time 
between April 1978 and December 1979. In fact, Zbig was busy outing his 
neocon hawk persona. Non-involvement coupled with appeasement was 
the last thing he intended as he went about implementing his interpreta-
tion of the Saur Revolution. But to understand what this was, we need to 
return to Brzezinski’s Columbia days.
In 1968–1969, during the pandemonium of Columbia University’s stu-
dent rebellion, Brzezinski ran a seminar on “Soviet Nationalities Problems.” 
It plotted rebellion. One of the participants in the seminar was Alexan-
dre Bennigsen, a count from St. Petersburg whose family had sided with 
the White Russians during the Bolshevik Revolution and was accordingly 
obliged to fl ee. The Polish and Russian ex-aristocrats were reported to have 
formed a “natural affi nity” during the seminar (Dreyfuss 2005: 252). Ben-
nigsen “fostered a movement of scholars and public offi cials who believed 
in the viability of” what he called “the Islamic card” (ibid.), believing that 
some ethnic groups within and bordering the USSR harbored anti-Soviet 
grievances that would erupt in reactionary rebellion if certain lines were 
crossed. For Muslim nationalities, such lines were breached upon imple-
mentation of policies and practices that violated deeply felt Islamic belief. 
Playing the Islamic card was a neocon enterprise that involved aiding those 
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Muslim nationalities’ rebellions, which fl ared subsequent to Russian red-
line transgression. Two other neocon scholars—Harvard’s Richard Pipes 
and Princeton’s Bernard Lewis—largely agreed with Bennigsen’s views 
(Dreyfuss 2005).
Brzezinski concurred with all three scholars’ opinions. Their views might 
be said to have constituted an Islamic card hermeneutic whose perceptual 
recognition was that some Soviet actions violated red lines of Islamic belief 
and/or practice, provoking rebellion; and whose procedural choreography 
was to aid those in rebellion against Soviet violation of Islamic doxa. Ben-
nigsen, Lewis, and Pipes were largely ivory-tower scholars in no position 
to actually play the Islamic card. Brzezinski—lord high hermeneut—did it 
for them in 1977 by organizing the Nationalities Working Group (NWG), 
an “inter-agency” body including the State Department, NSC, CIA, and 
Defense Department, which collaborated on policy designed to weaken 
the USSR by infl aming ethnic grudges against it, especially those of Isla-
mists (Dreyfuss 2005: 251–256). Brzezinski’s founding of the NWG might 
be said to have been the founding of an Islamic card iteration of the global 
domination public délire.
Even before the Saur Revolution, according to Roger Morris (2007a), 
the CIA had a record of supporting Islamist mujahideen against the Afghan 
government. In 1973 the agency, in conjunction with Pakistan, Iran (then 
still under the Shah), and China, covertly assisted Islamic rebels against 
the newly installed Daoud regime. Three weeks after the Saur Revolution, 
again according to Morris (2007a), Brzezinski was in China drumming up 
support against the USSR by warning of a “Soviet peril” in Afghanistan. 
Further, still according to Morris, “By fall 1978, more than a year before So-
viet combat troops set foot in Afghanistan, a civil war, armed and planned 
by the U.S., Pakistan, Iran, and China … had begun to rage in the same 
wild mountains of eastern Afghanistan” (2007a).27
According to Richard Cottam, a CIA offi cial advising the Carter ad-
ministration at this time, in 1978 Brzezinski was arguing for a “de facto alli-
ance with the forces of Islamic resurgence” (in Dreyfuss 2005: 241). Henry 
Precht, a State Department offi cial participating in the decision making, 
also recalled Brzezinski insisting “that Islamic forces could be used against 
the Soviet Union. The theory was, there was an arc of crisis, and so an 
arc of Islam could be mobilized to contain the Soviets” (in P. Scott 2007: 
67). Hence, both State and CIA offi cials reported Brzezinski as advocating 
playing the Islamic card in 1978.
US government planning vis-à-vis Afghanistan began to quicken in 
early 1979, at least in part because the mujahideen rebellion was strength-
ening. The fact that the mujahideen were already fi ghting meant that 
whatever Washington did had to recognize that the time for peaceful fi xes 
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had passed. The mujahideen rebellion, in this sense, granted the Carter 
administration Shultzian Permission. Gates ([1996] 2007: 144) reported 
that on 5 March the CIA sent Brzezinski’s SCC a “covert actions options” 
memorandum proposing different possibilities of exploiting this situation. 
The very next day the SCC met and requested more details concerning these 
options. Slightly over three weeks later (30 March), there was a follow-up 
mini-SCC meeting, at which “Walt Slocombe, representing Defense, asked 
if there was value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, ‘sucking the 
Soviets into a Vietnam quagmire?’” (ibid.: 144–145). Arnold Horlick, 
representing the CIA, according to Eric Alterman’s (2001) account of it, 
“warned that this was just what we would expect.” A week later at a full-
scale SCC meeting (6 April), the policy of covertly intervening on the side 
of the mujahideen was formally accepted. Roger Morris (2007a) claimed 
that after this gathering, “Gates, Brzezinski, and Carter” had “a deliberate 
plot to ‘suck’ the Russians into Afghanistan.” This string of meetings in-
dicates that by early April 1979, Brzezinski’s Islamic card iteration of the 
global domination public délire was moving toward implementation in a 
“plot” to “suck” the USSR into a “Vietnam quagmire.”
By May 1979, according to Alfred McCoy (2003: 475), the CIA had be-
gun working with rebels and other mujahideen leaders, especially Gulbid-
den Hekmatyar, as chosen by the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services 
Intelligence. Hekmatyar, who would receive about half of all US funding 
to the mujahideen, was relished by at least some CIA offi cials, perhaps 
because of his brutality, which included a reputation for skinning prisoners 
alive (Dreyfuss 2005: 267–268). On 3 July Carter signed the fi rst “fi nding” 
to covertly assist the mujahideen. In principle, this document authorized 
nonlethal assistance, but in actuality it allowed “support” that took “the 
form of cash” (Gates [1996] 2007: 146) that could be used to purchase 
weapons.
The July fi nding began actual implementation of the Islamic card. As 
Brzezinski (1998: 76) has acknowledged, on “that very day I wrote a note 
to the president … [saying] that in my opinion this aid was going to induce 
a Soviet military intervention.” Further, Brzezinski (1983: 427) reports in 
his memoir that a month later Carter asked him for “contingency options” 
outlining US choices in case of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So the 
Bear trap was baited and the mujahideen supported it. On Christmas Day 
the Soviets invaded and the trap was sprung. All this suggests that Carter 
responded to the Soviets’ aggression with “open mouth shock” out of as-
tonishment at the success of his lord high hermeneut’s Bear trap.28 A point 
remains to be clarifi ed: where was Secretary of State Vance?
Gates ([1996] 2007: 143–149), who was in Carter’s security appara-
tus at the time, makes almost no mention of Vance in his account of the 
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decision making that led up to Carter’s making the Islamic card a public 
délire. In fact, Foggy Bottom is mentioned only once in his account (at the 
30 March SCC meeting). Roger Morris (2007a), speaking of the period 
between the Saur Revolution and the Soviet invasions, says there were 
CIA “covert actions” and that this “intervention” was “kept secret from 
their hated rival, Secretary of State Vance.” Marshall Schulman, a steady 
hand who had worked for Dean Acheson and was Vance’s special adviser 
for Soviet affairs, confi rmed Morris’s assertion when he said Vance, “was 
unaware of the covert program at the time” (Alterman 2001). How is one 
to construe Vance’s and Foggy Bottom’s obliviousness?
Brzezinski has said that judgments about what to do after the Saur Rev-
olution “were being made in a highly charged atmosphere.” Among other 
things, Carter’s political stock was plummeting. At precisely this time, ac-
cording to Brzezinski (1983: 437), Carter “gave increasing signs of dissat-
isfaction with Vance,” so he (Brzezinski) became even more the “primary” 
security adviser; shutting Vance and the entire State Department out of 
decision making. Vance was hermetically sealed out of the hermeneutic 
politics concerning what to do about the Saur Revolution, leaving only the 
lord high hermeneut whose interpretation was to implement the Islamic 
card hermeneutic. It was done. The trap was set and sprung. It remained 
to kill the Bear.
Killing the Bear I: Allowed to stand, the Saur Revolution worsened the inter-
imperial contradiction, threatening another domino’s fall. Brzezinski’s Is-
lamic card iteration of the global domination public délire solved this re-
productive vulnerability with a violent reproductive fi x. The problem now 
became to ensure that the fi x worked, because the full weight of a Soviet 
army was committed to ensuring that the Afghan domino did fall.
Brzezinski described in 1997 what the Carter administration did to en-
sure that the trapped Bear was killed, saying he had gone
to Pakistan a month or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the 
purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response, the purpose of 
which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possi-
ble; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the 
Egyptians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the 
Mujaheddin, from various sources again—for example, some Soviet arms from 
the Egyptians and the Chinese. (Brzezinski 1997: 2)
So it would be a death by bleeding. In the above quotation Brzezinski de-
scribes its initial organization. The CIA, from the American side, would 
organize the bloodletting in Operation Cyclone, the longest and most ex-
pensive CIA covert operation up to that time. By July 1980 the operation 
had been “dramatically expanded” (Gates [1996] 2007: 148–149).
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The year 1980 would be Carter’s last as president. As indicated earlier, 
it was another diffi cult year, featuring an unpopular boycotting of the sum-
mer Olympics in response to the Russian invasion; mortifi cation at the 
hands of the Iranians who had captured US embassy staff in Tehran and 
refused to return them, compounded by a failed attempt to rescue them 
(which earned Vance’s resignation); and perhaps even greater humiliation 
at the hands of Carter’s political opponents—Teddy Kennedy on the left 
and Reagan on the right, the latter of whom trounced Carter in the next 
presidential election. Among the last acts of the Carter Administration 
“was a meeting between Turner [Carter’s CIA Director] and Brzezinski 
on October 29, where the latter complained ‘over and over’ that he didn’t 
think CIA was providing enough arms to the insurgents and wanted the 
Agency to increase the fl ow” (Gates [1996] 2007: 149). Brzezinski would 
get his wish.
Killing the Bear II: The Reagan administration, which began 21 January 
1981, killed the Bear. However, a strategic question was how much support 
for the mujahideen was so much that it would provoke the USSR to act 
beyond the Afghan border, possibly destabilizing Pakistan. Howard Hart, 
the CIA bureau chief in Pakistan and a Security Elite 2.0 par excellence, 
had the answer in 1983, telling his superiors, “The fuckers haven’t got the 
balls, they aren’t going to do it … so don’t worry about it” (in Coll 2004: 
70). The “fuckers” were the Soviets. The “it” they were not going to do was 
to extend military operations into Pakistan. “The stage was set,” according 
to Gates, for a “vast future expansion … all run by the CIA” ([1996] 2007: 
149).
This expansion would be propelled in part by the activities of Represen-
tative Charlie “Good Time” Wilson, a tall, alcoholic Texas congressman 
with a “maniacal” desire to assist Operation Cyclone. Beginning in 1984, 
he “began to force more money and more sophisticated weapons systems 
into the CIA’s classifi ed budget” (Coll 2004: 91). A year later Reagan 
signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 (1985), which 
led to “massive escalation” of the CIA’s role in Afghanistan.29 In April 1986 
US Stingers (ground-to-air missiles) were authorized for the mujahideen. 
They entered operation at the end of September.30 By 1987 funding to the 
mujahideen was at the level of $630 million per year. But by then it was 
all over: on 13 November 1986 the Politburo decided to evacuate Soviet 
troops. The Reagan administration took credit for the victory. Secretary of 
State Shultz (1993: 1094) exulted: “The Soviets had been rolled back. The 
Breznhev Doctrine had been breached … the event was monumental.” 
Certainly the Bear was killed during the Reagan administration, but the 
Reaganites organizing the killing were mere actors playing their roles in 
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strings of events earlier choreographed along the lines of Brezinski’s Isla-
mist card. Let us draw together the strands of the analysis of Afghanistan I.
The Saur Revolution appeared to hand the Soviets a new chunk of 
territory for their empire, worsening the inter-imperial contradiction be-
tween themselves and the US. The security elites’ hermeneutic politics to 
resolve the reproductive vulnerability posed by the increased contradic-
tion resulted in Vance being hermetically sealed out of fi xing the puzzle; 
leaving his nemesis, Brzezinski, responsible for fi nding a fi x. The diffi culty 
of the hermeneutic puzzle facing the lord high hermeneut increased once 
the mujahideen began armed insurrection against the communists in Ka-
bul, both because the uprising took nonviolent fi xes of the vulnerability 
off the table, granting Shultzian Permission, and because of the dangers 
to US should it directly violently oppose the Soviet Union. Brzezinski re-
sponded to this situation by interpreting it as one requiring the playing of 
the Islamic card. Carter’s 3 July 1979 fi nding started its implementation. 
Reagan’s March 1985 NSDD 166 authorized a “massive” increase in the 
violent force allocated to implementation. Consequently, the New Amer-
ican Empire fi xed the reproductive vulnerability imposed by the Saur 
Revolution by engaging in covert, indirect global war in Afghanistan. It 
worked. By 1989 the mujahiddin had killed the Bear. Two years later on 
25 December 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union itself was 
history. The Cold War was over. The Security Elites 2.0 congratulated 
themselves on winning it.
One fi nal observation and a query bear mention here. The observation 
is that although Afghanistan I was a Cold War confl ict related to the US/
Soviet inter-imperial contradiction, it also concerned the emerging eco-
nomic contradictions and attempts to fi x them through the control of oil, 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Afghanistan was geographically a place 
from which a determined country could strike at the Persian Gulf. If Af-
ghanistan was an imperial Soviet client, the Bear was therefore poised for 
assault on Middle Eastern oil. The security elites, as the chapter made 
clear, were aware of this reality. To warn off the Soviets and anybody else 
from oil country, Carter, in his State of the Union address on 23 January 
1980, proclaimed what became known as the Carter Doctrine. Perceptu-
ally, it began by observing that
the region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great 
strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s export-
able oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military 
forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hor-
muz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must fl ow.
Procedurally, it warned, 
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Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, 
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force. (Carter 1980) 
The Carter Doctrine was, and is, blunt: The New American Empire claimed 
control of the Persian Gulf, and by implication its oil, for itself. Attempts to 
eliminate this control would “be repelled by any means necessary”—tough 
talk. The Carter Doctrine might be called the oil-control iteration of the 
global domination public délire and is, as will become clear in the follow-
ing sections, a central iteration of that public délire in the post–Cold War 
period.
The query is whether the US Leviathan’s conduct of covert, indirect 
global warring actually won Afghanistan I and caused the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. If so, then Brzezinski’s, Reagan’s, and the CIA’s covert 
warfare killed the Bear not only in Central Asia but everywhere, a great tri-
umph of US arms. As might be imagined, this question is debated. Brzezin-
ski certainly thought he had won the Cold War. He had told his Le Nouvel 
Observateur interviewer that Afghanistan I had “fi nally” led to “the break 
up of the Soviet Union” (1998: 76). Reagan’s partisans are convinced that 
it was his tough anti-Soviet stance, including support for Afghanistan I, 
that ended the Cold War. On the other hand, some analyses highlight the 
damaging effect of the USSR’s dismal economy as key to its disintegra-
tion (Strayer 1998: 56–60). Still others speak of a multiplicity of causes 
(Halliday 1992). Above all, the last Soviet president sought perestroika 
(restructuring) and got more of it than he had ever bargained for. I believe 
James Mann’s (2009: 346) terse observation is acute: “Reagan did not win 
the Cold War; Gorbachev abandoned it.”31
But there is an alternative view that does not understand Afghanistan I 
as a triumph. It argues that the New American Empire’s “giving billions of 
dollars and high-tech weaponry to Afghan jihadis was a huge catastrophe, 
contributing to the creation and rise of al-Qaeda and setting the back-
ground for the emergence of the Taliban” (Cole 2013a). It is certain that 
Afghanistan I led to the Taliban and al-Qaeda; that the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged from al-Qaeda; and that ISIL recently 
declared itself the Islamic State, claiming a worldwide caliphate. Equally 
certain is that the US has spent a great treasure in money, human lives, 
and time fi ghting these groups, a subject of later chapters.
Attention now turns to a confl ict where Cold War antipathies were less 
important. Rather, because times were “a changin’,” security elites worried 
not about the inter-imperial but the land/capital contradiction, and US 
control over oil. This confl ict is the Iran-Iraq War, which occurred largely 
concurrently with Afghanistan I.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 248 –
Deadly Contradictions
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)
Iraqi air forces struck Iran, seeking to destroy the young Islamic Repub-
lic, on 22 September 1980. Though largely unsuccessful, the attack was 
followed a day later by a ground invasion involving six divisions along a 
644-kilometer front. On that day, Carter (2010: 467) reported in his diary 
that there were “very serious problems on the Iran-Iraq border,” further 
noting that “both countries have ceased shipment of oil. … This involves 
almost three million barrels of oil per day.” Thus the Iran-Iraq War began 
with the US president noting to himself that it had implications for oil.32 
The following analysis reveals how US operations during the Iran-Iraq War 
to maintain some control over this oil largely involved covert, indirect 
global warring, which after seven years became direct global warring. The 
outcomes of this warring would include solution of the strategic insolvency 
problem discussed earlier; transformation of the Persian Gulf into a deeply 
violent place; and establishment in this violent place of a new US surro-
gate to replace Iran. First, however, consider the Iran-Iraq War.
Old Irritants and a New (Mis-)Interpretation: A War of Four Phases
The Iran-Iraq War had four phases (Hiro 1991): 1980–1982, when Iraq 
invaded Iran; 1982–early 1984, during which Iran counterattacked, invad-
ing Iraq; mid 1984–1985, at which time a reinforced Iraq counterattacked 
Iran’s counterattack; and fi nally 1986–1988, a ferocious endgame in which 
Iran re-attacked Iraq and Iraq re-attacked the re-attack as the war became 
increasingly subject to direct US global warring. The causes of the war lay 
in old irritants and a new (mis-)interpretation.
1980–1982, Iraqi Invasion of Iran: Iran and Iraq have shared a 1,458-kilo-
meter border since the 1600s. Iraq, the easternmost province of the Otto-
man Empire, was contiguous with the Persian Empire, its border extending 
roughly along the Tigris River watershed in a line running from the Shatt 
al-Arab in the south to Kuh e-Dalanper in the north. Over the centuries, 
numerous border disputes vexed the two empires. One of these centered 
upon the Shatt al-Arab, the river formed by the confl uence of the Tigris 
and Euphrates Rivers at Al Gurnah that fl ows 200 kilometers south to the 
Persian Gulf. Control over the waterway and questions of its border have 
been debated since the seventeenth century. The latest fl are-up of this dis-
pute ended in 1975 when Saddam Hussein, fi fth president of Iraq, and the 
shah of Iran signed the Algiers Accord, fi xing the boundary between the 
two countries along the deepest channel of the river. The Shatt al-Arab 
was, and is, Iraq’s only Persian Gulf outlet. Placing the boundary in the 
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river meant that Iraq lacked unimpeded access to the Gulf, a worrisome 
situation for the Iraqi government. Saddam only signed the accord because 
Iran promised to stop aiding Iraqi Kurds in their rebellion against Baghdad. 
Attempting to right the wrong of the Algiers Accord was an element in 
Saddam’s later decision to invade Iran.
Another factor that perhaps more signifi cantly motivated Saddam’s de-
sire for war was Iran’s revolutionary Ayatollahs’ attempt to export their 
revolution to Iraq. The revolution had installed Khomeini’s interpretation 
of Shiite Islam. The majority of Iraq’s population was Shiite, but the coun-
try was ruled by a secular, Baathist party.33 Moreover, “tension between 
the Shia masses and the regime built up steadily” in Iraq, producing anti-
government disturbances in 1977 and 1979 (Hiro 1991: 24). The “tension” 
was aggravated when Khomeini’s government endeavored to spread Iran’s 
Islamist revolution to Iraq, culminating in an 1980 unsuccessful attempt 
(1 April) to assassinate Deputy Premier Tariq Aziz. Saddam responded to 
the attempt by executing Muhammad Baqir Sadr (8 April), Iraq’s most 
respected Shiite Ayatollah, provoking Khomeini to call for Saddam’s over-
throw. So another motivation—a strong one, indeed—for Saddam to de-
stroy Khomeini was that Khomeini sought to destroy him.
Two fi nal causes had to do with prizes to be won and prospects for suc-
cess. Consider fi rst the prizes. The Middle East had fi gured in UK im-
perial politics since the eighteenth century, reaching a high point upon 
Iraq’s transfer from the Ottoman to the British Empire at the end of World 
War I. However, in 1968, Her Majesty announced the UK’s departure from 
the Middle East in order to assume military responsibilities in NATO and 
the defense of Europe. This left a Persian Gulf power vacuum. Nixon’s Twin 
Towers policy was supposed in fi ll this void, but the policy crumbled when 
the Iranian tower came tumbling down.
Saddam’s attack on Iran was another attempt to fi ll that vacuum, for as 
Teicher and Teicher (1993: 65–66) report: “By … September 1980 Iraqi 
oil production had reached nearly four million barrels per day, second 
only to the production of the Saudis. Had Iraq succeeded in seizing Khuz-
estan Province (where Iran’s oil was) and Iran’s Kharg Island oil terminal, 
Saddam would have had control over eleven million barrels per day of oil 
production capacity, nearly one fi fth of the world’s global oil consumption 
at the time,” which would have given him extensive “fi nancial and politi-
cal power.” With such prizes, Saddam would fi ll the Persian Gulf vacuum. 
According to Teicher and Teicher (1993: 66) this was Saddam’s “funda-
mental rationale” for invading Iran.
Moreover, it appeared to be a propitious time to invade. Iran (636,372 
square miles and roughly 75 million inhabitants) is a far larger country 
than Iraq (169,234 square miles and roughly 34 million inhabitants). 
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While the shah ruled Iran as a US client-satrapy, Iran had been lavishly 
armed, so Baghdad prudently refrained from militarily challenging Tehran. 
However, in the months following the Islamic Republic’s founding Saddam 
received intelligence that Iran had experienced “rapid military, political 
and economic decline,” “low morale among military offi cers … and rapid 
deterioration in the effectiveness of … weaponry”; compounded by “con-
fl ict between the Iranian president Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and religious 
leaders” (Hiro 1991: 36). Furthermore, Saddam “had the active co-oper-
ation of the recently deposed Iranian military and political leaders, who 
possessed vital information and commanded the loyalties of hundreds of 
Iranians in key positions” (ibid.: 37). Such intelligence and collaboration 
became the basis of an interpretation on Saddam’s part, which was that 
Khomeini’s purge of the military had rendered Iran “practically defense-
less” (Pelletiere 1992: 18). Bani-Sadr (1991: 69–70), the Islamic Republic’s 
fi rst president, recalled sending Saddam a warning just prior to the onset of 
fi ghting: “You imagine you can fi nish Iran with a lightning war because our 
army is disorganized. You dream of becoming the pre-eminent power in the 
region. … You can start a war, but you cannot decide its outcome.” Nev-
ertheless, Saddam—harboring ancient grievances such as that over the 
Shatt al-Arab, enraged by Khomeini’s attempts to overthrow him, imagin-
ing Persian Gulf pre-eminence, and emboldened by his interpretation that 
Iran was “defenseless”—ignored his opponent’s counsel. Unfortunately for 
Iraq, Saddam’s interpretation turned out to be a (mis-)interpretation, as 
events revealed.
Four of the six invading Iraqi divisions were sent against Khuzestan, 
which borfders Iraq to the west and the Persian Gulf to the south. Khuz-
estan was largely Arab in ethnicity and, as earlier noted, was a center of oil 
production, so Saddam reasoned that an attack there might secure both 
support from the inhabitants and his oil prize. Regrettably, the Iraqi troops 
advancing into Iran in 1980 lacked offensive skills. The invasion encoun-
tered unexpectedly fi erce resistance and had stalled by December 1980. In 
Bani-Sadr’s (1991: 91) judgment, “Militarily, then … we were in a position 
to impose a peace advantageous to Iran.”
At this point Saddam announced that Iraq was switching to defense, and 
for about a year and a half thereafter there was little change at the front. 
In mid March 1982 Iran began an offensive, and the Iraqis were obliged to 
retreat. By June that year, this counteroffensive had recovered most of the 
areas earlier lost to Iraq. Saddam prudently chose to completely withdraw 
his armed forces from Iran, deploying them instead along the countries’ 
international border. Further, he announced (20 June 1982) that he would 
acquiesce to a ceasefi re on the basis of the prewar status quo. There was 
spirited deliberation among the Iranian ruling elite as to whether to ac-
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cept Saddam’s offer. One faction, including Army Chief of Staff General 
Ali Sayad Shirazi, was for acceptance; another, led by Speaker of Majlis 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, favored rejection. Khomeini sided with 
Rafsanjani and demanded elimination of the Baathist regime and its re-
placement with a Shiite Islamic republic, thereby extending the war six 
more years.
1982–Early 1984, Iranian Invasion of Iraq: Khomeini proclaimed on 21 
June 1982 that Iran would invade Iraq and would not stop until an Islamic 
republic governed that country. Iran’s offensive employed human wave 
attacks led by pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) and basij (teenage para-
military volunteers), the latter wearing wooden keys around their necks 
to open Heaven’s gates upon their martyrdom. Iranian units crossed the 
border in force on 13 July making for Basra, Iraq’s second most import-
ant city. By this time, however, Saddam had more than doubled the Iraqi 
army, enlarging it from 200,000 soldiers (12 divisions and 3 independent 
brigades) to 500,000 (23 divisions and 9 brigades). Now it was the Iranians 
who encountered a tough defense. On different occasions during the ad-
vance on Basra, the basij were obliged to clear Iraqi minefi elds with their 
feet in order to allow the pasdaran to advance. Five human-wave attacks 
were repulsed by withering Iraqi fi re and chemical weapons.
The 1982 Iranian summer offensives failed. Undaunted, Iran launched 
fi ve major assaults along the front in 1983. None met with signifi cant 
success. With the ground war substantially deadlocked, Saddam ordered 
aerial and missile attacks against Iranian cities on 7 February 1984. Iran 
retaliated against Iraqi cities. These exchanges became known as the “war 
of the cities.” The aerial attacks did not diminish Tehran’s taste for the 
offensive.
Some setbacks followed, but the Iranians had a major success when they 
captured part of the oil-rich Majnun Islands (16 March 1984). Despite 
an Iraqi counterattack featuring liberal use of mustard and sarin nerve 
gases, the Iranians maintained their gains and continued to hold them 
almost until the end of the war. The Iranian offensive ended on 19 March 
1984. The Iraqis were unable to recapture their lost territory, but Iran 
was stopped from advancing upon Basra. Neither Khomeini nor Saddam 
showed interest in a truce.
Mid 1984–1985, Stalemate: By the middle of 1984, Iraq had been supplied 
with a varied, lethal ordnance from a large number of US clients. To break 
the Iranian land offensives, Baghdad began attacking Iranian tankers and 
Iran’s oil terminal at Kharg Island in early 1984. Tehran responded by at-
tacking tankers carrying Iraqi oil, largely those of other Persian Gulf states, 
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especially Kuwait. Saddam hoped that attacks on Iranian shipping would 
provoke Tehran to take extreme measures in retaliation, such as closing 
the Strait of Hormuz. It did not, but an important naval dimension had 
been added to the confl ict, with the “tanker war” involving 53 Iraqi and 
18 Iranian raids on shipping in 1984 (Hiro 1991: 291).
Rearmed by US clients, on 28 January 1985 Saddam began a ground 
offensive, the fi rst since early 1980. It produced no signifi cant gains and 
prompted Iran to respond with its own offensive, again directed against 
Basra (beginning 11 March 1985), which succeeded in seizing a part of the 
Baghdad-Basra highway that had earlier resisted capture. Baghdad replied 
to these reverses by launching chemical attacks against Iranian positions, 
initiating a second “war of the cities” with a massive air and missile cam-
paign against Iranian urban areas. Bani-Sadr (1991: 209) reported that, at 
least for Iran, by “1985, general pessimism concerning a military solution 
to the war overwhelmed both the population and a large majority of the 
political offi cials.”
1986–1988, Endgame: “Pessimism” notwithstanding, Iran initiated yet an-
other major offensive in southern Iraq on 9 February 1986 designed to 
break the stalemate. The offensive was directed against the Fao Peninsula, 
a marshy region adjoining the Persian Gulf in Iraq’s extreme southeast be-
tween Iraqi Basra and Iranian Abadan. It was the site of Iraq’s two main 
oil tanker terminals and controlled access to the Shatt al-Arab (and thus 
access to the port of Basra). The Fao attack succeeded. Iraq immediately 
began counteroffensives to retake it. All failed. Fao’s loss boosted Iranian 
morale and diminished Saddam’s credibility, raising the possibility that Iran 
might just prevail.
In May 1986 the Iraqis seized the Iranian border town of Mehran and 
offered to exchange it for Fao. Tehran rejected the offer and in July retook 
the town. That September Tehran attacked to the north in Iraqi Kurdis-
tan; in October it organized a commando raid, in conjunction with Kurds, 
against Kirkuk; and in December, to end 1986 with a fl ourish, it directed 
a major assault against Basra. The New Year of 1987 began with a wave of 
Iranian offensives into northern and southern Iraq. Basra and the south-
ern oil fi elds were the major objective. The Basra attack failed, but the 
Iranians met with greater success later in the year in the north, especially 
around Suleimaniya, opening the way to Kirkuk and the northern oilfi elds. 
However, Tehran was unable to consolidate these gains. Little land actu-
ally changed hands in 1987, and after seven years of violence an effective 
impasse once more prevailed.
On 20 July 1987 the United Nations Security Council passed the US-
sponsored Resolution 598, calling for an end to fi ghting and a return to 
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prewar boundaries. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iran did not, prompting 
Iraq to return to the offensive in 1988. Saddam began his fi nal and most 
deadly of the “war of the cities” in February. His troops retook the Fao 
Peninsula in April. Immediately thereafter, they began a sustained drive to 
clear Iranians out of all of southern Iraq, against which the Iranians put up 
little resistance.
At the same time that Iraq was in the process of expelling the Iranians 
from its territory, a series of US-Iranian naval and aerial engagements, dis-
cussed in the next section, alarmed Iran’s ruling elite, who worried that the 
US was intervening and doing so on Saddam’s side. Anxiety sharpened on 
20 June when the US Navy blasted an Iranian passenger airline from the 
sky, killing all 290 persons on board. One Iranian scholar reports that “the 
Iranians interpreted [this action] … as a sign of American resolve to force 
Iran to accept the resolution” (Tousi 1997: 60). At this point Rafsanjani, 
instrumental in extending the war in 1982, had had enough. He urged 
ending the confl ict. Khomeini acquiesced, and on 20 July 1988 Iran an-
nounced acceptance of Resolution 598. A month later Iraq also complied 
and the war ended.
Iran settled for the terms it had rejected six years earlier in 1982. Many, 
many more people had died or were wounded. There were over a million 
casualties. Much treasure was wasted. Iran lost 40 to 60 percent of its land-
force military equipment in the last months of the war, and overall military 
expenses were in the order of a trillion, 1980 dollars (Hiro 1991: 1). The 
preceding narrative has told a grim tale of Iran and Iraq’s war. Absent from 
the story is the New American Empire’s role in it, an absence corrected in 
the upcoming section.
US Participation in the Iran-Iraq War
This section shows how the Security Elites 2.0 intervened in the Iran-Iraq 
war in ways that upgraded the US’s own capacities for exercising violent 
force in the region, while also “tilting” toward Iraq, attempting to trans-
form it into a client satrapy.
The Carter Administration during the Iran-Iraq War: Recall that the majors 
had lost control over oil due to nationalization and OPEC, worsening the 
oil company/petro-state contradiction in the 1970s. The “energy crisis” 
declared during Nixon’s administration was the cultural discourse in which 
the land/capital contradiction’s intensifi cation was recognized. The Nixon 
Doctrine was a public délire designed to fi x the “energy crisis” vulnerability. 
However, the fi x became unfi xed when Iran collapsed as a “twin tower,” 
branding the US as the “Great Satan.” Worse, the Iran-Iraq War further 
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aggravated the situation because whoever won might dominate much of 
Near Eastern oil, preventing the US from controlling it. Thus, by 1980, 
the oil company/petro-state and land/capital contradictions agitated the 
I-spaces of the Security Elite 2.0.
When the Iran-Iraq War erupted, Carter did not speak of contradic-
tions. Rather, two days after Iraq’s attack he wrote in his diary, “I con-
ducted a National Security Council meeting. We agreed to do everything 
we could to terminate the Iran-Iraq confl ict as soon as possible, to stay 
strictly neutral, … and to keep open the Strait of Hormuz” (2010: 467). 
Matters were not quite as simple as that. The US did a great deal to in-
fl ame the confl ict and was anything but neutral.
A key problem was that the US was “virtually powerless” to infl uence 
hostilities at their onset (El-Azhary 1984: 89), an actuality that was rec-
ognized by the Carter administration. Gary Sick, a member of Carter’s 
NSC, reported that among NSC security offi cials at this time there was “a 
growing awareness … the United States was left strategically naked, with 
no safety net” (in O’Reilly 2008: 148). This provoked the hermeneutic 
puzzle of how to fi x the problem of a “strategically naked” New American 
Empire—or, put differently, what should be done now that the Nixon Doc-
trine had failed to protect US Persian Gulf oil interests?
Actually, the Carter Doctrine, announced ten months earlier, already 
pointed the way to a fi x. It was designed to discourage Soviet Persian Gulf 
meddling but contained a more general implication, warning, “Any at-
tempt … to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be … repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force.” The procedural message 
was clear. Violent force would be used to control the oil-producing Middle 
East if other means failed. So understood, as earlier noted, the Carter Doc-
trine is understood as an “oil control” iteration of the global domination 
public délire.
However, a big procedural puzzle remained; US Middle Eastern strate-
gic insolvency. This began to be resolved, Brzezinski (1983: 454) recalled, 
because the events of 1979–1980 prompted “formal U.S. recognition” of 
“three, instead of two, zones of central strategic importance to the United 
States: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East.” Thus, a pro-
cedural message of the Carter Doctrine was to add a new, third area of 
central strategic importance to the US, the Middle East. In an area of such 
strategic importance, the US had to “establish a military presence” (Pel-
letiere 1992: 153), which got the Security Elites 2.0 into the development 
of violent force. There were three major ways to accomplish this: they 
could dedicate specifi c American military units to operations in the Gulf; 
they could “tilt” toward Iraq, hoping to make it a satrapy; or they could do 
both. The Carter administration opted for the third possibility.
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First, it moved to augment its Gulf forces. This had, in principle, begun 
when Carter signed PD 18 in the summer of 1977, a part of which autho-
rized a mobile force, composed of two Army divisions and one Marine 
division, capable of responding to worldwide contingencies. These units 
were the forerunner of the Rapid Deployment Force. Though authorized, 
this force was not implemented because it was largely unfunded, nor was 
it targeted toward the Persian Gulf. Two years later, Carter publicly an-
nounced he would actually establish such a force and that its area of op-
erations would be the Near East. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJTF) began on March 1980 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Its 
mission was to “help maintain regional stability and the Gulf oil-fl ow west-
ward” (Clementson 1983: 260). Earlier, between April and August 1980, 
Carter administration diplomats had negotiated troop and materiel access 
agreements with Kenya, Somalia, and Oman. They had equally negotiated 
landing rights in Morocco for US planes (O’Reilly 2008: 151).
The question of whether to seek allies in the region was more com-
plicated and involved a fair amount of hermeneutic politics within the 
NSC. The logical, geostrategic candidate for such an ally was Iran. Now, 
however, under Khomeini, Iranian elites regarded the “Great Satan” as 
a “wounded snake” and held its diplomats hostage as its masses chanted 
“Down with America” while torching US fl ags on television. The alterna-
tive to Iran was Iraq, but here too there were problems. Foremost among 
these was that Iraq was something of a Soviet client, having signed a treaty 
to this effect in 1972. Moreover, Saddam was judged an extreme dictator.
One of the factions in the hermeneutic politics that emerged over Iraq 
was led by Brzezinski, who by the spring of 1980 “began to suggest pub-
licly that Iraq was the logical successor to Iran as the dominant military 
power in the Persian Gulf” (Teicher and Teicher 1993: 62). Earlier Howard 
Teicher, then a mid-level bureaucrat in the Defense Department and his 
wife, Gayle Teicher, had written a report arguing that Iraq under Saddam 
was a country that could not be trusted to defend the US’s interests (ibid: 
62–70). The politics between the extremely powerful Brzezinski and the 
very much junior Teicher was asymmetrical. Teicher found his position 
ignored. It “ran contrary to those of most of the national security bureau-
cracy” (1993: 69). A month after the RDJTF was founded, Carter lost the 
election to Reagan. Nevertheless, the work of choreographing US Middle 
Eastern violent force had begun. The US was a bit less “naked.” This work 
might be characterized as a “twin towers redux plus” policy. The “redux” 
part of the policy was the intention to bring back Iraq as a new twin to 
replace the defunct one. The “plus” part of the policy was that the US had 
begun the RDJTF to be able to put boots on the ground in the Middle East 
when required.
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“Back in the saddle again”: The Reagan Administration during the Iran-Iraq 
War: Reagan had campaigned against Carter by promising to get the US 
“back in the saddle again.” This was the fi rst line of the signature song of 
the singing cowboy Gene Autry, who in the 1940s and 1950s had enter-
tained Hollywood audiences with his voice and acting. The lyric “back 
in the saddle again” evoked remounting a horse after a fall and being in 
charge once more, “out where a friend is a friend” while “totin’ my old 
44.”34 Reagan’s theme song implied that with him as president, America 
would recover dominance after the tumble suffered during Carter’s presi-
dency. Moreover, this America would be totin’, that is, carrying its 44 re-
volver in world where a friend is a friend; which is to say that Reagan’s 
America would stand armed and violent, with friendly clients that acted 
as friendly satrapies.
Promises and reality can diverge. Carter had established his Carter 
Doctrine as the public délire for addressing Persian Gulf vulnerability. His 
administration had begun the task of implementing this délire by institut-
ing the RDJTF and beginning the tilt toward Iraq. Very early in his fi rst 
administration Reagan endorsed the Carter Doctrine, saying that with it 
the US intended “to safeguard the West’s oil lifeline in the Persian Gulf 
area” (in O’Reilly 2008: 151). In October 1981, the Reagan administration 
extended the Carter Doctrine with what is sometimes called the Reagan 
Corollary.
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War there was concern that the fi ght-
ing could spill over into the other twin tower, Saudi Arabia, and harm it. 
The Reagan Corollary was designed to address this situation, declaring 
that “Washington would take on any state in the area that threatened 
U.S. interests” (ibid.: 152). This “corollary” was not an alternative to the 
Carter Doctrine. It was an iteration strengthening it: if a state outside of 
the Middle East (say, Russia) threatened US oil interests, the US reserved 
the right to militarily react; if a state in the Middle East (like Iran or Iraq) 
endangered US oil interests there, the US could militarily respond. Te-
icher and Teicher (1993: 146) insist that the Reagan Corollary laid “the 
policy groundwork … for Operation Desert Storm.” Actually it was the 
Carter Doctrine that laid the groundwork for the Reagan Corollary. The 
Reagan administration’s acceptance of Carter’s public délire meant that 
“the United States embarked upon a decade of military improvements” 
(O’Reilly 2008: 151), actually begun under Carter. The “improvements” 
were twofold: replacement of the 44 with more forceful weaponry; and 
a new “friend,” Iraq governed by Saddam. Implementation of these “im-
provements” is recounted next.
Casper Weinberger was Reagan’s Secretary of Defense. He had been 
nicknamed “Cap the Knife” because of his cost-cutting proclivities as head 
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of Nixon’s Offi ce of Budget and Management. Under Reagan the old mon-
iker disappeared, replaced by a new one, “Cap the Ladle,” because he was 
charged with “directing the largest military buildup” in US history (up to 
that time) (Brownstein and Easton 1983: 450). Considerable funding for 
the “buildup” went to high-tech weapons systems, like Star Wars. How-
ever, Cap also ladled money to the strengthening of military units, such as 
the RDJTF.
Grasping how Cap the Ladle reinforced the RDJTF requires knowledge 
of how the New American Empire organized, and organizes, its violent 
force. The 1947 National Security Act provided the legal foundation for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create unifi ed commands in strategic areas, 
places designated as potentially violent. At the end of World War II, Eu-
rope and Northeast Asia were strategic areas. Under Carter, at Brzezinski’s 
urging, the Middle East became a strategic area. A “unifi ed command” was, 
and is, an organization capable of exercising violent force that includes at 
least two of the military services “unifi ed” under a common leadership, the 
better to choreograph their cooperation.
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a result of 
Eisenhower’s conviction that the days of independent service action were 
fi nished, strengthened the National Security Act. It sought complete uni-
fi cation of all military planning, combat forces, and commands. Central 
to this act was the unifi ed command plan, which designated the Unifi ed 
Commands, or more simply, Commands. Two types of functional and geo-
graphic commands exist. “Functional” commands are those with specialized 
tasks. For example, different types commando units in the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force are all placed in a Special Operations Command. Geographic 
commands have areas of responsibility (AOR). The two earliest commands 
were those in Europe (EUCOM) and in the Asian Pacifi c (PACOM). AOR 
commands have a broad continuing mission and are led by a commander 
in chief. Eisenhower’s Reorganization Act established a clear chain of com-
mand from the president to the secretary of Defense to the commanders 
in chief.35
By the time Weinberger became defense secretary a lively hermeneutic 
politics about Carter’s RDJTF had emerged—not over whether to have 
rapid deployment forces, but over how to proceed with them. One faction 
in this politics was critical of the existing RDJTF. Jeffrey Record (1981: vii), 
then of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, was a leader of this bloc 
and insisted that the RDJTF was a “fatally fl awed military instrument for 
the preservation of uninterrupted access to vital Persian Gulf oil” because 
it had (1) unsuitable equipment for desert warfare, (2) inadequate mo-
bility, (3) confused and divided command structures, and (4) insuffi cient 
funding. Solve these faults, Record swore, and the RDJTF would work.
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Weinberger championed Record’s position and “addressed immediately” 
(Morrissey 2008: 107) the RDJTF’s faults, principally by transforming the 
RDJTF into its own unifi ed command and increasing its funding to ac-
quire equipment necessary for desert warfare and increased mobility. Wein-
berger announced in April 1981 that the RDJTF would become a separate 
geographic unifi ed command with Southwest Asia, its AOR. “Southwest 
Asia” was Pentagonese for the Persian Gulf and surrounding countries. In 
the Pentagon’s positional culture Southwest Asia came to be known as the 
“Central Region” (ibid.: 118).
Consequently, on 1 January 1983 the RDJTF became the Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM), which included nineteen countries. Its commander 
became commander in chief of CENTCOM. In 1983, CENTCOM had 
220,000 troops at its disposal. By 1986, it could call upon 400,000 soldiers. 
From the Army, it had one airborne division, one mechanized infantry di-
vision, one light infantry division, and one air cavalry brigade; from the 
Navy, three carrier battle groups, one surface action group, and fi ve mari-
time patrol air squadrons; from the Air Force, seven tactical fi ghter wings 
and two strategic bomber wings; and from the Marines, one and one-third 
Marine amphibious forces.
CENTCOM was an “over the horizon” command, meaning its troops 
were stationed for the most part outside of Southwest Asia with the notion 
that they would be “projected” there as needed. CENTCOM’s key logis-
tical problem was to get troops and equipment to the Middle East fast. To 
address this problem, “the Pentagon was procuring additional C-5 cargo 
aircraft and KC-10 cargo tanker aircraft, improving current aircraft such 
as the C-141 through wing modifi cation and a stretch modifi cation of the 
fuselage, and acquiring additional capacity through a restructured Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) enhancement program” (Isenberg 1984). Ad-
ditionally, once US troops arrived in the Middle East, they needed strong-
holds. To provide these, “the Pentagon also continued to improve its access 
to facilities in the Southwest Asia area. The funds for military construction 
programs in that area for FY 1983–87 totaled nearly $1.4 billion, a 30 
percent increase over the FY 1982–86 levels” (ibid.). As a consequence 
of the preceding, CENTCOM became “the military … instrument of the 
Carter Doctrine” (Morrissey 2008: 107), putting the New American Em-
pire “back in the saddle again” to dominate the Middle East and its energy 
resources. But it still needed a friend, after Iran’s perfi dy.
So Reagan’s Security Elites 2.0 did some diplomatic browsing in search 
of a friend. Iraq became their candidate, but recall that in principle Iraq 
was a Soviet ally.36 Early in 1981 Alexander Haig, Reagan’s fi rst Secretary 
of State (1981–1982), had signaled “some shift” that had made Iraqi policy 
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more “moderate” (in El-Azhary 1984: 94); “moderate” being the State De-
partment’s positional cultural term for a country not wedded to the USSR. 
Consequently, Reagan’s security elites began a courtship, wooing their pos-
sible new friend.
Courtships—diplomatic or matrimonial—involve gift exchanges. First 
off, the US offered Iraq a present of intelligence (June 1982) that was 
“quickly accepted”; thereafter Saddam’s relationship with the US “began 
to improve rapidly” (Teicher and Teicher 1993: 207). In January 1983, a 
counter gift was offered: Baghdad repudiated its USSR alliance, declaring 
“that Iraq had never been part of the Soviet strategy in the region” (Hiro 
1991: 119). This so fi red up the courtship that by the autumn of 1983 the 
NSC declared an Iraqi defeat would be a “major blow to US interests” 
(ibid.). Donald Rumsfeld, who was as prominent in Ford’s administration 
as he would be in that of Bush II, was sent to Baghdad in December 1983 
as a sort of shadchan (Yiddish, matchmaker) to declare Reagan’s approval 
of Iraq. Unfortunately, Iraq’s battlefi eld situation was faltering during this 
courtship. In response, the NSC concocted a really big present for Saddam, 
NSDD 139 (1984), a “plan of action to avert an Iraqi collapse” (in Battle 
2003). So Iraq and the US, after the courtship, fi nally got politically mar-
ried, establishing diplomatic relations in November 1984. Was it to be an 
enduring matrimony? Time would tell; but for now Saddam was delighted, 
seeing the US, according to one diplomat, as a “huge candy store full of 
high-tech goodies,” the better to kill with (in Timmerman 1991: 77).
Military “goodies” began to fl ow to Baghdad in enormous quantities 
(Phythian 1997).37 They included the ingredients necessary for brewing 
the chemical and biological weapons (Riegle 1994) that were a distinc-
tive mark of Iraqi war making. Some of this assistance involved denying 
weapons to Iran. Operation Staunch, begun in 1983, involved diplomatic 
pressure to prevent countries from arming Tehran. Further, two sorts of in-
telligence were provided: fi rst, that of Iran’s battlefi eld dispositions, so that 
Saddam’s generals knew where Iran would attack, and with what num-
bers of troops and weaponry; second, that of Iraq’s own troop placements, 
which, when compared with those of Iran, allowed Baghdad to know if its 
soldiers were poorly placed.
In 1987 Reagan’s then NSA Frank Carlucci told US News and World Re-
port he saw no reason ever to withdraw from the Persian Gulf (Tousi 1997: 
56). Why should they? They had the new “44”—US CENTCOM—and the 
new “friend,” a heavily armed Iraq. Critically, the US had solved the prob-
lem of its Persian Gulf strategic insolvency. It was time to do some killing.38
“In 1987, President Reagan issued CENTCOM with its fi rst forward de-
ployment order” (Morrissey 2008: 109). This was to defend Kuwaiti tank-
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ers that had been refl agged as US ships. By law the US Navy was allowed 
to protect only US ships, so Kuwaiti ships were re-registered as American. 
Then, when Kuwait’s tankers took Iraq’s oil to market, Iran would attack 
these ships to damage Iraq’s oil exports. By the end of 1987, CENTCOM 
had a fl otilla of forty-eight vessels in the Persian Gulf (Pelletiere 1992: 
129).
The armada was soon in action. The refl agged Kuwaiti supertanker 
Bridgeton, escorted by the US Navy in the fi rst convoy after the refl agging, 
was hit by an Iranian mine on 24 July 1987. A month later US naval heli-
copters destroyed the Iranian ship Iran Ajr. On 8 October they sank three 
Iranian patrol boats near Farsi Island. In retaliation Iran struck a refl agged 
Kuwaiti supertanker in Kuwaiti waters with a missile (16 October). Three 
days later, US warships destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms in re-
taliation for the retaliation. On 14 April 1988 a hole was blown in the side 
of a US ship, the Samuel B. Roberts, followed four days later by an Amer-
ican counterattack on two Iranian oil rigs in the Gulf, the destruction of 
an Iranian frigate, immobilization of another frigate, and the sinking of a 
patrol boat.
By this time Iran was engaged in two fi ghts: a naval war against the US 
Navy; and a land war against the Iraqi counteroffensive in the Fao Penin-
sula. Pelletiere (1992: xiv) reports that by 1986 Iraq had established “an 
excellent general staff (shaped by the traditions of the Prussian military), 
which by the war’s end had developed the army into a fi rst class fi ghting 
institution.” Additionally, their air force had secured dominance by 1987 
and “regularly targeted Iranian oil platforms, electrical grids, railways, and 
key cities. For example, they struck at Iran’s holy city of Qom” (ibid.: 132). 
By 1987 events were bleak for Tehran.
They would become grimmer. On 3 July 1988 the US cruiser Vincennes 
was covertly in Iranian waters. Some crewmembers nicknamed the ship 
“Robocruiser” in reference to Robocop (1987), a recent fi lm about a police-
man transformed into a cyborg killing machine. The Vincennes was fi tted 
out with an Aegis defense system that robotically tracked and attacked 
presumed enemy targets, and its Captain, Will Rogers III, was celebrated 
for his pugnacity (D. Evans 1993; Chomsky 1998). The Vincennes sailors’ 
designation of their ship as Robocruiser was thus a fi tting allusion to its 
cybernetic belligerence. On that July morning, Air Iran Flight 655 had just 
taken off and was climbing to cruising altitude above the Vincennes. Rogers 
mistakenly believed his Aegis system had detected the aircraft descending 
in attack mode. Robocruiser performed its robotic duty and blasted Flight 
655 out of the sky. Bodies and other collateral damaged rained down in the 
sea around the Vincennes.
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Now they understood in Tehran. Now they knew what it meant to fi ght 
the Great Satan, with its Robocruisers and Saddamite satrapy. Now the 
Iranians ended the war. In a radio address at the time, a broadcaster read 
an announcement by Khomeini, voicing his sorrow concerning the cease-
fi re. The old Ayatollah, soon to die, who had led his people through an 
Islamist revolution avenging Kermit Roosevelt’s coup, mourned: “Happy 
are those who have departed through martyrdom. Happy are those who 
have lost their lives in this convoy of light. Unhappy am I that I still survive 
and have drunk the poisoned chalice” (in Bullock and Morris 1989: 1). In 
1990, the US awarded Rogers the Legion of Merit for outstanding service 
in the killing of 290 innocents.
As Dylan had said, the times were indeed “a-changin’”: economic con-
tradictions developed as Cold War political ones receded. The land/cap-
ital and oil company/petro-state contradictions emerged. To US Security 
Elites 2.0, this was, as Kissinger (1999: 666) expressed it, an “energy crisis.” 
They understood that to fi x this vulnerability, they had to control oil, which 
meant they had to dominate the Middle East. However, they perceived that 
the US was militarily “naked” in Southwest Asia, posing a hermeneutic 
puzzle: How was the strategic insolvency of the Persian Gulf to be resolved?
The Carter Doctrine and the Reagan Corollary instituted the oil-
control iteration of the global domination public délire, procedurally based 
upon the twin towers redux plus policy. The “redux” part of the policy was 
the return to twin towers, achieved by replacing Iran with Iraq. The “plus” 
part of the policy was the instituting of a US command, CENTCOM, to 
project violence force into the region. Nonviolent fi xes to the Iran-Iraq 
War were not possible once Saddam had invaded Iran. Shultzian Permis-
sion was granted because the choice for the US was either to fi ght or to 
acquiesce to one of the opposing sides having enormous control over Per-
sian Gulf oil. Washington began implementing the oil-control public délire 
with, fi rst, indirect global warring by providing support to Saddam, and 
then direct, overt global warring in the form of naval operations.
Hence, by 1989 the Middle East was a violent place patrolled by CENT-
COM and the Iraqi military. In supporting Saddam’s regime, as Timmerman 
(1991: x) recognized, “Saddam Hussein was our creation, our monster.” 
Make no mistake about it: if there was hostility between the US and Is-
lamic countries, it was not because of any confl ict between Western reli-
gion and Islam, as Huntington proposed, but because Security Elites 2.0, 
like Huntington himself, had projected enormous violent force into the 
region to dominate its oil and thereby help reproduce the US Leviathan. 
It is time now to turn to another region in CENTCOM’s command, Libya, 
and to Reagan’s desire to do some carpentry on an opponent’s genitals.




You know what I’d do if Qaddafi  were sitting here right now? I’d nail his balls 
to this bench and then push him over backwards. (President Ronald Reagan 
speaking with the catcher on the Baltimore Orioles baseball team, in Gates 
[1996] 2007: 354)
US security elites have attacked Libya twice, fi rst in the 1980s and second 
in the early years of the twenty-fi rst century. What follows is an investiga-
tion of that fi rst aggression, called Libya I. On 7 April 1986, following a 
meeting between the president and his senior security offi cials concerning 
what to do about Gaddafi , Reagan traveled to Baltimore to throw out the 
fi rst pitch at the opening game of the baseball season. Prior to performing 
this ritual, he waited in the dugout, talking to the Orioles’ tough-as-nails 
catcher, Rich Dempsey. The president’s mind must have still been on the 
earlier meeting, because conversation turned to Libya; hence the presi-
dent’s claim of a desire to “nail” the Libyan ruler’s “balls” to the “bench.”
Chadians—Libya’s southern, impoverished neighbors—used to refer to 
Libya as sakitbus (Chadian Arabic, “nothing”). After all, at independence 
in 1951, Libya was “one of the poorest countries in the world” (El-Kikhia 
1997: 28), “a barely self-sustaining agricultural and tribal society” sprawled 
across the Sahara (Vandewalle 1998: 42). Average income was estimated 
at £15 a year (First 1974: 144). Though the seventeenth largest country 
in the world territorially, Libya had only an estimated 1.8 million people in 
1968 (ibid.: 31). Its food-production was dominated by nomadic pastoral-
ism and an irrigated agriculture that threatened scarce water supplies. It 
lacked raw materials and skilled labor, so its “major revenue sources were 
sales of scrap metal left behind by the belligerents during the war, sales of 
esparto grass, and rent from military bases leased by the United States and 
Great Britain” (Vandewalle 1998: 42). What could possibly be enraging 
about a sandbox in which essentially nobody was there; and where those 
few who did exist went about hawking junk metal and grass? Why did the 
president of the most powerful social being ever want to sexually torture 
the head of an insignifi cant and weak country?
Oil features prominently in the answer to this question. Commercially 
exploitable petroleum deposits were discovered in Libya in 1959 and put 
into production in 1961. Immediately thereafter Libya became “one of the 
largest oil producers in the Middle East” (Vandewalle 1998: 42). Salvaged 
metal and grass ceased to be leading economic sectors. Moreover, after 
Gaddafi ’s regime began in 1969, Libya developed into one of the most 
aggressive nationalizers of its petroleum resources (First 1974: 199–200, 
210–120; J. Wright 1989: 235–251; Vandewalle 2006: 59–60). Oil was na-
tionalized in 1973 by a decree that gave the Libyan government 51 percent 
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of the “assets and business of the major oil producers” (Sicker 1987: 24). 
Nationalization placed Libya at the center of intensifi cation of the oil com-
pany/petro-state version of the dominator/dominated contradiction.
Overnight, Libyan “government revenues rose spectacularly” (First 
1974: 144). Gaddafi  spent his new riches on “spectacular economic and 
political experiments” (Vandewalle 2006: 7), and it was the latter—in the 
judgment of Robert Gates, observing the Reagan administration from his 
CIA position—that drove the Reaganites to be “obsessed” with Gaddafi  
and to want to get him “in the worst way” ([1996] 2007: 352).39 Obsession, 
it will become clear, led to invention of another monster-alterity—the sec-
ond since the old boys’ creation of the Soviet monster-alterity—and you 
have to destroy monsters. Drive a stake through their heart if the monster 
is a vampire. Hammer a nail through his balls if he is a monster-alterity.
The position essayed below maintains that not only was Libya at the 
center of the oil-company/petro-state contradiction, but by Gaddafi ’s 
time, the New American Empire had replaced the old empires as the target 
of the dominated in the dominator-dominated contradiction as dominated 
peoples resisted the US Leviathan, some violently. Gaddafi ’s “experi-
ments” were part of this resistance, to which Reagan’s Security Elites 2.0 
responded with a new hermeneutic. The argument proceeds fi rst by doc-
umenting the nature of Libya-US warring. It then describes resistance to 
US imperial domination that developed both outside and inside Libya, and 
fi nally shows how this resistance provoked a new hermeneutic that created 
the new monster-alterity of the “terrorist”—as well as a new, anti-terrorist 
iteration of the global domination public délire—for the New American 
Empire to hunt down in Libyan sands.
Libya I: Getting Gaddafi  in the Worst Way
From the perspective of most in the world, especially ordinary Americans, 
Libya I was a war that never was. No such a confl ict appears on Wikipedia. 
Some, perhaps, remember that back in the 1980s there were “off shore 
skirmishes” over the Gulf of Sirte between US and Libya (Jentleson and 
Whytock 2005: 58), but a few skirmishes do not a war make.40 Few books 
or articles treat a First US-Libyan War.41 However, there is a widespread 
American English slang expression for wanting something very, very much: 
you want it “in the worst way.” Below it is shown how Reagan and his se-
curity elites, “obsessed” with Gaddafi , wanted in the worst way to destroy 
him and provoked over eight years (between 1981 and 1989) of covert and 
overt, direct and indirect global warring. The war had two theaters. One 
was in Libya itself, especially along its Mediterranean coast. The other was 
in the Republic of Chad, Libya’s southern neighbor. Events in the former 
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theater were overt and covert as well as largely direct; those in the later 
theater were chiefl y covert and indirect. Let us consider fi rst the warring 
within Libya itself.
Overt Warring—The USS Monster Steams into Naval Action: Reagan imag-
ined Gaddafi  was “insane” (Reagan [2007] 2009: 233), a “mad dog,” a 
“terrorist” (in Shultz 1993: 686). Further, he appears to have believed the 
Libyan leader was gay, at one point remarking about his fl amboyant cloth-
ing that “Gaddafi  can look in Nancy’s closet anytime” (in B. Woodward 
1987: 441). Nancy was Reagan’s wife, and gay men were supposed to cross 
dress in women’s clothes.42 Alexander Haig judged Gaddafi  a “cancer” 
(McGehee 1996). John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, compared 
him with “Hitler” (in Thompson, Kaldor, and Anderson 1986: 8). Gad-
dafi , then, was a Hitlerian, cancerous, crazed, terrorist queer—defi nitely a 
bad guy. Therefore imperial America steamed into naval action. Actually, 
there were four major engagements; details of which follow.
On 11 October 1973 the Gaddafi  government decreed an extension 
of its territorial waters to include the entire Gulf of Sirte, a great Med-
iterranean bay extending into Libya, roughly between Tripoli and Ben-
ghazi.43 Tripoli, using a hyperbolic rhetoric, warned that transgressing this 
new border was crossing a “line of death.” Five months later the US State 
Department pronounced Libya’s decree “a violation of international law” 
(Stanik 2003: 28). Thereafter throughout the 1970s the US Navy regularly 
challenged Libya’s claim by sending carrier battle groups across the “line 
of death” in what were termed “freedom of navigation” (FON) exercises.44 
FON challenges throughout the 1970s ended without any engagements.
Immediately on assuming the presidency, Reagan authorized two air-
craft carrier battle groups to cross the “line of death,” which they did on 
18 August 1981, drawing mock attacks from Libyan aircraft. The next day 
two US F-14 Tomcats fl ew a combat air patrol in support of other US air-
craft engaged in a missile exercise. They were approached by two Libyan 
Sukhoi S-22 aircraft, Russian-built bombers that were no match for the 
F-14s. One of the Sukhois fi red a missile at the Americans, who returned 
fi re, destroying both the Libyan planes. This was the fi rst encounter. The 
score from the US perspective: two planes for the guy with the “old 44.”
A second encounter in the Gulf of Sirte occurred in March 1986. This 
was Operation Prairie Fire. It was another FON exercise, but this time a 
monumental US armada was assembled: three carrier battle groups, forty-
fi ve ships, two hundred planes, and advanced nuclear powered subma-
rines. The “line of death” was crossed. On 24 March, with this vast force 
bearing down upon them, Libya launched a number of Russian surface-to-
air (SAM) missiles against the F-14s fl ying in support of the battle group. 
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The SAMs missed, and the armada returned fi re. The score was an esti-
mated 72 killed, 1 corvette sunk, 1 patrol boat sunk, 1 corvette damaged, 
1 patrol boat damaged, and a number of SAM sites damaged or destroyed 
for the guy with the “old 44”; nothing for Libya.
A third engagement, the gravest, occurred three weeks after Operation 
Prairie Fire. In a television broadcast on 15 April 1986, Reagan declared: 
“My fellow Americans, at 7 o’clock this evening, Eastern time, air and 
naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the 
headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Muammar 
Qaddafi ’s subversive activities” (in Bearman 1986: 287). The attack, called 
Operation Ghost Rider, involved thirty F-111 bombers. The targets were 
two airfi elds (one in Tripoli at the former US Wheelus Air Force Base; the 
other in Benghazi), air defense networks in Tripoli and Benghazi, the Bab 
al-Azizia barracks in Tripoli, and the Jamahiriyah barracks in Benghazi.
White House spokespersons stressed “that the targets … were only ter-
rorist installations” (ibid.). This was untrue. The Murat Sidi Bilal camp 
housed a Palestinian Liberation Organization school, but the other targets 
were Libyan military installations, with the exception of the Bab al-Azizia 
barracks, which contained Gaddafi ’s family dwellings, among other things. 
A total of nine F-111 fi ghter-bombers were supposed to bomb the Bab 
al-Azizia barracks—more than attacked any other target in the raid, which 
supports Seymour Hersh’s contention that their target was “Col. Muammar 
el-Qaddafi  and his family” (1987). Libyan fi gures placed their dead around 
one hundred, with double that number wounded: “Among the known ca-
sualties were members of Gaddafi ’s own family; his wife Safi a and three 
children suffered pressure shock from the blast of a 2,000 lb bomb which 
hit their accommodation” (Bearman 1986: 287).45 Gaddafi  himself was un-
hurt. One US offi cial claimed it was “pure serendipity” that he was present 
at the barracks (Teicher and Teicher 1993: 350), but this claim rings hol-
low, especially in the light of evidence that US offi cials had been closely 
tracking Gaddafi ’s movements prior to the attack (S. Hersh 1987). Note 
that in 1981 Reagan had signed Executive Order 12333, which stated, “No 
person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government 
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination” (in B. Woodward 
1987: 366). On the night of 15 April 1986, the New American Empire was 
in the business of assassination.
A fourth round of hostilities occurred three years later in 1989. US-
Libyan relations had grown especially twitchy following Operation Ghost 
Rider. They became still twitchier when Pam Am fl ight 103 exploded over 
Lockerbie, Scotland (21 December 1988), with intimations of Libyan in-
volvement. Finally, in the waning days of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, 
twitchier became twitchiest when Reagan security offi cials began warning 
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of the construction of a large chemical weapons facility at Rabta, forty 
miles south of Tripoli. There was discussion about destroying the facilities 
(Silverberg 1990). In a threatening move, the aircraft carrier USS Kennedy 
was sent with its battle group to the Gulf of Sirte. On 3 January 1989 four 
Russian Mig 23 Floggers began threatening two F-14s on patrol. The US 
planes took evasive action. The threats continued. The F-14s shot down 
two of the Floggers. The Libyans had not fi red on the Americans. This was 
the third encounter in the Gulf of Sirte and the fourth between the US and 
Libya during the Reagan administration. The score that day: two planes for 
the guy with the “old 44.”
Thus imperial America sailed into four naval encounters. Each was an-
nounced to the public and so was overt, the better to impress Reagan’s 
will to “nail” his opponent. Gaddafi  emerged unscathed from each attack. 
However, overt operations were only part of the Reagan administration’s 
global warring against Libya. Clandestine confl ict is reported next.
Making Contras in the Desert: Reagan signed an intelligence fi nding (18 
June 1981) early in his presidency directing Casey’s CIA to provide sup-
port and training to anti-Gaddafi  exiles. Four months later the CIA, with 
Saudi Arabia’s assistance, sponsored Muhammad Mugharief, a former Lib-
yan diplomat, to found the National Front for Salvation of Libya (NFSL). 
At this time the CIA, implementing the Reagan Doctrine, was setting up 
“contras” in Nicaragua to fi ght the Sandinista revolutionary government 
that had overthrown the Somoza dictatorship.46 Vincent Cannistraro had 
headed the CIA Central American task force that supervised covert oper-
ations, including those of the Contras. He applied the Nicaraguan Contra 
model to Libya.
Little is known about the personnel and activities of the NFSL. Mostly 
anti-Gaddafi  exiles and especially ex-soldiers, they are reported to have had 
US and Israeli training. In the 1980s Libya invaded Chad with unpleas-
ant consequences, one being the capture of a large number of its soldiers 
by the Chadians, a matter discussed in the following section. Some of the 
captured Libyans appear to have been placed in CIA custody. One of these 
was a Colonel Khalifa Hifter, who prior to capture had been a commander 
of the Libyan expeditionary force. The CIA recruited Hifter and in the mid 
1980s provided him with the training and weaponry to create a contra-
force, called the National Liberation Army (NLA), with approximately 700 
troops. The NLA appears to have been integrated into the NFSL as its 
military arm. The only known NSFL operation was apparently directed by 
Cannistraro and Donald Fortier, an NSC offi cer. It was a May 1984 attack 
on the Gaddafi s’ Tripoli residence. The attackers were sharply repulsed.47 
There were to be further Reagan administration interventions in Chad.
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“Bleeding Gaddafi ”—Covert Warring in Chad: On Casey’s third day in of-
fi ce he received a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) entitled 
“Libya: Aims and Vulnerabilities.” In part this was in response to Libya’s 
armed intervention in Chad. In total there would be four Libyan occupa-
tions of different parts of Chad in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981, and 1983–1987. 
The SNIE contained a “Key Judgment” that “Gaddafi ’s recent success in 
Chad ensures that his aggressive policies will pose a growing challenge to 
U.S. and Western interests” (in B. Woodward 1987: 94). Of course, such a 
key judgment provoked a hermeneutic puzzle: what to do about the “grow-
ing challenge”? The last line of the fi nal paragraph of the SNIE noted that 
conservative Arab states like Sadat’s Egypt opposed Libya by “focusing 
their resources on quietly bleeding Gaddafi  at his most vulnerable point—
his overextension in Chad and the dangers this poses for him at home” (in 
ibid.: 96). “Quietly bleeding” Gaddafi  in Chad seemed to Casey a splendid 
procedural solution to the hermeneutic puzzle. But why was Gaddafi  in 
Chad, and just what operations would lead to his “bleeding”? This war-
rants a brief foray into Chadian post-Independence history.
François Tombalbaye was the fi rst president of independent Chad (1960–
1975). He led a southern, non-Muslim government that many Muslims, 
who resided in the northern two-thirds of the country, found objection-
able. Starting in 1963, northern opposition to Tombalbaye turned violent. 
A Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT) was organized 
in 1966 by individuals, one of whom had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
to wrest control of the state.48 The French military intervened in support 
of Tombalbaye’s regime in the 1970s when it became clear that the Forces 
Armées Tchadiennes (FAT) could not defeat FROLINAT, which itself de-
volved into two major military factions that were increasingly hostile to each 
other: the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) under Hissen Habré, and the 
Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) under Oueddei Goukouni. Chadian losses 
multiplied. FAT offi cers, fearful of the southern regime’s future, staged a 
coup against Tombalbaye in 1975. Félix Malloum, a FAT general, became 
the new president. Nevertheless, FAT losses to FROLINAT continued.
Malloum bowed to the inevitable and in 1978 signed a Charte Fon-
damentale granting FROLINAT equal power in the central government, 
raising the question of the relative infl uences of the rivals Goukouni and 
Habré in that government. Habré became prime minister and immediately 
sought to dominate the government, provoking years of harsh confl ict 
(1979–1982). By 1979, southern infl uence in the central government had 
ended and Habré was in control, though Goukouni challenged him.
Libya had assisted FROLINAT since before Gaddafi . After the 1969 
revolution, this support increased: fi rst there was provision of nonlethal 
assistance; next, supply of lethal assistance; and, fi nally, starting in 1978, 
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direct commitment of the Libyan armed forces. There were two reasons for 
increasing Libyan backing of FROLINAT. The fi rst was that Gaddafi  gen-
erally supported Islamic revolutionary movements. The second had to do 
with regulation of a colonial Chad-Libya border dispute. In 1935, France, 
Chad’s imperial dominator, acceded to a treaty that awarded to Italy, Libya’s 
dominator, the Aouzou Strip, a band of land in Chad’s extreme north. World 
War II intervened, and France and Italy never signed the treaty. Gaddafi  
hoped to press his claim on the Aouzou Strip via his Chadian meddling.
The problem for Libya was which of the two FROLINAT armies—FAN 
or FAP—it was to support. For a number of reasons Gaddafi  chose Gouk-
ouni. Habré was a Daza, from the southern part of the Chadian desert. He 
had studied political science in Paris in the 1950s, absorbing some Maoist 
Marxism, to which Gaddafi  was indisposed. Goukouni, on the other hand, 
was the son of the derdei (chief) of the Toubou, the northernmost ethnic 
group straddling the Chad-Libya border. Toubou in Libya were supportive 
of Gaddafi , so he felt more comfortable allying with their Chadian kin. In 
January 1978 Libyan soldiers invaded Chad for the fi rst time, in alliance 
with Goukouni and in opposition to Habré.49 Now we return to Washing-
ton, and Casey’s contemplation of his SNIE.
Upon reading the SNIE, Casey knew that Habré opposed Goukouni and 
Goukouni was supported by Gaddafi , which meant the way to “bloody” 
Gaddafi  was to support Habré. Casey appears to have discussed this policy 
with then Secretary of State Haig, who assented to it. A number of meet-
ings followed, and a “second track,” as opposed to a fi rst policy track, was 
developed. First-track policy was that of normal diplomacy, “second-track” 
was that of covert operations. The second track was presented to Reagan 
and led to him signing the 18 July 1981 intelligence order “releasing … 
covert support to Habré” (B. Woodward 1987: 97).
Over the following seven years, this support grew to hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars as the US, assisted by France, fought Libya by providing all 
sorts of assistance to Habré, short of US soldiers.50 The strings of combat 
went as follows: Libya would invade, reaching Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, 
at some point; then retreat following Chadian and French counterattacks, 
usually as far as the northern desert area called the Tibesti. By the begin-
ning of 1987 the Libyans still had a force of 8,000 soldiers in northern 
Chad, backed by 300 tanks. They faced a Chadian army of 10,000 using 
Toyotas equipped with MILAN anti-tank missiles, with much of the ma-
teriel and training coming from covert US sources. There followed what 
has been called the “Toyota War,” in which the lumbering tanks proved 
no match for the nimble Toyota. Libyans were routed, and the following 
year they withdrew permanently from Chad. It was a triumph of covert US 
warring. Thousands of Libyans died; thousands were captured.51
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In sum, throughout Reagan’s administration the Security Elites 2.0 
globally warred overtly and covertly against Libya, chalking up victories 
at sea, in the air, and on the ground in the desert. Nevertheless, their in-
tended purpose, nailing Gaddafi , went unachieved. Why did the Reagan 
administration fi ght Libya I “in the worst possible way”?
The Making of a New Monster-Alterity: 
Anti-imperialism, Oil, and “Terrorist Goons”
We are sending a secret or private warning from me to him that harm to any 
of our people by his terrorist goons will be considered an act of war. (Reagan 
[2007] 2009 : 54).
The above quotation is from Reagan’s diary in January 1981. The “him” 
in the above quotation is Gaddafi . By the end of the 1970s, astute people 
outside America had penetrated the Leviathan’s camoufl age. Old empires 
were dead. The New American Empire, the “shining city on the hill,” was 
a dominator in the business of exploitation, repression, and domination. 
Recognition of this provoked resistance, some of it violent. The Secu-
rity Elites 2.0 interpreted the violent resistance as the work of “terrorist 
goons,” as Reagan put it in his diary in January of 1981. They attempted to 
eradicate the “goons” and in so doing revealed an explanation for Reagan’s 
obsessive warring against Gaddafi .
Resistance to the New American Empire: Since their earliest days, empires 
have always met with resistance. It was, as earlier discussed in chapter 3, 
a normal manifestation of the dominator/dominated contradiction. Skir-
mishes against British Redcoats at Concord and Lexington in 1776 ignited 
the American Revolution; bombs thrown at the czars or their offi cials in Im-
perial Russia eventually led to revolution in 1917; assassination of Austria’s 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand sparked the beginning of World War I. Most 
such violent resistance took, and takes, the form of “terrorism,” a term 
whose meaning is contested.
“Terrorism” might be heuristically defi ned as a form of warring whose 
perpetrators want to achieve their ends by exercising violence specifi cally 
to strike horror and dread into their opponent. Terrorism’s victims do what 
their adversary wants because they are terrifi ed of the alternative. Horror 
and dread may be attained by striking politically powerful elites or inno-
cent bystanders. Assassination, mutilation, bombing, torturing, hijacking, 
burning, and hostage-taking are common terrorist practices. Two types of 
terrorism occur. “Nonstate” terrorism is performed by individuals or groups 
against states. “State” terrorism is executed by governments against their 
opponents or their opponents’ supporters. A distinction is commonly made 
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between “domestic” and “international” terrorism, with the former terror-
ist practice within and the later terrorist practice across countries.52
Immediately following World War II, as explained in the previous chap-
ter, the old empires encountered overwhelming internal, terrorist resis-
tance. At the same time, people in the developing world, especially those 
parts of it most touched by the US, began to speak of a novel dominating 
force in the world—Yanqui imperialism, as they put it in Latin America. 
The event that most galvanized this recognition was the US Leviathan’s 
assault on Vietnam. American support for its client states and their elites 
(especially in Central America, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) further mo-
tivated resistance in these areas.
US security elites often term terrorism a tactic of asymmetrical warfare 
(Buffaloe 2006). Their narrative, especially among neocons, is that ter-
rorism in asymmetrical warfare is produced by religion, and specifi cally by 
fundamentalist Islam, which gives the narrative a Huntingtonian twist. 
Robert Pape and James Feldman (2010) conducted an analysis of a particu-
larily grim sort of terrorism, that involving suicide bombing. They collected 
a sample of 2,100 cases of suicide terrorism in the Middle East, Central 
Asia, and South Asia between the years 1980 and 2009. They found that 
most cases were fueled by US military intervention.53 Labeling terrorism 
an aspect of asymmetrical warfare obscures the fact that it is a tactic of 
resistance to military intervention. The term “resistance terrorism” is a 
more accurate designation of the violent tactics employed against the New 
American Empire and its clients.
Often, resistance terrorism targeted the US elites handling the empire: 
on 1 May 1961 a Puerto Rican hijacked a US commercial airliner to Ha-
vana; on 28 August 1968 the US ambassador to Guatemala was assassi-
nated by a rebel faction; on 3 September 1969 the US ambassador to Brazil 
was kidnapped by a Marxist revolutionary group; on 31 July 1970 a USAID 
advisor in Uruguay was kidnapped and killed by the Tupamaros. On 5 Sep-
tember 1972 there came a spectacular terrorist act: Black September, a Pal-
estinian organization tied to Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation organization, 
kidnapped and eventually killed eleven Israeli athletes and their trainers 
at the Munich Olympics.54 Though directed at a US client, this action was 
bloody enough to grab the US government’s attention, putting terms like 
“international terrorism” and “counterterrorism” into Washington security 
elites’ cultural vocabulary for the fi rst time (Naftali 2005). The Offi ce for 
Combating Terrorism was initiated in the State Department.
After the Olympics attack, the pace of resistance terrorist acts quick-
ened: on 2 March 1973 the US ambassador to Sudan was assassinated by 
Black September; on 4 May 1973 the US consul general was kidnapped 
in Mexico by the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces; on 17 December 
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1973 fi ve terrorists from an unknown organization attacked Pan Am Flight 
110 in Rome, killing thirty-one; on 19 August 1974 the US ambassador to 
Cyprus was shot and killed by a sniper outside his embassy; on 27 January 
1975 Puerto Rican nationalists bombed a Wall Street bar, killing four and 
injuring sixty. A 1976 CIA report noted an “enduring upsurge” in terrorism 
since 1967 (Milbank 1976: 1). The CIA certainly seemed correct, as on 
4 February 1979 the US ambassador to Afghanistan was assassinated in 
Kabul.
Finally, on 4 November 1979 there came a dramatic blow: Iranian stu-
dents took the entire US embassy in Tehran hostage. Everyone watched 
it live on television. It was the fi rst reality TV, and it starred President 
Carter’s impotence at freeing the hostages. One colleague remarked to 
me at the time, “He can’t get it up to get ’em out.” But Carter did try to 
“get it up.” Operation Eagle Claw was sent with Delta Force Special Ops 
to rescue the hostages on 24 April 1980. Unfortunately, the eagle crash-
landed—literally—because the operation’s commanders forgot to account 
for the haboob (Persian for “dust storm”). The storm occurred, the mission’s 
helicopters malfunctioned, and the mission was aborted, leaving Carter 
looking even more impotent, his political career terminated. At this mo-
ment, Secretary of State Vance chose to resign.
So by 1980, as Brian Jenkins (1980: 1) put it in a Rand Corporation 
report, “terrorism” had “become part of our daily news diet. Hardly a day 
passes without news of an assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking, or 
bombing somewhere.” Security elites, especially those destined to occupy 
positions in the Reagan administration, got it: terrorism was part of the 
“daily … diet,” and it could be politically devastating. Carter was savaged 
by reality TV that portrayed him as hopeless and hapless against terrorists. 
The rabbit didn’t get him—the media did, which had implications for war-
ring in Libya.
The Making of a New Monster-Alterity:
Reagan thought the hostage crisis … had condemned the Carter administra-
tion … [so when he] came into offi ce … hostages and terrorism were on ev-
eryone’s mind. (Nicolas Veliotes, assistant secretary of State, 1981–1984, in 
Toaldo 2008: 58)
Nicolas Veliotes, Rock and Roll Hall of Famer Johnny Otis’s younger 
brother, was assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs at the out-
set of Reagan’s administration. Veliotes reported that Reagan attributed 
Carter’s loss to the terrorism of the “hostage crisis.” This meant that a 
new, job-threatening hermeneutic puzzle faced the incoming administra-
tion: How to deal with international terrorism? During the transition—the 
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period between the election and the inauguration of a new president—
the CIA, along with other agencies, was asked to prepare position papers 
suggesting courses of action for the incoming president. Elaine Morton, a 
State Department offi cial, recollected a conclusion of these documents: 
“The issue of international terrorism was used to demonstrate that the US 
could be forceful again. In a sense, terrorism was the weapon of the weak. 
Weak countries were starting to use it successfully against us so we had to 
fi ght against the instability brought by international terrorism in order to 
maintain our hegemony” (in Toaldo 2008: 58–59). A central point of this 
quotation is that even before Reagan took offi ce there was understanding 
that the US “had to fi ght … terrorism … to maintain our hegemony.” Note 
the verb is strong. The US “had to” fi ght—not should fi ght or might fi ght, 
but had to fi ght. If the term “hegemony” is replaced with “empire,” and 
if “terrorism” is understood as US security elites’ interpretation of the re-
sistance produced by the dominator/dominated contradiction, then what 
Morton was saying was that resistance terrorism so threatened the empire’s 
reproductive vulnerability that it “had” to “fi ght” it.
Reagan accepted this view. In a welcoming speech (27 January 1981) 
for the hostages freed from their Iranian captivity, he warned, “Let terror-
ists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, 
our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution” (Reagan 1981). 
The next day, Alexander Haig reiterated Reagan’s point in a way that em-
phasized the new administration’s difference from Carter’s, when he said, 
“terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern, because it 
is the ultimate abuse of human rights” (in Stanik 2003: 34). Carter had 
made defense of human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy. Reagan 
assigned terrorism to take this place in his foreign policy.
A hermeneutic politics emerged in the fi rst year of the Reagan adminis-
tration concerning procedural diffi culties in the fi ght against terrorism. A 
fi rst issue was the trouble of detecting terrorists who operated in secrecy. 
How could you deliver “swift … retribution” without knowing who did the 
act? A second set of questions turned on terrorism’s relationship to the So-
viets. There were some, notably the CIA’s Casey, who believed the USSR 
managed a vast terrorist network. Others, largely in the State Department, 
were less convinced of Soviet terrorist activities.55 These debates were re-
solved in two National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) and the 
founding of several institutions to wage the fi ght against terrorism.
Reagan signed the fi rst of the directives, NSDD 30 on “Managing Ter-
rorist Incidents,” on 10 April 1982. It announced that “the United States 
is committed, as a matter of national policy, to oppose terrorism domesti-
cally and internationally” (NSDD 30 1982: 1). NSDD 30 further specifi ed 
who, in what institutions, would combat terrorism. Authority to combat 
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terrorism was delegated to “lead agencies.” These were the State Depart-
ment for international terrorism and the FBI for domestic terrorism. For 
any terrorist incident, a Special Situation Group was to convene to advise 
the president. A Terrorist Incident Working Group drawing its member-
ship from a number of government agencies was formed to “support” the 
Special Situation Group (ibid.: 2). An Interdepartmental Group on Ter-
rorism, chaired by the State Department, was to “be responsible for the 
development of overall US policy on terrorism” (ibid.: 2). NSDD 30 made 
combating terrorism “national policy” and identifi ed the agencies to lead 
the combat.
Reagan next signed NSDD 138 (3 April 1984) after an especially grim 
upsurge of Middle Eastern terrorism. On 3 October 1983, the Islamic Jihad 
Organization bombed the US Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 sol-
diers and wounding 60 others. For the Marines, it was the largest number 
of casualties since the Battle of Iwo Jima in World War II. A little over 
three months later the same group struck again, assassinating the president 
of the American University in Beirut (18 January 1984). Two months af-
ter that Hezbollah kidnapped, tortured, and killed the CIA Beirut station 
chief. A diffi culty posed by these attacks is that it was not entirely clear 
who did them. For example, no one really knew who the Islamic Jihad Or-
ganization were—perhaps Hezbollah, perhaps not. NSDD 138 attempted 
to address this, among other, problems.
It was largely the work of Robert C. McFarlane, then Reagan’s NSA. 
NSDD 138 remains secret; all that is publicly available of it is an extract 
prepared by NSC staff. The extract begins by announcing that terrorism 
“is a threat to our national security” (NSDD 138 Extract 1984: 1). The 
extract proclaimed, “States that actively practice terrorism or actively 
support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence” (ibid.: 1). 
This was an attempt to solve the problem of the elusiveness of terrorists. 
If particular terrorist perpetrators were diffi cult to identify, the states that 
supported them were less so, and any state that sponsored terrorism would 
suffer the “consequence.”
Still, secret portions of the “directive endorsed, in principle, the use of 
‘proactive’ operations—that is preemptive raids and retaliatory strikes—to 
fi ght terrorist organizations and states that support them” (Stanik 2002: 
93). News of this aspect of NSDD 138 reached the press. The Los Angeles 
Times stated that “Reagan had signed a new policy directive that autho-
rized the use of preemptive strikes … against terrorists operating overseas” 
(ibid.: 93). This meant that violent force was to be the “consequence” 
meted out to terrorists before they did anything. Remember that the “old 
boys” had explicitly rejected the idea of preemptive warfare at the found-
ing of the New American Empire. NSDD 138 approved it. The directive 
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also authorized formation of CIA and FBI covert action teams to adminis-
ter the violence. NSDD 30 made it US policy to oppose terrorism. NSDD 
138 made it clear that this was because terrorism threatened US “security,” 
that states sponsoring terrorism would be targets of US violent force, and 
that this force might be preemptive.
Together, the two NSDDs specifi ed a new iteration of the global dom-
ination public délire, that of “anti-terrorism,” with the hermeneutic that 
if responsible offi cials perceptually found terrorists, they were procedur-
ally authorized to use violent force against them. Further, this public délire 
may said to have spawned a new monster-alterity—not a political regime, 
like the old Soviet monster-alterity, but a particular choreographing of 
violence: that of terrorists. Fervent Security Elites 2.0, like Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver North of “Irangate” notoriety, urged racing out and killing 
“cocksucker” terrorists (B. Woodward 1987: 361). What does all this have 
to do with Libya? It is time to explain why Reagan and his Security Elites 
2.0 went after “cocksucker” Libyans.
“Special Attention”—The Should, Could, and Did of Global War on Libya: 
The Reagan administration attacked Libya because it should and it could, 
and so it did. First consider the “should” of Libya I. The new anti-terrorist 
public délire was a general proposition. US government policy prescribed 
that it should go after terrorists anywhere. Some reason or reasons were 
needed to apply it to Libya. Actually, Libya had been in the crosshairs 
well before Reagan took offi ce. On 2 December 1979 a mob demonstrat-
ing support for the taking of Americans hostage in Tehran attacked and 
burned the US embassy in Libya’s capital, Tripoli. Carter’s government 
responded by formally designating Libya a state sponsor of terrorism (Van-
dewalle 1998). Why?
The reason has to do with the way Gaddafi  positioned Libya vis-à-vis 
the dominator/dominated contradiction. Under Idris I, who ruled Libya as 
a king, there was “support for pro-Western regimes” (El-Kikhia 1997: 66), 
so much so that Libya became known as “a base for Imperialism” (J. Wright 
1989: 84). Further, Idris’s government showered “unabashed distribution 
of wealth to its friends,” that is, to its wealthy supporters (El-Kikhia 1997: 
72). Gaddafi  had been born in open desert south of the city of Sirte, the 
son of a semi-nomad. He was sent at ten to school in Sirte, where he was 
treated as a poor bedu (pastoralist). Four years later he was sent to the 
Sebha Preparatory School, where he began “to feed his new-found interest 
in current affairs by listening to the radio, turning mostly to the Nasserist, 
anti-Western ‘Voice of the Arabs’ … and by absorbing forbidden books 
and pamphlets.” (J. Wright 1989: 125).56 As a result, there formed an anti-
imperialist who became a military offi cer and then, with certain fellow of-
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fi cers, led a coup that swept the reactionary Idris I from his throne. The 
new regime made it crystal clear where it stood. Gaddafi  announced, “We 
support all the world liberation movements” (in Sicker 1984: 124).
He was specifi c about opposing the US, announcing over Tripoli ra-
dio, “America is determined to subjugate the Arab homeland to its inter-
ests and its will. We on our part, are determined to resist America” (ibid.: 
127). And Gaddafi  did resist, by closing the US’s Libyan military base, na-
tionalizing oil, supporting and fi nancing the Palestinian cause, promoting 
anti-imperialist attitudes, and intervening regionally to challenge West-
ern-oriented leaders, all undertakings facilitated by his oil wealth. Addi-
tionally, the regime stopped Idris’s practice of rewarding his “friends” and 
initiated one of aiding the poor, for as Ahmida (2005: 82) has reported, 
“The Libyan revolution brought about many positive changes for ordinary 
Libyans (especially women) including free medical care, a modern infra-
structure, and free education.” Libya was not only fi ghting imperialism, 
it was aiding its “ordinary” folk, and it was doing so using wealth derived 
from its Western oil sales. Imperialist dollars were paying for Libyan resis-
tance to imperialism.
Briefi ng of the incoming Reagan administration during the transition in-
cluded reports of Libyan resistance. For example, one of the papers passed 
to Reaganites was “Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980,” an annual 
survey of terrorist events conducted by the CIA’s National Foreign Assess-
ment Center (NFAC 1981). It began by announcing that there were “more 
casualties” from terrorism “in 1980 than in any year since the analysis of 
statistics related to terrorism began in 1968” (NFAC 1981: ii). Americans 
were identifi ed as terrorism’s “primary targets” (ibid.). Importantly, NFAC 
judged, “The government of Colonel Qadhafi  is the most prominent state 
sponsor of and participant in international terrorism” (ibid.: 9). Remember 
that three days into offi ce, Casey received the “Libya: Arms and Vulnera-
bilities” SNIE, which announced that Libya, with its aggressive support for 
terrorists, posed “a growing challenge to U.S. and Western interests” (in 
Burr and Collins 1999: 139). Libya was the “most prominent” sponsor of 
resistance terrorism.
Reagan’s Security Elites 2.0 perceived that Gaddafi  had closed the US 
airbase in Libya. He had nationalized Libyan oil. He supported liberation 
movements throughout the world. He tried to topple “moderate” leaders 
(i.e., US clients). Worst, he took dollars earned from selling oil to the US 
Leviathan and its clients and used them to attack the US Leviathan and 
its clients. Shultzian Permission should be given, because nothing peace-
ful stopped the string of anti-imperial resistance. Hence, Reagan and his 
henchmen interpreted Gaddafi  and his henchmen as “terrorist goons.” Ac-
cordingly, Gaddafi , because of his “support for international terrorism,” was 
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“selected for special attention” at the very fi rst (21 January 1981) meeting 
of Reagan’s NSC (in Stanik 2002: 32). This was the “should” of the matter. 
Next considered is the “could.”
On the same day that Reagan signed NSDD 138, Secretary of State 
Shultz gave a speech in which he identifi ed Iran, Syria, North Korea, and 
Libya as state sponsors of terrorism (ibid.: 94). In effect, Shultz was saying 
that America was threatened by a number of terrorist monster-alterities. 
Libya was certainly a resister of the New American Empire but—and this 
is crucial—to the US, Libya was an annoying fl y. Why waste time swatting 
the fl y? Why were other state-sponsors of terrorism not selected for “spe-
cial attention”? Not all terrorist monster-alterities are the same.
Raymond Tanter, an NSC member at the time, remembered, “Libya was 
more doable: it had fewer friends than Syria because it wasn”t really in the 
Soviet orbit. … On the other hand, the resupply of our troops would have 
been easier in the case of Libya because we could go there from Great Brit-
ain through Spain” (in Toaldo 2008: 66). Robert Gates, also at the NSC 
at the time, supports Tanter by saying that security offi cials believed that 
an attack on Iran would just “piss them off” and one against Syria would 
have an even worse consequence because it would “bring a confl ict with 
the Soviets” (Gates [1996] 2007: 351). Consequently, Libya “became the 
target for U.S. retaliation against all state-supported terrorism” because “it 
was in the poorest position to sustain itself against U.S. action” (ibid.: 352). 
So the Security Elites 2.0 did Libya because it was “doable”—or at least, 
they thought it was.
Each of the bouts of warring in Libya I was sparked by implementation 
of the anti-terrorist hermeneutic. Consider the fi rst August 1981 Gulf of 
Sirte naval engagement. As has just been shown, the transition papers 
prepared for the incoming Reagan administration identifi ed Libya as a ter-
ror-sponsoring state, and on day two of his presidency Reagan had warned, 
“terrorists beware.” This was a perceptual cultural interpretation. The pro-
cedural cultural response was to send the navy into the Gulf of Sirte, with 
the result being the downing of two Libyan planes. While conducting this 
overt warring, the Security Elites 2.0 began covert warring against Libya in 
Chad. Why Chad? This has to do with the earlier discussed SNIE on Libya 
that Casey had read in his fi rst week in offi ce, which had pointed out that 
Gaddafi ’s regional opponents (Egypt and Sudan) were “quietly bleeding 
Gaddafi  at his most vulnerable point—his over extension in Chad” (Stanik 
2002: 40). Casey and, then, Secretary of State Haig thought “bleeding” 
was great. They believed “that a Libyan defeat in Chad would foment wide-
spread disaffection within the offi cer corps of the Libyan armed forces,” 
and that Habré could hand Gaddafi  this “defeat” because they found him 
to be the “quintessential desert warrior” (ibid.). In sum, Casey and Haig, 
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using the SNIE, arrived at a procedural interpretation of what to do about 
Gaddafi , which was that the way to eliminate him was through Chad. They 
made their case to Reagan, who concurred with their interpretation and 
signed a covert “fi nding” (February 1981) supporting Habré. Covert oper-
ations were under way by the summer of 1981 and would last until 1988.
Operations Prairie Fire and Ghost Rider in 1986 were directly tied to 
particular terrorist incidents. Earlier in 1985 terrorists hijacked TWA 
Flight 847 (14 June), and later that year (27 December) they attacked the 
Rome and Vienna airports, with serious loss of life. The Reagan adminis-
tration claimed Libya was responsible for them. The next year Reagan’s 
security elite believed they had acquired “smoking gun” evidence of Libya’s 
involvement in the 5 April 1986 attack on the La Belle discotheque in West 
Berlin, which killed one US soldier and injured sixty others (Gates [1996] 
2007: 353).57 At a (mid July 1985) meeting of the security elite after the 
TWA hijacking, McFarlane opened by asserting that economic sanctions 
and diplomacy had failed against Gaddafi . Casey, Shultz, and Weinberger 
agreed (B. Woodward 1987: 409). This meant that nonviolent procedures 
had failed. It was time for violence. McFarlane (NSA), Poindexter (dep-
uty NSA), and North (deputy director NSC for politico-military affairs) 
proposed a full-scale US and Egyptian invasion of Libya. This was voted 
down at a 22 July NSC meeting (Gates 2007: 353). Reagan recorded in his 
diary that at a later National Security PlanningGroup meeting on 6 Jan-
uary 1986 he exhorted, “We must do something in view of the massacres 
in the airports of Rome and Vienna” (Reagan [2007] 2009: 381), and so 
they did, proceeding to the aerial raids that were Operations Prairie Fire 
and Ghost Rider.
The fi nal US overt attack on Libya, the 3 January 1989 raid, followed the 
pattern of the previous two attacks. First, there was a terrorist incident. In 
the case of the 3 January attack there were two incidents. The fi rst was Pan 
Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 Decem-
ber 1988, killing everyone on board. It was suspected and then concluded, 
to the satisfaction of the Security Elites 2.0, that Gaddafi  was behind the 
bombing of Flight 103.58 Then, to make matters worse, in December of 
1988 US intelligence discovered that the Libyans were building a chemical 
weapons plant at Rabta. Such a plant would open a whole new realm of 
possibilities for Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. Reagan ([2007] 2009: 664) 
remarked in his diary that the “plant … threatens the entire Middle East.” 
These cultural perceptions of a terribly threatening Libya were passed on 
as orders to the US navy to proceed once more into the Gulf of Sirte, once 
again with fatal consequences for elements of the Libyan air force.
Observe the string of events in this global warring. First there was a 
terrorist incident or incidents. Next the anti-terrorist iteration operated 
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with a perceptual cultural interpretation that the terrorism resulted from 
Libyan state-sponsored terrorism, provoking a procedural cultural inter-
pretation to attack Libya. Finally there was the attack.
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan (1988: 329) remarked, concerning 
the April 1986 attack on Gaddafi ’s residence, “however much it may 
have shocked liberal opinion here and abroad, it had a chilling effect on 
state-sponsored terrorism.” This view is correct but for reasons the Rea-
ganites might not imagine. Jentleson (2006: 47) and Whytock, following 
a survey of the evidence bearing upon terrorism during and following the 
Reagan years, concluded that exercise of military force against resistance 
terrorism “largely failed” to stop it. In fact, according to another source, 
“Between 1989 and the end of the twentieth century, militant Islamist 
groups became more violent and thus posed an increased threat for the 
United States and its allies” (Couch 2010: 17). Reagan’s aggression to-
ward Libya did not stop the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, and 
certainly this attack had a chilling effect on the opinion that Reagan had 
solved the problem of terrorism. Let us recapitulate the arguments con-
cerning the global warring in Libya I. 
Gradually, dominated peoples in the 1970s and 1980s got it: there was a 
new imperial dominator out there in very late modernity the New Ameri-
can Empire. Opposition to it increased, which can be explained as the dom-
inated resisting oppression and exploitation. The Security Elites 2.0 had a 
radically different understanding of the situation. They saw resistance as 
terrorism, an intensifi er of the dominator/dominated contradiction that 
threatened US “security,” and consequently was a serious reproductive 
vulnerability. This provoked hermeneutic politics to fi x the vulnerability, 
which was fi xed by instituting the new anti-terrorist iteration of the global 
domination public délire.
When Reagan’s security elite perceived the failure of nonviolent ways of 
stopping Gaddafi ’s support of terrorism, they granted Shultzian Permission 
and implemented the anti-terrorist public délire. In part they did so be-
cause Tripoli, notwithstanding its oil wealth, was so weak they could. The 
ensuing global warring, Reagan’s “obsession,” lasted from 1981 through 
1988. It “largely failed.” Resistance terrorism persisted—as did Gaddafi , 
though he had been categorized as a terrorist monster, and would face 
troubles ahead, a topic in a later chapter. 
Conclusion
To review this chapter’s work: Dylan got people in the 1970s and 1980s 
thinking that the times were “a-changin’.” They were. The contradictory 
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currents in the seas of modernity were altered: economic contradictions 
intensifi ed; political ones were more complex. The inter-imperial contra-
diction led to violence in the Americas and a fi nal fl are-up with the Bear 
during the Soviet-Afghanistan War, but abruptly relaxed with the Soviet 
Union’s demise. The dominated/dominator contradiction intensifi ed after 
the Vietnam War as some dominated folk resorted to resistance terrorism 
against the American imperium. Political and economic contradictions 
coalesced.
In their different ways, the wars analyzed in this chapter were responses 
to the shifting contradictory forces, the strings of events in each war being 
consistent with the global warring theory. The Bear went over the moun-
tain in Afghanistan I, intensifying the inter-imperial contradiction. Shult-
zian Permission was granted when Islamic rebels starting fi ghting, making 
peaceful fi xes moot; whereupon US security elites, operating on the basis 
of the global domination public délire, went after the Soviet monster-al-
terity. The Iran-Iraq War responded to intensifi cation of the land/capital 
contradiction. Shultzian Permission was granted because once Baghdad 
and Tehran began hositilities, the US had to participate militarily or risk 
losing considerable control over Persian Gulf oil. Carter and Reagan in-
stituted the oil-control iteration of the global domination public délire, 
and Reagan conducted US military operations by implementing it. Finally, 
Libya I was a response to intensifi cation of the dominator/dominated con-
tradiction in a situation where the control of oil was an issue. Shultzian 
Permission was granted because Gaddafi ’s provocations did not cease. To 
address this reproductive vulnerability Reagan instituted and implemented 
the anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public délire.
So some of the changes Dylan sung about in the 1970s and 1980s were 
in the means of interpretation of violence. After 1989, the NSC 68 itera-
tion of the global domination public délire faded. In very late modernity 
the New American Empire would be guided to battle by the oil-control 
and anti-terrorist iterations of the global domination public délire. The 
consequences of these changes are the story of the following chapters.
Notes
1. The old boys were either dead (Forrestal, Stimson, and Marshall) or ancient and super-
annuated (Truman, Acheson, Kennan, and Lovett). You read about them in books. Charlie 
Wilson, for example, a key player in the Soviet-Afghan War, remembered reading “Kennan’s 
prescription for dealing with Communism” (in Crile 2003: 26). 
2. Reagan had been in the army during World War II. Far from any combat, he made pro-
paganda movies. However, Bush I was a naval pilot and had been shot down in the Pacifi c. 
Alexander Haig, Reagan’s fi rst secretary of state (1981–1982) fought as an army offi cer in 
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both Korea and Vietnam, and was awarded medals for valor. George Shultz was a World War 
II combat Marine Corps offi cer. Casper Weinberger was a World War II army infantry offi cer. 
CIA Director William Casey was an OSS offi cer. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan was a 
Marine present at the battles of Guadalcanal and Okinawa. Younger members of Reagan’s 
security elite included NSA Colonel Bud MacFarlane (1983–1985), a Marine offi cer in Viet-
nam; NSA Admiral John Poindexter (1985–1986), commander of a naval destroyer squadron; 
NSA Frank Carlucci (1986–1987), a naval offi cer in the Korean War; and NSA General Colin 
Powell (1987–1989), an army offi cer in Vietnam.
3. Harvey (2005), Duménil and Lévy (2011), Campbell (2005), and Stedman-Jones 
(2012) analyze neoliberalism.
4. Free trade zones, also termed Export Processing Zones (EPZs), are areas within a coun-
try, situated in places favorable to trade (e.g. rivers, ports), where goods may arrive or be 
exported, manufactured or reconfi gured, under relaxed tax regimes. They have become “the 
predominant locations for light industrial manusfacturing, with around seventy million work-
ers in 3,500 EPZs” (Neveling 2015: 64). They have been largely placed in developing coun-
tries with low labor costs.
5. A “derivative” is a fi nancial instrument—created by agreement between two people or 
parties—whose value is determined by an agreed price of an asset. Profi ts are made on deriva-
tives when a person contracts to sell an asset at a price that turns out to be above the market 
price. For example, I might contract in January to sell a bushel of corn at $5. If the harvest 
has been abundant and the corn sells in September for $3 dollars per bushel, then I make a 
handsome profi t because due to my derivative contract I sell at $5. 
A collateralized debit obligation (CDO) is a security backed by a pool of bonds, loans, and 
other assets. If the pooled assets of a CDO remain good, its owner receives a profi t. If they 
do not, perhaps the CDO holder should have arranged a credit default swap (CDS). A CDS 
is a contract in which the buyer of the CDS pays the seller a certain sum to ensure the buyer 
receives a payoff if a given credit instrument (typically a bond or loan) goes into default. That 
is, the buyer of a CDS acquires protection against a credit instrument going bad. A mort-
gage-backed security (MBS) is an asset-backed security or debt obligation that represents a 
claim on the cash fl ows from mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property. MBSs 
became worthless when poor mortgage holders started being unable to make their mortgage 
payments in 2006.
6. Weart (2008), Giddens (2009), and Joshua Howe (2014) discuss the hermeneutic pol-
itics of global warming.
7. The environmentalist/anti-environmentalist debate over global warming has been 
nasty, brutish, and long. A good point of insertion to it is Michael Crichton’s State of Fear 
(2004), a novel depicting eco-activists as terrorists. 
8. Development of the oil industry is discussed in Adelman (1995), Bromley (1991), Yetiv 
(2004), Yergin (1993), Juhasz (2009), and Mitchell (2011).
9. Kobrin (1984) and Ayoub (1994) provide an overview of oil nationalization. Petras, 
Morley, and Smith (1977) discuss it in Venezuela, Brown (1979) in Iraq, Elm (1994) in Iran.
10. Ghadar (1977), Terzian (1985), and Euclid Rose (2004) document OPEC.
11. Films of the US evacuation of the Saigon Embassy can be viewed on YouTube (Laurie 
2010).
12. The notion of strategic insolvency appears to be been introduced by Walter Lippmann 
(1943).
13. Persons working for the Republican Party burgled the Democratic National Head-
quarters at the Watergate Apartments on 17 June 1972. The robbery became the “Watergate 
Scandal,” which Nixon tried unsuccessfully to cover up. 
14. Since the end of World War II, sixteen acronyms have been used for federal national 
security directives. “NSC,” made famous by NSC 68, was used from the Truman through the 
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Ford administrations. The “PD” acronym was favored during Carter’s administration (Relyea 
2007)
15. Said (2001), Gusterson (2005), and Fox (2005) offer criticism of The Clash of Civilizations.
16. Carter’s proposed energy policy was in considerable measure the work of S. David 
Freeman. In the early 1970s Freeman had been the director of energy policy at the Ford 
Foundation and authored the report A Time to Choose: America’s Energy Future (1974), which 
became “the foundation of Carter’s energy policy” (Freeman 2007). Freeman, an engineer, 
was able to digest the data warning of peak oil and communicate its signifi cance to Carter, 
another engineer (Kreisler 2003: 2).
17. The “attack rabbit” incident was as follows: Carter was in Plains fi shing in a canoe on 
20 April 1979, when a rabbit, chased by hounds, jumped in the water and swam toward the 
canoe. The media made this into a big story.
18. Rich (2005), Weidenbaum (2011), and Abelson (2006) provide accounts of the rise 
and infl uence of think tanks in the US. The Brookings Institution, founded in 1916, was the 
fi rst think tank.
19. Discussions of neoconservatism can be found in Stelzer (2004), Steinfels (1979) and 
Irving Kristol (1995). 
20. My mother surprised me by remarking that she had gone on one date with Reagan 
when he was a baseball announcer on Des Moines radio. I asked her what she had thought 
of him. She took a long drag on a Marlboro, refl ected a while, and said, “I can’t remember.” 
21. There is a considerable literature discussing Reaganomics, some supportive (Niskanen 
1988); much critical from both conservative (Bartlett 2009) and progressive (Scheer 2010) 
perspectives.
22. US warring in the Americas occurred in the Caribbean (Grenada 1983); in Central 
America (El Salvador 1981, Panama 1989, and Nicaragua 1981–1989), and throughout South 
America (Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Bolivia). With the exceptions of 
Grenada and Panama, the US was not a direct participant in these hostilities. Intervention 
occurred because Security Elites 2.0 believed a country was in danger of becoming communist 
due to Soviet or Cuban subversion. Hence, intensifi cation of the inter-imperial contradiction, 
in ways that elites believed harmed the US, led to hostilities. Additionally, as Greg Grandin 
(2006: 6) has put it, the wars involved “imperial violence through proxies”; that is, Washing-
ton made indirect war, keeping its hand largely covert. A particular institution, the School 
of the Americas, was especially important as a US army training center for Latin American 
offi cers. Founded in 1946 in the Panama Canal Zone as the Latin America Ground School, 
it became the School of Americas in 1946 and moved to Fort Benning in Georgia in 1983, 
becoming in 2001 the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation. By the early 
twenty-fi rst century it had trained over 60,000 offi cers in combat-related skills, especially 
those related to counterinsurgency. The SOA took young military offi cers, often trained to 
conduct warfare against external foes, and taught them the skills of massacring, torturing, and 
raping their own. All the while, as Lesley Gill notes (2004: 66), it facilitated their acquisition 
of, “the ideology of the ‘American way of life’ by steeping them into a vision of empire that 
identifi ed their aspirations with those of the United States.” The resulting confl icts have been 
termed “dirty wars” because they featured massacres, torture, and rape; and because it is so 
often diffi cult to distinguish insurgents from noncombatants, meaning that those abused tend 
to be peasant or urban poor civilians. In sum, SOA transformed Latin American offi cers into 
hybrid imperial elites who killed their own because it was the “American way.”
23. The phrase “the Bear went over the mountains” seems to have originated in a col-
lection of junior Soviet offi cers’ vignettes of their combat in Afghanistan. The US military 
became interested in the text for its “tips” on how to fi ght mujahideen (Grau 1996).
24. Useful references concerning Afghanistan I from the US perspective include Coll 
(2004) and Crile (2003); from that of Russian soldiers Alexievich (1992) and from that of a 
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Russian journalist Borovik (1990). Girardet (2011), Hauner (1991), Amin (1984), Overholt 
(1980), and Kakar (1995) are accounts of the war at its different stages. Roy (1990) and Fiefer 
(2009) offer general accounts.
25. The question of whether Amin had CIA ties remains unsolved. Western sources tend 
to dismiss it. Bonosky (1985: 30–42) makes the case that Amin had them. In the early 1960s 
Amin had studied at Columbia’s Teachers College, where he became head of the Afghan Stu-
dent Association. In 1967 Ramparts, a left-wing Catholic journal, revealed that the CIA had 
covertly funded international student groups since the 1950s, including the Afghan Student 
Association (S. Stern 1967). If Amin was ever recruited by the CIA, it was likely during his 
Columbia days.
26. Gorbachev said in his memoirs (2003: x) that his perspective was inspired by Alex-
ander Dubchek’s “socialism with a human face,” which prevailed during Dubchek’s 1968 re-
forms that were crushed by Brezhnev. Others have said that Gorbachev, who was Andropov’s 
protégé, was actually trying to implement his mentor’s views (Konchalovsky 2011).
27. Morris claims that the US began Afghan operations in fall 1978, an earlier start than 
that named by Robert Gates, then on the National Security Council, who has them beginning 
in July 1979 ([1996] 2007: 146). I am unable to verify which assertion is correct. Blum (1995: 
345), however, reported that the CIA began training mujahideen in Pakistan in 1978.
28. Steve Coll, who has written extensively on the Afghanistan I War, has asserted that 
“any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism” (2004: 
581). I disagree. In the late 1960s Brzezinski was developing the Islamic card hermeneutic. In 
1977, he set up the inter-agency NWG to help implement it. In 1978, the Saur Revolution 
and the ensuing mujahideen rebellion gave him the opportunity to try it in Afghanistan. From 
March through July 1979 a meeting string through Brzezinski’s SCC transformed the Islamic 
card hermeneutic from a mere hermeneutic into an authorized public délire. Brzezinski (1998: 
76) admitted as much in an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur when he declared, “We 
didn”t push the Soviet’s to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they 
would.” At this juncture, Brzezinski’s interviewer pointed out that the Soviets had stated that 
one of the reasons they invaded Afghanistan was to combat secret US involvement there. 
The interviewer asks Brzezinski if he “regrets” this. Brzezinski (1998: 76) bragged in response: 
“Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of driving the 
Russians into the Afghan trap. … Moscow had to carry on a war … that brought about the de-
moralization and fi nally the breaking up of the Soviet empire.” Coll may doubt that Brzezinski 
“lured” the Russians into Afghanistan. Brzezinski, to the contrary, boasts about it, believing it 
destroyed the Soviet Union.
29. Wilson’s role in Afghanistan I is told in a book by Crile (2003), which was made into 
the popular movie Charlie Wilson’s War (2007). Coll (2004: 125–125) describes the decision 
making that led up to NSDD 166.
30. It has been claimed that the Stingers were “decisive” in the war (Crile 2003: 437). 
Malley (2002) and Peter Scott (2003) believe otherwise. Only 500 Stingers were introduced. 
They were operational less than two months before the Politburo’s decision to end the war. 
There were too few Stingers and too little time for them to be decisive. More important in 
ending the war was Gorbachev’s desire to restructure the Soviet Union, which started with 
pulling out of Brezhnev’s folly.
31. Gorbachev (2003) himself supports this view, insisting that the Soviet Union was de-
stroyed by internal developments. 
32. Works by Murray and Woods (2014), Hiro (1991), Karsh (2002), Bullock and Morris 
(1989), and Pelletiere (1992) are useful. Rajaee (1997) offers Iranian perspectives upon the 
war.
33. Baathism, the ideology adhered to by the Baathist political party, has been important 
in Iraq and Syria since 1963. Michel Afl aq and Zaki al-Asuzi were its key founders in the late 
1930s and 1940s. Their ideology was a mixture of socialism, nationalism, and Pan-Arabism 
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inspired less by Islam than by European nationalism (Choueiri 2000: 154–157, 197–206). 
Sami al-Jundi has said of al-Asuzi’s Baathism, “We were racists. We admired the Nazis” (in 
Perdue 2012: 72). Of course, there were many racists in the US and Europe who admired 
Nazis in the late 1930s. 
34. A “44” was a 44-caliber revolver used in the Old West. Made by Remington, it com-
peted with the Colt 45 and was arguably the preferred sidearm.
35. Priest (2004: 53) usefully describes the commanders in chief.
36. Iraq had been allied with the USSR since 1958 and in 1972 had signed a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation.
37. Timmerman describes what the weapons were, their costs, and who they came from 
(1991: 419–424). The Germans and the French were major weapons suppliers.
38. The US also provided some limited military support to Iran. This was illegal and be-
came the basis of the Iran Contra Affair (L. Walsh 1998). However, Brzezinski had set Wash-
ington on the road to favoring Baghdad, a road on which the Reagan administration drove 
long and fast.
39. Seymour Hersh (1987), the journalist who revealed the US military’s 1969 My Lai mas-
sacre of Vietnamese civilians, also reported a Reagan administration “obsession” with Libya.
40. Sirte has a number of spellings in English texts. Sidra and Surt are often employed.
41. The major exception is Stanik (2003). 
42. The homophobia of Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz is striking. At one meeting, 
still fi xated on the Libyan leader’s fl amboyant attire, Reagan wisecracked, “Why not invite 
Gaddafi  to San Francisco, he likes to dress up so much” (San Francisco being considered a gay 
paradise at the time), to which Shultz snorted, “Why don’t we give him AIDS?” (in Woodward 
1987: 474).
43. Gaddafi ’s expansion of Libya’s territorial waters to include the entire Gulf of Sirte 
has been treated as an example of his megalomania. In fact, the gulf is a rich fi shing grounds 
where bluefi n tuna is especially abundant. The expansion of territorial waters was an attempt 
to protect Libya’s fi shermen from developed countries’ fi shing industries. 
44. A carrier battle group consisted of one aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, two 
anti-aircraft warships, and two anti-submarine destroyers or frigates.
45. Just as the Nazi Luftwaffe used Spanish cities as targets to test their new bombers 
during the Spanish Civil War, so the US military profi ted from Operation Ghost Rider’s use 
of Libyan targets to try out their new laser-guided missile systems. Hersh (1987) claimed that 
four of the nine systems on F-111s attacking Gaddafi  failed. 
46. The term “contra,” Spanish for “overthrow,” was an abbreviation of contrarrevolución. 
47. This section has used information from Ralph McGehee’s (1996) CIABASE. McGe-
hee is a former CIA offi cer. CIABASE is an Internet database from public sources.
48. The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the largest and most infl uential Islamist movements. 
Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, it combines political activism with Islamic charity, and 
holds the Koran and Sunnah to constitute the perfect form of social and political organization. 
It has been infl uential throughout the Islamic world since the 1960s (Pargeter 2010).
49. A general understanding of Chad’s civil wars can be found in Azevedo (1998) and 
Reyna (2003b). Buijtenhuijs (1978) has written a rich account of the rise of FROLINAT. John 
Wright (1989) discusses Libya’s interests in the Central Sahara.
50. The French, in Operations Manta (1983) and Epervier (1986), did directly intervene 
in Chad with ground troops and fi ghter aircraft.
51. Habré governed in Chad as something of a US client until December 1990. His rule 
became increasingly authoritarian and repressive. With CIA assistance, he created an internal 
security service, the Documentation and Security Directorate, which murdered and tortured 
many people in conjunction with other police agencies (Human Rights Watch 2005). Ru-
mor has it that Habré bought land in Colorado, perhaps as a retirement retreat. He never 
made it there. His increasingly brutal dictatorship was overthrown, with French assistance, 
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by Idriss Déby, once Habré’s army commander. In 2000 Habré was indicted for crimes against 
humanity.
52. There has been an enormous growth of terrorist studies since 9/11, a discipline that, 
according to Michael Howard, “attracts phonys and amateurs as a candle attracts moths” (in 
Hoffman 2008: 136). Crenshaw (1994), Laqueur (2000), and Hoffman (2006) provide useful 
introductions to the topic. 
53. Neocons (Boot 2011) have criticized Pape and Feldman’s position as unpersuasive.
54. The Munich Massacre was planned by Abu Daoud, who joined the Palestinian resis-
tance after witnessing the murder of family members and neighbors by Israeli commandos. He 
claimed that the operation was planned not to kill the Israeli athletes but to exchange them 
for Palestinian prisoners. The athletes were killed only after a bungled West German attempt 
to rescue them (Daoud 2007).
55. The debates over the diffi culty of identifying terrorists and of the role of Moscow in 
terrorism are discussed in Toaldo (2008: 59–65)
56. The Voice of the Arabs was a radio station that broadcast from Cairo throughout the 
Middle East. It was especially infl uential in the 1950s and 1960s; advocating Pan-Arabism and 
anti-imperialism, and featuring the legendary singer Umm Kulthum. 
57. According to Seymour Hersh (1987), at least some high-level US security offi cials 
disagreed that Libya had been involved in the La Belle bombing. At least one Libyan believes 
these accusations “turned out to be false” (Ahmida 2005: 81).
58. There has been heated debate over Libya’s involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 
Flight 103. Iran had an equally strong motivation, as the Vincennes had just downed the Ira-
nian airliner. It has even been claimed that the CIA was involved in the downing of Flight 
103. Ashton and Ferguson (2001) view the evidence against Libya skeptically.




A Tale of Two Elites
Perfect storm: A situation where a calamity is caused by the convergence and 
amplifying interaction of a number of factors (Wiktionary)
The years 1990 through 2014 saw four US presidents: George H. W. Bush (Bush I, 1989–1993); William J. Clinton (1993–2001); George 
W. Bush (Bush II, 2001–2009); and fi nally Barack Hussein Obama (2009–
2017). Bob Dylan had said the times were changing. The following three 
chapters relate the consequences of these changes during the time of the 
four presidents. The present chapter shows how the cyclical and systemic 
economic contradictions further intensifi ed and coalesced with an inten-
sifying dominator/dominated imperial contradiction, provoking a perfect 
storm—an unprecedented coalescence and intensifi cation of contradic-
tion. These contradictions proved impervious to peaceful reproductive 
fi xes. This led to the emergence in the 1990s of two security elites both sit-
uationally and experimentally fi xated upon oil and terror, and violent fi xes.
The chapter is organized as follows. It fi rst presents the new Security 
Elites 3.0. It then describes the storm of contradictions battering the New 
American Empire and how attempts to fi x them failed; and evaluates the 
security elites’ responses to the fi xless fi xes. They are revealed to have 
developed into two factions—Republican Vulcans and democratic liberal 
hawks—both disposed to violently fi x the vulnerabilities of their empire. 
Finally, Vulcans and Hawks are shown to have become fi xated upon oil 
and terror. The chapter’s tale is that of two elites—one economic, frozen 
into “uncertainty”; the other, the Vulcan and Hawk security factions, out 
to fi x the vulnerabilities produced by the perfect storm with global war. 
Attention turns to the tale’s central actors, the Security Elites 3.0.




Women, blacks, Italians, Orientals, gays, and Hispanics had been denied 
elite security status in the times of the Security Elites 1.0 and 2.0. This 
changed, starting in the 1990s. Gone, for the most part, were the old boys, 
except for the low-lying Bushes. But even they were not classic old boys. 
They did have a compound in Maine (where certain locals considered them 
“summer folk”), but Poppy (Bush I’s nickname) had moved the family to 
Texas. There they worked in the oil business, and in the case of Dubya 
(Bush II’s nickname) possessed signs of (wealthy) Texan culture. Dubya 
could manage a credible Texan drawl; had a ranch, so he could be home on 
the range; and at one time owned a Texas baseball club. As a young man he 
had been a party-hearty carouser who reportedly sought “commercial op-
portunity” while at Yale “selling ounce bags of cocaine” (St. Clair 2013b). 
He had reformed, found Jesus, and become a devout born-again Christian 
(something not unheard of for Anglo-Texans).1 Meanwhile, by 2012 mul-
ticulturalism and feminism were signifi cant ideologies, helping minorities 
and women to nestle in the highest government ranks.
Though these elites were not old boys, a number hailed from wealthy 
circumstances. Bush I’s Secretary of State James Baker’s father was a part-
ner in a fl ourishing Houston law fi rm. John Negroponte, Bush II’s Director 
of National Intelligence, might not have been a WASP, but he was the 
son of a Greek shipping magnate. First Lady, US Senator, and Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, the daughter of a “successful” tradesperson, grew up 
living a “privileged life-style in Park Ridge,” a Chicago suburb (Bernstein 
2007: 19, 15).
More of the new security elites came from modest backgrounds, how-
ever. Brent Scowcroft, Bush I’s NSA, was a grocer’s son from Ogden, Utah. 
Hillary’s marriage was hypogamous. Her husband, Bill Clinton, was the 
Arkansas son of a traveling salesman who died before his son’s birth. The 
future president grew up in Hope, Arkansas, in his mother’s extended fam-
ily, people of “modest means,” so much so that “they couldn’t afford vaca-
tion, rarely if ever went to the movies, and didn’t get television until the 
mid-to-late 1950s. They went out a few times a year—to the country fair, 
the watermelon festival, the occasional square dance or gospel singing” 
(Clinton 2005: 14). Warren Christopher, Clinton’s fi rst Secretary of State, 
was criticized as wooden, perhaps because he had “survived a diffi cult 
childhood in the Dakotas during the depression” (Halberstam 2001: 172). 
Clinton’s second NSA Sandy Berger’s parents ran an Army-Navy store in 
Connecticut. George Tenet, CIA director in both Clinton and Bush II’s 
administrations, was the son of Greek and Albanian migrants, and grew up 
in Queens, New York, working as a busboy in his parents’ diner. Bush II’s 
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fi rst secretary of state, Colin Powell, was born to Jamaican parents in Har-
lem and grew up in the South Bronx, where he worked in a Jewish store, 
a schwarz knabe (“black kid”) selling baby buggies (C. Powell 1995: 18). 
Dubya’s fi rst NSA and second Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, grew 
up in racist, segregated Birmingham, Alabama, in a middle-class family 
determined “to maintain their dignity despite the degrading circumstances 
of Birmingham” (Rice 2010: 14). Her mother, a teacher, had taught Willie 
Mays (Rice 2010: 21). Obama’s Kenyan father, like Clinton’s, died early, 
leaving his son in a single-parent family. When Obama’s mother went off 
to get her anthropology doctorate and work in development, he was raised 
within her extended family.
Though the old boys had largely disappeared, the educational establish-
ments that had made them fl ourished, practicing the alchemy of encul-
turating elite culture. Exeter, Andover, Groton, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, 
and the like still took the dross lead of teenagers and transmuted them 
into the gold of masters and commanders in the US Leviathan. Tenet went 
from his parents’ diner to Georgetown and Columbia Universities. Clinton 
started poor, but he too went to Georgetown, Yale Law School, and as a 
Rhodes Scholar to Oxford, where met Sandy Berger, who had gone from 
an Army-Navy store to Cornell, Harvard, and on to Oxford, likewise as a 
Rhodes Scholar. Obama graduated from Columbia and went on to a degree 
at Harvard Law School.
The Security Elites 3.0 were something of a closed shop in the sense that 
they tended to have been mentored by earlier, older security elites. Brent 
Scowcroft (Bush I’s NSA) had been deputy NSA under Kissinger. Albright 
(Clinton’s UN representative and secretary of state) had been a pupil of 
Brzezinski at Columbia, though he belittled her as “hardly”a special stu-
dent” (Dobbs 1999: 197). Nevertheless he had hired her for the NSC. Su-
san Rice, Assistant Secretary of State in Clinton’s administration, and NSA 
in Obama’s, “grew up with … privilege and superior social connections,” 
which came in good measure because “Albright watched Rice grow up with 
her daughters—hanging out at backyard barbecues, languishing poolside 
or lunching at McDonalds” (Parker 1998). Colin Powell (NSA under Rea-
gan, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Clinton, secretary of state un-
der Bush II) had worked for Frank Carlucci (secretary of defense under 
Reagan), who was something of a protégé of Donald Rumsfeld during the 
Nixon administration. Condoleezza Rice (Bush II’s NSA and later secretary 
of state) had been a student of Albright’s father at the University of Denver 
and a protégée of Brent Scowcroft. Anthony Lake (Clinton’s fi rst NSA) 
had been a Kissinger aid; Stephen Hadley (NSA in Bush II’s administration 
following Rice) had worked with Kissinger in the NSC. Otherwise put, net-
works counted: you had to “know somebody” to become a Security Elite 3.0.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 288 –
Deadly Contradictions
Security Elites 3.0 became affl uent once they achieved the principal 
level, regardless of their backgrounds. As prosperous people, they lost 
touch with ordinary folk. Condoleezza Rice said that when she was at 
Stanford University she had had very little contact with the poor people 
of color who lived in East Palo Alto. She acknowledged, “I … realized that 
I knew very little of the poverty and lack of opportunity just a few blocks 
from my house.” She further confessed, “I avoided any real contact with 
East Palo Alto” (Rice 2010: 277). The case of Condoleezza Rice is not 
unique. Security Elites 3.0 might have been more diverse than their pre-
decessors, but they led lives sealed into elite networks and out of those of 
ordinary persons.
Certain old boys had come from Wall Street. These ties remained—
Treasury secretaries Robert Rubin under Clinton and Hank Paulson under 
Bush II both came from the investment giant Goldman Sachs. However, 
a surprising number of Security Elites 3.0, especially in the two Bush ad-
ministrations, were in some way involved with energy industries. Sandy 
Berger, Clinton’s second NSA, owned a fair amount of Amoco Oil Com-
pany stock. Bush I worked for Dressler Industries, which manufactured 
oil and gas fi eld machinery. James Baker, Bush I’s secretary of state, had 
been a lawyer whose fi rm did business with big oil; Baker was described 
by one journalist as “a lobbyist for the oil industry” (Palast 2004). Bush II 
founded Arbusto Energy, an unsuccessful business largely devoted to oil 
exploration and said to have links with the Bin Laden family (Rodríguez 
2006). Vice President Cheney had been CEO of Halliburton Oil, a fi rm 
providing a wide variety of oil fi eld services. Condoleezza Rice had been 
a director at Chevron Oil and had the distinction of having an oil tanker 
named after her. Rumsfeld enjoyed investments in energy-related fi rms. A 
number of the security elites were women, and it is to them that attention 
now turns.
Women as Security Elites: Some have hoped that the inclusion of women 
into politics, with their “maternal thinking” (Ruddick 1995), might make 
for a more peaceful world. Certainly feminists have for a long time—at 
least since 441 BC, if Aristophanes’ Lysistrata is to be believed—struggled 
for peace. Liberal feminist theory (Tong 2008), on the other hand, has ad-
vocated inclusion of women in all organizations on the grounds that they 
will perform just as well as males: if warriors are needed, women warriors 
will do just fi ne. The inclusion of six women at the highest levels—Secre-
taries of State Madeleine Albright and Hillary Clinton; NSA Condoleezza 
Rice; UN Representative Susan Rice, ultimately President Obama’s NSA 
in his second term; Head of the Offi ce of Multilateral Affairs and Hu-
man Rights Samantha Power, who replaced Susan Rice as Obama’s UN 
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representative; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy Planning in 
Obama’s administration—provide evidence bearing on this disagreement.
Refl ect fi rst that Hillary Clinton has been described by one source “as 
Barack Obama’s most prominent hawk” (Lavelle 2011). She pushed her 
husband to intervene in the Balkans, voted with Dubya to invade Iraq, 
and insisted upon Gaddafi ’s 2011 elimination. Hillary’s husband had ap-
pointed Albright fi rst to the post of UN ambassador and then to secretary 
of state. Albright, in her memoirs, reminisced about a time when she had 
reprimanded General Colin Powell for his reticence to exercise military 
power, admonishing him, “What’s the point of you having this superb mil-
itary you’re always talking about, Colin, if we can’t use it” (in Dobbs 1999: 
360). Powell’s hesitancy concerning warring may have had to do with his 
Vietnam combat experience. Contemplate a second instance of Albright’s 
violent disposition.
At the US’s and UK’s insistence, the UN Security Council imposed 
sweeping economic sanctions on Iraq, embargoing everything from foods 
to medicines to infrastructure, immediately following the 1990 Gulf War. 
These constituted a blockade that denied Iraq the goods needed for its in-
habitants’ well-being. By the mid 1990s there was evidence that the sanc-
tions were killing large numbers of civilians, especially children and the 
elderly. US security elites knew this, but refused to remove of the blockade. 
In May of 1996, the TV journalist Lesley Stahl interviewed Albright about 
the civilian deaths:
Lesley Stahl: We have heard that a half a million children have died. I mean, 
that’s more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth 
it?
Madeleine Albright: I think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think 
the price is worth it. (In Herman and Peterson 2010: 32)
Dennis Halliday, a UN humanitarian offi cial in Iraq at the time, resigned 
over the regime of sanctions, calling them “genocidal” (ibid.: 30). If this 
was genocide, Albright thought it was “worth it.”
Condoleezza Rice, known as the “Warrior Princess” while heading Bush 
II’s NSC (Serafi n 2005), was involved in planning and implementing his 
military adventures, and was equally implicated in the administration’s tor-
ture policy (Kessler 2009).2 The other Rice, Susan, was an Obama admin-
istration “liberal interventionist,” since the 1990s a prevalent term for a 
person who believes it is appropriate to go to war in the defense of human 
rights. During the Clinton administration, Ambassador Rice encouraged 
Rwanda’s 1996 invasion of Congo (which the US covertly aided) to over-
throw longtime Congolese President Mobutu (whom the US had overtly 
supported).3 More recently, she pressed offi cials at the UN and in the 
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Obama regime to violently overthrow Gaddafi  on the grounds that he was 
feeding Viagra to his troops to pep them up for “mass rapes” (MacAskill 
2011). No less an authority than “US military and intelligence offi cials” 
said “that there is no basis for Rice’s claims” (Garris 2011).
Samantha Power self-reports herself to be a “genocide chick” (Roig-
Franzia 2014). Her book, A Problem from Hell (2003), which condemned 
the US for ignoring genocides, caught Obama’s eye and eventually led 
to her replacing Susan Rice at the UN. She has been a prominent advo-
cate of humanitarian interventionism, arguing that violence in the name 
of violated human rights, especially of the gravest sort (like genocide), is 
good. She was one of Obama’s foreign policy advisers during his fi rst pres-
idential campaign and authored the memo “Conventional Washington 
versus the Change We Need,” announcing that “Barack Obama’s judg-
ment is right; the conventional wisdom is wrong. We need a new era of 
tough, principled and engaged American diplomacy to deal with 21st cen-
tury challenges” (Power 2007). The operative word in this memorandum 
is “tough.” The “genocide chick” channeled the Kennedys in wanting a 
“tough” America.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, another humanitarian interventionist, has been 
a strong advocate of “R2P” or Responsibility to Protect—the norm ad-
opted by the United Nations in 2005 specifying that states have the duty, 
under certain conditions, to violently intervene in other states that grossly 
violate human rights (G. Evans 2008). Slaughter insisted upon Dubya’s 
intervention in Iraq and Obama’s intervention in Libya. Writing immedi-
ately after the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq, she opined that “the biggest 
problem with the Bush pre-emption strategy may be that it does not go far 
enough” (in Slaughter and Feinstein 2004: 136).
It thus appears that women who shattered the glass ceiling in the US 
security establishment made just as good warriors as their male counter-
parts—as liberal feminist theory knew all along they would. After all, as El-
eanor Smeal, a president of NOW and a liberal feminist, reported, “Peace 
is not a feminist issue” (in Feinman 2000: 139).
For the most part, the masters and commanders of the New American 
Empire’s security after 1990 came from a broader, humbler social base than 
those in the 1.0 cohort. During the course of their lives, they participated 
in what might be termed “strings of elevation,” whose logic was to pursue 
rapid upward class mobility, accomplished by attending elite schools, ac-
quiring wealth, and benefi ting from mentors drawn from earlier cohorts 
of security elites. But whether men or women, minorities or old boys, the 
security elites in the years following 1990 were just as disposed to do their 
“duty” as were their predecessors, though this time their “duty” was per-
formed in an increasingly turbulent contradictory storm. The following 
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section explores those contradictions and the reproductive fi xes engi-
neered to relax them. At the end of the section, God makes an appearance.
A Perfect Storm: Contradictions and Fixless Fixes
We are in a chaotic situation. … We can have a system better than capitalism 
or we can have a system that is worse than capitalism. Only thing we can’t have 
is a capitalist system. (Wallerstein 2009)
Surely Professor Wallerstein jests. Capitalism has been around a long time 
and is a tough nut to crack. Then again, global economic elites at the 2012 
Davos World Economic Forum insisted that capitalism was “somehow bro-
ken” (Frederick 2012), and things that are broken can go kaput. This sec-
tion examines what happened to have Wallerstein and the capitalist elites 
so worried about the fate of capitalism. Attention is fi rst focused upon 
economic contradictions.
Cyclical Contradictions
It will be recalled that neoliberalism was proposed as a fi x for capitalism’s 
cyclical problems, and elites had begun its implementation starting in the 
late 1970s. The high point of the neoliberal fi x was in the decade of 1990s. 
What materialized?
What happened was 
a downward shift in the real growth rate of the US economy, which was lower 
in the 1970s than in the 1960s; lower in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s; 
and lower in 2000–2007 than in the 1980s and 1990s. Since 2007 the economy 
has declined further, in the deepest crisis since the Great Depression. (Foster 
and McChesney 2009: 9) 
Manufacturing was especially harmed. In the decade from 2000 to 2010, 
the US lost a third of its manufacturing jobs. These closings followed on 
those that had turned a good portion of the US into the Rust Belt in the 
1980s. Manufacturing as a percentage of total US GDP dropped from 23 
percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 2009 (Smil 2011). As industry declined, 
so did high-paying jobs. Between 2000 and 2010 the US lost 5.7 million 
manufacturing jobs and created only 4.9 million service jobs, most of them 
low-paying (Smil 2011). Consequently, wage levels for the average US 
worker were over 50 percent less in 2009 than forty years earlier, “down to 
the same levels as during the Great Depression” (Nielson 2012).
Alex Callinicos (2010: 68) has suggested that the year 1997 was the 
“turning point for the US and the world economy” because of a double 
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collapse—the 2001 dot-com crash followed by the 2002 telecom crash, 
when the US stock market plummeted following major failures of US 
Internet and telecommunication fi rms. Approximately $5 trillion of the 
market value of technology companies was lost between 2000 and 2002, 
and around 50 percent of the dot-coms failed (Gaither and Chmielewski 
2006). Then, in 2007, unsettling developments emerged in the fi nancial 
sector, especially as it pertained to US housing.
Neoliberal ideology, it will be recalled, prioritized growth of the fi nancial 
sector, where profi ts appeared to beckon. Starting in the 1980s, US banks 
and other lending institutions began offering mortgage loans that allowed 
the less affl uent to buy houses. Such lending is called “subprime” because it 
is risky—the recipients have few fi nancial resources. This lending was not 
done out of solicitude for the impoverished, but as a way of opening new 
markets for investment in housing. On Wall Street this meant that
the drive was to take advantage of cheap credit conditions to build up leverage 
as high as possible and thereby to maximize profi ts. Credit derivatives—above 
all, collateralized debt obligations … played a key role getting lending off banks’ 
balance sheets by selling the loans on in as high a volume as possible. The 
global market for derivatives rose from $41 trillion to $677 trillion in 1997–
2007. Loans to less safe debtors—for example, subprime mortgages—were par-
ticularly attractive, because the higher the risk, the higher the interest and fees 
that would be charged. (Callinicos 2010: 74)
Many of the subprime mortgages came with variable rates, where mort-
gage payments would initially be lower and later balloon to higher amounts. 
Approximately 80 percent of US mortgages issued to subprime borrowers 
in the 1990s and 2000s were adjustable-rate mortgages. When the higher 
rates began in 2006–2007, mortgage defaults rapidly increased. Soon,
the entire speculative house of cards erected by the banks and their partners 
in the shadow banking system began to fall apart. … The crisis in the sub-
prime sector undermined the market for market-backed securities, and thereby 
hauled down the prices of the CDOs into which these securities had been bun-
dled. But, since CDOs—and the credit default swaps (CDSs) used to insure 
against default—had been taken up throughout the entire fi nancial system … 
the entire system seized up. (Callinicos 2010: 81)
The fi nancial wizards had put their money in subprime lending and tripped 
down the yellow brick road of hazardous fi nance into the Great Recession. 
Refl ecting on this situation, a group of French economists issued the Mani-
festo of the Appalled Economists in 2010, which—according to its authors—
stated the “obvious”: Neoliberalism had “obvious failures” (2010: 2). Why 
did this happen? One answer opts for overaccumulation.
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Overaccumulation and the Long Downturn: The tendency toward over-
accumulation as the result of an intra-capitalist contradiction was part of 
Marx’s explanation of reproductive vulnerabilities intrinsic to capitalist 
systems. Harvey (2001: 79–80) refreshes memories of how this contradic-
tion provokes overaccumulation in the following quotation:
A contradiction arises within the capitalist class because individual capital-
ists, each acting in his or her own self-interest in a context of competitive 
profi t seeking, produce a result which is antagonistic to their own class inter-
est. Marx’s analyses suggest that this contradiction creates a persistent ten-
dency toward “over-accumulation,” which is defi ned as a condition in which 
too much capital is produced relative to the opportunities to fi nd profi table 
employment for that capital.
Two major sorts of evidence indicate that overaccumulation has, or is, 
occurring. The fi rst of these is “overproduction” (which conventional 
economists term “overcapacity”), that is, “surplus of capital relative to 
opportunities to employ that capital” (Harvey [1982] 2006: 192). An ex-
ample is the situation where car companies have the ability to produce 40 
million cars but have purchasers for only 30 million of them. The second 
indicator of overaccumulation is reduced, or declining, rates of profi tability.
One body of inquiry scrutinizes overproduction during the long down-
turn. M. K. Venu (2009) actually speaks of it as an “epidemic” since the 
1980s. Walden Bello (2006a) documents overproduction in the US com-
puter industry, as well as in automobiles, steel, and telecommunications. 
Bello (2006b) estimates that over 75 percent of China’s industries were 
burdened by excess capacity at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. 
The former General Electric CEO Jack Welch, speaking from the vantage 
of capitalist elites, announced recently that there was “excess capacity in 
almost every industry” (in Bello 2006a). If there is excess capacity in an 
industry, then supply exceeds demand, meaning profi ts decline.4
There are alternative explanations of the long downturn. Perhaps the 
most prevalent of these derive from different formulations of supply-side 
economics. However, a considerable body of research has come from con-
ventional economists who challenge supply-side theory as “crackpot” 
(Chait 2008), especially when it was applied to the problem of explaining 
the long downturn (Krugman 1995). Additionally, some have attempted 
to explain the “Great Recession” purely as a result of problems in the fi -
nancial sector. Brenner (2009) has vigorously critiqued this approach for 
ignoring the causes of the fi nancial diffi culties, which he lays at the door 
of overaccumulation.
Step back and contemplate the economic world revealed by this anal-
ysis, which takes us to the person known as the “Iron Lady”: Baroness 
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Margaret Thatcher, the Tory prime minister (1979–1990) who introduced 
neoliberalism to the UK. The baroness declared “TINA”—“there is no 
alternative”—to neoliberal capitalism. So it was neoliberalism or bust, 
but here was the problem for since 1973 it has been a busty time: bust 
(1973–1974), bust (1981–1982), bust (early 1990s), bust (2001–2002), 
biggest bust (2007–2012). Maybe there was “no alternative,” but the 
alternative that existed was, as the Davos economic elites recognized, 
“broken.” Consequently, since the 1970s the New American Empire has 
experienced cyclical economic contradictions that reached a peak in the 
fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century. Next the subject turns to systemic 
contradictions.
Systemic Contradictions
The systematic contradictions between 1990 and 2014 have been, if any-
thing, even more menacing than the cyclical ones. Consider, fi rst, global 
warming.
Global Warming: The previous chapter established that the CO2 level in 
the atmosphere was at 354 ppm in 1989 and that no fi x had succeeded in 
slowing its increase. It had been calculated that 350 ppm was the upper 
safe level of CO2 in the atmosphere. Currently, the level is rapidly increas-
ing: it was 389.85 ppm in 2010; 391.63 ppm in 2011; 393.63 ppm in 2012; 
and 399.85 ppm in 2014 (CO2Now.org 2013, 2015). Recall that methane 
is a more potent agent of global warming than CO2. In 2011 “vast” plumes 
of methane were observed released as a result of retreating Arctic Ocean 
sea ice (Conner 2011). Large craters that began to appear in Siberia in 
2014 are thought to be the result of methane escaping from the defrosting 
tundra (T. McCoy 2015).
Globally there are unusual and terrible hurricanes and typhoons, un-
usual and terrible droughts, unusual and terrible fl oods—and all the while 
the temperature extremes continue. The simple fact, according to NASA’s 
James Hansen (2012), is that “global warming isn’t a prediction. It is hap-
pening.” Given this reality, the respected climate journalist Gwyne Dyer 
(2008: xii) announced, “When you talk to people at the sharp end of the 
climate business, scientists and policy makers, there is an air of suppressed 
panic. … We are not going to get through this without taking a lot of casu-
alties, if we get through it at all.”
Some might dismiss Dyer as a Jeremiah. But her jeremiads are reality-
based. There is an accelerating rate of CO2 accumulation in the atmo-
sphere; “vast” plumes of methane are appearing in the Arctic Ocean; and 
there already are an estimated 300,000 plus global warming–related deaths 
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a year (Vidal 2009). All this points to an intensifying capital/land systemic 
contradiction. Next, look at peak oil.
Peak Oil: A crucial indicator of peak oil’s arrival is that demand for oil ex-
ceeds supply, but supply cannot increase to meet demand. The US Energy 
Information Administration reported that global demand for oil rose from 
63,849.7 thousand barrels per day in 1990 to 86,952.5 thousand barrels in 
2010 (Index Mundi 2015). Oil production meanwhile rose from 60,399.4 
thousand barrels per day in 1990 to 72,631.4 thousand barrels per day in 
2010 (ibid.). Importantly, between 2005 and 2011 oil production appeared 
to level off to roughly 71.50 to 72.80 million barrels per day. Such data 
prompted certain scholars to conclude that peak oil had arrived. Kunstler 
(2006: 47), citing data from a number of sources, dated the arrival of the 
peak between 2000 and 2010. Hubbert (1956) had predicted the global 
peak oil would arrive between 1995 and 2000. His prediction, like that of 
the timing of the decline of US oil production, appeared pretty accurate.
However, given the recent escalation in oil prices, oil companies have 
sought to increase supply by utilizing costly technologies to extract oil and 
gas from inaccessible environments where removal previously had been too 
expensive. These environments include tar sands, offshore deep-sea loca-
tions, and shale rock formations that trap both oil and gas. Klare (2012) 
calls such oil production “extreme” while others call it “tight” (Miller and 
Sorrell 2014), because the oil comes from habitats that are tremendously 
diffi cult to work in, presenting a likelihood of environmental damage. Re-
member that oil production from 2005 through 2011 appeared to have 
peaked around 71–72 million barrels per day (Index Mundi 2015). How-
ever, in 2012 it rose to 75.72 million barrels per day (“Global Oil Produc-
tion Up” 2012). These fi gures suggest that oil production had surged above 
its peak, with the increase due to bringing tight oil into production.
Some commentators reckoned that tight oil production rendered peak 
oil a “myth” (Orszag 2012). This view is contested in a series of articles in 
an issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A (Miller and 
Sorrell 2014). One argument is that oil and gas output from shale rock 
formations declines very rapidly after the sites are put into production, and 
an overall decline from these sources is estimated to hit as early as 2016 or 
2017 (Koch 2013). Additionally, James Hamilton (2013) notes, 
If you leave out the growth in shale oil production from the U.S. and oil sands 
production from Canada, total fi eld production of crude oil from the rest of the 
world actually decreased between 2005 and 2012. Given the increase from the 
U.S. and Canada global production managed to increase by 2 million barrels a 
day over the period, but that is less than the growth in consumption from the 
emerging economies and oil-producing countries over the same years.
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Unsurprisingly, there is considerable concurrence with the distinguished 
environmental lawyer Nicolas Arguimbau’s judgment that “the supply of 
the world’s essential energy source is going off a cliff” (Arguimbau 2010: 
1). The debate is over just how far away the cliff edge is. Moreover, just 
as in the case of global warming, the situation with peak oil indicates con-
tinued intensifi cation of the capital/land contradiction between 1990 and 
2012. Let us draw the threads of this section together.
The economic system that was supposed to accumulate value for the 
New American Empire sputtered starting in the 1970s. Arguably this was, 
at least in some measure, due to overaccumulation and intensifi cation of 
cyclical contradictions that coalesced with intensifi cation of capital/land 
systemic contradictions leading to global warming and peak oil. Adam 
Smith ([1776] 2003) had promised that if his economic vision were imple-
mented, an “invisible hand” would guide humanity to higher and higher 
levels of capital accumulation. A century later Marx ([1867] 1909) warned 
that the contradictions involved in capital accumulation would destroy 
capitalism. Classical liberal, Keynesian, and neoliberal policies might be 
imagined as forms of experimental fi xation to assist the invisible hand in 
doing its job. For roughly a century after Marx, capital accumulated and 
the “invisible hand,” with help from its policy fi xes, muddled through. 
Then, starting in the 1970s, something new began in the world of con-
tradiction, something utterly novel. Cyclical and systemic contradictions 
both intensifi ed and coalesced—and the “invisible hand” went “leaden.” 
Further intensifi cation of these contradictions coalescing with the cyclical 
ones could reach a point where they destroy human being, suggesting that 
Wallerstein might just have a point: we “can’t have … a capitalist system.” 
It is time to contemplate economic elites’ responses to these contradictory 
realities.
A “Zone of Ignorance” and Malinowski
Religious faith … fi xes … all valuable mental attitudes, such as … courage and 
confi dence in the struggle with diffi culties. (Malinowski [1948] 1954: 89)
Starting in the late 1970s economic elites became involved in hermeneu-
tic politics that relied on neoliberalism to fi x the vulnerabilities provoked 
by the contradictions. The politics failed. Offshoring and fi nancial fi xes 
did not fi x cyclical problems, and the specter of global warming caused 
“panic” while peak oil went “off a cliff.” Here, then, were fi xless fi xes to 
hermeneutic puzzles whose solution concerned humanity’s fate. The words 
of Malinowski will become relevant following consideration of important 
economic elites’ perceptual understanding of this situation.
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A good place to begin is with Ben Bernanke, head of the Federal Reserve 
during the Great Recession. Bernanke came from a rural, southern back-
ground in Dillon, South Carolina. His father owned a drugstore. Young 
Ben was a “brain” (he taught himself calculus) and went to Harvard and 
then MIT for his doctorate, about which certain wags chant: “MIT, PhD, 
M-O-N-E-Y.” Bernanke’s (1979) doctoral dissertation, titled “Long-Term 
Commitments, Dynamic Optimization, and the Business Cycle”, dealt 
with business executives and the “business cycle” (conventional econo-
mists’ way of conceptualizing cyclical contradictions). Bernanke (1979: 2) 
analyzed “the problem of making irreversible investment decisions when 
there is uncertainty about the true parameters of the stochastic econ-
omy.” A stochastic process is one where the outcome is unpredictable. A 
stochastic economy is one where the different production, distribution, 
and consumption results are uncertain. Bernanke told the world in his 
dissertation that when things are uncertain, economic elites “wait for new 
information” (ibid.). Brilliant! Ben was in the M-O-N-E-Y, ascending the 
ranks of government economic positions, until in 2002 he was appointed 
to the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, becoming its president in 
2005.
In a 2004 speech entitled “The Great Moderation,” Bernanke was 
pretty certain of one thing: that, due to the effectiveness of contemporary 
macro-economic policy, the volatility of the business cycle had decreased 
to the point that it should no longer be a major topic in economics (in 
Krugman 2009: 10). This judgment was rendered after the recessions of 
the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000, and just three years before the Great 
Recession. Three years later in 2007, during the eruption of grave volatility 
that was to be the Great Recession, Bernanke reached back to doctoral 
stochastic memories and asserted that a prime attribute of the current 
economy was “uncertainty” (2007). Of course, it would have been in times 
of uncertainty that Sir Mervyn King, then governor of the Bank of En-
gland, confi ded to a Telegraph reporter, “Who knows what’s going to hap-
pen tomorrow” (Aldrick and Kirkup 2011).
Other respected economic elites were of like mind. In an analysis of the 
US economy, Michael Spence, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, and his 
colleague Sandile Hlatshwayo concluded that employment problems had 
emerged. In their judgment about what will happen with this “employ-
ment situation” being “unknown,” “answers” as to what to do “appear to 
be missing,” so “experimenting is the only way to solutions” (Spence and 
Hlatshwayo 2011: 38). Robert Solow (2009), another Nobel Prize winner 
in economics, argued that a new regulatory system is needed to solve the 
problems of the Great Recession, though he also believed “there is no way 
yet to know what form the new system will take.”
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Media hermeneuts surveying elite economic opinion arrived at conclu-
sions similar to those of Bernanke and company. Robert Samuelson (2012), 
the Washington Post’s business and economics journalist, told readers in 
2012, “It must be obvious that, economically speaking, we’re in another 
country. Things we took for granted no longer apply. … We’ve entered a 
zone of ignorance.” Two years later he was equally gloomy, writing, “These 
are hard times for economists. Their reputations are tarnished; their favor-
ite doctrines are damaged. Among their most prominent thinkers, there is 
no consensus as to how—or whether—governments in advanced coun-
tries can improve lackluster recoveries” (Samuelson 2014). Regarding res-
olution of the fi nancial crisis, the Business Week editor Paul Barrett (2009) 
advised, “Let’s enact some thoughtful regulation, and hope for the best.” 
In covering the 2012 Davos World Economic Forum, where elites met to 
discourse on the state of the globe, Jim Frederick of Time magazine asked 
participants, “what practically speaking will a global capitalism retooled for 
the 21st century look like?” He discovered that, “Well, no one has quite 
fi gured that one out yet. But a surprising number of attendees (and these 
are the world’s most direct benefi ciaries of the current system) seems to 
agree that something is wrong” (Frederick 2012). Three years later, again 
at Davos, Unilever’s chief executive, Paul Polman, worried that what 
might be “wrong” was the “capitalist threat to capitalism” (in Milne 2015). 
At the same Davos meeting Christine Lagarde, the IMF’s managing di-
rector, agreed, worrying that Marx may have been right all along and that 
capitalism might harbor the “seeds of its own destruction” (ibid.). After all, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Europe’s most important institution for predicting economic futures, had 
warned world leaders to prepare for “systemic shock” that would shake the 
global system (OECD 2011). Robert Johnson, a former hedge fund man-
ager, declared, “I know hedge fund managers all over the world who are 
buying airstrips and farms in places like New Zealand, they think they need 
a getaway” (in Hogg 2015).
Finally, let us explore the experience of a gentleman at the very height of 
the US fi nancial elite as the stochastic economy darkened, as this will lead 
us to grasp the signifi cance of Malinowski quoted at the beginning of this 
section. This was Hank “the Hammer” Paulson. A “jock” (athlete) while 
at Dartmouth, Hank went to Harvard Business School and on to a career 
that led to his becoming CEO of Goldman Sachs, one of Wall Street’s and 
the world’s largest investment banks. He was appointed Bush II’s treasury 
secretary (28 June 2006) when it became clear that there could be a severe 
fi nancial upheaval.
Dubya brought Hank to the Treasury because, he said, Paulson had 
“intimate knowledge of fi nancial markets” (in Isidore 2006). After nine 
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months on the job, Hank drew upon this “intimate knowledge” to lecture 
a Chinese audience that “an open, competitive, and liberalized fi nancial 
market can effectively allocate resources … far better than governmental 
intervention” (Yidi and Hamlin 2008). As US subprime mortgage problems 
mounted in August 2007, he assured Americans they need not worry be-
cause the global economy was very strong (Lawder 2007). Eleven months 
later, following failure of the Indymac Bank, he reassured the public that 
the US had a “safe and sound banking system” (Garofalo 2008). On 15 
September 2008, the day Lehman Brothers Bank went into bankruptcy, 
Hank reassured the “American people” that they “can remain confi dent in 
the soundness and resilience of our fi nancial system” (Gross 2008).
Perhaps the invisible hand had been out to lunch. It certainly hadn’t 
guided the economy. Financial elites, knowledgeable about the situation, 
did not “remain confi dent.” Rather, Wall Street fl ew into a “panic” (Reich 
2010: 103), and shortly thereafter the Dow experienced the largest one-
day loss in its history. Money markets globally went into free fall. Wall 
Street was effectively bankrupt, obliging the US Congress to authorize the 
“Paulson Plan” (3 October 2008) and create the US Emergency Stabili-
zation Fund, that included the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
TARP had $700 billion to buy distressed bank assets, especially mort-
gage-backed securities. Two years after Paulson’s lecturing Chinese people 
on the superiority of liberal fi nancial management, that system had failed. 
Now Hank was busily engineering government regulation using public 
money, overseeing the largest government intervention in fi nancial history 
to save the economic lives of the elites who owned most of the fi nancial 
system’s assets.
Understandably for Hank, the worst experiences of his stint as treasury 
secretary were during the Lehman Brothers collapse. The Washington Post 
recounted at this time:
In the tense moments as Lehman Brothers slid toward bankruptcy, he [Hank] 
stepped out of his offi ce and called her [his wife Wendy]. She had just been to 
church. “Everybody is looking to me and I don’t have the answer,” he told her. 
“You needn’t be afraid,” she replied. “Your job is to refl ect God, Infi nite Mind, 
and you can rely on Him.” (Goldfarb 2010)
So, by the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, as the contradictory storm 
hit, the economic elites faced grave reproductive vulnerability follow-
ing failure of the neoliberal fi x. One of the two US gentlemen with the 
most authority to fi x the economy babbled on about “uncertainty.” The 
other admitted he didn’t “have the answer,” but was told by his wife to 
“refl ect God.” Nietzsche sneaks back into the narrative to be corrected by 
Malinowski.
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Nietzsche had shouted “Gott ist tot” (“God is dead”). Not so! God, 
like capitalism, is a tough nut to crack. Wendy told her very elite hubby 
not to “be afraid”; he could rely on “Him.” Malinowski classically argued 
in the quotation that began this section that religion “fi xes … courage 
and confi dence” in the face of “diffi culties.” In effect, Malinowski was ob-
serving that there were religious reproductive fi xes as well as economic 
and violent ones. Economic elites did not know what to do as they faced 
“diffi culties” produced by rising economic contradictions. Some, like the 
very elite Hank, turned to “religious faith” because it “fi xes … courage 
and confi dence.” Of course, other economic elites, like the fund managers 
mentioned by Robert Johnson, were not into “courage” but just planned to 
make their “getaway,” splitting to remote places.
“Turbulent Waters”
Mervyn King’s 2012 warning—“We are navigating through turbulent wa-
ters” (2012)—was apt. The neoliberal fi x of cyclical contradictions failed. 
Fixes of systemic contradictions failed. The contradictory turbulence 
seemed to be driving the US Leviathan toward its limits. Of course, a 
Malinowskian God might fi x “courage.” But a Nietzschean God seemed 
to be more in evidence, and this God was either out to lunch with the 
Invisible Hand or dead. Our gaze now turns to an intensifying political 
contradiction.
“The Rarest Opportunity”: 
The Dominator/Dominated Contradiction
By the 1990s the condition of the political contradictions was complicated, 
being at the same time both relaxed and intensifying—relaxed because the 
Soviets were gone, taking with them the inter-imperial contradiction that 
had churned Cold War politics; intensifying because, as documented in 
the last chapter, the dominator/dominated contradiction intensifi ed in the 
years 1975–1989, taking the form of increasing resistance terrorism. This 
strengthening continued throughout the 1990s. Out of this situation came 
what Brent Scowcroft called “the rarest opportunity.”
Bush I was president in 1990. The key security elites in his administra-
tion—himself, NSA Brent Scowcroft, Secretaries of State James Baker and 
Lawrence Eagleburger, CIA Director Robert Gates, and Defense Secretary 
Dick Cheney—were hardly pacifi sts. However, their main chore was help-
ing choreograph the Soviet Union’s collapse. Gorbachev and Bush I met 
at their fi rst summit meeting at the end of 1989 in Malta, at which time 
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Gorbachev refl ected, “We stated, both of us, that the world leaves one 
epoch of cold war and enters another epoch” (Bush and Gorbachev 1989: 
3). However, it was a delicate time. Something could go wrong: it was the 
domino theory in reverse as territory after territory hived off the former 
Soviet Empire. Gorbachev would soon be struggling for his own survival. 
There was also the matter of German reunifi cation; sparks could fl y.
Accordingly, Bush’s I security elites entered confl ict-avoidance mode as 
much as possible. The one time they warred—in Iraq—was the result of 
blatant aggression on Baghdad’s part (discussed in the next chapter). Bush 
I’s response, Operation Desert Storm (August 1990–February 1991), was a 
swiftly successful invasion. However, the US evacuated Iraq as quickly as 
possible, leaving Saddam Hussein chastened but still in power. Hence, the 
end of the Cold War was initially a time of trying to hold the peace; with 
security elites restraining violent dispositions, whatever their personal pro-
clivities. When it was all over—the USSR gone, Gorbachev history—the 
New American Empire stood alone as the world’s sole superpower.
Brent Scowcroft, Bush I’s trusted friend and NSA, interpreted the cir-
cumstance as one where, “The fi nal collapse of Soviet power … brought 
to a close the greatest transformation since World War I. … We were sud-
denly in a unique position … standing alone at the height of power. It was 
an unparalleled position in history, one that presents us with the rarest 
opportunity to shape the world” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998: 565). Dean 
Acheson, remembering the old boys’ creation of the post–World War II 
world, might well have disputed the claim that the dissolution of the So-
viets was “unparalleled,” but he would have probably agreed that it was 
another opportunity “to shape the world.” The only problem was that the 
New American Empire was not the only social being out to “shape” global 
structures.
The groups that had been labeled “terrorists” by the US government 
competed to be present at the creation of the post-Soviet world. It was a 
ludicrous competition—mere hundreds on the side of the “terrorists” ver-
sus the full military might of the New American Empire. But resistance to 
the New American Empire increased in the 1990s, perhaps because, with 
the Soviet monster-alterity slain, Washington dropped some of its imperial 
cloaking, revealing more plainly its domination. After all, the US Levia-
than was the “sole … superpower.” Robert Gates (2014: 149–150) wrote 
that during this time, “other nations increasingly resented our singular 
dominance and growing penchant for telling others how to behave,” add-
ing that “the arrogance with which we conducted ourselves in the 1990s 
and beyond … caused widespread resentment.”
Some “resentment” produced resistance, and some resistance aug-
mented terrorism; especially when al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, was 
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formed in 1988 from elements of the Afghanistan I’s anti-Soviet mujahi-
deen movement.5 Al-Qaeda was distinguished from other guerilla organi-
zations at the time in that it increasingly came to target the US and was 
relatively comfortably funded due to Osama’s connections and wealth. In 
1992 it conducted its fi rst bombing of US troops in Yemen. Terror was 
brought home to Americans in February 1993 when al-Qaeda bombed the 
World Trade Center in lower Manhattan for the fi rst time, with six fatali-
ties and a thousand wounded. That October, the Battle of Mogadishu was 
waged. Elite US Special Ops—Delta Force, Rangers, and Seals—were sent 
in Black Hawk helicopters to attack a Somali warlord, Mohamed Farrah 
Aidid. Aidid’s troops turned the tables, shot down the helicopters, and 
annihilated the Special Ops. Mark Bowden published Black Hawk Down 
(1999), and Ridley Scott directed a 2001 movie by the same title. In effect, 
Bowden and Scott were hermeneuts interpreting for Americans the dan-
gers of terrorism. Both evoked images of dead US troopers’ bodies dragged 
through Mogadishu’s streets. Al-Qaeda claimed to have trained the sol-
diers that killed the Americans.
The following year, 1994, brought no signifi cant terrorist attacks upon the 
US, but in 1995 al-Qaeda plotted to assassinate President Clinton during a 
visit to the Philippines. More disturbing was the Oklahoma City bombing 
(April 1995). In this “home-grown” act of terrorism Timothy McVeigh, who 
viewed the US government as “the ultimate bully” (Aitken 2001), blew up 
the Alfred Murrah Federal Building, killing 168 people and wounding 680.
The bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia a year later (June 
1996) killed 19 US Air Force soldiers and 372 others. The identity of the 
attack’s perpetrator is debated: the US at one point attributed it to Iran; 
then the FBI blamed it on Hezbollah; meanwhile Abdel Bari Atwan (2006) 
argued al-Qaeda was responsible. Regardless of who was responsible, the 
Khobar Towers were near the headquarters of Saudi Arabia’s oil company 
Aramco and a place where US soldiers were stationed. The bombing was a 
symbolic strike, and not an especially subtle one, at the US-Saudi alliance 
and its control over vast amounts of oil.
Two months later (August 1996), al-Qaeda formally targeted the US, 
declaring jihad against America in a fatwa—literally, a “judgment”—in the 
Palestinian newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi. The fatwa made it an “obligation 
incumbent upon every Muslim” to “kill the Americans and their allies—ci-
vilians and military” (Bin-Ladin et al. 1998). It should be understood as an 
al-Qaeda public délire binding its members to violence against the US. Al-
Qaeda went to work to implement the fatwa. The Clinton administration 
got the message. In his memoir, My Life, Clinton reported that by August 
1996 he had recognized “the threat of terrorism is on the rise” (2005: 737).
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However, before al-Qaeda could strike, terrorism returned to New York 
from another source in February 1997, when Ali Abu Kamal, a Palestinian 
teacher, shot and killed tourists and himself on the observation deck of 
the Empire State Building. A note found on his body said his act was an 
attack upon the enemies of Palestine. Thereafter al-Qaeda, implement-
ing its fatwa, conducted a double bombing (August 1997) against US em-
bassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Kenyan bomb killed 291 persons and 
wounded about 5,000. Ten were killed and 77 wounded in the Tanzanian 
blast. Roughly two weeks later, Clinton responded to the embassy attacks 
by striking Afghanistan and the Sudan with cruise missiles. Unimpressed, 
al-Qaeda responded by blasting a gaping hole in the USS Cole (October 
2000); a destroyer in port at Aden, Yemen’s major harbor.
Then came 9/11. From the perspective of most Americans, 9/11 was an 
atrocious horror: the homeland attacked and 2,977 people killed utterly 
unexpectedly—and on television, for everybody to watch it over and over 
again. From al-Qaeda’s perspective, as well as that of others in opposition 
to the New American Empire, 9/11 had a different signifi cance. How is 
one to understand these differing meanings?
Elite US offi cials tried to interpret it as follows. They observed that ter-
rorist operations, al-Qaeda or otherwise, were largely directed against the 
US. A Congressional Research Service report declared that “U.S. policies, 
citizens, and interests are prime targets for international and foreign terror-
ism—in 2001, approximately 63 percent of all terrorist incidents worldwide 
were committed against U.S. citizens or property” (Perl 2003: 2). Immedi-
ately following the 9/11 attacks, Congress organized an investigation to 
understand their causes and what to do about them. The investigators’ 
fi nal document, The 9/11 Commission Report, was clear. The assaults were 
the result of “Islamic terrorism,” whose agents were “Islamist extremists,” a 
“minority strain” and “perversion of Islam” (Kean and Hamilton 2004). So 
from the vantage of the offi cial US, 9/11 was the work of monstrous Middle 
Eastern, religious perverts. It was Huntington redux.
Al-Qaeda did not share this interpretation. Its 1998 fatwa declaring war 
on America had stressed, “It should not be hidden from you that the peo-
ple of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed 
on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the 
extent that the Muslims blood became the cheapest and their wealth as 
loot in the hands of the enemies” (Bin-Ladin et al. 1998). “Zionist-Cru-
saders” was al-Qaeda’s term for the New American Empire and its allies, 
including Zionist Israel. The US Leviathan had committed “aggression” 
against people in the Middle East. Their wealth had been seized as “booty” 
by their “enemies.” They had become “dispossessed people” (ibid.). The 
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1998 fatwa was a response to the “arrogance” of which Gates had said the 
US was guilty.
Following Nixon’s 1970s recognition of the importance of Persian Gulf 
oil, the US had sought to dominate the region; especially by supporting 
its ally Israel, which violently expropriated Palestinian land and wealth. 
Additionally, the US government created client states throughout the 
Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran were the twin towers in the 1970s. 
Iraq became one for a while in the 1980s, as did Egypt and other Gulf 
States. Many leaders in these client states, schooled in American or Euro-
pean educational institutions, were hybrid elites. They collaborated with 
US economic and security elites, especially, among other matters, helping 
them earn profi ts for US companies. At the same time, these hybrid elites 
richly compensated themselves at the expense of ordinary people in their 
countries, all the while repressing them. Here was a situation of double 
domination, with two sets of dominators; US and client state elites, accu-
mulating at the expense of ordinary repressed people.
In this optic, the increased Middle Eastern resistance terrorism in the 
1990s further intensifi ed the dominator/dominated contradiction. At fi rst, 
in the 1980s that resistance had been supported by Gaddafi . Then, in the 
1990s al-Qaeda, who as allies of the Americans during the fi rst Afghani-
stan War had learned how to war against them, applied this knowledge to 
resisting the Zionist-Crusaders. The 1998 fatwa declaring war upon the 
Americans was a public délire ratcheting up the dominator/dominated con-
tradiction. Annihilation of the people in the World Trade Center—iconic 
seat of capitalist accumulation—was an exercise of violent force imple-
menting this public délire.
In the 1980s, as documented in the last chapter, US security elites 
had been unable to fi x the problem of terrorism. Throughout the 1990s, 
the Bush I and Clinton administrations instituted agencies and policies 
to counter terrorism. The evolution of these was described by Richard 
Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, 
and Counter-terrorism in the Clinton administration (2004). The 9/11 
Commission Report judged US counterterrorism to have been inadequate 
(2004: 71–107). The attack itself, with its nearly three thousand deaths, 
was brutal demonstration of the accuracy of the commission’s judgment. 
Prior to 9/11, Washington’s counterterrorism measures were fi xless fi xes to 
the dominator/dominated contradiction. It had become, as the title of one 
book put it, The Age of Terror (Talbott and Chanda 2001).
Scowcroft said that the fall of the Soviets led to “the rarest opportunity 
to shape the world.” Perhaps, but what world was to be shaped? By the 
turn of the new millennium the cyclical contradiction had intensifi ed and 
coalesced with the systemic contradiction, which had intensifi ed and co-
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alesced with the dominator/dominated contradiction, which itself had in-
tensifi ed. Fixes to the contradictions had been tried and failed. Whatever 
shaping the Security Elites 3.0 would do was in a tempest of contradiction 
and fi xless fi xes.
Vulcans and Liberal Hawks
Two sorts of Security Elites 3.0 with varying ideologies emerged to “shape” 
the world of contradiction and fi xless fi xes. These were the Vulcans and 
the liberal hawks. Consider fi rst the Vulcans.
Vulcans
The Vulcans were Republicans, Bush II’s leading Security Elites 3.0: 
Cheney; Rumsfeld; Powell; Condoleezza Rice; and slightly below the top 
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle; along with a number of others.6 They origi-
nated as Bush II’s foreign policy advisory team during his fi rst presidential 
campaign. The group met at times in Birmingham Alabama, Rice’s home-
town, which boasts the world’s largest cast iron statute of the Roman god 
Vulcan, the divine forger of weapons out of fi re. The iron and steel industry 
had been important in Birmingham’s history, and the statue symbolized 
this past. Rice called this gaggle of foreign policy advisors Vulcans, after 
the statue. Their “vision” refl ected the understanding that US was the 
world’s only superpower, “whose military power was so awesome that it no 
longer needed to make compromises or accommodations” (Mann 2004: 
xii). They were iron-hard forgers of American security.
Dov Zakheim, a lesser Vulcan, has emphasized that there were differ-
ences among the major Vulcans. These certainly existed. However, all 
shared a long-running elective affi nity with neoconservatism. Cheney and 
Rumsfeld came by their neoconservatism, in some measure, out of the 
hurley-burley of hermeneutic politics and their struggle to forge a hard line 
against the Soviets during the Ford administration. Wolfowitz and Perle, 
purported intellectuals, came by their neoconservatism from the teachings 
of Leo Strauss and Albert Wohlstetter; both from the University of Chica-
go’s economics and politics faculty, which had been deeply conservative in 
in the last half of the twentieth century.7
So, among the differences were key similarities: Dick Cheney expressed 
the shared Vulcan Ur-principle when he declared (2003) that security 
elites have “the duty to use force in order to create a world in the image of 
the US.” The emphasis in this quotation is on the word “duty.” Why was 
violent force a duty? Rumsfeld (in Thomas 2002), a wise-guy joker, bor-
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rowed a line from the gangster Al Capone, insisting, “You get more with a 
nice word and a gun, than you get with a nice word”—funny man.
“Big Bad,” as Bush II nicknamed Wolfowitz, expressed more seriously why 
the exercise of violence was a “duty.” He recognized, as had John Quincy Ad-
ams, that there were monsters in the world. However, unlike John Quincy 
Adams, in the words of Richard Immerman, Wolfowitz believed “monsters 
cannot be contained”; so again in the words of Immerman (2010: 21), 
“Destroying monsters was the prerequisite for establishing an American 
empire, and American empire was a prerequisite for an Empire of Liberty.” 
Who were the monsters (or monster-alterities as I term them)? They were 
America’s enemies, opponents of democracy and liberty, who would deny 
the Vulcans the possibility of creating “a world in the image of the US.” 
Vulcans knew the monsters were so evil they could not “be contained.”
Dean Acheson and the old boys 1.0 were pretty tough. They had fought 
World War II, seen its terror, and set the US on the path of global empire 
by developing enormous violent force resources. But for the most part they 
aimed to use those forces as part of a policy of containment or rollback. 
Nobody dreamed of a preemptive strike against Russia. Daalder and Lind-
sey (2003: 2) propose that Bush II unleashed a “revolution” in US foreign 
policy because at the urging of his Vulcans, he “turned John Quincy Ad-
ams on his head and argued that the United States should aggressively go 
abroad searching for monsters to destroy” (ibid.: 13). Consider next the 
Democratic Security Elites 3.0 who championed a liberal hawk ideology 
based upon concern for the defense of human rights.
Liberal Hawks
Security elites variously called “humanitarian interventionists” or “hu-
manitarian imperialists” rose to prominence in the Clinton administration. 
They helped Dubya in Iraq and fl ourished during the Obama years.8 Be-
cause these elites continue the Democrats’ Vietnam War hawk faction, 
they are usefully termed “liberal hawks.” They include journalist and in-
tellectual hermeneuts such as Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, 
Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek, Fred Kaplan of the Atlantic, and Paul Ber-
man of the New Republic. Other prominent liberal hawks found within the 
Clinton and Obama administrations included both presidents as well as 
Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright, Susan Rice, Samantha Powers, and 
Dr. Slaughter.9
Bill Keller of the New York Times asserted that peace-loving liberals 
had had an “epiphany” (2003) that metamorphosed them from doves into 
hawks. Actually, the epiphany was a long time coming. Its origins lay in 
Jimmy Carter’s decision to make the support of human rights a guiding 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
The Perfect Storm
– 307 –
principle of US foreign policy, though Carter’s own human rights policy 
was more a diplomatic tool than a war-justifying stratagem. Anthony Lake, 
director of policy planning in the State Department, was an important 
proponent of Carter’s initiative in opposition to Brzezinski (Glad 2009). 
Lake became Clinton’s NSA.
President Clinton, and a number of important players in his admin-
istration, had opposed the Vietnam War—so much so that he had trou-
ble properly saluting his military, a failing that ex-president Reagan kindly 
helped him to overcome (Gibbs and Duffy 2012). However, there was a 
bigger diffi culty that might be called a “Kennan Problem.” “From the early 
days” of the Clinton administration, with the Soviets gone, there was con-
cern to formulate “a new, integrating foreign policy doctrine to replace 
George Kennan’s containment” (Dumbrell 2009: 41).
The slow liberal hawk epiphany, nudged by the Kennan problem, be-
gan to emerge during the grim Rwandan and Yugoslavian civil confl icts. 
Liberal security elites, through the windows of their authority, perceived 
the perpetrators of human rights violations engineering massacres, rapes, 
holocaust, and genocides. Rwanda in 1994, where the US refused to in-
tervene and some 800,000 people were massacred, was central in stimu-
lating humanitarian interventionism. Susan Rice, who observed the US’s 
refusal to intervene from her position in the State Department, has said, 
“I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, I would come 
down on the side of dramatic action, going down in fl ames if that was 
required” (in Power 2001: 10). Anthony Lake also witnessed Rwanda and 
years later refl ected in a television interview that “it [Rwanda] sits as the 
saddest moment, in retrospect, of my time in the Clinton administration” 
(2004). Why was it his “saddest moment”? He did not directly explain, but 
perhaps it was because “we” (the US) never contemplated “an American 
intervention itself.” Later in the interview, he announced, “I believe in hu-
manitarian intervention” (ibid.). President Clinton himself, after leaving 
the White House, said, “I’ll always regret that Rwanda thing” (in Pearlman 
2008: 1). Guilt over the hundreds of thousands butchered, partly due to 
American inaction, was the reason that Rwanda was so important in rais-
ing the security elites’ consciousness about human rights.
It was during Yugoslavia’s dismemberment that members of the Clinton 
administration actually began to act as humanitarian interventionists, no 
one more so than Madeleine Albright. She, according to David Halber-
stam, was “a champion of the use of force” and the “leading hawk” in 
Clinton’s administration (2001: 197, 376), due in part to her particular 
background. Her parents had been Czech elites prior to World War II. Her 
father had been the Czech ambassador to Yugoslavia, witnessed Nazi terror 
in Eastern Europe followed by the Soviet takeover, and become a “hard-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 308 –
Deadly Contradictions
liner” in the struggle against Moscow (ibid.: 382). Albright said her parents 
were “great humanists who worried about what happens if evil succeeds” 
(in M. J. Lee 2012: 3). In 1994 she had contemplated the Rwandan “evil” 
from her position as UN ambassador (1993–1997). Thereafter, promoted 
to secretary of state (1997–2001), she watched “evil” as Milosevic’s Serbs 
brutalized Bosnians, Croatians, and Kosovars and as these latter returned 
“evil” with “evil.” Such experiences made her a fi erce promoter of US mil-
itary intervention—so great an advocate that when the US fi nally did be-
gin bombing Serbia (1999) over its Kosovo invasion, the ensuing confl ict 
would be called “Madeleine’s War” (Buckwalter 2002).
Paralleling and aiding Albright’s rise was Hillary Clinton’s emergence as 
a liberal hawk. She had favored intervention in Haiti (1994) and Bosnia 
(1995), and then, in the hermeneutic politics over whether to bomb Serbia 
to punish its military campaign in Kosovo, she sided with Albright. Secre-
tary of Defense William Cohen, and Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 
Powell, two infl uential interpreters of the Kosovo situation, were hesitant 
about the use of violent force. Hillary was not. She recalled telephoning 
her husband: “I urged him to bomb” (in S. Chapman 2007: 23). According 
to her biographer, Gail Sheehy (1999: 345), Bill and Hillary disputed over 
the matter for a number of days, and fi nally she moralized, “You cannot let 
this go on to the end of a century that has seen the major holocaust of our 
time. What do we have NATO for if not to defend our way of life”? What 
she understood by “way of life” apparently was, bombs away!
To be clear, certain liberals justifi ed violent intervention in terms of 
“evil.” Obama had underscored this in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance 
speech when he said: “evil does exist.” However, their understanding of 
evil came from a particular hermeneutic based upon a particular percep-
tual understanding of wickedness. Terrorist violation of human rights was 
evil. The procedure for addressing malevolence was intervention against 
it, with violent intervention being entirely acceptable. Epiphany had been 
a long time coming. Ten years to be exact, but doves metamorphosed into 
hawks, supported by a humanitarian interventionist ideology.
During an Indonesian campaign of terror in East Timor in the late 
1990s, Sandy Berger, who replaced Anthony Lake as NSA (1997–2001), 
responded to criticism that the Clinton administration had not intervened 
in East Timor with the statement, “I don’t think anybody ever articulated 
a doctrine which said that we ought to intervene whenever there’s a hu-
manitarian problem” (in Dumbrell 2009: 45). This might be called the 
“Berger Caveat” to the humanitarian interventionist hermeneutic, that is, 
the US government will intervene in humanitarian crises when and where 
it wants. Because of this qualifi cation, some have detected hypocrisy con-
cerning the liberal hawks’ defense of human rights.10
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But the Clinton administration had done it. They had solved the Ken-
nan problem. They had their grand strategy. It was a liberal hawk iteration 
of the “violence makes peace” hermeneutic of the Security Elites 1.0. Hu-
man rights were universal. Evil violated those rights. Terrorists despoiled 
them, so terrorists were evil. Procedurally, if the US perceived human 
rights had been violated anywhere in the world, then they could proceed 
to intervene. If the violations had been violent, then the US reserved the 
right to fi ght evil violence with good violence.
This argument reprises that of nineteenth-century imperialists. Then, it 
was legitimate to violently intervene globally because the opponents were 
bad savages. Now it was legitimate to do the same because the terrorists 
were still bad savages. In both cases it was a moral good, as Kurtz had put it 
in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, to “exterminate all the brutes.”
It is time to summarize how the Republican and Democratic security 
elites had responded to the worsening contradictions that they faced at 
the end of the old and the beginning of the new millennium. Their re-
sponses differed from those of their economic elite counterparts, who were 
frozen into impotence due to the uncertainty of their fi xless fi xes. The 
masters and commanders 3.0 intended to “shape” their imperial world. 
Andrew Bacevich (2005), a perceptive scholar of contemporary imperial 
warring, has argued that they would do so, due in good measure to a “new 
militarism.” In our terms, this neo-militarism was the Vulcan and Hawk 
iterations of the “violence makes peace” hermeneutic. However, the fact 
that US security elites were disposed to make peace violently does not 
explain what they would be violent about and how they would go about 
implementing the wars they waged from the 1990s through 2014. The fi rst 
of these two questions is answered by considering the fi xation affecting the 
Vulcans and Hawks.
Situational Fixation: Oil and Terror
Refl ection upon reoccurring events was said in Chapter 2 to be situational 
fi xation. If the situation is such that an event happens once and never 
again, it is a one-off; people do not think much about it. If the situation 
is such that it reoccurs, and what is reoccurring is important, they refl ect, 
that is, fi xate, upon it. If you get a toothache that lasts for ten minutes 
and then goes away, it is no big deal and you forget about it. However, if 
that toothache continues for several days, it becomes something you fi xate 
upon. People desire to fi x what they are situationally fi xated upon; that 
is, they are experimentally fi xated. Be very clear, experimental fi xation is 
desire—a union of reason and emotion—to act, and thus motivates people 
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with a laser-like focus to act on their fi xations. In the 1990s Vulcans and 
Hawks situationally fi xated upon two sorts of circumstances: those involv-
ing oil, and those involving terror. 
Oil: The “Foundation” of “the Global Economy”
First, the situation regarding oil looked bad—at least for the US Levia-
than. As earlier documented, since the 1970s the US oil industry “had 
fallen on tough times” (LeVine 2007: xiii) with the extensive oil nation-
alizations and the rise of OPEC. Starting in the 1980s, the addition of 
new players in oil commodity chains that competed with the majors for 
oil supplies exacerbated the “tough times.” These companies—Russian 
and Chinese—might be called the new majors. The three largest Russian 
petroleum companies are Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft. Three Chinese 
companies—the Chinese National Offshore Corporation, the Chinese Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation, and PetroChina—had been “increasingly 
aggressive” in a “global investment blitz” (“Chinese Oil Giants” 2003).
Then, for a while in the 1980s, the situation regarding oil looked better 
because of the state of affairs in the USSR’s former Caspian and Central 
Asian region, where the Russians had been developing oil and gas for over 
a century (LeVine 2007). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this 
industry was up for grabs. The Clinton security elites could hardly believe 
their calculations. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott announced 
there might be 200 billion barrels of crude oil around the Caspian, together 
with additionally enormous amounts of gas (Cheterian 1997). Media her-
meneuts hyped the region as the “new” oil “El Dorado” (Guma 2006).11 
Consequently, the Clinton administration’s energy policy sought “to estab-
lish an American preserve” in the Caspian (LeVine 2007: xiv). So the oil 
situation changed: in the 1990s, oil elites went from a fi xation upon “tough 
times” to preparing for a new “El Dorado.”
Clinton’s liberal hawks fi xated on the oil situation because they rec-
ognized, as Bill Richardson, Clinton’s energy secretary (1998–2001), put 
it, that “oil has literally made foreign and security policy for decades” (in 
Kaldor, Karl, and Said 2007: 1). Why had oil “made … security policy”? 
This question was easily answered by Kenneth Pollack, who bluntly stated, 
“It’s the Oil, Stupid—… the global economy built over the last 50 years 
rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation 
were removed, the global economy would collapse” (in Everest 2004: 251). 
You were “stupid” if you did not know the world “runs” on petroleum en-
ergy. Liberal hawks were not “stupid.” What about the Vulcans?
They were not stupid either, and some of them, as earlier noted, had 
close ties with the energy business. However, they fi xated upon a seemly 
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self-contradictory realization: on one hand, the US Leviathan, even though 
it had economic problems, was in a good situation; on the other, the petro-
leum situation was bad; but not to worry—this could redound to the New 
American Empire’s benefi t. Two reports documented their fi xation.
The fi rst came from the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), 
founded in 1996 as a neoconservative think tank; Wolfowitz, Perle, Rums-
feld, and Cheney were active members. At the end of the 1990s the PNAC 
published Rebuilding America’s Defenses (RAD; Donnelly 2000), which 
largely addressed military policy but had implications for oil.12 The doc-
ument concentrated on political circumstances and was triumphalist, de-
claring the times to be a “unipolar” moment in world history (Donnelly 
2000: 2) at which the US was “the world’s only superpower” enjoying “pre-
eminent military power” (ibid.: i). In effect, the Vulcans were bragging. 
With the Soviets eliminated, the New American Empire had achieved what 
no other empire had ever achieved: world empire. Eat your hearts out, 
Alexander, Ghengis Khan, Napoleon.
Nevertheless, the PNAC report recognized that the US faced economic 
problems, which they spoke of in terms of “a shrinking industrial base 
poorly structured to be the ‘arsenal of democracy’ for the 21st century” 
(ibid.: 1). In terms earlier discussed in the chapter, the “shrinking indus-
trial base” was a consequence of neoliberal outsourcing and the cyclical 
contradiction. To address this vulnerability, the report recommended that 
security elites proceed “from the belief that America should seek to pre-
serve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the pre-
eminence of U.S. military forces” (ibid.: 4). Implicit in this “belief” was an 
understanding that military “preeminence” could “preserve and extend” 
US empire. Preserving and extending empire was reproducing it, so RAD 
did not base the New American Empire’s reproduction on an economic 
system beset with fi xless fi xes. Rather, imperial reproduction was to be en-
trusted to the military.
RAD reiterated that the Persian Gulf was, “an essential element in U.S. 
security strategy given the long-standing American interests in the region” 
(ibid.: 17). Of course, those “interests” were in oil. The second report was 
more explicit about oil. In April 2001, two months after Bush II’s inau-
guration, the US Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute 
of Public Policy issued an energy task force report concerning US en-
ergy strategy entitled Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century 
(SEPC 2001). The report had been commissioned by the new vice pres-
ident, Dick Cheney. Task force members were technical specialists from 
“every segment of the world of energy” (ibid.: 3). Their expert fi nding was 
brutal: “the energy sector” was “in critical condition” (ibid.: 7). Cheney’s 
task force singled out “spare capacity”—the amount of oil available at any 
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time above that needed for immediate consumption—as a key concern. 
The report noted that OPEC spare capacity stood at 25 percent of global 
demand in 1988 and at 8 percent of demand in 1990. It was projected at 
only 2 percent in 2001. The report interpreted this rapid decline as follows:
The world is currently precariously close to utilizing all of its available global 
oil production capacity, raising the chances of an oil supply crisis with more 
substantial consequences than seen in three decades. (SEPC 2001: 4)
The SEPC report obliterated any notion that the New American Empire 
was headed for any petroleum El Dorado. The energy sector was in a “crit-
ical condition.” So the situation the Vulcans fi xated on in the 2000s was 
that that the US had become a world empire reproducible by “military 
preeminence,” but that the empire was threatened by an “oil supply crisis.” 
How should the US Leviathan respond?
The Vulcans answered this question in the “capstone” public statement 
of US military policy, the National Defense Security Strategy (NDS-2008 
2008). Released in 2008, it refl ected earlier Vulcan understandings that 
had been around since the 1990s. It decreed that “as the relative balance 
of economic and military power between states shifts … new fears and 
insecurities will arise, presenting new risks. … These risks will require 
managing the divergent needs of massively increasing energy demand to 
maintain economic development” (ibid.: 5). It explicitly recognized that 
the US military must involve itself in “managing … massively increasing 
energy demands.” Later the same document further announced, “The 
well-being of the global economy is contingent on ready access to energy 
resources;” and “The United States will continue to foster access to and 
fl ow of energy resources vital to the world economy” (ibid.: 16). As Bush 
II began his presidency, the Vulcans’ fi xation upon the situation of their 
empire and the world’s oil focused upon the military’s “managing” oil in 
the sense of providing “access to” it.
They might have been said to be experimentally fi xated upon global 
warring as a force resource to control petroleum energy, thereby enhanc-
ing the New American Empire’s “managing” the “well-being” of its global 
economy.
In sum, US security elite fi xation on the situation of oil might be un-
derstood as beginning with the Nixon Administration’s recognition of an 
oil “crisis,” continuing with the Carter’s administration’s Carter Doctrine, 
and strengthening with the liberal hawks’ and Vulcans’ common belief that 
if the US Leviathan employed its military to control the oil, then it could 
control the global economy and thereby relax the economic contradictions 
to its imperial being. Consider now the fi xation on terror.
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Terrorism: A Happening Thing
The situation with terrorism was simpler than that of oil. As it had been 
in the 1980s, so it was in the 1990s. Terrorism happened, re-happened, 
and re-happened again and again. It could not be stopped. It was, like the 
sound of police, fi re truck, and ambulance sirens in a city, “a happening 
thing”—and, in bad news for US elites, was often aimed at them. Then, 
it really happened. 9/11! Out of the clear blue sky, the hijacked planes 
fl ew in for a second attack on the World Trade Center and a fi rst on the 
Pentagon. The twin towers—the New York ones, not the Middle Eastern 
ones—afl ame, collapsed. My youngest son sat at the Brooklyn waterfront 
that day and watched little black specks falling from the burning towers. 
He puzzled over what they might be before recognition struck: Desperate 
people fl inging themselves off the towers to avoid the inferno.
On the following weekend, Bush II and his top Vulcans met at Camp 
David to decide on a response. Following this meeting Dubya announced 
his war on terrorism, saying, “This crusade—this war on terrorism—is go-
ing to take awhile” (in Bazinet 2001). A week later, in a nationally televised 
address to a joint session of Congress, he reiterated the message, saying, 
“Our ‘war on terror’ begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, 
and defeated” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Address” 2001).
The oil situation had been like a roller coaster melody, from high notes 
to low notes, all the time getting higher. That of terrorism was like a sharp 
dental pain that suddenly became excruciating. Terrorists had been un-
stoppable. When they took down the towers, the hurt became unbearable. 
Dubya cried out that he would mount a “crusade,” and US security elites 
3.0 experimentally fi xated upon a “war on terrorism.”
Conclusion
This chapter has narrated a tale of two economic and security elites in the 
face of a perfect storm of intensifying and coalescing contradictions that 
provoked ominous reproductive vulnerabilities. The economic elites tried, 
and failed, to fi x the vulnerabilities. The security elites responded to the 
storm of contradictions by developing liberal hawk and Vulcan factions. 
Neither faction understood the storm in terms of contradiction. Rather, 
they fi xated on it in terms of the perceptual cultural messages already 
stored in the neuronal memory evoked by the actualities the contradic-
tions created. In the actuality created by the intensifi cation of economic 
contradictions, the control of oil became central to the US Leviathan’s 
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“well-being.” Meanwhile, intensifi cation of the dominator/dominated con-
tradiction created an actuality where terror stalked US elites.
So the Hawks and Vulcans fi rst became situationally fi xated on oil and 
terror during the 1990s. Having refl ected on them, they came away with 
the understanding that they would be violent about issues of oil and ter-
ror, believing that such violence could fi x the US Leviathan’s reproductive 
vulnerabilities. That is, this situational fi xation produced an experimental 
one in which Hawks and Vulcans experimentally fi xated on the exercise of 
violent force to control oil and eliminate terrorism. The next two chapters 
are about how they did it—how they used the oil-control and anti-terrorist 
iterations of the global domination public délire, already instituted back in 
the 1980s, to choreograph world warring.
Notes
1. Bush II was controversial. A word is in order about his competencies. Rumsfeld (2011: 
319) insists Bush “was a far more formidable president than his popular image.” As Condo-
leezza Rice explained, “He’s really smart—and he’s also self-disciplined” (in Felix 2005: 8). 
Scott McClellan (2009: xiii) described him as “self-confi dent, quick-witted, down-to-earth 
and stubborn.” Rumsfeld, Rice, and McClellan were Dubya’s employees. Bush (2010: 61) 
himself announced he became convinced he should run for president after listening to a ser-
mon about Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt. Kristof (2000) reported on the occasion 
he walked up to a matron at a smart cocktail party and asked, “So, what’s sex like after 50, 
anyway?” Bush II denigrated his policy people as “propeller heads” and insisted, “I don’t do nu-
ance” (Draper 2007: 165). Furthermore, prior to assuming the presidency, he acknowledged 
in a moment of candor (or perhaps foolhardiness), “I don’t have the foggiest idea what I think 
about international, foreign policy” (in B. Woodward 2006: 3). Nevertheless, he believed him-
self to be effective, confi ding, “I don’t spend a lot of time theorizing or agonizing. I get things 
done” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 199). The evidence of his cocaine use is largely hearsay, but 
it is considerable (Hatfi eld 1999). 
2. Condoleezza Rice’s family preserves the memory of their great-grandmother Julia Head 
Rice, who was a house slave on an Alabama plantation during the Civil War (Felix 2005: 
24; Rice 2010: 13). It is remembered that toward the end of the war, when Union soldiers 
threatened the plantation, Julia helped hide its horses from them. How is one to interpret 
Rice’s family remembrance? Does it support the contention that her family looked favorably 
on working for oppressors? It will be recalled that in the Civil War, hundreds of thousands of 
slaves fought for the North, against those oppressors. 
3. The US had been involved in Congolese confl icts well before Susan Rice. However, the 
Rwandan invasion of Congo (the First Congo War, 1996–1997) that Rice argued for led di-
rectly to the Second Congo War (1998–2003), the deadliest confl ict in contemporary African 
history, in which an estimated 3.9 million people were killed (Coghlan et al. 2006: 44). Capi-
talist interests, including US ones, plundered Congolese resources during these wars (Renton, 
Seddon, and Zeilig 2007).
4. Information about declining profi t rates is presented by Magdoff and Sweezy (1988). 
Makoto Itoh (1990) provides evidence for the 1970s and 1980s; Foster and McChesney 
(2009) for the 2007–2009 Great Recession. In an entire issue of the New Left Review, Robert 
Brenner (1998) marshaled evidence bearing on profi t rates that supported an overaccumula-
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tion explanation for the period between 1950 and 1993. Callinicos (2010: 51–68) summarizes 
evidence of the entire period. 
5. Steven Wright (2007) and Hellmich (2011) provide useful accounts of al-Qaeda. Ibra-
him (2007) has published certain of al-Qaeda’s texts, allowing readers to grasp al-Qaeda from 
their own perspective.
6. I am using the term Vulcan broadly to refer to Bush II’s leading security advisors, as does 
James Mann (2004). Daalder and Lindsey (2003: 17–35) discuss the Vulcans from a Demo-
cratic perspective. Zakheim (2011a) provides an insider’s view.
7. Strauss was a political philosopher whose thought has been judged by some to be elitist 
and anti-democratic (Drury 1999; for an opposing view consult S. Smith 2006). Wohlstetter 
was a controversial Cold War nuclear strategist credited with steering his students along a 
neoconservative path (Unger 2008), and the supposed model for the mad Dr. Strangelove in 
Stanley Kubrik’s dark 1964 comedy of the same title. 
8. Humanitarian interventionism is an old liberal doctrine found in John Stuart Mill 
(1859). Chomsky (1999) criticizes it. Bricmont (2006) explains how it legitimates imperial 
violence.
9. Perhaps most directly infl uential, at least concerning Dubya’s Iraq II War, was Kenneth 
Pollack, a longtime CIA specialist on Iranian and Iraqi military issues who became the director 
of Persian Gulf affairs for the NSC during the Clinton administration. Leaving government, he 
took up residence at the Brookings Institution, a centrist think tank dedicated to propagating 
interpretations relevant to US government policy. Especially important in this regard was his 
The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (2002). Bill Keller, then the New York Times 
managing editor, when revealing his own support for Iraq II, announced “Kenneth Pollack” 
wrote “surely the most infl uential book of this season” because it “provided intellectual cover 
for every liberal who fi nds himself inclining toward war but uneasy about Mr. Bush” (2002). 
10. Herman and Peterson (2010) document US human rights hypocrisy, especially as it 
pertains to genocide.
11. A “downsizing” has reduced proven Central Asian crude oil reserves (Ebel and Menon 
2000: 4), perhaps down to 40 million barrels. 
12. RAD’s project participants were a neoconservative who’s who in which the father-son 
team of the Kagans—Donald (father), Fred, and Robert (sons)—was particularly important. 
RAD’s principal author was Thomas Donnelly.




The Middle Eastern Theater
I believe that [the revolt of the passengers on the hijacked Flight 93 on Septem-
ber 11, 2001] was the fi rst counterattack in World War III. (President George 
W. Bush, 2006, in Chossudovsky 2007)
We’re in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War and, 
frankly, our bureaucracies are not responding fast enough and we don’t have 
the right attitude. (Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, 
2006, in Chossudovsky 2007)
By 2014 American global warring had raged in fi ve theaters: the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacifi c. So it could 
be said that no matter where you lived on the earth, war was coming to 
a theater near you—except in the US (where they watched it on their 
TVs), thanks to the assistance of US Security Elites 3.0. Some, like Bush 
II and former Congressman Newt Gingrich, quoted above, thought global 
warring had escalated to become an actual World War III. This, as will be 
shown, is plausible; but it was a world war distinct from any other.1
The last chapter argued that Security Elites 3.0 fi xated upon global war-
ring to control oil and to eliminate terror. The work of this chapter and 
the next is to investigate how the security elites actually went about doing 
this. It does so using evidence from the sixteen global wars between 1991 
and 2014 to discover whether the New American Empire exercised violent 
force through application of the oil-control and anti-terrorist public délires. 
Inquiry proceeds by fi rst examining the particularities of each theater. 
Then it documents the specifi c global wars in a theater and establishes 
the relevance of the oil-control and anti-terrorist public délires to each 
confl ict. The powers created by the wars are considered, especially to learn 
whether the Security Elites 3.0 got what they délired when they warred. 
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Did they fi x the vulnerabilities provoked by the storm of contradictions? 
This chapter investigates global warring in the Middle Eastern theater. 
The next chapter considers it in the other theaters. The fi nal discussion in 
the next chapter concerns whether the evidence of chapters 8, 9, and 10 is 
consistent with the global warring theory.
The Middle Eastern Theater
[There] is a memo [at the Pentagon] that describes how we’re going to take 
out seven countries in fi ve years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, fi nishing off, Iran. (NATO Supreme Allied Com-
mander General Wesley Clark 2007)
She weeps while telling the story. The abaya (tunic) she wears cannot hide the 
shaking of her body as waves of grief roll through her. “I cannot get the image 
out of my mind of her foetus being blown out of her body.” (A memory of Muna 
Salim, in Jamail 2004)
Muna Salim’s sister, Artica, was seven months pregnant when two rockets 
from US warplanes struck her austere home in Falluja. Boom! Splat! The 
New American Empire was in the business of blasting unborn children 
out of their mother’s bodies. On 2 March 2007 General Wesley Clark, 
speaking at the civic-minded Commonwealth Club of California, let the 
cat out of the memorandum bag. Actually, he let out the cats—seven Mid-
dle Eastern countries that the Pentagon planned to “take over.” Of course, 
nobody takes over a region without a fi ght. The years since the 1990s have 
witnessed a veritable War for the Middle East, with imperial storm troopers 
fi ghting over six of the seven countries Clark mentioned as targets. And 
the thing of it is, knowledgeable folk knew the Middle East to be a “dan-
gerous neighborhood.”
First, there was the problem of the military satrapies that were supposed 
to defend US Middle Eastern interests—the twin towers of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Since the fall of the shah, Iran has viewed the US as the “Great 
Satan,” an interpretation only strengthened by the US’s tilt toward Iraq in 
the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and especially by its use of “Robocruiser” 
to shoot down a civilian Iranian airliner. After 1979, Iran was an enemy of 
the US.
Saudi Arabia was still an ally, but one with an “uncertain future” (T. 
Lippman 2012). The country was governed as an absolute monarchy by 
the Saud royal family. Their governance exhibited a political bipolarity: 
on the one hand, provision of generous benefi ts to citizens deemed loyal; 
on the other, repression of opponents (Alrabaa 2010). Absolute monarchy 
invites rebellion. King Faisal was assassinated in 1975 by a nephew. In 1979 
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rebels seized the Holy Sanctuary in Mecca, citing the corruption of the 
House of Saud. In 1992 a group of 107 Wahhabi clerics sent King Fahd a 
“Memorandum of Understanding” criticizing his government for corrup-
tion and human rights abuses, as well as for allowing infi del soldiers (those 
of the US military) into the kingdom. Since the early nineteenth century 
the House of Saud had allied with the Wahhabis, a fundamentalist Sunni 
Islamic sect.2 Criticism by revered religious fi gures was a blow to regime 
legitimacy.
Additionally, there had been problems in the country’s East for a con-
siderable period (Zambelis 2012). The area produces about 90 percent of 
Saudi oil, little of whose value returns to the region, and its inhabitants 
are Shiite Muslims. Wahhabis condemn Shiites as infi dels. So the House 
of Saud had oppressed people in the East for both their religious beliefs 
and their grumbling about not receiving a fair share of the oil revenues. In 
response, Easterners had organized different nonviolent and violent resis-
tances to their oppressors. Given such developments, knowledgeable US 
security elites worried about the House of Saud’s durability. Thus, one twin 
tower had collapsed by the 1990s and the other was “uncertain.”
As described earlier, the Reagan administration had sought to replace 
Iran with Iraq as a new tower of support for US imperial projects, know-
ing full well that Saddam Hussein was something of a “monster.” Iraq had 
come out of the Iran-Iraq war in fi nancial distress. Wars are expensive. Iraq 
had borrowed a lot, and owed roughly $60 billion, a debt it found diffi cult 
to service because oil prices had declined during the 1980s. Iraq, then, was 
a monster-satrapy, frustrated by fi nancial exigencies.
Then there was the Israel-Palestine confl ict, which began in the late 
1940s with Israelis violently cleansing Palestinians from their homes, 
making them stateless in their own land.3 US elites had long championed 
Israel. By 1990 Israel had used US support to create the most powerful 
military in the Middle East, which it exercised to defend its occupation of 
Palestinian lands and its external security concerns, as well as those of the 
US. Palestinians were dismayed that Israeli security forces routinely used 
American arms to crush their resistance.
Israeli repression of Palestinians made the Holy Land a birthing ground 
for resistance terror organizations opposing both Israel and its American 
friend. The grandparent of these was the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), founded in 1964. Associated with the PLO are Fatah, its military 
arm; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); Al Saiqa; 
and Tanzim. Independent of the PLO but still anti-Israeli are Islamic Jihad, 
the Palestine Liberation Front, Abu Nidal, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Israeli 
oppression motivated Osama bin Laden—the iconic terror entrepreneur 
and Arsenal football club supporter—to create al-Qaeda in the late 1980s 
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(Scheuer 2007). These organizations, as we have seen, swarmed to attack 
US imperial targets.
In support of its Middle Eastern vital interests, the US Leviathan forged 
an alliance with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an association 
of six petroleum-wealthy Persian Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates) that was founded 
in 1981. These were authoritarian monarchies threatened by a series of 
popular demonstrations that began in 2010 in North Africa—fi rst in Tu-
nisia, next in Egypt—and seemed to target authoritarian governments 
such as those in the GCC. The demonstrations began peacefully, tended 
to quickly turn violent, and were termed the “Arab Spring.” Springtime 
in the Middle East seemed in part to be a response to neoliberal policies 
that had impoverished the working and middle classes; in part a claim by 
Islamists for more Islamic forms of authority; and in part a demand by sec-
ularists for liberal democratic governance. 4 By 2014, the Middle Eastern 
springtime had been followed by a reactionary winter, especially in Egypt, 
where a repressive military dictatorship threatened. The implications for 
the New American Empire were ambiguous—hostility to neoliberalism 
was worrisome, as was the possibility of Islamic states. So by the end of the 
fi rst decade of the new millennium, the Middle East seethed with violent 
movements to make and remake the region’s forms of governance.
Without question, by 1990 Vulcans and Hawks fi xated, as the title of 
Daniel Yergin’s book put it, on “The Prize” (1993, Middle Eastern oil. But 
they equally saw enemies in Iran and its allies as well as in terrorists; plus a 
dubious client in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and a wobbly one in Saudi Arabia. 
By 2010 different countries were bothered by the Arab Spring’s attempts to 
remake the political map of the whole region, with ambiguous implications 
for the American imperial project. Hence, the Middle East in the last de-
cade of the twentieth century and the fi rst of the twenty-fi rst century was 
a rough neighborhood, getting rougher.
Nonetheless, it was a neighborhood where the Security Elites 3.0 had 
made preparations by building up CENTCOM during the Iran-Iraq War. 
Since 1990, eyes on the prize in this rough neighborhood, they have waged 
six global wars in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Israel. These are con-
sidered next, taking fi rst the case of Iraq, where the phrase “cut and run” 
will assume especial signifi cance.
The Iraq War, 1991–2011: Cutting and Running “Responsibly”
This is an assault on humanity. (Khalid Salman, lawyer for the victims of the 
Haditha Massacre, in AFP 2012)
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 320 –
Deadly Contradictions
In English slang the phrase “cut and run” means to run away from some-
thing. It has been suggested that it has a nautical derivation, referring to 
ships making a fast departure by cutting the anchor rope and running be-
fore the wind. In contemporary usage it often has a scornful connotation. 
To cut and run is to lose one’s nerve and stop something too quickly. In 
order to appreciate the signifi cance of this phrase for American global war-
ring in Iraq, attention turns to Anbar Province, a huge desert region to the 
west of Baghdad.
Haditha is a small city about 150 kilometers northwest of Falluja, where 
Artica died. After the US invasion in 2003 it became a center of resistance to 
US occupation. On 19 November 2005 a detachment of patrolling US ma-
rines—“frontline bullet chewers” (Bellavia 2007: 3)—massacred twenty-
four of Haditha’s citizens. The soldiers involved in the incident were inves-
tigated by US authorities. Only one was ever charged. He received a slap 
on the hand. On hearing of the result of these legal proceedings, the lawyer 
for the victims judged it “an assault on humanity.” Indeed, many through-
out the world go further and assess the New American Empire’s twenty 
years of warring against Iraq from 1991 to 2011 as a crime against humanity. 
The narrative that follows fi rst discusses the actual warring against Iraq, 
showing how the US ended its “assault on humanity” by cutting and run-
ning. Then, it argues that the hostilities followed from the interpretations 
the Security Elites 3.0 made of events in light of the oil-control and the 
anti-terrorism public délires.
Before we proceed, one point needs to be clear. Iraq has oil, perhaps 
more of it than all but one other country in the world (Saudi Arabia). 
Conservatively, it has 112 billion proven barrels of reserves, 10.7 percent 
of the world’s total (Klare 2004: 19). The exact size of Iraq’s oil reserves is 
unclear. Some estimates suggest there may be more than 300 billion barrels 
(Luft 2003), which would mean Iraq has even more oil than Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, this oil is relatively close to the surface and hence easy and 
less costly to extract.
US Global Warring against Iraq prior to 1991
In Arabic the name Saddam means means “one who confronts.” The man is 
a metonym for the country, because since the 1970s the history of indepen-
dent Iraq has been one of confrontation—often violent—with US imperi-
alism. Between 1972 and 1991 there were three—secret, but nevertheless 
real—bouts of global warring against Iraq. Saddam had begun his political 
rise in the 1960s with confl icting commitments to Iraqi nationalism, so-
cialism, and pan-Arabism on the one hand, and to the US and the CIA 
on the other (Coughlin 2005). At the age of twenty he joined the Baath 
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Party. In the early 1960s Iraq was governed by a left-leaning regime headed 
by Abdel Karim Qasim. At this time the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), 
a consortium of British and American oil companies, controlled Iraq’s oil. 
Under Qassim’s guidance, a policy of oil nationalization began. Public Law 
#80 was passed, stripping the IPC of 99.5 percent of its ownership rights.
This was unacceptable to President John F. Kennedy, who in 1963 au-
thorized CIA support for a successful Baathist coup against Qassim. JFK’s 
authorization of CIA participation in the coup was essentially a reiteration 
of Eisenhower’s earlier coup against Mossadeq in Iran, both coups being 
over control of oil. Saddam probably had his fi rst encounters with the CIA 
at this time. The coup succeeded and the Baathists came to power, using 
lists supplied by the CIA to eliminate leftist professionals and intellectuals. 
The young Saddam was said to have had a hand in supervising the killing. 
The CIA’s importance to the coup is not clear, but Andrew and Patrick 
Cockburn (2000) report that James Critchfi eld, then head of the CIA in 
the Middle East, insisted that “we regarded it as a great victory,” while Ali 
Saleh Sa’adi, then the Baath Party secretary general, believed “we came to 
power on a CIA train.” This was the fi rst covert, indirect war between the 
US against Iraq.
By 1969 Saddam was the de facto leader of the country; in 1979 he 
became its president. There was initially some US sentiment that he might 
make a fi ne client to counterbalance more radical Arab states, especially 
Egypt under Nasser. However, in 1972 Saddam continued Qassim’s work 
and fully nationalized the IPC. Worse, he signed the Iraq–Soviet Union 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (also in 1972), making it clear that 
he would confront US imperial délires.
Unsurprisingly, President Nixon and his powerful henchman Henry 
Kissinger turned against Saddam, hoping to acquire greater US access to 
Iraqi oil. In 1973 they made a secret agreement with the shah to commence 
covert action against the Iraqi regime. This was to be done by arming Iraqi 
Kurds in their rebellion against Baghdad. Israel joined in this campaign, 
and for a period in 1973–1974, Iranian, Israeli, and CIA agents all oper-
ated in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 1975 Saddam negotiated a cessation of sup-
port for the Kurd rebellion by agreeing to Iranian demands concerning the 
Shatt al-Arab, as we saw earlier among other matters. This fi ghting was a 
second covert, indirect form of global warring between Iraq and the US. 
Like the fi rst global warring, it partly concerned control over oil.
In a third bout of global warring from 1985 through 1986 (discussed 
in chapter 7), the Reagan administration secretly armed the Iranians in 
their 1980–1988 war against Iraq. The Iranians were supposed to serve as 
proxies for the Americans to stop the Iraqis from becoming too powerful 
by winning the confl ict. Arming the Iranians was illegal, so it was supposed 
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to be covert. When the Reagan administration’s actions were made public, 
they became known as the Iran-Contra scandal.
What made the arming of the Iranians so scandalous was how it was 
done: the administration had the Israelis sell US arms to the Iranians and 
then used the proceeds of these sales to support ultra-right militias (the 
Contras) in their fi ght against the progressive Sandinistas in Nicaragua. In 
principle, the weapons were sold to Iran to win the release of US hostages 
taken after the fall of the shah in 1979. In practice, US security elites 
knew these weapons would be used against Saddam and were not averse to 
seeing Saddam humbled. The Iran-Iraq War, as detailed earlier, ended in a 
stalemate. Saddam was chastened by it, though he was resurrected as a US 
client—though one thought to be something of a monster-alterity—with 
his country’s fi nances in terrible shape.
Three times prior to 1991 the US had intervened in Iraq with covert, 
indirect global warring. Two of the three interventions had confronted 
Saddam. Two of the three interventions had been over control of Iraq’s oil. 
As Mohammed Aboush, an Iraqi Oil Ministry offi cial, lamented, “Oil has 
not been a blessing. Without oil, we would not have had these wars” (in 
Maass 2009: 152). In 1991, a fourth US global war against Iraq began. It 
would be long and grim, and it ultimately, as will become clear, involved oil.
The Twenty-Year War: US versus Iraq 1991–2011
The years between 1991 and 2011 are often depicted as a time of two wars 
between Iraq and the US divided from each other by a decade of peace. 
The wars are said to be Bush I’s Persian Gulf War I (1990–1991) followed 
by Bush II’s Persian Gulf War II (2003–2011), with the Clinton administra-
tion (1993–2009) providing an interregnum between hostilities. However, 
just as historians talk of the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) between 
England and France, so it is appropriate speak of a protracted Twenty-Year 
War between Saddam and the New American Empire. In the Hundred 
Years’ War the debate was over whether territory in continental France 
would be part of the English Empire. In the Twenty Year War the debate 
has been over Iraq’s position in the New American Empire. Further, note 
that the soi-disant tranquility between the two opponents during Clinton’s 
presidency was actually a time of air and naval blockade, and that block-
ades are acts of war. Consider the fi rst period of the war.
Gulf War I, An American Anabasis: An anabasis in ancient Greece was any 
march from a coast into the interior. The Anabasis is Xenophon’s (2004) 
account of an extraordinary fi fth-century BC march by a Greek mercenary 
army from the Mediterranean through the hostile Persian Empire. Gulf 
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War I started at the coast in Kuwait and marched into the interior of Iraq. 
It was the US’s anabasis. Its immediate casus belli was Saddam’s invasion 
of Kuwait, which suggests that inquiry into Iraq’s relations with Kuwait is 
pertinent.
Kuwait had been an Ottoman province of Iraq since the 1500s (Crystal 
1995). Following World War I, the victorious allies at the League of Nations 
conference in 1920 dismembered the Ottoman Empire as punishment for 
its siding with the Germans, which was how they justifi ed awarding each 
other its parts. The UK received, among other areas, Iraq. By 1920 it was 
clear that Iraq had signifi cant amounts of oil, and the IPC was formed. A 
year later Kuwait was severed from Iraq and made an independent monar-
chy governed by the Al-Sabah lineage under the tutelage of the UK. One 
goal of this act was to block Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, weakening 
its nationalist aspirations. In 1932 Britain granted independence to Iraq, 
which became a monarchy headed by the Hashim dynasty. London’s mili-
tary support of the Hashims meant that independence was limited. Iraqis 
put up lively resistance to the British disposition of Kuwait throughout the 
1930s. A popular Kuwaiti uprising in 1939 demanded that Kuwait return 
to Iraq. The UK crushed it. In 1958, when the Iraqi prime minister publicly 
asked for the return of Kuwait, the British government replied, regard-
ing this request, that it “approved in principle.” That same year, Qassim 
overthrew the monarchy and London abrogated the agreement to return 
Kuwait to Iraq.
Should a powerful imperial thug sever Texas from the US, it would be 
Americans’ patriotic duty to recover it. Saddam’s bid to reconnect Kuwait 
to Iraq might be imagined as the fulfi llment of a similar patriotic obligation. 
He was joining together what had been cut asunder by an imperial in-
timidator.5 Further, it made splendid sense economically. Kuwait had 96.5 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves or 9.2 percent of the world’s total 
reserves (Klare 2004: 19). Gaining of control over these would solve Iraq’s 
fi nancial problems and so much more.
On 2 August 1990 the monster-alterity behaved like a monster-alterity 
(from the vantage of the US and Kuwaiti governments) and invaded Ku-
wait. Whatever the logic behind Saddam’s annexation, Bush I was irri-
tated. Five days later he began Operation Desert Storm, a campaign to 
eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. First, the elder Bush put together a coalition 
of thirty-nine states to assist CENTCOM, states that were for the most part 
imperial clients. Japan and Germany did not join the coalition but did con-
tribute signifi cant fi nancial support. General Colin Powell, then chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had overall responsibility for the order of bat-
tle. CENTCOM’s commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf (“Stormin’ 
Norman”), commanded the coalition troops that did the actual fi ghting; 
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these eventually numbered around a million. Most of the coalition’s sol-
diers came from CENTCOM.
Combat operations began on 17 January 1991 with heavy aerial bom-
bardment of Iraqi targets. Invasion began on two fronts—one in Kuwait, 
the other in Iraq—on 24 February. Just as the Germans had experimented 
with their newest military machines during the Spanish Civil War; so the 
Americans tried out their new technologies during Gulf War I—especially 
stealth bombers, smart bombs, and armor-piercing depleted uranium ord-
nance. Iraqi forces, outgunned, were devastated. On 27 February Saddam 
ordered evacuation of Kuwait. Long convoys of retreating Iraqis slowly 
straggling along the Kuwait-Iraq highway were attacked from the air, caus-
ing the road to be named the “Highway of Death.” Stormin’ Norman had 
stormed through Gulf War I in a hundred hours. Bush I declared Kuwait 
liberated on 28 February. They marched in, they marched out: all in all, 
America’s anabasis had gone well.
No attempt was made to take Baghdad or remove Saddam from his 
presidency, partly due to the urging of Colin Powell, and partly because the 
president and his NSA, Brent Scowcroft, believed it would be “destabiliz-
ing” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998: 489). Regarding this restraint, as Gordon 
Libby has reminisced, “neither” he nor Wolfowitz “liked it much” (Isikoff 
and Corn 2006: 237). For that matter, neither did Cheney. There would be 
a next time, but it only came after a war of blockades.
War of Blockades and Other Assorted Violence: It was believed that blockad-
ing Saddam’s regime would provoke internal resistance to it, so that Iraqis 
would themselves do the nasty work of removing the Saddamite outrage. 
Blockading began immediately after the Kuwait invasion. The Security 
Council passed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 661, 
which imposed a near total fi nancial and trade embargo on Iraq that cov-
ered everything from pencils to bras to medicines to food. A few weeks 
later, UNSC Resolution 665 authorized the force to enforce the embargo. 
The blockade was on. UNSC Resolution 687 made the cease-fi re contin-
gent upon permanent disarmament, reparations to Kuwait, and continued 
embargo. In April 1991, the US and the UK unilaterally established no-fl y 
zones in northern Iraq. The Kurds, who fi ercely opposed Saddam, are lo-
cated in northern Iraq, and establishment of a no-fl y zone there meant that 
the Iraqi air force could not be used against them. Equally, by mid March 
1991, a Shiite rebellion against Saddam had developed in southern Iraq at 
Basra, Karbala, and Najaf. In August 1992 the no-fl y zone was extended 
to southern Iraq.
President Clinton took offi ce in 1993. Prior to his doing so, the Bush I 
administration had poured money, largely through the CIA, into the Iraqi 
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National Congress (INC), an opposition group led by Ahmed Chalabi that 
sought to depose Saddam. In March 1995 the INC staged an “uprising” 
that quickly collapsed. A year later in June 1996, the INC plotted an-
other coup, once more with CIA assistance (Everest 2004: 337). It came 
to nothing.
By 1996, it was recognized that the UN embargo had led to great suf-
fering among ordinary Iraqis. The head of the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) estimated that the sanctions had led to 500,000 civilian 
deaths, especially among children as a result of malnutrition.6 It was at this 
time that Madeleine Albright acknowledged in a television interview that 
US offi cials knew the human costs of their choice to blockade, telling her 
interviewer “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think the 
price is worth it” (in Everest 2004: 185). To further make her point about 
being “hard,” she announced in 1997 that the blockade would continue 
until Saddam was eliminated.
Thereafter, US Security Elites 3.0 were more open and determined in 
their attempts to destroy Saddam. The Project for a New American Cen-
tury sent a public letter to Clinton demanding “regime change” in Iraq 
in January 1998. Congress passed the “Iraq Liberation Act” that October. 
Clinton signed it into law. In Operation Desert Fox Clinton sought to assas-
sinate Saddam and other high military offi cials, bombing one of Saddam’s 
presidential palaces as well as barracks and the command headquarters of 
the elite Republican Guard. Nothing worked—not sanctions, not coups, 
not aerial bombardments. The War of Blockades and other assorted vio-
lence failed.
In 1998 the White House became fi xated upon the Monica Lewinsky 
affair—President Clinton’s lying about his sexual dalliance with a youthful 
White House intern. Many titillating details were released to the prurient 
pleasure of an enthusiastic public. It has been argued that distaste over 
these hurt the 2000 Democratic presidential campaign. Perhaps, but Al 
Gore, the Democratic candidate, won the popular vote. Nevertheless, he 
lost in the Electoral College due to an adverse decision in the Republican-
controlled Supreme Court. Clinton left offi ce in 2001, judged a sexual 
predator by some. Meanwhile, the Saddamite remained in Baghdad. Fin-
ishing him off fell to Dubya.
Anabasis II: Going Massive, Gulf War II: Bush II was inaugurated on 20 
January 2001 against a backdrop of 10,000 protesters challenging the le-
gitimacy of his election. During the following seven months he organized 
his administration, concentrating on domestic matters such as federally 
funding faith-based organizations for the poor and tax cuts for the wealthy. 
Then 9/11 happened. In the hours immediately after American Airlines 
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Flight 77 smashed into the Pentagon, according to notes taken by an aide, 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, immediately began instructing his 
military to work on counterstrikes; urging them to “Go massive. Sweep 
it all up. Things related and not” (Borger 2006). At 2:40 p.m. on 9/11, 
according to the notes taken by one deputy, Rumsfeld, despite evidence 
indicating that the attack had been the work of Osama bin Laden, directed 
defense offi cials to secure “best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit 
S.H.” (S.H. being Saddam Hussein) (ibid.).
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” opened Gulf War II on 19 March 2003. It 
was based on a far smaller coalition than Gulf War II, basically US and UK-
troops. A number of important US client states opposed the war, France 
and Germany prominent among them. The confl ict might be thought of as 
an American anabasis II.
This time, combat operations involved implementation of a “shock and 
awe” military doctrine, close to Rumsfeld’s heart, which might be grasped 
as blitzkrieg by alternative means. It meant an offensive war of movement 
with aerial bombardment replacing that of tanks. Developed by Harlan 
Ullman and James Wade, this strategy’s goal was to achieve “rapid dom-
ination” by applying overwhelming and spectacular air power as fast as 
possible (Ullman et al. 1996: x). As Ullman put it to CBS News in 2003, 
“You’re sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you’re a general and 30 of 
your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city 
down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2, 3, 4, 5 days 
they are physically, emotionally exhausted” (in Correll 2003).7
On 19 March, intense bombing commenced against Saddam’s Presiden-
tial Palace in Baghdad as well as other targets throughout the country. A 
ground invasion of heavily armored units coming from the south in Kuwait 
drove in a pincer movement directly at Baghdad. The capital fell on 9 
April, and a US psychological operations unit toppled an enormous statue 
of Saddam, effectively ending his reign.
Coalition troops spread throughout the country and had largely occu-
pied it by 30 April, the end of the invasion phase of the war. Iraqi forces 
had been devastated. Coalition combat operations had been gratifyingly 
“massive,” with just the right touch of “shock and awe.” On May Day, 
Bush II, a character in a comic opera, descended by helicopter onto the 
deck of an aircraft carrier. Dressed in a fl ight suit to look properly military, 
he delivered a rousing speech before a huge sign bearing the American 
fl ag and the phrase “Mission Accomplished.” Wrong. Shock and awe, and 
going massive, had failed.8 Gulf War II was about to begin. Three years 
later US casualties would reach 20,000 (P. Cockburn 2006: 1). By the end 
of the confl ict in 2011, US casualties numbered around 37,000 (Statistic 
Brain 2015).
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Let us return to the hostilities’ beginning. Throughout the remainder of 
2003, coalition offi cials instituted Iraq’s occupation. They inaugurated an 
interim government led by retired US General Jay Garner, which soon be-
came the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by L. Paul Brem-
mer. For Iraqis it was a grim time—little food, water, or electricity; lots and 
lots of killings; enormous amounts of looting. The CPA’s fi rst acts were to 
outlaw the Baath Party, disband the Iraqi army, and begin neoliberal eco-
nomic policies.
Insurgency quickly developed, prompting Bush to taunt, “Bring ’em on” 
(2010: 260).9 They came. First were Baathists and the former military, who 
raided Saddam-era weapons depots and melted into the desert to fi ght in 
the manner Mao had urged. Religious groups followed the Baathists and sol-
diers into insurgency. These included Sunnis such as the Mujahideen Shura 
Council (Iraq), the Islamic Army in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq, the United Jihad 
Factions Council, and Jaish al-Rashideen. There were also Shia insurgents, 
especially in the powerful Badr and the Mahdi armies. Additionally, foreign 
fi ghters came to join the insurgency; they were only a small percentage of 
the rebellion but were experienced combatants, motivated by Salafi /Wah-
habi doctrine (sometimes generically termed “jihadists”). The most import-
ant of these groups was al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, originally led by Abu 
Musab al Zaqawi, which entered the fray in 2004. Saddam, a secular leader, 
had kept al-Qaeda with its Salafi st orientation out of Iraq. It was the US 
Leviathan’s destruction of Saddam that allowed them in.
A second, sectarian civil war emerged in the midst of the insurgency. 
Iraq is a largely Shiite country. Though the Baathists were formally a sec-
ular party, there was a Sunni tilt to the state under Saddam. As the in-
surgency against the occupation wore on, competition for control over 
the provisional government increasingly sharpened between Sunnis and 
Shiites. Gradually, the Shiites gained the upper hand in the struggle, with 
Nouri Al-Maliki, head of the Dawa, a Shiite party, becoming the prime 
minister in May 2006. US forces were caught in the middle of this civil war, 
which intensifi ed the violence of the occupation.
Between 2003 and 2007, the different insurgent groups largely targeted 
coalition armies. There were 26,496 recorded insurgent incidents in 2004. 
The fi gure increased to 34,131 incidents in 2005 and still more in 2006, 
reaching a level of 960 attacks per week. Baghdad, Al Anbar, and Salah 
Ad Din were the provinces with the highest concentration of attacks. The 
US military suffered a total of 4,486 deaths in the entire war, the vast bulk 
of these coming between 2003 and 2007 (“Operation Iraqi Freedom” 2009; 
see also B. Woodward 2006: 472–475). It was equally a time of atrocity.
The US Marines have a proud motto, semper fi delis (always faithful). 
In 2004 they destroyed Fallujah using, among other ordnance, white 
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phos phorous munitions, an incendiary weapon prohibited by the Geneva 
Conventions of War, killing Artica and her unborn child in the process. 
Some wags remarked at the time that the Marines were “always faithful! 
To war crimes!” Seymour Hersh (2004), writing in the New Yorker maga-
zine, broke the story of torture, rape, sodomy, and other prisoner abuses 
in Abu Ghraib prison. Throughout this time US occupation authorities 
confronted enormous corruption, of which they themselves were often the 
authors, involving the plundering of vast sums of money authorized for 
Iraqi reconstruction (Auken 2009).
Powell’s deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, himself an accom-
plished naval commando during the Vietnam War, visited Iraq at the end 
of 2004 to learn how the war was going. On his return he briefed the pres-
ident, telling him, “We’re not winning,” adding, “We’re not losing. Not 
winning over a long period of time works for the insurgents” (B. Woodward 
2006: 373). This was his not especially subtle way of reporting to the presi-
dent that the US was losing, which the president at that time may not have 
got. Armitage further communicated with the CIA, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (DIA), then US Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte, and 
then Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq General George Casey, telling 
them what he had told the president. They got it, and—according to Bob 
Woodward—the CIA, the DIA, the US ambassador, and the in-country 
commander of the forces “were in agreement” with his judgment (ibid.).
A year later in the fall of 2005, General Abizaid met with a number 
of former senior military colleagues at his Doha headquarters. He was 
from a Christian Lebanese-American family, spoke Arabic, had succeeded 
Tommy Franks as head of CENTCOM, and went on to serve the longest 
stint as its commander (2003–2007). He had also been part of the initial 
planning and execution of Gulf War II. If anybody knew the war’s progress, 
it was he. Abizaid told his senior colleagues, according to Woodward, that 
“he held the position that the war was now about the Iraqis. They had 
to win the war now. The U.S. military had done all it could” (ibid.: 426). 
Abizaid was emphatic about this point, stressing, “We’ve got to get the 
fuck out” (ibid.). His colleagues asked what his strategy for winning was. 
He responded, “That’s not my job,” indicating this work was for “The pres-
ident and Condi Rice” (ibid.). Impotent to reduce surging insurgency, the 
US military was losing the war throughout 2003–2006 and knew it, and its 
commanding general wanted “to get the fuck out.”
Democratic elites, especially in the Congress, echoing General Abizaid, by 
this time, heartily clamored for withdrawal; everyone from Joe Murtha in the 
House of Representatives, to Hillary Clinton, in the Senate. By the late spring 
of 2006 Bush was personally told that in Iraq, “It’s hell” (Bush 2010: 364); and 
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by summer of that year, according to Bush himself, all of his security elites were 
aware of the “deteriorating conditions” in Iraq. (Ibid.: 363)
At this time, two “wise men”— former Secretary of State James Baker 
and Lee Hamilton of the House of Representatives—led a group of secu-
rity elite elders in what was called the Iraq Study Group (ISG), whose role 
was to advise the president on the war’s management. The group was a 
reprise of the Vietnam “wise men” who had brought President Johnson the 
bad tidings that Vietnam was unwinnable. The ISG’s central conclusion—
blazoned on the fi rst line of the fi rst page of their report—was that the Gulf 
War II situation was “grave and deteriorating” (Baker and Hamilton 2006: 
6). The “wise men” had spoken by 2007. The war, as the title of Thomas 
Ricks’ book on the topic put it, was a “Fiasco” (2006).
The day after the ISG report was submitted, Bush II confi ded, “And 
truth of the matter is, a lot of reports in Washington are never read by 
anybody. To show you how important this one is, I read it” (“The ‘Mis-
underestimated’ President” 2009). What he read confi rmed the debacle. 
Dubya called this time the “worst period of my presidency” (2010: 367). 
Perceptually, the war was interpreted as a mess, so that the procedural 
question of “what to do” was foremost. Here, the ISG report advised, “Our 
most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic 
and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary 
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin 
to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly” (Baker and Hamilton 
2006: 6). The crux of what the ISG procedurally advised was to “move … 
combat forces out of Iraq.” Make no mistake about it, this was cutting and 
running, which Baker and Hamilton advised be done “responsibly” after 
“enhanced diplomatic and political efforts.”10
Though they were never formally publicized and the administration 
would deny it, the ISG’s recommendations were essentially accepted. The 
following year, the US military and the Iraqi provisional government en-
tered into negotiations, that is, “enhanced diplomatic and political” work, 
for a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). A SOFA is a legal framework 
stipulating how the US military operates in a host country. The US-Iraq 
SOFA was signed in November 2008. Article 24 required US combat 
troops to exit Iraq’s cities by 2009 and Iraq by 2011. Iraq is desert with 
occasional cities. Most of the fi ghting and attendant casualties had been in 
the cities, especially Baghdad. It was publicly announced on 18 November 
2008 that there would be “full withdrawal” of US troops by 2011 (Bruno 
2008). Thus, by 2008 it had been announced to the Iraqis, US Security 
Elites 3.0, and the American public that the war was effectively over, at 
least the American part of it, very soon—the next year!
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Bush II and his band of Vulcans in 2007 had responded to their fi asco in 
a different way than had President Johnson to his Vietnam disaster. John-
son, after the slow buildup of the Kennedy administration, had chosen 
massive escalation, been told by his “wise men” that it had failed, and 
chosen to leave the presidency. Bush II had gone “massive” from the very 
beginning, been told by his “wise men” that this had failed, and chosen to 
stay in the presidency but get out of Iraq. All of this would be done “re-
sponsibly,” because the very last thing Bush II and his Vulcans” needed was 
another Vietnam.
So in order to disguise the fact of US imperial withdrawal there had to be 
one last campaign in Gulf War II to provide a military rationale for leaving. 
This would be a “surge.” At this point General David Petraeus strolled onto 
center stage. He was remembered in his West Point yearbook as “always 
going for it … even in his social life” (Bruno 2007). In fact, the general went 
“for it” so diligently that Senator John McCain—who had been a Vietnam 
War POW (supposed by some to have collaborated with his captors [Cock-
burn 2008])—labeled him a “genius,” one of “America’s greatest military 
heroes”; the person “responsible—after years of failure—for the success of 
the surge in Iraq” (Curry 2012). Why such praise? It appears that McCain 
awarded it because Petraeus, along with a number of like-minded military 
thinkers, came to believe that shock and awe was not the way to proceed—
not an especially diffi cult understanding as shock and awe had led to fi asco. 
So the general proposed a turn to counterinsurgency warfare (COIN).11
Petreaus’s COIN: Actually COIN is old hat, militarily. There have been 
COINdinistas (lovers of COIN) since Americans employed it in their 
1630s war against the Pequots in New England (Hauptman and Wherry 
1990). An iteration of COIN was used in the Vietnam War, with dubious 
results (Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011). So a word is in order about 
the Petraeus reiteration of it, which might be described as “pseudo-Maoist 
guerrilla warfare with a wallop” (PMGWW). On the one hand, troops us-
ing PMGWW-COIN would labor to pacify the civilian population by un-
derstanding them better and improving their lives in some way. To better 
understand occupied people, “anthropologists” would be sent in to tell the 
soldiers about the enemy’s “culture” so they could be “sensitive” to it.12 
These occupying soldiers would help occupied folks by making them safer, 
improving their water supply, helping them with health care, and paying 
them for different services. In doing this they would transform the Maoist 
doctrine of “swimming with the fi sh” to one of “bribing the fi sh.” On the 
other hand, PMGWW-COIN regarded insurgents who remained enemies 
as targets for “kinetic” operations, in which they were hunted down and 
eliminated.
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Kinetic operations were the specialty of the covert Joint Special Op-
erations Command (JSOC), headed for much of Gulf War II by General 
Stanley McChrystal (2003–2008), whose operatives were often called 
“ninjas.”13 However, the Defense Department also developed units within 
the Iraq police force that might be termed hyper-kinetic. Prior to receiv-
ing overall command in Iraq, Petraeus had been sent to Baghdad in 2004 
as head of the Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I), 
where his responsibility was to oversee training of Iraqi military and police. 
After a few months, he assured Americans in a Washington Post piece that 
“training is on track” (2004). A question, however, poses itself: just what 
sort of “track” was the general laying?
Rumsfeld, for his part, had sent an ex-colonel named James Steele to 
Iraq as a “consultant.” Steele had been instrumental in developing para-
military death squads in El Salvador during the Central American “dirty 
wars” of the 1980s. Steele worked in Iraq with another ex-colonel, James 
Coffman, who appears to have reported to Petraeus. Their assignment was 
to redo in Iraq what Steele had done in El Salvador. They succeeded, cre-
ating the Special Police Commandos (SPCs), who were commanded by 
General Adnan Thabit (Mahmood et al. 2013a). General Thabit has said 
that “the main person I used to contact was David Petraeus” (in Mah-
mood et al. 2013b). Together Steele, Coffman, and Thabit turned the 
SPC into a counterinsurgency organization whose chief kinetic tool was 
pain, often administered with a power drill. Mahmood et al. (2013b) write, 
“According to one soldier with the 69th Armoured Regiment … ‘it was 
like the Nazis … like the Gestapo basically. They (the commandos) would 
essentially torture anybody they had good reason to suspect.’” The track 
Steele and associates were laying was that of torture. It was the “wallop” in 
PMGWW-COIN.
Such COIN tactics are fl awed. US soldiers, when they are big guys 
tricked out in body armor, armed to the teeth, speaking gibberish, and, 
regardless of any sensitivity-training, acting like jerks by urinating on their 
dead enemies, posing for trophy photos with their body parts, and burning 
Korans (Gates 2014: 219), have trouble convincing anybody that they are 
benevolent “fi sh.” Their helping of civilians is not so much swimming with 
the fi sh as suborning them. Each time one of these civilians’ relatives was 
walloped by the JSOC or the SPC, the fi sh became enemies and secret 
ones at that, the worst type because they smile at you and infl ict vengeance 
through surprise, and then you have to send the SPC after them. Thereaf-
ter their mutilated bodies turn up by the side of the road, perforated with 
holes drilled in them by power tools. The trouble with PMGWW-COIN, 
and for that matter other iterations of COIN, is that eventually what it 
does is kill fi sh, a condition that creates more fi sh who will kill you. Rums-
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feld sent Steele to Iraq and must have known what he was sent to do. 
Petraeus, as head of training, oversaw Steele and his colleagues’ work, so 
Petraeus’s management of the development of torturers was a feather in his 
“genius” cap. It is time to examine his “surge.”
The Surge: At the beginning of the Gulf War II (2003–2004), prior to his 
MNSTC-I command, Petraeus served as the 101st Airborne Division’s 
commanding offi cer in Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city, where he had tried 
to implement PMGWW-COIN. The US media credited him with success, 
though evidence suggests otherwise.14 In a television address to the Amer-
ican public on 10 January 2007, Bush II announced that there would be a 
“surge” in US troops in Iraq, consisting of 21,500 additional combat sol-
diers. The next month, he made Petraeus commander of Multi-National 
Force – Iraq (MNF–I), the position that oversaw all coalition forces oc-
cupying the country. Petraeus’s task was to manage the surge using his 
COIN tactics to achieve some kind of accomplishment that would allow a 
“responsible” exit from the Iraq “fi asco.”15
The surge, which operated between February 2007 and July 2008, in-
volved addition of fi ve brigades, focusing on Baghdad (four brigades went 
there) using COIN tactics. “Violence decreased” (Gabrielsen 2013) during 
the surge. Figures are disputed, both Iraqi and coalition casualties appear 
to have been reduced. As many as 2,700 to 3,800 civilians had been killed 
every month in the period from September 2006 to January 2007, when 
death squads roamed the streets of Baghdad. The US army suffered about 
100 killed and 700 wounded per month during this period. Eleven months 
later, the monthly average of Iraqi civilian deaths had declined to about 
500, while US Army fatalities had shrunk to 23 killed per month.16 Was the 
surge responsible for the violence reduction?
Thomas Ricks (2009: 200) argues for the interpretation that prevails 
among many—especially US political elites—that the surge worked be-
cause the additional US soldiers, as called for in PMGWW-COIN, pro-
tected the Iraqi population. Not everyone agrees. Gian Gentile (2009), a 
US army offi cer who did two tours of duty in Iraq, condemns this position 
as “hubris run amuck,” the “hubris” being the presumption that the addi-
tion of fi ve brigades could somehow transform a previously intractable war 
in which hundreds of thousands of coalition forces armed with the most 
lethal of technology had fl oundered.
Five factors warrant skepticism about the surge’s success. The fi rst is 
obvious. By 2007 many Iraqis, certainly those in high positions, knew that 
the days of American occupation were numbered. After all, Washington 
elites publicly spoke in favor of pulling out. Congressman Murtha had sub-
mitted a resolution (17 November 2005) to the House of Representatives 
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demanding immediate US withdrawal, reasoning, “The U.S. cannot ac-
complish anything further in Iraq militarily. It is time to bring them home” 
(in Schmitt 2005). General Abizaid had insisted they “get the fuck out.” 
General Casey, MNF-1 commander, “supported a gradual drawdown of 
U.S. forces” (Knowlton 2010: 1). As Admiral William Fallon, Abizaid’s 
CENTCOM commander at the time, remarked, “In the days leading up 
to the decision to surge, many in Iraq thought we were just looking for the 
quickest exit, to bail out” (in D. Davis 2010: 24). So, why fi ght the Ameri-
cans if you knew they were about to leave (Feldman 2008)?
A second reason to be skeptical of the surge’s effi cacy had to do with 
Shiite ethnic cleansing of Sunnis in Baghdad and its environs. Baghdad 
was the major locus of extreme violence at this time, and the struggle be-
tween Shiite and Sunni death squads to eliminate each other from the 
city’s neighborhoods was one reason for this mayhem. However, eventually 
the ethnic cleansing had a resolution: Sunnis were cleansed. This led to 
a reduction in casualties, for the very grim reason that by the middle of 
2008 there were simply very few Sunnis left to kill, as Patrick Cockburn 
(2008) observed. A third, related reason to question the surge’s success has 
to do with the role of the Shiite Mahdi Army, a signifi cant player in the 
ethnic cleansing in Baghdad and surrounding areas. For reasons having to 
do with emerging Shiite politics, the leaders of the Mahdi Army opted “for 
a temporary ceasing of fi ghting” (Gabrielsen 2013), which became largely 
permanent.
A fourth factor in the reduced violence pertains to the movement vari-
ously called the “Anbar Awakening” (or “Sons of Iraq”). Anbar is the larg-
est province in Iraq, covering predominantly desert to the west of Baghdad. 
It is a Sunni region where fi ghting had been especially heavy early in the 
confl ict, at Falluja and Ramadi. The Anbar Awakening consisted of tribal 
paramilitary alliances between sheikhs in Sunni tribes to fi ght for these 
tribes’ benefi t. Additionally, the sheikhs would ally with US military units 
occupying their territory as the Americans practiced the bribe component 
of Petraeusian COIN, providing their tribal allies with money, weapons, 
and training. Often the privileges the sheikhs were interested in had lit-
tle to do with the goals of the surge. However, certain sheikhs were con-
cerned to curb the infl uence of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which was in 
the Americans’ interest. The Anbar Awakening reduced violence in three 
ways. First, tribes allied with US forces agreed not to attack them (Bid-
dle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012); second, Anbar Awakening attacks on 
al-Qaeda degraded al-Qaeda’s fi ghting capacity, reducing casualties from 
this source (ibid.); and third, Anbar Awakening paramilitaries defended 
Sunnis from Shiite paramilitary attacks, thus further reducing casualties 
(Kilcullen 2009: 145). One may question, however, whether the Anbar 
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Awakening had much to do with the surge, because according to Colonel 
Sean McFarland, who commanded troops in the province at the time, 
it appears “maybe 75 to 80 percent of the credit for the success of the 
counterinsurgency fi ght in Ramadi goes to the Iraqi people who stood 
up to al-Qaida” (in D. Davis 2010: 24). Moreover, another source insists 
the Anbar Awakening appeared “to have occurred not only before that 
strategy (the surge) was implemented, but before it was conceived” (Walls 
2008). 
The role of neighboring countries in the violence was also a factor in 
violence reduction. Gulf War II had regional implications that pertained 
to the Sunni/Shiite divide in the Middle East. Predominantly Sunni coun-
tries (Saudi Arabia and Jordan) supported Iraqi Sunnis, while Shiites in 
Iran supported their coreligionists. Kilcullen (2009: 151–152) has argued 
that Gulf War II needs to be situated in the context of the Sunni/Shiite 
divide, which suggests a fi fth reason to harbor suspicions about the suc-
cess of the surge. As Gabrielsen (2013) reports, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 
Syria reduced the number of Sunni fi ghters that were allowed to infi ltrate 
Iraq from their territories, while Iran was miserly regarding the weaponry it 
supplied to the Shiites. Fewer combatants and fewer weapons would likely 
reduce casualty levels, suggesting that the actions of regional states con-
tributed to the reduction of violence in Gulf War II.
Is it plausible to hold that the surge made General Petraeus one of 
“America’s greatest military heroes”? Five factors suggesting otherwise 
have been presented. Only in the Anbar Awakening does PMGWW-
COIN play, and only probably at that, a limited role in casualty declines. 
Consequently, the evidence does not support the view that the US military 
surge signifi cantly reduced violence. Rather, it favors the conclusion that 
while the surge was occurring, other factors reduced fatalities. However, 
considering the statistics of declining violence, and ignoring the actual 
factors reducing that violence, Petraeus appeared a “genius.”
Moreover, the appearance of reality, not reality itself, was all that was 
needed because it helped Washington hermeneuts frame and perpetuate 
a “popular narrative”—the surge had “succeeded” (D. Davis 2010: 22).17 
Dubya certainly believed the surge to have been a “success” (2010: 388). 
CNN news guru Wolf Blitzer declared it a “success” (Blitzer 2008). USA 
Today announced it had led to “progress” (Dilanian 2008). The New York 
Times acknowledged it had “clearly worked—at least for now” (Filkins 
2008). Time magazine more circumspectly called it a “success,” albeit a 
“limited” one (Duffy 2008). The presidential campaign that year—Obama 
versus McCain—saw all the candidates pronounce the surge a victory. On 
the campaign trail, McCain said, “I can tell you that it [the Surge] is suc-
ceeding. I can look you in the eye and tell you it’s succeeding” (in Dobbs 
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2008). Obama, not to be outdone, called it a “success” beyond “wildest 
dreams” (in Chipman and Goldman 2008). His primary opponent, Hillary 
Clinton, gave the game away when she said, “The so-called surge was de-
signed to give the Iraqi government the space and time to make the tough 
decisions that only the Iraqis can make for themselves. … And I think 
that putting forward a very clear objective of beginning to withdraw our 
troops is the best way to get the Iraqis to take responsibility” (“Transcript: 
Hillary Clinton” 2008). The hermeneuts might be said to have constructed 
for Americans a manly war “hero,” General Petraeus; while injecting into 
their understanding the stupefacient that his surge was a “success.” All of 
this allowed “Iraqis to take responsibility” and US Security Elites 3.0 to 
“withdraw,” or otherwise put, to cut and run, which they did—“responsi-
bly,” of course. What had they done?
They wrecked Iraq. Consider deaths during the three phases of the war. 
Beth Daponte, a social demographer, estimated that Gulf War I resulted in 
205,500 Iraqi deaths (“Totaling the Casualties of War” 2003b). The War of 
Blockades, it has already been reported, resulted in between 500,000 and 
567,000 deaths, mostly of children. Mortality estimates for Gulf War II 
vary: the Iraq Family Health Survey (WHO 2008) found 151,000 war-
related deaths between 2003 and 2006, whereas a study reported in the 
medical journal The Lancet estimated some 655,000 excess deaths (Brown 
2006). These Iraqi fatalities were both civilian and military, mostly civilian. 
Many did not die on the battlefi eld, but rather from the consequences of 
the combat. Malnutrition and disease were especial killers. And of course 
millions upon millions of Iraqis were in some way injured but did not die. 
Who would want to stay in such a place? Not the inhabitants. By 2007, 
roughly four million were refugees (Chatty 2010).
There was enormous infrastructural damage to Iraq. Gulf War I had 
destroyed an estimated $230 billion worth of infrastructure (Nordhaus 
2002: 53). Enormous portions of the electrical grid; the sewage and irri-
gation systems; and manufacturing, health care, and educational facilities 
were demolished. The War of Blockades made it diffi cult to replace infra-
structure destroyed in Gulf War I, and Gulf II re-ruined what had earlier 
been ruined. Ghali Hassan (2005), reporting upon living conditions in Iraq 
during the time of the Iraqi warring, notes that the United Nations Human 
Development Index for Iraq fell from 50th to 127th place out of 130 coun-
tries between 1995 and post-2003. Life was wretched: relatives and friends 
sick or dead, no work, little to eat, fi lthy water, terrible heat, and always 
the fear that there were people who wanted to kill you and yours. Hassan 
called this situation a “tragedy” (ibid.), an understatement. The US impe-
rial elites’ project made an earthly hell in Iraq and called it liberation. This 
poses the question, why did they do it?
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“Not There for the Figs’: The Security Elites and Their Public Délires
It [Gulf War II] has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing. (Donald Rumsfeld 
on CBS News, 14 November 2002, quoted in Easterbrook 2002)
The task of explaining why the US invaded Iraq begins with observation 
of a conundrum regarding US imperial elites’ understanding of why they 
warred in Iraq. As the above quotation illustrates, a least one Vulcan denied 
that oil was the reason. Furthermore, those who suggested differently ran 
the risk of considerable personal abuse. Consider, for example, the pillory-
ing of Congressman Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat in the House of Repre-
sentatives (1997–2013) who, speaking just prior to the invasion (February 
2003) on the infl uential news program Meet the Press, proposed that the US 
was about to overrun Iraq because of its oil. The Vulcan Richard Perle, a 
co-panelist on the show who at the time chaired the Defense Policy Board 
Advisory Committee, retorted, “It is an out and out lie” (in Diemer 2003). 
Examine, next, the treatment of Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican sen-
ator from Nebraska (1997–2009), the secretary of defense in Obama’s 
second term, a decorated infantry soldier in Vietnam, and a successful 
businessman who sat on the board of directors of Chevron Corporation. 
During a 2007 speech he commented, “people say we’re not fi ghting for 
the oil. Of course we are,” adding, “We’re not there for the fi gs” (in W. 
Kristol 2013). Perhaps it was the fi gs that did it, but William Kristol, editor 
of The Weekly Standard and neoconservative hermeneut, could not refrain 
from labeling Hagel’s comments “vulgar and disgusting” (ibid.). Whether 
you were Democrat or Republican, certain Bush II loyalists declared you a 
loutish, sordid perjurer if you said warring in Iraq was about oil.
But certain Vulcan elites did affi rm the “loutish, sordid” lie. Consider 
Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy. When asked why the US had invaded Iraq, 
he answered, “Let’s look at it simply. The most important difference be-
tween North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice 
in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil” (“US Admits” 2014). In a 
1999 speech to the Institute of Petroleum at London’s Savoy Hotel, Dick 
Cheney, who fourteen months later was to become the Vice President, 
remarked a bit more circumspectly than Wolfowitz that “the Middle East, 
with two-thirds of the world’s oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize 
ultimately lies” (in Muttitt 2012a: 4). Midge Dector, an original founder of 
neoconservatism and a onetime co-chair with Rumsfeld of the Committee 
for the Free World, said in 2004, after the hell in Iraq had become clear, 
“We’re not in the Middle East to bring sweetness and light. … That’s non-
sense. We’re in the Middle East because we and our European friends and 
our European non-friends depend on something that comes from the Mid-
dle East, namely oil” (in Moore 2013). General John Abizaid corroborated 
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Wolfowitz and Dector, insisting, “of course it’s about oil, we can’t really 
deny that” (“Abizaid: ‘Of Course It’s About Oil” 2008). Alan Greenspan, 
the infl uential former Chairman of the Federal Reserve who, though not 
in Bush II’s inner circle, was knowledgeable about economic matters, also 
stated that “the Iraqi war is largely about oil” (Greenspan 2007).
So there is a puzzle. Washington elites, including Bush II’s Vulcans, as-
serted opposing stories of why they went to war in Iraq: they did it for the 
oil, and they didn’t do it for the oil. This raises two questions: Did US secu-
rity elites go to war over oil or did they not; and if they did, why did some of 
them deny it so vehemently? The response to these questions leads to the 
oil-control and anti-terrorist public délires. First, evidence concerning the 
degree to which oil was a reason for the Iraq warring is considered.
Iraq Warring and the Oil-Control Public Délire
Osama Kashamoula, an Iraqi Oil Ministry offi cial, confi ded, “I lived in the 
West for more than seven years. … We have oil and you need it” (in Maass 
2009: 150).18 Kashamoula was confi rming what Cheney had earlier spo-
ken about in his Savoy Hotel speech. There Cheney had noted the world 
needed oil and that oil was becoming more diffi cult for the oil companies 
to acquire. Then he rhetorically asked, “So where is the oil going to come 
from?” responding that “the prize … lies” in the “Middle East” (in Muttitt 
2012a: 4), and the “prize” would be Iraq. First discussed are the délires 
guiding Gulf War I.
Gulf War I and the Oil-Control Public Délire: Gulf War I resulted from Sadd-
am’s invasion of Kuwait, whose considerable oil resources he indicated he 
intended to acquire. At the NSC meeting held the morning after Saddam’s 
invasion (2 August 1990), oil played a part in discussions. Treasury Secre-
tary Nicolas Brady “explained that Iraq would be getting potential oil prof-
its of about $20 million a day from Kuwait production. In all, Iraq now held 
20 percent of the world’s known oil reserves. If Saddam were to take over 
Saudi Arabia he would have 40 percent” (B. Woodward 1991: 226). Both 
Bush I and the then Defense Secretary Cheney were concerned that the 
Iraqi army of a million soldiers posed a real threat to Saudi Arabia (ibid.: 
227). Brent Scowcroft, Bush I’s NSA, brought up the Carter Doctrine, the 
original iteration of the oil-control public délire, suggesting that Saddam 
was in violation of that doctrine (ibid. 230). This fi rst NSC meeting ended 
on an “inconclusive note” (ibid.: 229), but it was clear that oil occupied 
everybody’s mind.
At a second NSC meeting the next day, discussion concerned a CIA 
report on the situation that argued that the invasion threatened “the cur-
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rent world order” because if it succeeded, the increased oil would turn 
“Iraq into an Arab superpower—a balance to the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and Japan” (ibid.: 237). Further, the CIA estimated that Saddam 
could get from Kuwait to the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, in three 
days (ibid.). Again, the meeting ended without a formal decision. Bush I 
asked that Cheney, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell, 
and CENTCOM Commander Schwarzkopf meet him at Camp David the 
next day to discuss procedural military options, indicating the drift of his 
thinking.
Later that day Bush met with Bandar bin Sultan, the infl uential Saudi 
ambassador to the US. Bush told him, “I give you my word of honor, I will 
see this through with you” (in ibid. 241). The president had indicated there 
was to be war with Iraq, and that the US would protect Saudi Arabia in the 
hostilities, in effect making a payment on its strategic rent to the Saudis. 
The question was what type of war, and the Camp David meeting settled 
that question. The Pentagon already had a plan for a campaign against 
Iraq called Operation Plan 90-1002, which would be a large-scale confl ict 
involving hundreds of thousands of troops and extensive aerial bombard-
ments. This plan was accepted. It became Operation Desert Storm, and as 
we have seen, when implemented it was over in a few days.
Bush I’s administration prevaricated little about the reasons for the war. 
Paul Aarts and Michael Renner (1991: 25) put it clearly: “This war was 
about oil access.” However, an important question is whose “access” was 
being contested. Cheney explicated the Bush I regime’s understanding of 
this invasion in 9/11 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
declaring that “once [Saddam] acquired Kuwait and deployed an army as 
large as the one he possesses,” he would be “in a position to be able to 
dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that [would give] him a 
stranglehold on our economy” (in Klare 2004: 50). The defense secretary 
was saying Bush’s national security team feared that Saddam had stolen a 
page from the US’s own imperial military strategy. Saddam wanted to ac-
quire access to Kuwaiti oil in order to “dictate” global “energy policy.” and 
nobody dictates to the New American Empire what it intends to dictate 
to the world. Saddam was a true monster-alterity, and the Kuwait inva-
sion had to be reversed. Gulf War I, this evidence suggests, was fought in 
some measure to achieve control over petroleum resources. It was fought 
to deny an enemy the benefi ts of access to such resources. Consider the 
Iraq warring during the War of Blockades.
The War of Blockades and the Oil-Control Public Délire: The War of Block-
ades was waged by the Clinton administration as part of a “dual con-
tainment” policy announced in 1994 that was largely the formulation of 
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Martin Indyk, then head of Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs at 
the NCS, and his boss, the NSA Anthony Lake. The policy goal, largely 
inherited from the previous administration, was to contain, not overthrow, 
the Baghdad and Tehran regimes through continuation of sanctions and, 
in Iraq’s case, aerial bombardments.
Only obliquely did the Clinton security elites consider questions of 
Saddam’s attempts to add to Iraq’s oil reserves. However, as Jerry Mraz 
(1997: 3) emphasized, Clinton’s security elites recognized “that uninter-
rupted access to oil from the Persian Gulf” was “of vital national interest” 
to the US. Further, Washington during this time was trying to protect the 
Persian Gulf’s oil sheikhdoms, and of course Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were 
sheikhdoms. On 16 December 1998, Clinton began Operation Desert Fox, 
four days of especially heavy aerial raids on Iraq, including one of Saddam’s 
palaces. Some believe these were to divert attention from impeachment 
proceedings slated to begin the next day in response to the president’s 
sexual improprieties (Everest 2004: 203). However, Clinton defended the 
attacks in a speech to the nation, insisting they were “designed to degrade 
Saddam’s capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction 
and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors” (Clinton 1999: 292). 
“Weapons of mass destruction” (WMDs)—chemical, biological, and nu-
clear weapons—would play a considerable role in the hermeneutic politics, 
especially in Bush II’s presidency. Iraq’s neighbors, of course, were the “oil 
sheikhdoms.” The dual containment policy might be understood, at least 
vis-à-vis Iraq, as an iteration of the oil-control iteration of the global dom-
ination public délire because degrading Saddam’s weaponry and his ability 
to threaten oil-producing “neighbors” reduced his ability to expand Iraq’s 
access to oil.
Criticism of the dual containment policy increased in the hermeneutic 
politics of the later years of the Clinton administration. A key reason for 
this was that even though the policy was formally supposed to contain 
Saddam’s regime, informally it was supposed to eliminate him, and in this 
it failed. Further, Baghdad appeared to fl out UN inspections designed to 
ensure that it disarmed and did not develop WMDs.19 So, early in 1998, 
the PNAC had sent an open letter to Clinton, signed by the major soon-
to-be Vulcans, reporting a délire that the US entertain “a willingness to 
undertake military action” against Saddam because he was a “hazard” to “a 
signifi cant portion of the world’s supply of oil” (PNAC 1998). By the end 
of the year, the PNAC’s délire was gratifi ed: Congress had voted in favor 
of an act stipulating a US policy of regime change toward Iraq. Clinton 
signed the act in 1 November 1998. Consequently, as Richard Holbrooke 
noted, “Clinton changed U.S. policy from containment to regime change” 
(in Isikoff and Corn 2006: 125). Secretary of State Albright named Frank 
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Ricciardore the special representative to Iraqi opposition groups who were 
to receive military assistance in overthrowing Saddam.
Two struggles fl ared during 1999 and 2000. One was the presidential 
campaign to replace Clinton, with the Democrats hampered by their pres-
ident’s recent sexual improprieties. His nickname had gone in certain 
quarters from “Slick Willie” to “the Stainmaker” (“The Many Nicknames” 
2002); the latter moniker referring to seminal fl uid that stained an article 
of Ms. Lewinsky’s clothing. The other confl ict was the continual bombing 
of Iraq, unhampered by the Iraqi air defenses, which had been debilitated 
by earlier American raids. More than a hundred airstrikes were mounted 
against Iraq in 1999. Between 1999 and 2001 the US and UK air forces 
dropped on the order of 1.3 million pounds of bombs (“Clinton bombing 
of Iraq” 2005).
Bob Woodward (2004: 9) has said that the Clinton administration ran 
a “low grade war” against Iraq. From the perspective of the Iraqis who 
experienced food and medical deprivation along with bombing, it may not 
have felt so “low grade.” However, Woodward makes an important point: 
Gulf War I never stopped; rather, the Clinton administration conducted it 
by other means, that is, blockade and air raids. Consequently, when Bush 
II took offi ce on 20 January 2001, he did not so much start Gulf War II as 
continue combat operations begun by his Poppy and continued by Clinton.
Gulf War II and the Oil-Control Public Délire:
“We won’t do Iraq now,” the president said, “we’re putting Iraq off. But eventu-
ally we’ll have to return to that question.” (Bush to Rice, 15 September 2001, 
in B. Woodward 2004: 26).
Dubya, in the above quotation, was telling his NSA Condoleezza Rice four 
days after 9/11 how they would respond. They would not deal with Iraq 
fi rst. Rather, the administration would begin with Afghanistan and then 
return to the problem of Iraq. In American English the verb “do” has a dou-
ble signifi cance. It can mean to “go about” something, as in “George is going 
to do homework.” It can also have the more raffi sh meaning of having sex-
ual intercourse with a woman, as in “George is going to do Mary.” Further, 
in American English “fucking” has a double meaning of “to make love” or 
“to hurt someone,” as in “I’m going to fuck you over.” Perhaps Bush II’s 
statement to Rice was rich in all these signifi cations. On 20 March 2003, 
as dawn’s rosy fi ngers spread over Baghdad, they revealed a city once again 
blasted and burning due to shock and awe. Bush II was really doing Iraq.
The question of when the Bush II administration actually decided to 
“do” Iraq has been debated. Richard C Clarke (2004), a member of the 
NSC from 1992 through 2003 and for a considerable time in charge of 
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anti-terrorism, has said Bush took offi ce with a predetermined plan to at-
tack Iraq. According to Ron Suskind, Bush’s fi rst treasury secretary, Paul 
O’Neill, recalled that Dubya’s fi rst NSC meeting, held ten days after the 
inauguration, “was all about fi nding a way to do it. The president saying, 
‘Go fi nd me a way to do this’” (in Stein and Dickinson 2006: 3). “It” was 
invading Iraq. O’Neill later recanted what he told Suskind, saying, “Actu-
ally there was a continuation of work that had been going on in the Clin-
ton administration” (“O’Neill: ‘Frenzy’” 2004). Possibly, Clarke, Suskind, 
and O’Neill were all correct. Having adopted a policy of violent regime 
change, Clinton’s people, especially those in the Pentagon, were likely to 
have formulated contingency plans for a possible war. Certainly the Vul-
cans, with their 1998 PNAC letter to Clinton urging Saddam’s elimina-
tion, had expressed an intention to forcefully get Saddam, so it was entirely 
possible that they would have entered offi ce with a generalized délire to do 
what Clinton had already been doing.20
Matters moved quickly after 9/11. Recall, on that day, Rumsfeld had or-
dered his offi cials to “judge whether [the evidence is] good enough [to] hit 
SH [Saddam Hussein]” (in Stein and Dickinson 2006: 4; edited for clar-
ity). Eight days later the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, headed by Rich-
ard Perle, declared that Iraq should be invaded after Afghanistan (ibid.). 
On 21 September, the intelligence community informed Bush that there 
was no evidence linking Saddam to 9/11 (ibid.). It made no difference. On 
21 November Bush “collars Rumsfeld physically,” asking “what have you 
got in terms of plans for Iraq? What is the status of the war plan?” (ibid.: 5). 
Three days after Christmas, Dubya has his answer. General Tommy Franks, 
now CENTCOM’s commander, briefed the president on the status of the 
Iraq war plan (ibid.: 6).21 War followed a lengthy campaign of vilifi cation of 
Saddam, considered in the following section, and apparently was intended 
to impose at least fi ve types of control over oil, thereby implementing the 
oil-control public délire.
Readers should be clear about the following enquiry. Its interest is in the 
intentionality of Bush II and the Vulcans’ délires, not their achievement—
the powers they wanted, not those they actually got. The fi rst sort of con-
trol the Bush administration intended to gain from its global warring was 
US oil companies’ access to Iraqi oil. In January 2003, before the invasion, 
it was “reported that representatives from ExxonMobil Corp, Chevron 
Texaco Corp, ConocoPhillips and Halliburton, among others, were meet-
ing with Vice-President Cheney’s staff to plan the post-war revival of Iraq’s 
oil industry” (Leaver and Muttitt 2007: 3). This “revival,” the Washington 
Post explained in 2002, was meant to provide a “bonanza for American oil 
companies” (in Everest 2004: 267–268). This “bonanza” was potentially 
enormous, as one appraisal projected future profi ts to private oil compa-
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nies operating in Iraq running between a low of $600 billion and a high in 
the order of $9 trillion (Paul 2004).
Further, this access was believed, by at least some in the administra-
tion, to extend to control over the supply and the price of oil. Bush II’s 
economic security elites believed that war would increase the supply of oil 
by bringing more of Iraq’s oil on line, thereby keeping oil prices in check. 
Later, in February of 2003, the pro-war newspaper mogul Rupert Murdoch 
echoed this position, claiming that hostilities would hold the price of oil 
around $20 a barrel and that this would be good for the world economy 
(Day 2003).
However, there was a problem. Iraqi oil had been nationalized as part of 
the wave of 1970s nationalization, which meant that Baghdad strictly con-
trolled it, and part of this control included strict limitation of foreign enter-
prises’ access. The Bush administration sought to eliminate this problem 
by awarding Bearing Point Incorporated a contract to restructure Iraq’s 
economy, including the oil sector. Bearing Point, a fi nancial and business 
consulting fi rm, was actually itself in fi nancial disarray and would fi le for 
bankruptcy in 2009. A week after the invasion, however, the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the development branch of the 
State Department, conferred a no-bid contract for $240 million on Bear-
ing Point, charging it, according to Naomi Klein (2006), with the responsi-
bility of designing a private sector along the lines of “neocon utopia.”
The contract Bearing Point signed with USAID instructed the fi rm as 
to the sort of economy to create in Iraq. Its 100 pages clearly laid out 
the Bush administration’s intention to open Iraq’s economy in a neoliberal 
fashion (King 2004). USAID’s intentions vis-à-vis oil were probably largely 
hammered out in the Oil and Energy Subgroup of the State Department’s 
Future of Iraq Project (Muttitt 2006).
The Future of Iraq Project began on 1 October 2001, headed by Thomas 
Warwick.22 It involved US and exiled Iraqi “experts” organized into sev-
enteen working groups, and was charged with planning for “the day after” 
in Iraq (Economy and Infrastructure Working Group 2005: 4). It produced 
thirteen volumes and was the most extensive pre-invasion planning for 
post-invasion Iraq. The extent of its actual infl uence has been questioned. 
One senior CPA offi cial remarked, “It’s our bible coming out here” (Has-
sen 2006).23 Critically, the Oil and Energy Working Group called for a “re-
structuring” of the “oil industry” (Oil and Energy Working Group 2005: 
5) that involved its “denationalization” (ibid.: 9) and privatization. The 
Iraq National Oil Company would become private, and international oil 
companies would be allowed into Iraq (ibid.: 3).
Immediately following the occupation, General Jay Garner, who had 
been successful in humanitarian operations during Gulf War I, became the 
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head of the post-invasion occupation body, the CPA. He was succeeded 
by L. Paul Bremer III, a protégé of Kissinger, on 11 May 2003. For a while 
Bremer was a veritable viceroy of the newly conquered territory. He largely 
adopted Bearing Point’s recommendations. Denationalization and privat-
ization were forgone conclusions intended to allow all private companies, 
including American ones, access to Iraq’s economy.
The privatization of the oil industry was to go as follows:
When Bremer left Iraq in June 2004, he bequeathed the Bush economic agenda 
to two men, Ayad Allawi and Adel Abdul Mahdi, who Bremer appointed in-
terim Prime Minister and Finance Minister, respectively. Two months later, 
Allawi (a former CIA asset) submitted guidelines for a new petroleum law to 
Iraq’s Supreme Council for Oil Policy. The guidelines declared “an end to the 
centrally planned and state dominated Iraqi economy” and advised the “Iraqi 
government to disengage from running the oil sector, including management of 
the planned Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), and that the INOC be partly 
privatized in the future.” (Juhasz 2007)
Iraqi oil would be privatized through introduction of production sharing 
agreements (PSAs). These are contracts between oil companies and a 
state stipulating that oil ownership ultimately rests with the government, 
but that the more lucrative exploration and production sectors of the oil 
industry are given to the private companies under decidedly advantageous 
terms.24
Saddam’s regime had awarded contracts to other countries’ oil industries 
to develop Iraq’s oil fi elds. In fact, sixty such contracts had been presented 
to fi rms from over thirty countries, especially France and Russia. None 
went to US companies (Juhasz 2007). The imposition of sanctions upon 
Iraq after Gulf War I had meant that few of these contracts were imple-
mented, and there was fear that lifting them might threaten the American 
majors’ access to Iraqi oil. However, because only seventeen of Iraq’s eighty 
known oil fi elds have been developed, it was recognized that there would 
be room for US expansion into Iraqi oil, especially because it was believed 
that the American oil multinationals were more effi cient and would con-
sequently win contracts against their competitors. Clearly, Bush’s security 
elites had planned to pry open access to Iraqi oil for US majors.
A second sort of control the Bush administration intended to provide 
through its global warring was that of denying Saddam, and his successors, 
control over their own oil, at least in ways that the US did not approve. 
They were grimly successful in the fi rst of these goals. Saddam, soon af-
ter the invasion, inhabited a hole in the ground, where he was captured 
(14 December 2003), taken for trial, and eventually hung (30 December 
2006). Thereafter, US occupation authorities attempted to induce post-
Saddam Iraqi rulers to regulate the oil in the manner the US desired.
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When Bremer left Iraq in 2004, he appointed Ayad Allawi and Adel 
Abdul Mahdi to run the Iraqi Interim Government. Allawi submitted 
proposals to Iraq’s Supreme Council for Oil Policy for a new petroleum 
law that had been drawn up previously by Bremer’s people and sought to 
induce the “Iraqi government to disengage from running the oil sector.” 
Allawi’s proposals also projected turning all undeveloped oil and gas fi elds 
over to private international oil companies, putting them beyond the con-
trol of Baghdad. Mahdi, commenting on these plans, stated, “I think this 
is very promising to the American investors and to American enterprise, 
certainly to oil companies” (in Juhasz 2007), something of an understate-
ment. Allawi and Mahdi, doing Bremer’s bidding, proposed to eradicate 
the Iraqi government’s access to its own oil.
A third sort of control the Bush II administration intended its global 
warring to confer was to increase the business of US companies working 
in support of oil companies in Iraq. Such fi rms are called oil service com-
panies, or colloquially “plumbers.” Philip Carroll, who had headed both 
Shell and Fluor Daniel, an oil service and engineering fi rm, was appointed 
the CPA’s adviser to the Iraq Ministry of Oil. Carroll brought success to 
not only the international oil companies but also the plumbers who helped 
them. Juhasz (2007) reported that in the three years immediately following 
occupation, “Halliburton received the largest contract, worth more than 
$12 billion.” Halliburton, headquartered in Houston, is the world’s largest 
plumber.
As Iraq’s oil industry reestablished itself in the years after 2006, US oil 
services companies’ business fl ourished. In part this was because Iraq al-
lowed only the “Big Four” plumbers (Halliburton, Baker Hughes, Weather-
ford International, and Schlumberger) to bid for contracts. The New York 
Times reported, “The oil services companies Halliburton, Baker Hughes, 
Weatherford International and Schlumberger [have] already won lucra-
tive drilling subcontracts and are likely to bid on many more in one of the 
world’s richest markets for companies that drill oil wells” (Kramer 2011).
A fourth form of control that Bush’s security elites intended global war-
ring to provide concerned the dollar’s role as a reserve currency. In 1999 
the euro was introduced as a common European Union currency. A year 
later on 6 November 2000, Saddam demanded that buyers of Iraqi oil pay 
in euros, a decision that potentially lessened demand for the dollar, reduc-
ing its value. The dollar did depreciate 17 percent against the euro in 2001. 
There were rumors that other OPEC nations might begin demanding eu-
ros for their oil. Consequently, by 2001 the US and Iraq were involved in 
a petrodollar war.
There is not much of a paper trail concerning the Bush administra-
tion’s preparation to address the petrodollar war. However, in a document 
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drafted just prior to the invasion, the Economy and Infrastructure Working 
Group of the Future of Iraq Project stated, “Oil revenues can be expected 
to increase. … This signifi cant dollar fl ow must be used … to fi nance cur-
rent and future redevelopment” (Economy and Infrastructure Working 
Group 2005: 1). The working group did not recommend that oil sales be 
conducted in dollars rather than euros; rather, it assumed that they would 
be. Then, shock and awe attended the invasion on 7 March 2003, Saddam 
took to a hole, and on 5 June 2003 “Iraq … stepped back into the inter-
national oil market for the fi rst time since the war, offering 10m barrels of 
oil from its storage tanks for sale to the highest bidder. … The tender … 
switches the transaction back to dollars—the international currency of oil 
sales—despite the greenback’s recent fall in value” (Hoyos and Morrison 
2003: 1). The petrodollar war was over. The US had won control over the 
currency in which Iraq would conduct its oil business, which would be 
greenbacks.
A fi fth form of control that Bush’s security elites intended to gain 
through global warring was US clients’ access to Iraq’s oil, thereby helping 
the US pay its strategic rents.
During a 2001 series of meetings of Vice President Cheney’s Energy Task 
Force, charged with devising the new Bush II administration’s oil strategy,
a map of Iraq and an accompanying list of “Iraq oil foreign suitors” were the cen-
ter of discussion. The map erased all features of the country save the location of 
its main oil deposits, divided into nine exploration blocks. The accompanying 
list of suitors revealed that dozens of companies from 30 countries—but not 
the United States—were either in discussions over or in direct negotiations 
for rights to some of the best remaining oil fi elds on earth. (In Holland 2006)
The map and the discussion at the meeting appear to have been about 
which non-Americans were likely to seek Iraqi oil, and whether Bush’s 
security elites would choose to assist or hinder them in the search for oil 
contracts.
When the Future of Iraq’s Oil and Energy Working Group reported its 
plans for “the day after” it was clear that it intended for there to be “inter-
national oil companies” in Iraq, not only American ones (Oil and Energy 
Working Group 2005: 3). They would be there because they had won PSA 
contracts in competitions open to different countries’ oil fi rms. Of course 
unstated, but understood, was that the US would help its friends win such 
contracts.
Robert Stevens has reported on some of the haggling over access to 
Iraqi oil that went on between the US and some of its allies. In late 2002, 
Baroness Symons was trade minister of Tony Blair’s government, and the 
UK was the staunchest of Bush II’s clients. Symons told British Petroleum 
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(BP) offi cials that Blair’s government “supported British energy fi rms be-
ing given a share of Iraq’s oil and gas reserves. She said this would be a re-
ward for Prime Minister Tony Blair’s military commitment to US plans for 
regime-change” (Stevens 2011). Further, Stevens quoted an article in the 
Independent, a newspaper, that discussed the minutes of a meeting between 
BP and the baroness on 31 October 2002, saying that the minutes, “show 
that Lady Symons agreed to lobby the Bush administration on BP’s behalf 
because the oil giant feared it was being ‘locked out’ of deals that Wash-
ington was quietly striking with US, French and Russian governments and 
their energy fi rms” (ibid.). These quotations indicate that in the months 
just prior to the invasion, Bush II’s security elites were busy “striking” deals 
about the “reward” there would be for client countries’ oil companies. Re-
member, there was a purported $600 billion to $9 trillion dollars of Iraqi 
oil profi t to be made, suggesting that the rewards could be substantial. Of 
course, another term for such rewards is strategic rents.
The previous discussion concerned imperial délires vis-à-vis oil. Were 
they gratifi ed? As Iraq acquired more sovereignty after the invasion, it 
strove to develop its petroleum resources on its own terms. Initial Iraqi 
support for denationalization gave way after 2005 to a complex struggle to 
retain control over their petroleum resources, best documented in Muttitt 
(2012a). A Transitional National Assembly began to function in 2005, and 
its members were suspicious of anything that looked like privatization to 
benefi t foreigners. Nevertheless, occupation authorities required the as-
sembly to pass an oil law favorable to them By 2007 it was clear that there 
were not enough votes to pass the law. As of 2013 it still had not passed. 
Nevertheless, Iraqi government offi cials allowed Big Oil to bid on different 
oil fi elds, and by 2010 BP and the China National Petroleum Company 
were developing the Rumaila oil fi eld; France’s Total was developing the 
Halfaya oil fi eld; ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell were developing West 
Qurna I; Russia’s Lukoil and Norway’s Statol were doing the same for West 
Qurna 2; and Shell and Petronas, a Malaysian company, had the Majnoon 
oil fi eld (Stevens 2011). Moreover, access was secured not through PSA 
contracts but through Technical Service Contracts, under which interna-
tional oil companies gained less control and profi ts, for shorter time peri-
ods. Muttitt concludes that “any oil company victory in Iraq,” by which he 
means the Big Oil of the US and its allies, “is likely to prove as temporary 
as George W. Bush’s triumph in 2003” (2012b)
In June 2013 Denise Natali, a Middle East expert at the National De-
fense University in Washington, noted in the New York Times (in Arango 
and Krauss 2013) that “the Chinese are the biggest benefi ciary of this post-
Saddam oil boom in Iraq.” By 2013 they appeared to have acquired more 
than half of Iraq’s oil (ibid.). As the Times’s reporters observed, “Chinese 
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state-owned companies seized the opportunity, pouring more than $2 
billion a year and hundreds of workers into Iraq, and just as important, 
showing a willingness to play by the new Iraqi government’s rules and to 
accept lower profi ts to win contracts” (ibid.). In 2013, the Chinese sought 
to reduce US access to Iraqi oil by “bidding for a stake … owned by Exxon 
Mobil in one of Iraq’s largest oil fi elds” (ibid.). Michael Makovsky, a former 
Bush II Defense Department offi cial responsible for Iraq oil policy, ruefully 
grumbled, “The Chinese had nothing to do with the war, but from an eco-
nomic standpoint they are benefi ting from it, and our Fifth Fleet and air 
forces are helping to assure their supply” (in Arango and Krauss 2013). So 
the Vulcans’ global warring against Baghdad increased access to Iraqi oil 
for the Chinese; who, after all is said and done, are a grave potential threat 
to the New American Empire. Increasing an opponent’s power is not a 
recommended strategy for the successful empire.
It is time to draw a conclusion regarding global warring in Iraq and the 
oil-control iteration of the global domination public délire. Fixated upon 
oil, Bush II’s security elites sometimes found their intentions thwarted, 
yet these were nevertheless manifest in statements and plans: prior to 
the commencement of hostilities, the intention was to war so as to con-
trol Iraq’s oil in fi ve different ways. Hence, the resort to violent force to 
achieve the power of such control was an implementation of the oil-con-
trol public délire. Saddam knew what was happening: a few months before 
the invasion, he had told the UN General Assembly that the US wanted 
“to destroy Iraq in order to control Middle Eastern oil” (in Yetiv 2004: 2). 
The empire went about destroying Iraq. Yet, as Muttitt (2012b) judges, the 
destruction vis-à-vis oil appears to have been “mission unaccomplished.”
Iraq Warring and the Anti-terrorism Public Délire
When you read George Bush, Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and all the rest of them, 
they tell you, “We have to go after Saddam Hussein, this guy is such an evil 
monster that he even used chemical weapons against his own people.” It is 
true. (Chomsky 2002)
Consider, for a moment, the development of the international law of war. 
From the Franco-Prussian War (1870) through World War I and on to 
World War II (1945), there were seventy-fi ve years of wars of aggression, 
where one country attacked others to gratify its elites’ délires. The result 
was devastation at unimagined and unintended levels. The legal judgments 
that the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal (1945–1946), specifi cally held 
to try Nazi War criminals, have come to have the moral and legal weight 
of international law. The Tribunal had blunt words about “wars of aggres-
sion.” Its chief US prosecutor at the tribunal, Judge Robert H. Jackson, 
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stated, “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an interna-
tional crime; it is the supreme international crime, differing only from 
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of 
the whole” (in P. Scott 2007: 180).
Of course, the New American Empire’s attacking other countries to 
achieve power over the world’s oil is an offensive exercise of violence to 
control the force resource that allowed power over other force resources 
and, thereby, the world. It was aggressive warfare. It was an “international 
crime.” Not only that, it was the “supreme” such crime. This falsifi ed any 
US assertion—claimed and reclaimed by elites from Governor Winthrop 
in 1630 to Bush II—to be “a city upon a hill” divinely elected to lead the 
world to heaven on earth.
However, the US might still claim “city upon a hill” status if it could show 
that it had—a bit like Saint George and the Dragon—slain the fi re-breath-
ing terror monster. Chomsky, in the quotation that begins this section, 
tells his readers that the security elites, “all … of them,” said Saddam was 
an “evil monster,” and that consequently they had to “go after” him. The 
following narrative shows the string of events that portrayed Iraq’s presi-
dent as a monster (worse than a fi re-breather, he was a chemical spewer); 
how this monsterization allowed the Security Elites 3.0 to war on the basis 
of the anti-terrorism public délire, camoufl aging the actuality that the US 
was a “supreme” international criminal. The analysis begins with a spot of 
phantasmagoric baby killing.
Gulf War I and Baby Killing: Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1991. In his eyes 
and undoubtedly those of numerous Iraqis, this was not commencing a war 
of aggression, but correcting a colonial injustice by returning to Iraq what 
British imperialism had severed from it. When this context was ignored, 
however, Saddam’s invasion was very much a war of aggression if you be-
lieved the evidence of your eyes, which saw Iraqi tanks streaming into 
Kuwait City. A US invasion of Iraq to stop the Saddamite needed selling. 
At this point the public relations business Hill and Knowlton Strategies 
(H&K) enters the narrative.
In the late 1980s and 1990s H&K was the world’s largest public rela-
tions fi rm and had special Republican ties. In the 1960s it was famous for 
representing the tobacco industry’s denial of links between smoking and 
cancer. More recently it has represented the domestic US gas and oil in-
dustry in support of fracking. During Gulf War I its Washington offi ce was 
headed by Craig Fuller, a close friend of Bush I and his former chief of staff 
in vice presidential days. After Saddam’s invasion, Kuwait hired H&K to 
make the case for its liberation by the US. The Wirthlin Group, Ronald 
Reagan’s former pollsters, did H&K’s research. It was their job to discover 
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the messages that struck Americans as emotionally powerful. A Canadian 
Broadcasting Company television documentary, To Sell a War, presented 
an interview with a Wirthlin Group offi cial who said the most emotionally 
compelling message they had found concerning the Iraq situation was one 
constructed as the “fact that Saddam Hussein was a madman who had 
committed atrocities even against his own people, and had tremendous 
power to do further damage, and he needed to be stopped” (CBC 1992). 
The Wirthlin Group revealed this to H&K, which in turn revealed to 
Bush I’s security elites that in order to fi ght terrorism, he needed “a mad-
man” terrorist who “committed atrocities.” Monsterization of Saddam was 
on.
There needed to be a “hook”—something that grabbed people’s atten-
tion and made them believe that the former ally and CIA asset who ran 
Iraq was a monster. H&K’s hook was an old one, adapted from one the 
British had employed to monsterize the Germans during World War I: the 
Huns killed little babies! H&K’s hook would be that Saddam’s soldiers 
killed little babies. They fi rst presented their hook on 10 October 1990, 
at a Human Rights Caucus hearing on Capitol Hill. Explosive testimony 
was delivered by Nayirah, a sobbing Kuwaiti teenager who recalled what 
she had witnessed in a Kuwait City hospital: “I saw the Iraqi soldiers come 
into the hospital with guns, and go into the room where … babies were in 
incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incuba-
tors, and left the babies on the cold fl oor to die” (in MacArthur 1992: 58). 
Nayirah’s story was distributed worldwide.
It was untrue. Nayirah was the daughter of Kuwait’s ambassador to the 
US. She never saw babies being removed from incubators. Other stories 
with similar messages were produced. One person recalled, “I heard Bush 
Sr. personally deliver an atrocity tale that had been revived from I don’t 
remember where. The Iraqis ordered a family to bring out their sons who 
were shot before the parents’ eyes. ‘And then they charged the parents for 
the bullets used to kill their sons,’ said Bush” (in Center for Media and 
Democracy 2005).25 Here was the Saddamite, a monster disgorging terror; 
and under the anti-terrorist public délire the procedure for treating such 
terror was to go to war against its perpetrators, as Bush I did in Desert 
Storm.
The point here was that H&K constructed Saddam as a monster prone 
to terrorizing. Did Bush I and his security elites believe their propaganda? 
They certainly interpreted him as a distinctly scary character who as such 
warranted application of the anti-terrorist public délire: he could be per-
ceptually understood as a terrorist, which meant he was procedurally a 
monster to be attacked. Ponder next Saddam’s treatment during the Clin-
ton administration.
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The War of Blockades and WMDs: During the Clinton years, much of the 
foreign policy attention focused upon Africa and the Balkans. The Iraq 
policy was the previously mentioned “dual containment” iteration, with 
Iraqi containment performed by the sanctions. Saddam was not forgotten, 
but for much of the time he was on the back burner as the debacles in 
Somalia and Rwanda detonated and as Yugoslavia disintegrated. All this 
changed in 1997.
The sanctions regime imposed following Gulf War I included creation 
of a UN group, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 
charged with responsibility to inspect for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruc-
tion and, upon fi nding them, to eliminate them. UNSCOM and Saddam 
had a testy relationship throughout the early and middle years of the 
1990s. Testy became dysfunctional when it became clear that UNSCOM 
was supplying information to US intelligence.26 Unsurprisingly, on 11 No-
vember 1997 Baghdad requested that US personnel working for USCOM 
leave Iraq. The following day Clinton met with his top security elites, and 
they decided to move toward war. This involved a campaign to inform 
Americans of the reasons for such aggression.
Clinton’s “campaign” lacked the melodramatic hook of the previous 
administration. There were no babies dying on hospital fl oors. Rather, the 
president started the campaign in his 27 January 1998 State of the Union 
address, declaring, “Saddam Hussein has spent the better part of this de-
cade and much of his nation’s wealth not on providing for the Iraqi peo-
ple, but on developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the 
missiles to deliver them” (W. Clinton 1998b). The presidential message 
was that Saddam had developed monster weapons, WMDs, to terrorize. 
This was a reprise of an earlier Cold War trope shown on television screens 
across America during the 1950s to warn against the USSR: a rising 
mushroom cloud from an atomic explosion triggered by monster Soviets. 
Let us call this the “scare-them-with-monster-weapons” trope. Khru-
shchev had nuclear bombs. Saddam, even more terrifyingly, had WMDs 
that included ghastly poisonous gases, terrible epidemic diseases, and 
atomic weapons. Clinton told Saddam point blank in the State of the 
Union address: “We are determined to deny you the capacity to use them 
again” (ibid.).27
Three weeks later, three principals of the security elites—NSA Sandy 
Berger, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of Defense 
Bill Cohen—traveled to the campus of Ohio State University to hold a 
“town meeting” to further excoriate the Baghdad regime. Albright told her 
audience, “Iraq is a long way from Ohio, but what happens there matters 
a great deal here. For the risk that the leaders of a rogue state will use nu-
clear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest 
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threat we face” (in Freedom Agenda 2012). The secretary of state had 
elevated Saddam to “the greatest threat,” a monster with WMDs.
Did Clinton’s security elites actually believe their monsterization? Iraq 
had had a nuclear weapons program. There had been a biological weapons 
program. With the assistance of Europeans and the connivance of the US, 
Saddam had used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. UNSCOM 
had destroyed considerable quantities of WMDs, and nobody really knew 
what might be hidden out in the desert. Clinton’s security elites had rea-
son to believe. Seen in this light, their aggression against Iraq was imple-
mentation of the anti-terrorist public délire to keep the terrorist in check. 
Attention turns now to how the Bush II administration dealt with the 
Saddamite.
Gulf War II and “Repeating Things Over and Over Again”: A nugget of wis-
dom from a candidate on the 2000 campaign trail, delivered to high school 
students in Rochester, New York, let slip a secret of how he planned to 
govern: “See in my line of work you got to keep repeating things over and 
over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda” 
(in “Bush: ‘You Have to Keep Repeating Things’” 2005). Dubya and his 
Vulcans would “keep repeating over and over again” that the problem with 
Saddam was WMDs and the terror they caused, in effect “repeating over 
and over again” the Clinton administration’s rant against Saddam.
It began with Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who from the 
outset of Bush II’s presidency, well before 9/11, had supported the idea 
that Saddam was a terrorist. He did so by championing the views of Lau-
rie Mylroie, a Harvard political science Ph.D. and an Iraq “expert.” Ini-
tially she had supported US government attempts to ally with Saddam, but 
eventually she made a 180-degree turn and insisted that he was behind 
much of the world’s terrorism (Mylroie 2000). Her arguments were later 
dismissed as crackpot (see Plotz 2001). Wolfowitz, however, used her views 
to argue to the new administration that Saddam was the world’s terrorist 
mastermind (Isikoff and Corn 2006: 66–67). When 9/11 fi nally occurred, 
Wolfowitz immediately insisted Saddam was behind it. A year after 9/11, 
in an address on Ellis Island with the Statue of Liberty in the background, 
Bush echoed Wolfowitz in a speech, saying, “We will not allow any terrorist 
or tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of mass destruction” (in 
Isikoff and Corn 2007: 42). Saddam was a bad guy. Why did Bush II and 
Wolfowitz link Saddam with terrorism and WMDs?
They may have done it simply because the Clinton administration had 
previously done it. However, Wolfowitz suggested a second reason for 
linking terrorism with WMDs and Saddam when he recollected, “For bu-
reaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction 
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[as justifi cation for invading Iraq] because it was the one reason everyone 
could agree on” (in Counterpunch News Service 2003). “Everyone” could 
“agree” because in the past it had been known that Saddam had WMDs 
and used them. After all, there were the widely screened 1988 fi lms of his 
gassed victims in Halalja. Even journalists, the most skeptical of observers, 
thought Saddam had WMDs. When Patrick Cockburn installed himself 
in Iraq to cover the war, he found that “in what had been the lobby of the 
hotel was a birdcage with a canary called Diehard 2 which was expected to 
provide early warning of a poisoned gas attack by dutifully expiring at the 
fi rst whiff” (2006: 43–44).
It was in the summer of 2002 that the Vulcans became serious about ty-
ing Saddam to WMDs. Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Karl Rove, Bush’s 
senior advisor and eminence grise of political strategy, inaugurated a task 
force that came to be known as the White House Iraq Group (WHIG) to 
market the anti-Iraq message. Key WHIG members included Condoleezza 
Rice; her deputy Stephen Hadley; Irve “Scooter” Libby, Cheney’s deputy; 
and Michael Gerson, Bush’s speechwriter. According to James Bamford 
(2005: 325), WHIG operated as follows: upon receiving “false or exag-
gerated intelligence; then [they] … leak it to friendly reporters, complete 
with prepackaged vivid imagery; fi nally when the story breaks, senior offi -
cials point to it as proof and parrot the unnamed quotes.” Gerson is sup-
posed to have provided WHIG members with their most vivid imagery, the 
potential mushroom cloud rising over America if Saddam’s regime was not 
dealt with (Isikoff and Corn 2007: 35). The mushroom cloud evoked mem-
ories of school days for many mature Americans who had had to “duck and 
cover” under their school desks in anticipation of a Soviet nuclear attack. 
What a hook!
After WHIG was formed, senior Vulcans began a barrage of announce-
ments decrying the dangers of Saddam’s WMDs. The opening salvo was 
made by Cheney in a 26 August 2002 speech to the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, in which he announced, “Simply stated, there is no doubt that 
Saddam now has weapons of mass destruction” (in “Context of ‘August 26, 
2002’” 2003). A few weeks later on 8 September, Rice took to the Sunday 
talk shows, insisting certain aluminum tubes that had been discovered in 
Iraq were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programs” and that it 
was inadvisable to ignore this because “we don’t want the smoking gun to 
be a mushroom cloud” (Blitzer 2003). She had used Gerson’s hook. On 
27 September Rumsfeld said the evidence linking Iraq and al-Qaeda was 
“accurate and not debatable” (Stein and Dickinson 2006).
Two days later on September 29, the DIA demurred, judging there was 
“no reliable” evidence of Iraqi WMDs (Stein and Dickinson 2006). To 
counter this breach in the hermetic seal, the CIA was tasked with the 
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chore of creating an NIE concerning Iraq and WMDs. Recall that NIEs, 
as compendiums of all the US intelligence agencies’ views on a particu-
lar topic, are the “last word” on the government’s views on intelligence 
matters. The 2002 NIE’s last word, released in October of that year, was: 
“We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction” (NIE 
2002). Tenet, using a basketball metaphor, told his president the case for 
Saddam having WMDs was a “slam dunk” (in B. Woodward 2004: 249). In 
a 7 October speech in Cincinnati, Bush ignored his DIA and accepted the 
NIE, once again employing Gerson’s hook by telling his audience that “fac-
ing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the fi nal proof—the smoking 
gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud” (Stein and Dick-
inson 2006). Rumsfeld reiterated Bush’s claim on 29 January, 2003, appear-
ing to give it quantitative legitimacy by revealing that “the Iraqi regime has 
not accounted for some 38,000 liters of botulism toxin, 500 tons of sarin, 
mustard gas, VX nerve gas and upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of 
delivering chemical weapons” (in Rosenberg 2006: 2).
A little over six weeks before the attack on Iraq, the constructing of 
Saddam as a WMD toting terrorist gained greater stridency. On 5 February 
Powell gave his embarrassing speech at the UN, declaring to the world that 
Iraq was awash in WMDs. Three days later in his weekly radio address, 
Bush warned the American people, “We have sources that tell us that 
Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi fi eld commanders to use chemi-
cal weapons” (in B. Woodward 2004: 139). Ominously, on 10 February the 
newly instituted Department of Homeland Security advised Americans to 
buy plastic sheeting with which to seal their houses from Iraqi chemical or 
biological attacks (Stein and Dickinson 2006). The assault on Iraq began 
on 19 March. No Iraqi WMDs were used in the combat. Two and a half 
years later (18 December 2005), speaking from the Oval Offi ce to a world 
audience, Bush admitted “we did not fi nd those weapons” (in B. Wood-
ward 2006: 435).
Many people around the world believed the slogan “Bush lied. People 
died.” Scholars have suggested that it was known before the onset of hos-
tilities that the case for Iraq’s possession of WMDs was weak (Cole 2013c). 
Did Bush’s security elites really believe Saddam had WMDs? Tenet, per-
haps, was representative of Vulcan understandings on this matter. In his 
memoir he disputes Woodward’s account of his “slam dunk” exclamation, 
asserting he was not maintaining it was a slam dunk case that Saddam 
had WMDs, but that a slam dunk case could be made that he had them 
(Tenet 2007: 362).28 However, a few lines after this assertion he insisted 
he “strongly” believed Saddam had WMDs (ibid.). After all, Saddam had 
once had them, and he had used them. Bush (2010: 269) stressed in his 
memoirs that “supporters of the war believed it [that Saddam had WMDs]; 
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opponents of the war believed it; even members of Saddam’s own regime 
believed it.” Some might wonder if Bush is truthful here. However, many 
did worry about the possibility of Iraqi WMDs. Remember the journalists 
in Irbil with their canary, Diehard 2.
Meanwhile, “slam dunk” proof was elusive. Prewar US intelligence, an 
oxymoron, was poor. Bush’s security elites added to the problem by biasing 
their intelligence against Saddam. Tenet (2007: 348) regretted that only 
“much later” did he realize Wolfowitz, Libby, and Feith had been purveyors 
of tainted intelligence. Feith’s Offi ce of Special Plans (OPS) was especially 
notorious for distributing anti-Iraq information, what Tenet called “Feith-
based analysis” (ibid.: 342–358).29 At the same time, the Vulcans also had 
to contemplate data indicating that WMDs had not been found, realizing 
too that Iraq was a large place with a large desert in which to hide WMDs. 
Consequently, when Bush security elites examined intelligence upon Iraq, 
what was clear was that either there were, or there were not, WMDs.
Finally, Tenet and Gates have identifi ed emotional states relevant to 
Vulcan dispositions during the run-up to Iraq II. Gates, in his memoir of 
his years as defense secretary, confi ded that the Bush II security elites felt 
that by not preventing 9/11 they had “let the country down” and con-
sequently had a “huge sense of having allowed a devastating attack on 
America to take place on their watch” (2014: 93). Tenet reminded readers 
in his memoir that “few understand the palpable sense of uncertainty and 
fear that gripped those in the storm center in the aftermath of 9/11” (2007: 
496). Bush and the Vulcans were the ones in the “storm center,” and they 
had failed horribly in 9/11. Now they were scared. Bush II wrote in his 
memoirs, “I still see the Pentagon smoldering, the towers in fl ames, and 
that pile of twisted steel. … And it redefi ned my job. … I would pour my 
heart and soul into protecting the country, whatever it took” (2010: 151). 
Rice (2011: 88) confi ded in her memoir that she felt Bush “was carrying a 
weight heavier than any other president, at least since Abraham Lincoln.” 
Perhaps she was a bit hyperbolic here.
But Dubya was the president, after all, and his window of authority au-
thorized him to be the “decider.” He knew that if anything else appalling 
happened, “I would be responsible” (Bush 2010: 237). So the “decider” felt 
failure as well as “fear” and the délire to avoid it. Dreading that some other 
horrible event could occur on their watch, and sensitive that it was their 
responsibility to prevent it, Bush and his Vulcans consequently interpreted 
Iraq’s president as a monster Saddamite—the better to prevent him from 
hurting them, even though deep down in their heart of hearts they proba-
bly did not really know the truth of their interpretation.
The preceding information reveals that perceptually, Bush II and his 
Vulcans understood Saddam’s regime as that of a monster terrorist, which 
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meant that procedurally, if no other way was found to address Saddam, war 
was required. This suggests that Gulf War II was, at least in part, imple-
mentation of the anti-terrorism public délire. So elimination of terrorism 
was a délire in each of the wars the US Leviathan fought against Saddam. 
Were the security elites successful in their anti-terrorist warring?
They certainly eliminated Saddam. However, Saddam had kept al-
Qaeda out of Iraq. After his demise in 2003, al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by the 
Jordanian Abu Musab al Zaqawi, was formed to resist the Americans. It 
became infl uential during the occupation. Its powers were curbed by the 
time of the surge but were never completely eliminated. Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
became a magnet for foreign Islamic radicals from throughout the Middle 
East and other Muslim areas, providing them with training and experience 
in insurgency. These radicals tended to return to their home countries and 
in turn diffuse al-Qaeda doctrines and warring skills. This grew terrorism, 
according to two NIE reports in 2006 (Mazzetti 2006). How much the Iraq 
War contributed to the growth of terrorism has been debated, but support 
that this was the case has come from journalists (Priest 2005), scholars 
(Gunaratna 2004), security research institutes such as the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (Sengupta 2004), and US intelligence agen-
cies (NIE 2006, 200930). Bluntly, the empire increased terrorism by warring 
to fi ght it.
The preceding established that the twenty-year imperial war in Iraq 
involved implementing the oil-control and anti-terrorist iterations of the 
global domination public délire. In the implementation of later iteration, 
it might be added, a violent grab for energy force resources believed able 
to facilitate reproduction of the US Leviathan was cloaked in the noble 
light of purging terrorist monsters from the world. Of course the Security 
Elites 3.0 could only attack the Saddamite when they believed that nonvi-
olent ways of achieving their intentions had failed. The following section 
investigates the hermeneutic politics that led to the awarding of Shultzian 
Permission in Gulf War II.
The Confl ict that Led to the Confl ict: The Hermeneutics Politics 
of Shultzian Permission in Gulf War II
“Mr. President, this force is ready. D-day H-Hours is 2100 hours tonight Iraqi 
time…”
President Bush nodded to the NSC, then, turned toward me.
“All right. For the sake of peace in the world. … As of this moment I will give 
Secretary Rumsfeld the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
“Tommy,” The President added, his voice fi rm, “May God bless the troops.” 
(Franks 2004: xvi–xvii)
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“Tommy” was CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks, sitting 
in the conference room of his headquarters in Doha, Qatar. The presi-
dent, of course, was Dubya, thousands of miles away in Washington, sitting 
with the Vulcans of the National Security Council. “For the sake of peace” 
the “order to execute” did just that: it began Gulf War II and executed 
hundreds of thousands of people, most of them civilians. It has already 
been suggested that the Vulcans proceeded on the basis of the two oil- and 
anti-terrorist public délires, but a question remains: why did the actually 
give themselves Shultzian Permission? This had to do with the hermeneu-
tic politics of a very restricted circle of Vulcans, discussed next.
Remember, Bush was the “decider.” Further, understand that the pres-
ident largely took his decisions from the Vulcans, within whose délires he 
was hermetically sealed. Actually, the choice to war occurred within an 
inner circle of the inner circle of Vulcans. Five made Gulf War II—the 
NSA, Rice; the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld: the Vice Presi-
dent, Cheney; the Secretary of State, Colin Powell; and the Director of the 
CIA, George Tenet.
These actors’ relationships to each other, and to Bush, varied. Cheney 
originally had the closest ties to the president. As Dubya once told Bob 
Woodward, “I love Cheney” (in Woodward 2004: 420).31 Rumsfeld “im-
pressed” Bush (2010: 84), who found he had a “captivating vision” for 
the defense department. One wonders what was “captivating” about an 
institution whose practice was to slaughter enormous numbers. Neverthe-
less, Bush saw Rumsfeld as having “strength and experience,” and besides, 
Cheney “recommended him strongly” (ibid.). Rumsfeld and Cheney were 
a “secret cabal”—as Powell’s State Department Chief of Staff, Colonel 
Lawrence Wilkerson, put it (Froomkin 2005)—in “alliance” throughout 
Bush II’s presidency (Gordon and Trainor 2006: 44) in a collaboration dat-
ing from the Ford administration.
Rice, as the title of her memoirs made clear, found “no higher honor” 
than in serving Bush II (Rice 2011). Gordon and Trainor (2006: 168) 
found her to be “more coordinator than maestro” as compared to her NSA 
predecessors Kissinger and Brzezinski. She seems to have believed her task 
was to divine Dubya’s délire and then help deliver it. Secretary Powell’s 
Chief of Staff Wilkerson claimed in a 2005 speech that Rice, aiming to 
strengthen her closeness with the president instead of transmitting the 
best possible advice, would send what she believed Dubya wanted to hear 
(Froomkin 2005).32
Tenet’s relations to Bush resembled those of Rice, though for differ-
ent reasons. The CIA director had also been Clinton’s fi nal head of the 
agency. Bush found he “spoke bluntly” and grew to like the “blue-collar,” 
“cigar-chomping,” “Greek-to-the-core” guy (Bush 2010: 84). Others have 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
World Warring 1990–2014: The Middle Eastern Theater
– 357 –
reported that Tenet strove energetically to win Dubya’s backing (B. Wood-
ward 2004: 67–68). He had to. The Offi ce of the Inspector General (OIG 
2005: vii) had examined CIA operations prior to 9/11 and concluded, “the 
Director of Central Intelligence,” Tenet, “was either unwilling or unable 
to marshal the full range of … resources necessary to combat” terrorism. 
Thus condemned as “unwilling or unable,” Clinton’s man had to work 
harder to please Bush II.33 
As for Powell, I once met a grandmother, a knowing matriarch, who as 
a child had played with Powell’s sister. He was the little brat brother who 
tagged along. They used to put him in the closet. In a sense, the story told 
below concerns what happened to Powell after he got out of the sisters’ 
clutches, going from the closet to the refrigerator. Bush’s relations with 
Powell were, according to Rice (2011: 20), “complicated,” which puts the 
matter mildly. Importantly, Powell had “extraordinary stature” and had 
been spoken of as a candidate for the presidency (ibid.: 21). Further, he 
had had far more political and military experience at the highest levels of 
Washington than had the president. So regardless of whether or not he 
intended it, Secretary of State Powell was the president’s competitor. Bush 
II, for his part, had lost the popular election and only been granted the 
presidency—illicitly, many believed.
Make no mistake about it: neither Rumsfeld nor Cheney liked Powell. 
Rice (2011: 22) observed that “Don and Colin did not get along,” which 
“the President knew.” Cheney, according to Bob Woodward (2004: 411), 
insisted “Colin always had major reservations about what we were trying to 
do.” Gordon and Trainor (2006: 44) believe that “Cheney’s alliance with 
Rumsfeld allowed him to set the terms of the policy debate,” leaving Powell 
“the odd man out.”
Tenet (2004), refl ecting on the time when it was decided to attack Iraq, 
has said, “There was never a serious debate that I know of within the ad-
ministration about the imminence of the Iraqi threat.” That is, there may 
never have been discussion of the “imminence” of danger from Saddam, in 
the sense of when it might occur. However, in addition to personal animos-
ities toward each other, members of the inner circle had opposing views of 
what to do about the “threat.” These differences were the confl ict that led 
to the confl ict.
Gordon and Trainor (2006: 44) revealed the heart of these differences 
when they observed, “Bush had picked Cheney and Rumsfeld for a num-
ber of reasons and their tough-minded approach to the exercise of power 
was one of them. It was a troika. The president would preside, the Vice 
President would guide, and the defense secretary would implement.” 
“Tough-minded” meant pro-war, and as Cheney told the world on national 
television just after 9/11, this would be war working on “the dark side” 
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(Cheney 2011: 335). Going to the “dark side” meant a number of things 
to Cheney and Rumsfeld, one of which was having their underlings run 
campaigns to provoke confl ict with Iraq. The key underlings working for 
Rumsfeld were Wolfowitz, Feith, and Pearle; Scooter Libby was the most 
important of those working for Cheney. Going to the “dark side” also meant 
utilizing unlawful forms of extreme violence. Bush II would become the 
fi rst president in US history to authorize torture of captured prisoners.34
It is sometimes said that Powell opposed going to war in Iraq. Powell’s 
differences with Cheney and Rumsfeld were more nuanced than that. He 
agreed with Cheney and Rumsfeld that Saddam was a thug. He also agreed 
that the regime probably had WMDs. So he shared with them the per-
ception that Iraq was a menace. Nevertheless, speaking in 2007, Powell 
(2007) remembered, “I tried to avoid this war.” This was because he was 
troubled by the way Cheney and Rumsfeld proposed to address Iraq. The 
basis for this foreboding was his professional soldier’s worry about what 
the “secret cabal” planned to do. As Gordon and Trainor (2006: 577) ob-
serve, “Rumsfeld and Franks dominated the [war] planning” and Cheney 
“never once challenged the realism of Rumsfeld’s expectations.” Powell 
recognized fl aws in the plans well before combat began. Specifi cally, he 
“raised both the issue of insuffi cient troops and the diffi culties the U.S. 
would encounter in post war Iraq” (ibid.).35 Following his experiences in 
Vietnam, he had formulated what became known as the Powell Doctrine, 
fi rst articulated during preparation for Gulf War I (C. Powell 1992).
This doctrine has a number of elements. Two are basic: the resort to 
violent force should only occur after all peaceful means are exhausted; and 
when this happens, overwhelming force should be applied. The fi rst ele-
ment accepts the validity of Shultzian Permission as a condition for com-
mencing hostilities, while the second refl ects the belief among some in the 
US military that such tactics will reduce US casualties and shorten hostili-
ties. In planning for Gulf War II, General Franks, Cheney, and Rumsfeld vi-
olated the Powell Doctrine in two ways. First, they proposed to go directly 
to war without seeking Shultzian Permission. As a soldier, and perhaps 
due to the success of the coalition he helped build as chief of staff during 
Gulf War I, Powell appreciated that seeking such permission facilitated al-
liance-building, which helped with the fi ghting and insured its legitimacy. 
Second, Franks and his colleagues did not plan for applying overwhelming 
force. Rather, they sought “a revolution in war” by using relatively few US 
soldiers in what was termed a “turbo-blitzkreig.” From Powell’s perspective, 
this was unrealistic because it did not anticipate post-confl ict diffi culties, 
such as the possibility of insurgency.
So, the Powell versus Cheney/Rumsfeld debate was not over interpreta-
tions of perceptions. According to Powell (2012: 222), “None of us knew 
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that much of the evidence was wrong,” the “evidence” being the proof of 
the existence of WMDs.36 Everybody perceived Saddam had WMDs, knew 
he had used them, and so was a monster who should go. The dispute was 
over procedure. How was he to go? Here, considerable differences led to 
hermeneutic politics that ended in the granting of Shultzian Permission, 
which ultimately ushered in Gulf War II. Let us follow the course of the 
(hermeneutic) confl ict that led to the (violent) confl ict.
Granting Shultzian Permission: The inner-circle confl ict was most rancor-
ous between Powell and Cheney. The stage was set for acrimony probably 
immediately after 9/11. Cheney (2011: 369) reports that in the emotional 
days following the destruction of the World Trade Center, he “spoke … 
privately” to the president: 
I was aware that Secretary Rumsfeld had set up a process to review all De-
partment of Defense war plans, and I suggested to the president that it would 
be useful to make certain that Rumsfeld had assigned priority to planning for 
possible military action against Saddam Hussein. … I also suggested that our 
planning be … under the command of General Tommy Franks. 
Bush accepted Cheney’s “suggestion” and asked Rumsfeld to start planning 
for war in Iraq, “two months after 9/11” (Bush 2010: 234). Almost immedi-
ately afterward on 27 November, Rumsfeld told Franks to begin developing 
an Iraq war plan (Franks 2004: 329). Bush (2010: 234) is careful to say in 
his war memoirs that this planning was not necessarily to actually go to 
war; rather, it was “the coercive half of coercive diplomacy.” It is impossible 
to discern at this point whether Bush is telling the truth about coercive 
diplomacy, or whether he and Cheney in their private conversations actu-
ally intended to go to war all along. Nevertheless, two months after 9/11 
the formulation of the plans that would be used against Iraq was initiated.
Powell, his “megastar wattage” notwithstanding, was already in trou-
ble. In the fi rst sixteen months of Dubya’s administration he and Armit-
age joked about how he (Powell) was “in the refrigerator” (B. Woodward 
2004: 149). The press noticed this and suggested the secretary of state was 
on the way out. Not only was he a nonentity, but as Mitchell and Mas-
soud (2009: 275) judge, “By directing Rumsfeld to work on an invasion 
plan, Bush gave an advantage to the pro-war faction. … This meant that 
Powell” was “further hamstrung in trying to infl uence the policy process.” 
Cheney, Franks, and Rumsfeld kept the actual invasion planning between 
themselves and the president. Bush (2010: 235) recalls that Franks briefed 
him about war planning “more than a dozen times” between December 
2001 and August 2002. The details for invading Iraq were well under way, 
and Powell was chilling in the fridge.
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In the spring of 2002, Cheney (2011: 380–81) “began hearing … that 
Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage were not only failing to 
support the president’s policies, but were openly disdainful of them”—in-
formation likely to have been passed on to Bush II. For Powell, it looked 
like he was being moved from the refrigerator to the freezer. Powell (2007) 
remembered that, hoping to strengthen his position, “I went to the pres-
ident in August of 2002, after coming back from a trip and seeing all the 
planning that was under way, and we had a long meeting upstairs in the 
residence.” This meeting, which took place on 5 August between himself, 
Rice, and the president, has come to be known as the “Pottery Barn” meet-
ing. At it Powell used the pro-war cabal’s understanding that they were 
conducting coercive diplomacy to begin a string of events that resulted in 
the granting of Shultzian Permission, and war.
Powell’s rhetorical tactics at the meeting appear to have been meant to 
inform the president of the frightening consequences of invading Iraq.37 
At one point, he told Bush that if the hostilities were successful, “‘You are 
going to be the proud owner of 25 million people,’ and ‘You will own all 
their hopes, aspirations and problems. You’ll own it all’” (in B. Woodward 
2004: 150). The press called this the “Pottery Barn rule.” Retail stores sell-
ing fragile ceramics and earthenware, like those in the Pottery Barn chain, 
can have a “you break it, you own it” rule, meaning that if you break it, you 
must pay for it. Broken pottery was a metonym for all the damage invasion 
might cause in Iraq, and a warning to Bush that if he broke the stuff, he 
would have to pay.38
Bush (2010: 238) recalled of the meeting, “I listened carefully and 
shared Colin’s concern.” Woodward says that Bush eventually inquired, 
“What should I do?” (2004: 151), to which Powell responded, “You can 
still make a pitch for a coalition or U.N. action,” cautioning that “if you 
take it to the U.N., you’ve got to recognize that they might be able to solve 
it” (ibid.). What taking “it to the U.N.” actually meant during the Pottery 
Barn meeting was probably left unclear, though it would have been under-
stood that it included asking the Security Council to conduct inspections 
for WMDs. Bush did not commit to going the UN route at the meeting, 
but he certainly leaned toward it.
There followed a month of fi erce hermeneutic politics during which, in 
General Franks’s somewhat amazed terms, the “Washington bureaucracy 
fought like cats in a sack” (Aslam 2013: 69), the two chief combatants be-
ing Cheney and Powell debating whether to go to the UN. Bob Woodward 
(2004: 155), with long and detailed knowledge of the capital’s intrigues, 
reports, “Rarely … had there been such deep division within a national se-
curity team as between Cheney and Powell.” The dogfi ghting commenced 
at a 14 August NSC principals’ meeting from which the president was 
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absent. During the meeting Powell argued for going to the UN. Woodward 
writes, “Powell believed he had Cheney boxed in, and to a lesser extent 
Rumsfeld. He argued that even if anyone felt that war was the only solu-
tion, they could not get to war without fi rst trying a diplomatic solution” 
(ibid.: 156). In a sense, Powell was saying they could only grant themselves 
Shultzian Permission if peaceful, that is, diplomatic measures had been 
tried and failed. Powell believed, according to Woodward, that Cheney 
was “terrifi ed” of the prospect of going to the UN because going diplomatic 
“might work,” so he “harangued” against the UN, saying that dealing with 
it would lead to “a never-ending process of debate” (ibid.: 157).
The 14 August meeting resolved nothing. However, the next day the 
Wall Street Journal ran a piece by Bush I’s close associate and former NSA 
Brent Scowcroft, headlined “Don’t Attack Saddam,” that recommended 
taking the Iraq problem to the UN. It appeared that the father was sending 
the son a message, one Cheney did not want to hear. “Boxed in,” the vice 
president went out and delivered the 26 August speech to the Veterans of 
Foreign War in which he announced that there was “no doubt” that Iraq 
had WMDs. This led to a Labor Day (1 September) meeting at the White 
House between Powell and the president, with Rice present as usual. Wor-
ried about the effects of Cheney’s speech, Powell asked Dubya if it was his 
policy that inspectors should return to Iraq. The president responded yes, 
“though he was skeptical that inspections would work” (ibid.: 167). Powell 
was relieved, believing that at least for the moment Cheney was “neutral-
ized” (ibid.). However, ominously, WHIG was formed two days later to 
make the case that Saddam had WMDs.
On 6 September there was a principals meeting at Camp David, again 
in the president’s absence. The principals were to consider the UN issue 
and the upcoming summit meeting with the UK prime minister before 
the full NSC meeting the next day. Once again, Cheney did not trust the 
UN and Powell did, so the “conversation exploded into a tough debate” 
(ibid.: 175). Powell remembered that Cheney argued with a “fever” and 
that he was “beyond hell bent for action against Saddam” (ibid.). However, 
“the decider” was absent, so no decision could be taken. The next day the 
“decider” was there to meet with the NSC principals. Powell once again 
argued for the need “to offer a plan to begin inspections again as part of 
any reengagement with the U.N.” Cheney listed all the reasons this “could 
mire them in a tar pit” (ibid.: 176). Tenet (2007: 319), recalling the meet-
ing, said Bush “pretty much let them duke it out.” Woodward (2004: 176) 
reported that Bush thanked the debaters and “promised to think about it.”
As Rice (2011: 181) observed, “Some people have claimed that the 
president never asked his advisors whether he should go to war against 
Saddam.” Solicitous of Bush’s memory, she disagreed, declaring that the 
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7 September meeting “was the culmination of the debate that had been 
playing out over the summer,” which fi nally “decided on a course of action” 
(ibid.: 180). The verdict came in obliquely as the president announced 
what Saddam’s response to renewed inspections would be: “Either he will 
come clean about his weapons, or there will be war” (quoted ibid.: 181). 
Later that day, Bush met with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. He informed 
Bush that in order to achieve parliamentary consent for war in Iraq, he had 
to fi rst go to the UN. Bush knew the UK was likely to be his only major ally, 
one that would deliver a substantial number of soldiers and weapons. So he 
informed “Blair he had decided to go to the U.N.” (ibid.: 178).
The “decider” had decided. They would go to the UN. Powell had won, 
for the moment. It is important to grasp just what was chosen. It was a 
procedure to resolve whether, or not, peaceful means of settling the argu-
ment with Saddam had been exhausted and Shultzian Permission could be 
granted. Bush was clear. If Saddam did not “come clean” there would be 
war. War preparations continued. Bush told Blair where he stood on the 
matter at the summit, affi rming, “Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass 
destruction” (in B. Woodward 2004: 178). On 8 September, WHIG orga-
nized the entire Vulcan inner circle to appear on the Sunday talk shows to 
excoriate Saddam and insist he possessed WMDs. This was when Rice told 
the world that the smoking gun of Saddam’s WMDs might be a mushroom 
cloud (ibid.: 2002). That autumn US “troops and supplies” began moving 
to the region (Cheney 2011: 438).
Now that they had decided to go to the UN, they had to actually do it. 
This was Powell’s job, and it involved negotiations with the UN that were 
made diffi cult by what were considered the US’s bellicose intentions. Nev-
ertheless, the negotiations were successful and resulted in the 8 November 
UNSC Resolution 1441, which gave Iraq a fi nal chance to comply with 
its disarmament requirements by providing a “complete accounting of all 
aspects” of its WMD programs and allowing UN inspectors immediate and 
unrestricted access to these programs. Iraq had thirty days to comply and 
was warned that it faced serious consequences if it failed.
Some Bush security elites made efforts to make clear to Iraq that this 
was Saddam’s last chance. General Franks (2004: 407), for example, re-
membered how, during a visit with Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
who had ties to Saddam, he asked Ali to tell Saddam that “he should 
cooperate with the UN immediately.” On 27 November, UN inspectors 
led by Hans Blix, head of the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation and Inspection 
Commission, and Mohamed El Baradai, head of the International Atomic 
Energy Commission, entered Iraq. Iraq responded to Resolution 1441 on 
7 December, within the required time frame, sending the Security Coun-
cil a 12,000-page declaration that it lacked WMDs. On 27 January, Blix 
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spoke publicly about Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 1441 to the Se-
curity Council, announcing, “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine 
acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament” (Blix 2003).
The Vulcan inner circle smelled blood. Rice (2011: 186) believed “Sad-
dam seemed to be playing games with inspectors.” Rumsfeld (2011: 442) 
dismissed Iraq’s declaration as “contemptuously incomplete.” Franks (2004: 
417) thought the problem was that the Iraq declaration “was basically a 
collection of papers judged false in the 1990s.” At an 18 December NSC 
meeting, as remembered by Feith, the president observed, “It’s clear that 
Saddam is not cooperating,” to which Powell responded, “That’s right” (in 
Feith 2008: 339). Yet it seems that Rice was the person who convinced 
Bush that Saddam had not confessed. Dubya (2010: 251) recollected in 
his memoirs that “she had been a strong supporter of inspections. But af-
ter meeting with Blix and his team, she was convinced Saddam would do 
nothing but stall.” Woodward (2004: 251) reports that during the Christ-
mas holidays of 2002, there “was a lot of stress.” Bush told him, “I would 
constantly talk to Condi.”
During one of these tête-a-têtes, the conversation went: “‘What do you 
think?’ the president asked Rice, ‘Should we do this?’ He meant war. … 
‘Yes,’ she said” (ibid.). Gates tells readers in his defense secretary memoir 
that Rice reported that “the fact is we invaded Iraq because we believed 
we had run out of other options. The sanctions were not working, the 
inspections were unsatisfactory, and we could not get Saddam to leave by 
other means” (Rice in Gates 2014: 27). When Rice insisted they had “run 
out of options,” she meant peaceful ones. Thus Shultzian Permission could 
be given and her president’s stress relieved, and “Yes,” they could go to war.
On 16 March, three days before the start of the invasion, Cheney was 
asked on the nationwide television program Meet the Press whether Sad-
dam’s 7 December declaration was a true confession that Iraq possessed no 
WMDs. To some extent the confession Saddam was being asked to make 
resembled those demanded of persons accused of witchcraft in medieval 
and early modern Europe (Thurston 2001): the accused (usually women) 
were told to admit their witchcraft, whereupon refusal to confess was 
judged further proof of guilt and reason for burning at the stake. Bush and 
his Vulcans appear to have expected Saddam to perform a ritual of public 
confession of his WMDs. Saddam, not having any WMDs, did nothing of 
the sort. So when asked whether Saddam had made a true confession, the 
vice president responded, “We asked for a declaration of all of his WMD 
[so he would] come clean. He refused to do that. He’s, again, continued to 
do everything he could to thwart the inspectors” (Cheney 2003).
The hermeneutic politics had come down to a public ritual during which 
the Iraqi president was to confess to WMDs. The 7 December “Declara-
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tion” denied possession of such weapons. The inner circle of Vulcans inter-
preted this to mean he did not “come clean.” So the granting of Shultzian 
Permission was appropriate. Many, many innocent Iraqi were burned at a 
fi gurative stake of US military operations. A year later Blix changed his 
mind and declared that 700 inspections had occurred in Iraq and none 
had found WMDs. Further, he announced that during this time the US 
government had had the “same mind-frame as witch-hunters of the past” 
(in Azab Powell 2004). It is time to review the narrative just presented.
Each of the three stages of the Iraq War—Gulf War I, the War of Block-
ades, and Gulf War II—can be accounted for in part as a result of the 
implementation of the oil control and anti-terrorist iterations of the global 
domination public dêlire. Furthermore, there is evidence that in Gulf War 
II that the actual triggering of hostilities was due to a hermeneutic politics 
pitting the secretary of state against the other members of the inner circle 
over whether the violations of the oil and anti-terrorist public dêlires could 
be diplomatically resolved. The inner circle believed Saddam had not 
“come clean” and interpreted this to mean that peaceful diplomacy was 
impossible, which allowed them to award themselves Shultzian Permission.
The war that followed was a preemptive war of aggression—preemptive, 
because it was supposed that Iraq intended to harm America; aggressive, 
because the US invaded Iraq. Iraq, already crushed by Gulf War I and 
the War of Blockades, had neither the intention nor the means to attack 
America. Because it was a war of aggression, it was a crime under interna-
tional law. Recollect that Robert Jackson, the chief American prosecutor 
at the Nuremburg Tribunal, had classifi ed wars of aggression as “the su-
preme international crime.” Recall additionally that although the fi gures 
for Iraq civilian deaths and injuries during Gulf War II vary, they do so at 
high levels—from hundreds of thousands to millions killed and wounded.
Moreover, the three phases of US global warring with Iraq actually left 
the Hawks’ and Vulcans’ délires frustrated. With regard to fi ghting terror-
ism, they may have eliminated Saddam, but they allowed al-Qaeda into 
Iraq, where it had never been before, and where the Islamic State has 
grown. With regard to controlling oil, the wars appear to be, as Greg Mut-
titt puts it, a case of “mission unaccomplished,” with Chinese oil compa-
nies a primary benefi ciary of the US warring.
Finally, the evidence concerning the Iraq War is consistent with the 
global warring hypothesis. Prior to and during the global warring, there was 
intensifi cation and coalescence of the cyclical, the land/capital, and the 
dominator/dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted in 
Gulf War I and the War of Blockades because hostilities were already on-
going when the US intervened; and in Gulf War II because, as Rice put it, 
they had run out of peaceful “options.” Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II saw to 
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it that the global warrings they executed were implementations of the anti-
terrorist and the oil-control public délires. Obama, as Gates (2014: 297) 
has reported, has claimed that the US ended the war in Iraq “responsibly.” 
Perhaps, but consider what the US Leviathan was responsible for. Its myr-
midons came, butchered (perhaps over a million people), and cut and ran.
The Iraq War was but one of a number imperial wars during the chang-
ing of millenniums. Attention now turns to another Persian Gulf hostility 
in a “fairyland” where there is a lot of oil and there has been a lot of global 
warring.
Twilight Warring in “Fairyland”: 1994–2013
Winston Churchill, who helped the UK acquire control over Iran’s oil 
industry in the early twentieth century, in words of condescension and, 
perhaps, sexual innuendo, called this acquisition “a prize from fairyland 
beyond our wildest dreams” (in Kinzer 2008: xi).39 We have already seen 
how the US engaged in global warring against “fairyland” in 1953 and 
again during the Iran-Iraq War. According to David Crist (2012: 572), 
a former US military offi cer with combat experience in the Persian Gulf, 
after 1979 there were “three decades of twilight war.” By “twilight” warring 
Crist meant relatively small-scale, largely indirect, clandestine global war-
ring. Ari Ratner (2012), of the United States Institute of Peace, has spoken 
of a “covert war” between the US and Iran during the Bush II and Obama 
administrations. Actually, information on the period under review points 
to indirect, overt and covert global warring beginning during the Clinton 
administration in 1994 and continuing through 2013, which warring is 
evaluated below.
Twilight Warring
During his inaugural address in January 1989, Bush I announced to Iran 
that “goodwill begets goodwill” (in Haass 2010). From the American per-
spective, Iran did not respond with much “goodwill,” especially because 
Khomeini’s offi cials dragged their heels about freeing American hostages 
held by Iran-backed Hezbollah. Of course, from the Iranians’ vantage 
point Bush I’s 1990 awarding of the Legion of Merit to Will Rogers III, 
who had downed the civilian Iranian airliner at the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War, did not seem an act of “goodwill.” There were numerous complica-
tions between the two countries. However, according to Richard Haass 
(2010), who was George H. W. Bush’s special assistant (1989–1993), “The 
U.S.-Iran relationship was largely stagnant during the Bush administra-
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tion.” As it stands, this assertion is correct but misleading, for the inertia 
was of a particular sort. During the Bush I years, as had been the case since 
the elimination of the US-imposed shah, ill will begat ill will. So what 
remained stagnant, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld (2011: 4), was that 
“U.S.-Iran relations” were “poisoned.”
Rumsfeld (2011: 638–39) notes in his memoirs that “every American 
administration since the Iranian revolution has participated in some form 
of diplomatic engagement with” Iran. However, recall that he believed 
such diplomacy to be “poisoned.” Steven Kinzer (2008: xviii–xix) iden-
tifi ed the toxin when he observed that “the American political class has 
never recovered from the shock of losing the Shah and the humiliation 
of the hostage crisis that followed.” The poison is “humiliation,” and US 
security elites, having drunk deeply of it, are impelled to stealth violence 
against Iran whenever they think they can get away with it, in effect grant-
ing themselves Shultzian Permission against Tehran.
During the Clinton administration this violence involved two sorts of 
global warring: blockades and CIA covert operations. Washington had been 
sanctioning Iran since 1979 and the taking of US embassy hostages. Under 
Clinton the sanctioning became considerably more onerous in the spring of 
1995, when he signed Executive Order 12957, barring any trade with Iran’s 
petroleum industry, and Executive Order 12959, prohibiting any US trade 
with Iran. A year later, the US Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act, which punished all foreign companies that invested in Iranian hydro-
carbons. Additionally, in 1995 the Clinton administration allocated 18–20 
million dollars for covert operations inside Iran. This money was in prin-
ciple to be used as part of the administration’s dual containment policy.40 
The exact operations of this “containment” are unclear, but Tehran would 
probably have regarded all of them as hostile. So, by the mid 1990s the New 
American Empire was globally warring in Iran, largely by blockading its oil 
sector—its greatest source of wealth—while running covert operations.
The Bush II administration had its hands full dealing with its invasion 
of Iraq. As part of it, the Vulcans had to confront a “counter invasion of 
Iraq” from Iran that “followed shortly after the American attack. MOIS 
and Quds force offi cers arrived in southern Iraq on the heels of U.S. tanks 
driving north to Baghdad” (Crist 2012: 468). The MOIS was Iran’s Min-
istry of Intelligence and National Security, the Iranian equivalent of the 
CIA. The Quds Force was a special unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, 
which by the 1990s had become a “blend of U.S. Special Operations and 
the Peace Corps” (Crist 2012: 468). The combination of MOIS and Quds 
Force strengthened Shiite rebellion against the American occupation. 
How would Bush II’s Vulcans respond?
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Evidence circulated in 2006 of U.S. covert military operations inside 
Iran aimed at destabilizing the country. When this covert warfare began is 
unknown, but it is clear that in 2007 the Bush II administration allocated 
$400 million to increase it (S. Hersh 2006). How this money was spent is 
uncertain. It appears U.S. commandos were ordered into Iran to estab-
lish contact with Kurdish, Baloch, and Arab ethnic groups that opposed 
the Iranian government. There were charges that the U.S. was using the 
Mujahedin el Khalg, an opposition movement in exile that advocated the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s overthrow, to conduct cross-border operations 
between Iraq and Iran (Bergman 2008). It is known that drone missions 
over Iran were initiated, as was Operation Olympic Games, a program for 
cyber attacks on Iran’s nuclear program. It can be speculated that at least 
some of the covert funds went to media campaigns against the Tehran 
regime and to dissenting members of its governing elite. In sum, proba-
bly starting around 2005, the US had considerably escalated covert global 
warfare against Iran, though instead of using the Iraqi state as its proxy as 
it had during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, it now appeared to be relying 
upon its own covert operations.41
Obama, largely because of his Iran adventures, was labeled “George W. 
Bush on steroids” by one critic (A. Miller 2012). Such a designation seems 
melodramatic. Nevertheless, his regime did further escalate global warring 
against Iran. It added new and broader sanctions against Tehran designed 
to hinder all sectors of its economy, especially its fi nancial sector. It has also 
pressed the UN and individual countries to impose their own sanctions 
upon Tehran. Consequently, Iran faced a harsh sanction regime intended 
to strangle economic life by blockade. This was only one aspect of the New 
American Empire’s violent operations against the country.
Obama’s Security Elites 3.0 have specialized in covert campaigns of 
“high-tech sabotage” (Ratner 2012). They took the Bush II administra-
tion’s Olympic Games to a new level of performance. Apparently in collab-
oration with the Israelis, a computer virus called Stuxnet was developed 
and deployed in 2009 and 2010. It was designed to, and did, destroy cen-
trifuges in Iran’s nuclear program.42 The Obama security elites have had an 
elective affi nity for drones, whose use in Iran has seemingly been largely for 
intelligence purposes. Iranian facilities (refi neries, pipelines, and a missile 
development center) have had a high rate of explosions; Iranian nuclear 
physicists have been assassinated on the streets of Tehran (probably by 
Israeli agents); and US Special Ops teams have been inserted in several 
places for undisclosed covert goals. So it is clear a “twilight war” began un-
der Clinton, strengthened under Bush II, and intensifi ed still further under 
Obama, posing the question of what the fi ghting was all about. This brings 
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the analysis back to the anti-terrorist and the oil-control iterations of the 
global domination public délire.
The Anti-terrorist Public Délire
Iran may be “fairyland,” but according to the Security Elites 3.0, “fairy-
land” is a bastion of terrorism. Katzman (2010: 26–37) catalogs the extent 
of Iran’s terrorist activities, as recorded by the US government. During 
Clinton’s presidency his NSA Anthony Lake proposed that some countries 
were “rogue states” because, among other things, they sponsored terror-
ism. Rogue states were to be isolated and punished. Lake labeled Iran a 
prime example of such a rogue. Bush II continued this theme in 2002, 
when in a speech he branded Iran (along with Iraq and North Korea) part 
of an Axis of Evil for its state support of terrorism. As Obama’s Secretary 
of State, Hillary Clinton (2007) condemned Iran as “the country that most 
sponsors state terrorism.” Iran’s purported nuclear weapons program has 
especially concerned US imperial elites since the Bush II administration.43 
Thus, the New American Empire’s attacks on Iran have been entirely con-
sistent with implementation of the anti-terrorist public délire.
The Oil-Control Public Délire
In 2007 Iran was the fourth largest oil producer. It has the fourth largest 
oil reserves, slightly ahead of Iraq. Global warring against Iran might con-
tribute to maintaining or increasing US imperial control over oil, securing 
a number of the different types of control. However, making this happen 
would require regime change, with a new government returning Iran to 
US client status. First, consider the positive potential of global warring for 
the New US Empire’s control over access to oil. Kinzer (2008: xiii) has 
reported that “those who like the idea” of attacking Tehran believe it will 
“allow American oil companies free access to Iranian petroleum” because 
it would facilitate re-entry of both US oil production and oil-support fi rms 
into the Iranian petroleum industry. Another potential consequence of 
such fi ghting is that it could prevent Tehran from subverting either Kuwait 
or Saudi Arabia in ways that restrict their production and/or prevent US 
oil companies from doing business there, as the State Department and 
Pentagon feared was possible during Khomeini’s rule (Kinzer 2008). A de-
crease in Kuwaiti or Saudi Arabian production would roil both the supply 
and the price of oil. Yet another possible consequence of such fi ghting is 
that it could facilitate distribution of oil. The Iranian navy can mine the 
Strait of Hormuz—the point where the Persian Gulf opens onto the sea-
lanes to Europe, the US, and Asia—through which roughly 40 percent of 
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the world’s oil fl ows. A successful closure of shipping at the choke point of 
the strait would gravely disrupt the movement of oil to its markets. During 
the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran did mine the Strait of Hormuz. However, the US 
Navy’s Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 removed the mines, proving it 
feasible to use naval force to keep sea-lanes open.
An additional positive potential of US global warring against Iran is that 
it could help the Security Elites 3.0 pay strategic rents. Should Tehran re-
turn to being a client in the US imperial system, then control over Iranian 
oil will provide the US elites with “carrots and sticks” to utilize as strategic 
rents. Provision of the “carrot” of access to Iranian oil to another country 
would constitute payment to that country of rent equal to the amount of 
money its companies earn in the Iranian petroleum sector. Meanwhile, the 
wielding of the “stick” of denying access to Iranian oil to another country 
would constitute a potential cost to the client equal to the amount its 
companies could earn if they had access to Iranian oil.
Third, global warring could help the US Security Elites 3.0 maintain 
the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Like Baghdad, Tehran had 
planned an oil bourse based on euros rather than dollars (W. R. Clark 
2005: 150–157), and it opened in 2008. This threatened the petrodollar. 
Regime change might well eliminate the Iranian oil bourse, facilitating the 
dollar’s continuation as the world’s reserve currency. Such information is 
consistent with the view that Security Elites 3.0 have conducted overt war 
and covert war to implement the oil-control public délire.
US security elites 3.0 have been conducting “twilight” global warring 
in “fairyland” since 1990. Since the 1990s the US Leviathan has faced in-
tensifi cation and coalescence of the cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/
dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission has been de facto granted 
since the debacle of the US embassy hostage-taking and subsequent fail-
ure to rescue them. The hostilities appear to be an implementation of the 
anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires. This is evidence consistent with 
the global warring hypothesis.
Unfortunately, from the perspective of the US Leviathan’s masters and 
commanders, this global warring has been disappointing. There has been 
no regime change in Tehran. If anything, the Iranian political elites’ ran-
cor toward the New American Empire has deepened. The insistence upon 
warring via blockades has, according to one source, led to a “growing ten-
sion between the US and its international allies and rivals” (Howard 2007: 
xii), “undermining” the Leviathan’s “global power” (ibid.: 23). This is be-
cause of the sanctions that oblige countries to forgo economic activities 
with Iran, including those in the petroleum sector. Sanctions equally bur-
den the US economy. American companies estimate that they cost US 
business $19 billion a year and on the order of 250,000 jobs (ibid.: 57). The 
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Iranian nuclear program has not been substantially harmed by US-Israeli 
cyber attacks on it.
Worse, US covert warring against Iran has contributed to the forma-
tion of a “Shiite Necklace.” Alliances might be imagined as necklaces, 
with countries the jewels in the strands of an alliance. The empire’s global 
warring in the Middle East spurred the forging of an alliance involving 
Shiite Iran and other countries with Shiite populations that oppose US 
domination. The biggest gem in the necklace is Iran. Oil-rich Iraq, also 
predominantly Shiite, is another rich jewel in the necklace. Iran encour-
aged closer cooperation with Iraq once the US’s removal of Saddam and 
his Sunni government allowed the majority Shiites to take power—a result 
of US warring there. The Iraqi government was delighted to enter into this 
cooperation as a way of resisting US occupation. Together, Iran and Iraq 
boast enormous oil reserves (294.3 billion barrels). Syria is a third jewel in 
the necklace. Since the 1990s its government has “built increasingly close 
ties” with Iran (Rumsfeld 2011: 640). The fourth jewel is Lebanon’s pow-
erful Hezbollah, the most effective paramilitary in the world, which has 
received Iranian fi nancial and military support since the 1980s. The Shiite 
Necklace stretches from Iran’s border with Pakistan and Afghanistan in 
the east to Lebanon’s Mediterranean shoreline in the west. It has strength-
ened due to US warring since the 1990s, with Iraq and Syria being strung 
more securely on it, and has become a powerful bloc contesting the Middle 
East with the US Leviathan.
This leads to the question of why the US has not exercised greater vi-
olent force against Iran. After all, the potential benefi ts of controlling its 
oil are signifi cant. Consider, however, that Iran is the eighteenth largest 
country in the world in terms of landmass, and much of it is rugged and 
mountainous, that is, ideal for guerilla operations. It has almost 80 million 
people, and in the Iran-Iraq War it demonstrated its ability to war for long 
periods over large areas. It has allies, especially Hezbollah, that allow it to 
strike widely in the Middle East. Recently, Austin Long and William Luers 
(2013) summarized the results of a study analyzing the costs and benefi ts of 
overt, direct warfare against the Islamic republic. The resulting document 
was endorsed by thirty-two major security elites ranging from former NSAs 
to senators to a State Department offi cial and a gaggle of generals, includ-
ing a former commander of CENTCOM. It judged that extensive military 
strikes against Iran would set back Iran’s nuclear program for about “four 
years” (ibid: 9)—in other words, not very much—and “would increase 
Iran’s motivation to build a bomb” (ibid.: 12). Further, occupation of Iran 
“would require” more violent force resources than “the U.S. has expended 
over the past ten years in the Iraq and Iran wars” (ibid.: 10). Churchill 
may have been right about “fairyland” in a manner he did not understand. 
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“Fairyland” appears to be a “prize” “beyond” the US security elite’s “wildest 
dreams.” The narrative now turns to a third area of US global warring in 
the Middle East. Once again, it is Libya.
Once Again Libya, 2011: “A Model Intervention”?
When we last left the tale, Gaddafi , who termed himself the Brother Leader, 
had been condemned by Reagan’s security elites as a terrorist monster. 
Attempts to destroy him had failed, though readers were warned that he 
faced troubles ahead. These came in February 2011 in the form of an Arab 
Spring rebellion against his regime. The US and its European allies sided 
with the rebels as part of a liberal hawk “responsibility to protect” (R2P) 
hermeneutic to rid Libyans of their monster. It was an intervention that 
Ivo Daalder, a former NSC member and permanent US Representative 
to NATO, and Admiral James Stavridis, a commander of EUCOM and 
NATO, “hailed as a model intervention” (Daalder and Stavridis 2012: 2).
Hostilities commenced in February 2011. They were effectively over by 
20 October, the date Gaddafi  was killed. Upon learning of Gaddafi ’s death, 
Hillary Clinton, then Obama’s Secretary of State, jovially channeled Julius 
Caesar by quipping, “We came. We saw. He died” (in Daly 2011). Perhaps 
she should have said, “We came. We saw. We sodomized.” The Brother 
Leader, whom the rebels called Abu Shafshufa (“Old Fuzzhead”), was try-
ing to escape in a convoy. After it was strafed by NATO planes, Old Fuzz-
head was captured—dragged from the culvert he was hiding in as one rebel 
attempted to thrust a knife in his anus (Shelton 2011)—and shot.44 Let 
us analyze this “model intervention,” especially as it pertains to the anti-
terrorist and oil-control iterations of the global domination public délire.45
Duct Taped and Krazy Glued
Libya had successfully resisted the global warring of the Reagan adminis-
tration, but it emerged from the hostilities weakened in a number of ways. 
The fi rst of these pertained to the fi asco of the Chad campaign. According 
to Alison Pargeter (2012: 133), the Chadian defeat “was not lost … on the 
Libyan army, which was deeply embittered over a reckless campaign.” This 
made Gaddafi  suspicious of his offi cers’ loyalty, leading him to downgrade 
their effectiveness to lessen their likelihood of attempting coups. He was 
entirely successful in this degradation. By the time of the rebellion his gov-
ernment was reliant on three units estimated at ten thousand troops. These 
included the Revolutionary Guard Corps, recruited largely from Gad dafi ’s 
own ethnic group; the Khamis Brigade, commanded by Gad dafi ’s youngest 
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son; and the Amazon Corps, a personal guard composed of women. US 
offi cials judged these troops to be “not very skilled” and to have “equip-
ment far from cutting edge,” so that by the time of the rebellion they were 
“trying to hold things together with duct tape and Krazy Glue” (in Hosen-
ball 2011). International sanctions imposed upon Libya also contributed to 
the sorry state of his armed forces because “the country was never able to 
recover and rebuild its armed forces” (Pargeter 2012: 133). Consequently 
duct taped and Krazy glued, Gaddafi ’s ten thousand would take on the 
New American Empire.
Gaddafi  Faces Problems at Home: Following Reagan, and in part because 
of Libya’s alleged guilt in the downing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, in 1988, the Clinton administration infl uenced the UN Security 
Council to impose a regime of sanctions on Libya in 1991 and 1992. These 
did not prohibit oil exports, but they banned importation of spare parts and 
other consumer goods. This hurt the oil industry and raised importation 
costs, leading to high infl ation of 35 percent per year from 1993 to 1997. 
Infl ation eroded public services like schools and hospitals, and made acqui-
sition of imported staples more onerous.
For most citizens, “simply getting by became more diffi cult,” so “resent-
ment hardened,” leading to an “utter desperation for change” (Pargeter 
2012: 172–173, 188). “Desperation” engendered resistance, by citizens 
against their government. To some extent this involved spontaneous man-
ifestations on the part of the populace. However, starting in the late 1980s 
Islamists threatened the regime for the fi rst time, and Gaddafi  responded 
in two contradictory ways by increasing both repression and handouts for 
ordinary citizens and for elites. Although tortured and imprisoned indi-
viduals experienced this repression as grim, its level appears to have been 
relatively modest.46 In an additional response to these problems, Gaddafi  
began to reform his regime in a more Western direction.
Reform involved submitting to Washington and its allies’ demands that 
the Libyan economy be opened to neoliberal policies; destroy its weapons 
of mass destruction; forgo terrorism; and pay reparations to the relatives of 
the downed Pan Am 103. A kowtowing Gaddafi  appointed his hybrid-elite, 
intellectual son Saif-al Islam to oversee the process of liberalization. Saif 
al-Islam had an MBA from a Viennese university and a Ph.D. from the 
London School of Economics, and had hobnobbed with English high so-
ciety at the turn of the millennium. Perhaps Saif’s most notable act was to 
negotiate elimination of Libya’s WMD program. In 2004, in the midst of 
warring in Iraq, Bush II signed an executive order lifting any remaining US 
sanctions against Libya. A team of US offi cials visited Libya in 2009 and 
congratulated the country as “an important ally in the war on terror” (in 
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Dinucci 2011). Gaddafi  was back in the fold of the New American Empire, 
or so he thought.
Unfortunately for Gaddafi , going neoliberal solved neither the problems 
with his people’s welfare nor his problems with his people. In fact these 
worsened, and they did so along lines of existing geographic antipathy. 
The country has long had an east/west antagonism pitting the old Otto-
man provinces of Cyrenaica in the east with its capital Benghazi, against 
Tripolitania in the west with its capital Tripoli.47 The 1969 coup transferred 
control over the country from King Idris, of the east, to Gaddafi , of the 
west. Consequently, throughout Gaddafi ’s 42-year reign eastern Libya was 
always more discontented. Especially disgruntled were the Islamists, who 
were largely from the east. A number of them had had combat experience 
in Afghanistan, and in 1989 the regime had discovered armed militant 
cells in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Ajdabia (Pargeter 2012: 166).
Throughout 2009 and early 2010, Arab Spring rebellions against au-
thoritarian governments to the east in Tunisia and Egypt were successfully 
occurring. Unsurprisingly, they diffused westward to an already disgrun-
tled Cyrenaican populace, and spontaneous uprisings in Benghazi began 
on 15 February 2011. Very quickly, Washington and its allies chose sides. 
Old Fuzzyhead was abandoned. On 17 March the UN Security Council 
voted to establish no-fl y zones in Libya, using “all necessary measures” (in 
Daalder and Stavridis 2012: 2).
Two points are unclear concerning the onset of the Libyan revolts: how 
much they resulted from diffusion of the idea of rebellion during the Arab 
Spring, and how much the New American Empire helped shape the spon-
taneous uprisings. Wayne Madsen (2012) and Maximilian Forte (2012) 
report that American, British, and French Special Ops were on the ground 
in eastern Libya before Obama’s security elites’ began insisting on inter-
vention, a suggestion substantiated by Nazemroaya (2011).48 If this was 
the case, the message of rebellion may have been carried to eastern Libya 
from the Arab Spring, but the actual violence may have been choreo-
graphed by helpful hints from the CIA, MI6, and SAS.
Hermeneuneutic Politics
Senior security elites in the Obama administration entered into a her-
meneutic politics over whether Washington should go about “getting in-
volved” in the anti-Gaddafi  insurgency (Gates 2014: 518). Robert Gates, 
then defense secretary, reported the politics were between liberal hawks 
and their opponents. On the liberal hawks’ side were Susan Rice, then US 
Ambassador to the UN; Samantha Powers, on the NSC; and Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton. All argued the US Leviathan “had to” get involved 
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(ibid.: 518). Opposed to the Hawks were principally Vice President Biden, 
Defense Secretary Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
Mike Mullen, and Obama’s NSA Tom Donilon. Those opposed to inter-
vening in Libya basically interpreted such operations as risky and unnec-
essary. The US had already engaged in two diffi cult and expensive wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The political perils were great. The US had invaded 
two Muslim countries since 1991; how would the Islamic world feel about 
a third? The military consequences were too open-ended—what if the 
fi ghting dragged on? Finally, what vital US national security issues were at 
stake just because Old Fuzzyhead’s citizens repudiated him?
The liberal hawks, on the other hand, interpreted the situation through 
the optic of the R2P hermeneutic. Perceptually, Gaddafi  used bloodcur-
dling rhetoric, vowing to crush the rebels with “no mercy, no pity” (in 
Golovnina and Worsnip 2011). Procedurally, the liberal hawks believed 
that if this was the case, it was necessary to intervene “to prevent an an-
ticipated massacre of the rebels,” as Gates (2014: 511) expressed it. On 
3 March 2011 President Obama declared Gaddafi  “must go” (ibid.: 515).
Twelve days later (15 March) a NSC meeting was convened over the 
issue. Obama went with his liberal hawks. He told Gates that his decision 
to accept the Hawk interpretation “had been a 51-49 call” (ibid.: 518). 
One wonders is if this was really the case. As reported in a previous chap-
ter, Obama was a liberal hawk, so the interpretations of Clinton, Rice, and 
Powers simply reinforced his hermetic seal into R2P. Two days after the 
NSC meeting the UN established the no-fl y zone in Libya.
Operation Unifi ed Protector: Regardless of the degree to which the original 
rebellion was “spontaneous,” the US, UK, and France initiated land and 
sea bombardment of Libya two days after establishment of the no-fl y zone. 
Eventually the global warring came to be directed by NATO in a campaign 
called Operation Unifi ed Protector, but Daalder and Stavridis (2012: 3) 
are clear: the US “played a critical role.” Manlio Dinucci (2012: 1–2), 
summarizing these hostilities, reported that for
over seven months, US and NATO air forces carried out 30,000 missions of 
which 10,000 were offensive air strikes, using more than 40,000 bombs and 
missiles. Additionally, Special Forces were infi ltrated into Libya, among them 
thousands of easily concealed Qatari commandos. They also fi nanced armed 
tribal groups hostile to the Tripoli government and supported Islamic groups 
that only months earlier were watchlisted as terrorists. The operation in its 
entirety was directed by Washington, according to the US ambassador to 
NATO.
The duct taped and Krazy-glued ten thousand did not stand a chance. 
Operation Unifi ed Protector was over on 31 October, 222 days after it had 
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commenced. Why did the US Leviathan do it? This question leads to dis-
cussion of the roles of the anti-terrorism and the oil-control public délires.
R2P and The Anti-Terrorist Public Délire
Bear in mind, hostilities were already underway in February of 2011, so if 
the US Leviathan was to intervene in Libya, it had to do so in a situation 
where hostilities were ongoing. This meant that peaceful options were over 
and Shultzian Permission granted. Even though Obama’s security elites 
had decided Libya was an “important ally” against terrorism in 2009, two 
years later they returned him to monster status, organizing a press cam-
paign depicting him as a terrorist.
As Thomas Josceyln (2011), writing for the conservative Weekly 
Standard, put it, “Gaddafi  is, after all, a terrorist.” As mentioned earlier, 
Obama’s UN ambassador Susan Rice, speaking to the Security Council 
in April 2011, claimed Gaddafi  was supplying his troops with Viagra “to 
encourage mass rape” (MacAskill 2011).49 Once again, America’s foe was 
“paranoid” and full of “horror.” With Gaddafi  back in the docket as a ter-
rorist, as Daalder and Stavridis (2012: 2–3) explain, it was easy for US to 
lead “the charge” for “intervention” on the basis of “the responsibility to 
protect.” Of course, “responsibility to protect” was the way that liberal 
hawks discoursed about the anti-terrorist public délire: if you perceived a 
monster terrorist, then it was your responsibility to protect against it, by 
killing it. However, US intervention in Libya was not entirely about slaying 
monsters. Libya has oil that is cheap to produce and highly profi table, so as 
is about to be shown, the oil-control public délire was equally relevant to 
the global war in Libya.
The Oil-Control Public Délire
Libya had already kowtowed to Washington and begun neoliberal reform 
by 2004. What more could concern the New American Empire about Gad-
dafi ? Plenty, it turns out. Tripoli may have reconciled with Bush II, but the 
old revolutionary’s heart was not comfortable settling into New American 
Empire client-state status. In 2009, at the second Annual Africa–South 
America Summit, Gaddafi  joined with fellow revolutionary Hugo Chavez 
in calling for an “anti-imperialist” front. For Security Elites 3.0 back in 
Washington, three aspects of such politics were especially distressing. The 
fi rst had to do directly with oil. Back in the 1970s Gaddafi  had been one of 
the most aggressive oil nationalists, pioneering nationalization of oil pro-
duction and the increased fl ow of black gold to the oil producers. At the 
turn of the millennium, even as Libya was supposedly opening up to invest-
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ment from the US and its allies, Libya resisted giving away the oilfi elds and 
imposed higher royalties than the foreign oil companies wanted to pay. So 
imperial security and oil industry elites worried that Gaddafi  might outfox 
them and return to his old nationalism. 
Two other areas of concern pertained to oil, though less directly. At 
the very end of his government Gaddafi  proposed two fi nancial innova-
tions for the African continent. These were an African Investment Bank 
to be located in Syrte, Libya, and an African Monetary Fund to be based 
in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Both would be backed by Libyan assets ultimately 
derived from oil. Their opening was to be followed by introduction of a 
pan-African currency, the dinar, backed by gold derived from Libyan oil. 
The bank and the fund would invest in African projects at loan rates below 
those of international fi nancing institutions like the IMF or the large pri-
vate banks. Payments for oil would be made not in dollars, but in the new 
dinars. Gerald Perreira (2011), one of the few journalists to have worked 
in Libya for an extended period, wrote at the onset of the attack upon the 
regime, 
Gaddafi ’s creation of the African Investment Bank … and the African Mon-
etary Fund … would have supplanted the IMF and undermined Western eco-
nomic hegemony in Africa. Furthermore … creation of a gold dinar based 
on the African gold reserve to replace reliance on the U.S. dollar, the French 
franc and the British pound threatened to fi nally swing the global economic 
pendulum.
Such an endeavor threatened the US dollars reserve currency status, 
among other things.
Finally, and similarly at the very end of the regime, Gaddafi  was frus-
trating US Security Elites 3.0’s major African policy initiative. By the end 
of the 1990s competition for African resources, especially oil, was acceler-
ating. Alarmingly, this was due to Chinese economic operations. In 1999 
Chinese investment in Africa was $6 billion; a decade later it was $90 
billion and had displaced the US as the continent’s largest trading part-
ner (Glazebrook 2013: 5). US security elites in the Bush II administration 
began to develop US military force resources in Africa (see the section on 
Africa in the following chapter). Just as CENTCOM had been created 
to establish control in the Middle East; so a new military command, AF-
RICOM, was initiated in Africa in 2006 for the same purpose. If the empire 
could not hold the continent with economic force, it intended to do so 
with violent force. However, Gaddafi  was a fl y in the AFRICOM ointment 
because “leaked US diplomatic cables make it very clear that Libya was 
viewed by the US as THE main obstacle to establishing a full muscular US 
military presence on the African continent” (Glazebrook 2013: 5).50 It is 
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argued next that addressing each of these three concerns with global war-
ring against Libya could contribute to the New American Empire’s control 
over Libyan oil and was in this sense an application of the oil-control pub-
lic délire.
The following points warrant this judgment. First, imperial fi ghting 
could increase the empire’s and its allies’ oil and oil-supply companies’ ac-
cess to Libyan oil. The degree to which this actually occurred is unclear. 
However, once source asserts that there has been a “give-away” of Libya’s 
oil, “with contracts allotted according to the number of bombing runs each 
country had made—France on behalf of Total, Spain on behalf of Repsol, 
Italy on behalf of Eni, England on behalf of BP, and the US on behalf of 
Marathon, Hess, and ConocoPhillips” (Barahona 2012: 3). The precise 
nature of these contracts remains to be seen. However, talk of a “give-
away” is a report of the empire’s and its allies’ increased access to Libya’s 
oil, suggesting that imperial security elites perceived that the rebellion 
against Gaddafi  offered an opportunity to increase the empire’s access to 
oil, an opportunity they seized with the NATO intervention.
Second, imperial fi ghting could help maintain the dollar as the world’s 
reserve currency by eliminating the alternative of the gold-backed dinar. 
Since termination of hostilities in October 2011 there has been no Afri-
can Investment Bank or African Monetary Fund. Gold-backed dinars are 
nowhere to be found in circulation; which may be unfortunate for Afri-
can development but is just fi ne for the dollar. The non-occurrence of the 
competing currency recommends the view that imperial fi nancial elites 
intended its elimination, which suggests they perceived the anti-Gaddafi  
rebellion as an opportunity to defend the dollar—which they seized with 
the NATO intervention.
Third, imperial fi ghting could help the empire pay its strategic rents. A 
letter signed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya, a forerunner 
to the National Transitional Council, and published in the French daily, La 
Liberation, recounted a deal struck at a 29 March 2011 summit on Libya 
held in London, where Hillary Clinton met Mahmoud Jebril, head of the 
rebels. It was reported that the New American Empire would side with 
Brother Leader’s opponents. The quid pro quo of the deal was that the 
empire and its allies would get a percentage of Libya’s oil. France’s cut was 
to be 35 percent of the crude oil (Barahona 2011: 1). The French Foreign 
minister at the time, Alain Juppe, considered this to be “logical and fair” 
because, after all, armed intervention is “expensive” (quoted ibid.: 3). Fur-
ther, by removing the Brother Leader the security elites were eliminating 
his opposition to AFRICOM, helping the empire acquire oil spoils not only 
in Libya but in other areas of Africa as well. China might be snapping up 
African oil resources, but US military would help ensure the empire’s allies 
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got their fair share and in so doing pay its security rent to its allies. In sum, 
the Libya War could contribute to strengthening US control over Libyan 
oil in three different ways and as such was an application of the oil-control 
public délire. However, security elites cloaked this oily reality by declaring 
“Old Fuzzyhead” a monster and US global warring a noble undertaking of 
R2P.
Unlike the covert activities in Iran, the Libyan global war of 2011 was 
no “twilight” operation but had been broadcast in the full glare of the em-
pire’s media. It was short and extremely violent—you actually saw the guy 
try to stab Gaddafi  in the rectum on television. Hostilities occurred when 
cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dominated contradictions were in-
tensifying and coalescing. Shultzian Permission had been granted due to 
the ongoing aggression that was the uprising against Gaddafi  in the east. 
The ensuing combat was implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-con-
trol public délires—all of which is evidence supportive of the global warring 
theory.
Supposedly the Libyan War rid the world of a terrorist monster and 
gave the New American Empire greater control over Libyan oil. Did it 
succeed? In the immediate aftermath of fi ghting, the “model intervention” 
appeared to have given the empire’s oil companies greater access to Libyan 
oil, to have helped it defend the petrodollar, and to pay its strategic rents. 
However, by 2013 oil production had almost entirely “stopped” owing to 
“disintegrating” governmental authority (P. Cockburn 2013). Any Libyan 
assault on the dollar appears to have been thwarted. But if oil production 
is greatly reduced, then are the empire’s Big Oil companies actually ac-
quiring greater access to Libyan oil, and is much strategic rent being paid?
What about the elimination of terrorism? The English NGO Global 
Civilians for Peace in Libya (“The Standard of Living in Libya” 2011), 
reviewed the literature bearing upon Libyans’ standard of living at the end 
Gaddafi ’s regime. Gaddafi  had actually used Libya’s oil wealth to give its 
citizens the highest standard of living in Africa, with wealth fairly equitably 
distributed. Libya under Gaddafi  had gone from being one of the poorest 
countries in the world to being 64th out of 187 countries on the UN Hu-
man Development Index.
Post-Gaddafi  Libya is described by Time magazine as “demonstrating re-
markable stability” (Hauslohner 2012). Is this really so? Cyrenaica, where 
two-thirds of the oil is located, has declared itself a semi-autonomous re-
gion. Ahmed al-Zubair was appointed as its head—a reactionary move, 
because he is the grandson of the King Idris deposed by Gaddafi  in 1969. 
Throughout the country, paramilitaries—armed and trained during the 
war by the empire’s soldiers—defi ed central government authority, ruling 
considerable chunks of territory as their fi efs. Certain of these are headed 
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by Islamists, some with al-Qaeda links (ibid.: 2012). In 2012 some Islamists 
killed a US ambassador on a visit to a diplomatic mission in Benghazi. 
This was largely given over to the CIA (Friedersdorf 2013), which ap-
pears to have been training counterrevolutionaries to attack the Islamists 
(Schmitt, Cooper, and Schmidt 2012). By 2014, Khalifa Hiftar, whose ear-
lier adventures as a CIA proxy were recounted as part of Reagan’s war 
against Gaddafi , had left his Virginia home and was back in Libya attacking 
Islamists and declaring the overthrow of the government (Stephen, Black, 
and Ackerman 2014).
The UN Security Council has expressed its concern with “ongoing il-
legal detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings” in post-Gaddafi  Libya 
(in Dinucci 2012: 2). Forte reports an account of the current situation as 
experienced by an ordinary Libyan as follows, “Two years ago the anti-
Gaddafi  uprising had the strongest support in Benghazi but today a very 
different mood has emerged. ‘Most people would say they are very un-
happy,’ a local worker said. ‘Some say they are worse off than before’” (in 
Forte 2013: 1). It is unclear what the future might hold, but currently there 
is no state in Libya. It is a place of marauding paramilitaries, some affi li-
ated with al-Qaeda, others tied to the Islamic State. Overall, the “model 
intervention” hardly moved Libya into the realm of “remarkable stability.” 
Consider next US global warring in Syria, where a dead man is said to be 
walking, or maybe not.
Syria 2011–2013: Dead Man Walking?
Since December 2010, the Middle East had been experiencing an Arab 
Spring of popular unrest against authoritarian governments, fi rst in Tunisia 
and Egypt; then in Lebanon, Oman, Yemen, and Morocco; and in February 
2011 in Libya with, as just documented, terminal consequences for Gadda-
fi ’s regime. A month later, on 15 March 2011, “spring” began in the Syrian 
city of Daraa.51 Protesters insisted on an end to Baath Party rule and the 
resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, whose father Hafez al-Assad had 
held the Syrian presidency from 1971 until 2000. The father had governed 
adroitly but with an iron fi st when necessary, especially in his suppression 
of a 1982 uprising in Hama. As the popular demonstrations spread there 
was question as to how the son would respond. Hafez had been a military 
man. Bashar, like Saif al-Islam, was a hybrid elite: an ophthalmologist, ed-
ucated in part in London, married to a woman who had worked for J.P. 
Morgan (Ajami 2012). He appeared to be a geek who had inherited the 
government only after his elder brother—a dashing military man—was 
killed in an automobile crash.
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However, Bashar proved ophthalmologists too have moxie. The Syrian 
army was ordered to crush the uprising. Easier ordered than done! After 
months of government military strikes against local protests, the protesting 
groups converged into a countrywide armed rebellion. By the end of 2011 
it was a full-blown civil war, with the rebels seizing considerable chunks of 
territory. By 2012 this war had come to have a sectarian dimension, pitting 
mainly Sunni rebels against a largely Alawi branch of Shiites in the gov-
ernment. By 2013, approximately a hundred thousand rebels faced Bashir’s 
forces. Government forces were reinforced by Hezbollah, and the rebels 
by radical Islamists, including the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), now called the Islamic State.52 US diplo-
mats are sometimes called “cookie pushers” by other security elites because 
their job is imagined to consist of walking around at receptions proffering 
refreshments. Frederic Hof, cookie pusher par excellence, declared Al As-
sad to be a “dead man walking” (in Matthew Lee 2011). What do cookie 
pushers know? What follows is an answer to this question.
The Shiite Necklace and Another Dead Creature Walking?
Let us begin by clarifying the Americans’ glee at Bashar’s discomfi ture. 
During Bush II’s Iraq war, the Vulcans had been furious that Syria allowed 
anti-American fi ghters to slip across its border to fi ght in Iraq (Rumsfeld 
2011: 463; Cheney 2011: 437). After this war wound down, it became 
clear that Syria was part of what was earlier termed the Shiite Necklace. 
The Security Elites 3.0 were gleeful at Bashar’s problems because if Syria 
could be broken, the Shiite Necklace might come unstrung, and the US 
Leviathan’s position in the Middle East would be strengthened.
A counter coalition to the Shiite Necklace had formed in 2011 to op-
pose Assad. Based upon the New American Empire’s clients, it included 
Israel, NATO, and states in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar especially active. Operations and leadership of this 
countercoalition have been murky. The overt policy of Obama’s adminis-
tration toward the Syrian uprising was initially to provide “humanitarian, 
medical, and communications assistance” in what was termed a program of 
“band aids and halal happy meals” (Rogin 2013). However, knowledgeable 
observers were not buying this. The respected geopolitical analyst Mahdi 
Nazemroaya (2012) reported that Syria was being attacked in a strategy 
orchestrated by Washington that emphasized proxy operations.
The US Leviathan’s coalition’s basic operations were to provide covert 
military support to the rebel organizations, which were disorganized and 
increasingly dominated by radical Islamists.53 Rebel political organizations 
included the Syrian National Council (founded in 2011) and the National 
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Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (founded in 
2012). Rebel military groups included the Free Syrian Army, more or less 
allied with a collection of around a thousand localized “brigades.” The rad-
ical Islamists included the Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL. Saudi Arabia and Qa-
tar have been especially active in arming the rebel military.54 Initially the 
rebel forces were successful. At the end of 2011 rebel brigades brought the 
fi ghting to Damascus, Syria’s capital, and Aleppo, the country’s largest city.
But the ophthalmologist hung tough. The rebel offensives against Da-
mascus and Aleppo were blunted by the fall of 2012, when the national 
army began a counteroffensive. On 26 March 2013, rebel commander 
Khaled al Hamad, leader of the Al Farooq al-Mustakilla Brigade, fi ghting 
near the Syrian town of al-Qusayr, consumed the fl esh of a dead govern-
ment soldier, proclaiming “I swear to God, you soldiers of Bashar, you dogs, 
we will eat from your hearts and livers! O heroes of Bab Amr, you slaughter 
the Alawites and take out their hearts to eat them!” (Baker 2013). Snack-
ing on their opponent did not work; on 5 June government forces retook 
al-Qusayr, a town of strategic signifi cance.
Mustafa Alani, director at the Dubai-based Gulf Research Council, 
warned, “This is an Iranian fi ght. It is no longer a Syrian one,” adding, 
“The issue is hegemony in the region” (Sly 2013). The war had spread. It 
was the New American Empire versus the Shiite Necklace. In the Security 
Elite 3.0’s terms, the “issue” was not hegemony; it was defense of empire. 
The empire had been weakened by cutting and running in Iraq, and by 
the strengthening of the Shiite Necklace. Defeat in Syria would further 
threaten it. So what did the cookie pusher know? Not much, for the “dead 
man walking” was still walking tall by 2013, part of a war for the Middle 
East. Something drastic had to be done to strengthen the Americans’ hand.
Unsurprisingly, eight days after the fall of al-Qusayr, US news sources 
publicly announced the US government’s news that Assad’s forces had 
used chemical weapons, killing up to 150 people in this manner (out of a 
total 93,000 fatalities up to that time). Earlier, Obama had declared (20 
August 2012) use of such weapons to be a “red line” not to be crossed. The 
line had been crossed, and US offi cials announced they would begin to arm 
the rebels (Goodenough 2013; Mazzetti, Gordon, and Landler 2013). Un-
til this day, 13 June 2013, Obama’s Security Elites 3.0 had been involved 
in a twilight covert, indirect global war against Syria. Thereafter, imperial 
warring in Syria was to be neither entirely covert, nor entirely indirect.
The Assad regime was not especially attractive. It was authoritarian, 
prone to violent repression, and in bed with its crony capitalist elites. Nev-
ertheless, it had not the slightest intention of attacking America because 
it could not attack America; its violent forces were too puny. Obama’s 
administration had received no UN approval to war in Syria but he was do-
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ing it, if only in a desultory manner. Desultory or not, US warring in Syria 
was an unsanctioned war of aggression and thus illegal. Recall that when 
Obama (2009) accepted the Nobel Peace prize, he warned in his speech, 
“For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world.”
“Evil” was about to make an appearance. In the days after the “red line” 
was crossed in June, the ophthalmologist’s troops continued to make gains 
against the rebels. Then, on 21 August 2013, a sarin gas attack in Ghouta, 
an agricultural belt to the south and east of Damascus, killed substan-
tial numbers of civilians—1,429, the US claimed (White House 2013: 1). 
Nine days later, the White House released a report declaring, “The United 
States Government assesses with high confi dence that the Syrian govern-
ment carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs” 
(ibid.).55 Obama’s Security Elites 3.0 asserted, none more passionately than 
John Kerry, his new secretary of state, that this time the Assad regime had 
crossed the red line blatantly and massively. It had terrorized its people with 
a weapon of mass destruction. Assad, according to Kerry, was the author of 
“inconceivable horror,” a “thug” and a “murderer” (Mohajer 2013). “Evil” 
had arrived, and the US Leviathan’s R2P, superseding the international law 
of war (at least according to liberal hawk fi xations), obligated the empire 
to punish Syria for its “Evil.” The US proposed that this punishment be an 
attack by US forces. Whether the attack might be the launching of a few 
cruise missiles or a long-term aerial bombardment went unspecifi ed. What 
was specifi ed was that the New American Empire would overtly increase 
use of violent force directly against Syria.
Then something curious happened. There was unexpected (at least in 
the eyes of Obama’s security elites), widespread rejection of the empire’s 
proposal. Polls showed that Americans strongly opposed intervention. Such 
polling certainly infl uenced Obama’s decision to turn to the Congress for 
authorization to strike Syria. The mere fact of requesting Congress’s per-
mission to war was unprecedented since World War II and refl ected presi-
dential weakness. Moreover, it appeared that a majority of Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress opposed attacking Syria. Beyond US boundaries 
almost everyone (except the French) condemned the proposed military 
intervention. The Pope was against it. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, and China) were against it. The fact that the Russians and the 
Chinese were against it frustrated any UN Security Council authorization 
of US force. Signifi cantly, key imperial clients opposed it. The UK parlia-
ment refused to allow Great Britain to participate in any attack on Syria. 
A meeting of EU Foreign ministers refused to authorize US intervention. 
The bonds of empire appeared to be loosening.
Luckily for US Security Elites 3.0, the Russians proposed that the Syri-
ans might give up chemical weapons in exchange for not being attacked by 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
World Warring 1990–2014: The Middle Eastern Theater
– 383 –
the US, and the Assad regime quickly agreed. The Obama regime equally 
accepted, grumbling that it was its idea that Assad give up his chemical 
stockpiles, and that if he didn’t, Damascus would be walloped by impe-
rial rocketry. A decision to attack the ophthalmologist’s government had 
sparked widespread rebellion against the empire. Could it be that Obama 
just might be another candidate for “dead man walking”? His Republi-
can Congressional antagonists certainly appeared to think so when they 
began conducting their own foreign policy that bypassed the President. 
Dead man walking or not, Obama has been guided by the anti-terrorist 
and oil-control public délires while seeking to manage the Syrian debacle. 
These are explored next.
The Anti-terrorist Public Délire
Arabi Souri (2013) claims that “Bashar al-Assad has been systematically 
demonized by the mainstream and so-called alternative media who claim 
that he is a brutal dictator.” This was not always the case with the Obama 
administration. Initially, talks were begun with Assad. As part of this ini-
tiative, Hillary Clinton referred to him as a “reformer” (Case 2012). Then, 
when the popular demonstrations began, Washington remembered it had 
listed Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979. At that point Bashar’s 
monsterization began. Typical of these efforts was the New York Daily 
News’ transmogrifi cation of Bashar from a “reformer” to a “brutal dicta-
tor,” a “pampered London-educated eye doctor” who led a “blood-soaked 
crackdown” on pro-democracy demonstrators (Weinthal 2011). Theodore 
Dalrymple (2012) continued this theme in the UK paper The Telegraph: 
When you look at pictures of Assad you see a weak man, whom you would 
expect to be a pettifogger rather than a brute. But push a pettifogger to the wall 
and he is capable of the greatest obduracy, which is the strength of the weak. 
A cornered rat, that normally resides incognito, is a ferocious and dangerous 
beast, even if he remains in essence weak and highly vulnerable.
Surveying Syria after 2011, Obama’s liberal hawks perceived Bashar as a 
“pampered,” “brutal” “rat” commanding a terrorist state. They saw “Evil.” 
Given such a perception, Obama publicly requested on 18 August 2011 
that Bashar step aside. Following the Ghouta incident, he proposed to 
blow the “thug” aside with imperial rocketry if he did not step down. The 
“thug”-“rat” refused. In such situations, nonviolent ways of doing things 
had failed. It was time for granting Shultzian Permission. Further, the an-
ti-terrorist public délire directs, once such permission has been accorded 
the proper procedure is to eliminate the terrorists with violence. This was 
precisely what the Obama administration began to implement—fi rst co-
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vertly and indirectly; then, at the time of al-Qusayr, overtly, and directly; 
and fi nally, upon realizing he lacked support domestically as well as from 
his clients, he backed off, with Russian assistance.56 Let us consider a role 
for the oil-control public délire in Syria.
The Oil-Control Public Délire
Syria produces oil, but its fi elds are depleting rapidly from a high of 610 
thousand barrels per day in 1996 to roughly 385 thousand barrels per day 
in 2010. Such a modest amount is not a tempting prize for the New Amer-
ican Empire. Rather, Syria’s relevance to the Security Elite 3.0’s oil-control 
délire has to do with its potential power over the distribution of petroleum 
products, and the implications of the Shiite Necklace for overall control of 
Middle Eastern oil. Consider, fi rst, distribution issues, which are all about 
pipeline politics.57
In February 2013, Iraq authorized the signing of an agreement for an 
Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline to transport natural gas from Iran’s South Pars 
fi eld across Iraq to Syria (AFP 2013b). This pipeline, easily extendable to 
Lebanon and Europe, would further boost Iran’s position as a formidable 
global player in the oil industry. Additionally, the Iran-Iraq-Syria project 
directly competed with Qatar’s plans for a pipeline running from Qatar’s 
North fi eld, contiguous with Iran’s South Pars fi eld, through Saudi Ara-
bia, Jordan, Syria, and on to Turkey, also with a view to supply European 
markets. Pepe Escobar (2013) explains, “It’s crucial to remember that the 
Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline is … anathema to Washington. … The difference 
is that Washington in this case can count on its allies Qatar and Turkey 
to sabotage the whole deal.” The Syrian and the Qatar pipeline dreams 
were in competition. Qatar, a member of the GCC and the host of the 
chief US naval base in the Persian Gulf, was a close ally of the US. Clearly, 
Washington preferred the Qatar pipeline. Regrettably, and equally clearly, 
“Only Al-Assad” was “in the way” (ibid.). Syria, then, stood in the way of 
Washington’s control over gas distribution in the Persian Gulf.
Then there is the fact that Syria is allied with Iran in the Shiite necklace. 
The two are curious bedfellows: Syria’s Baathist dogma is secular and [in 
principle] socialist; Iran’s ideology is Islamic and supposedly scandalized 
by godless socialism. However, having strong enemies in common makes 
for strong friendships. Having the US and Israel as heavy-duty enemies 
has helped cement strong Iranian-Syrian bonds. This alliance began after 
Iran’s 1979 revolution and was formalized in 1982 with the conclusion of 
bilateral oil, trade, and military agreements. Since then, the two countries 
have coordinated political and military force resources. This involved de-
veloping a stable of surrogate militias to frustrate their opponents’ designs 
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that has at different times included, besides Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestin-
ian Islamic Jihad, and an array of radical Palestinian groups. Their col-
laboration fl ushed US forces from Lebanon in 1984 after the bombing of 
the Marines in Beirut, and thwarted Israel’s effort to dominate Lebanon 
during an eighteen-year occupation that fi nally ended in Israel’s unilateral 
withdrawal in 2000. By doing this, The Iran Primer reports, they, “infl icted 
repeated setbacks on six American presidents” (Goodarzi 2013).
Otherwise put, Obama’s Security Elites 3.0 harbored a grudge against 
Syria—the more so because it strengthened the Shiite Necklace, and a 
strong necklace could better contest the Americans for overall control 
over Middle Eastern petroleum resources.
At this juncture the oil-control public délire becomes relevant. Percep-
tually, the Syrian pipeline threatened US control over petroleum product 
distribution. Worse perceptually, Syrian friendship with Iran strengthened 
the Shiite Necklace menacing US Middle Eastern oil control. Under such 
conditions, the appropriate action was to put violent force into operation, 
if Shultzian Permission had been granted.
Had Shultzian Permission been approved? Earlier we suggested it had. 
In his memoirs Rumsfeld (2011: 639) reported, “For decades, Syria has 
been considered a prized quarry for optimistic American diplomats,” a 
quarry that has never been captured. Rather, the reverse appears to have 
been the case, as noted above in the The Iran Primer (Goodarzi 2013), with 
Syria engineering setbacks for six presidents. The US Leviathan, according 
to Rumsfeld, had tried to settle differences with Syria diplomatically and 
failed. So, given the reality of open rebellion in Syria by 2011, US security 
elites effectively granted themselves Shultzian Permission and began im-
plementing the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires.
Consider the following: US global warring in Syria occurred during in-
tensifi cation and coalescence of the cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/
dominated contradictions; Shultzian Permission had been granted follow-
ing the failure of peaceful fi xes of problems with Syria and the onset of 
hostilities there; and covert, indirect and overt, direct global warring was 
implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires. All this 
information is consistent with the global warring theory.
By 2014, Assad—dead guy walking—was still walking. Moreover, after 
two years of fi erce hostilities, the inability to break the Shiite Necklace at 
the point of Syria promised trouble for the New American Empire’s control 
of Middle Eastern oil. The UK’s refusal to countenance an imperial attack 
on Syria after the Ghouta gas attack indicated the US’s closest client was 
dissatisfi ed with American imperial operations. Saudi Arabian offi cials, on 
the other hand, “boiled over,” promising a more independent policy fol-
lowing the Obama administration’s eventual refusal to attack Syria after 
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the Ghouta incident (Mohammed and Wastall 2013). Ominously, the exis-
tence of disgruntled clients indicates strain on the bonds of empire. All this 
suggests, if not a dead empire walking, a wobbly empire wobbling. Sadly, 
according to the UN, by the middle of 2013 about a hundred thousand 
Syrians had found peace—that of the grave (AFP 2013c).
Consider, next, Yemen, in whose wars the New American Empire has 
been droning on and on.
The Prophet’s Place of Refuge: 
Yemen 2001–2013; Warfare Droning On and On…
Early in his career, his religion attacked from all sides, and himself driven 
from Mecca into the desert, the Prophet Muhammad is said to have ad-
vised, “When disaster threatens, seek refuge in Yemen” (in Johnsen 2012: 
xi). Many centuries later, the followers of another prophet took this advice 
to become a thorn in the side of the New American Empire. The narrative 
now turns to an account of how the US became involved in global warring 
in Muhammad’s place of refuge and the implications this had for certain 
of his later followers.
Droning On: A Lighter Footprint
The US, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, has con-
ducted both direct and indirect, covert warfare in Yemen since 2001 
(Drones Team 2012a). The signature weapon in these hostilities has been 
unmanned aerial vehicles, called drones—the latest robotic killing tech-
nology. Drones can either fl y autonomously or be directed by a “pilot” sit-
ting at a console, perhaps continents away from the vehicle itself. They 
may be used to gather intelligence or to fi re rockets. People hunted by 
drones are often up against an invisible machine raining Hellfi re (the name 
of the preferred US rocket). According to the Bureau of Investigative Jour-
nalism, between 2002 and 2013 in Yemen there were 44–54 confi rmed 
drone strikes and 78–96 possible additional strikes, in addition to 12–76 
other sorts of covert actions (probably largely JSOC ninja raids) (Serle 
and Woods 2013: 1). The use of drones began in the Bush II years and 
increased during those of Obama. From the perspective of Yemenis, global 
warring drones on and on. Why?
Greater reliance on drones has to do with the Obama administration’s 
response to how the Bush II administration had globally warred. Dubya’s 
security elites, as seen in the Iraq War, waged large-scale, troop-intensive 
global wars that were expensive. US global warring in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
World Warring 1990–2014: The Middle Eastern Theater
– 387 –
and Pakistan has cost an estimated $4 trillion (Costs of War Project 2013). 
The fi nancial burden of Vulcan warring became worrisome after 2007 ow-
ing to constrained government revenues as the US, along with the rest of 
the globe, entered the Great Recession. Moreover, though the American 
public may have shown indifference to casualties among the peoples its 
military attacked, which ran into the millions, it was increasingly distressed 
about the death and injury done to its own.
Given this context, a procedural hermeneutic politics about how to 
continue fi ghting developed among Obama’s security elites. On one side, 
Hillary Clinton in State; Robert Gates in Defense; and Petraeus, then in 
the CIA, argued for continuing a large military footprint. On the other 
side, Vice President Biden argued for “a modest military footprint around 
the world” (Sanger 2013). Initially, the Clinton-Gates-Petraeus faction ap-
peared to have won: there was, as will be analyzed later, an increase in US 
troops in an Afghanistan surge (2010–2012). Gradually, especially under 
the stewardship of John O. Brennan—fi rst as Obama’s chief counterter-
rorism advisor and then as Petraeus’s CIA replacement—the US moved 
toward a lighter footprint. Drones, actually fi rst used by the Vulcans, were 
a key element of Brennan’s policy. They were an “effi cient way to kill” (C. 
Kirk 2012). They replaced people with machines, reducing costs. They 
were especially useful used in targeted assassination programs aimed at 
opponents’ leaders in order to “decapitate” their organizations. We will 
encounter them in several of Obama’s global wars. Why were they so im-
portant in Yemen?
The answer to this question turns upon appreciation of Yemen’s geo-
graphic position and its tumultuous recent political history. Yemen occu-
pies the southwestern end of the Arabian Peninsula, bordered to the north 
by Saudi Arabia, to the south by the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, to 
the west by the Red Sea, and to the east by Oman. For the most part the 
landscape is grim: arid, baking coastal plains leading to interior mountains 
and desert. The southwestern-most point in Yemen is at the entrance to 
the Bab al Mandab, a strait that joins the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and 
is one of the most heavily used waterways in the world.
Since the 1960s Yemen has had a politically rowdy time of it. After 
years of civil war the area of northern Yemen became the Yemen Arab Re-
public in 1968. The southern region, more strategically important because 
of Bab al Mandab’s location there, remained a British colonial possession 
until 1967, when a communist rebellion ended UK domination and led 
to a socialist state, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Relations 
between the two Yemens in the 1970s and 1980s alternated between wary 
amity and open hostility. In 1978 Ali Abdallah Saleh became president 
of North Yemen. Then, in 1990, the two Yemens’ governments agreed on 
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unifi cation, joining on 22 May 1990. Saleh became president and had to 
fend off persistent threats to his rule, especially the Harak Uprising (1994 
and ongoing) and the Houthi Rebellion (2004 and ongoing). His rule con-
tinued until Arab Spring demonstrations brought it down in 2011. Yemen 
contains numerous, powerful tribes that have competed with the state for 
control since its inauguration.58 The combination of Haraks’ and Houthis’ 
rebellion with tribal competition has meant that the central government 
has often not had control in many areas of the country.
The Republic of Yemen, as the country is formally known, is one of the 
poorest Arab states. The economy centers on oil, which is unfortunate be-
cause Yemen actually has few reserves. Production was at 170,000 barrels 
per day in 2011, down from 259,000 the previous year (EIA 2012b). Re-
serves are predicted to be exhausted by 2017. There is natural gas, which 
has only just begun to come into production. The country has been, and 
continues to be, plagued by poverty (affecting 43 percent of the popula-
tion in 2009) (Breisinger et al. 2011). Its “economy is caught in a jobless 
slow growth cycle leading to stagnant per capita incomes and rising levels 
of unemployment, particularly amongst the youth and women” (Pournik 
and Abu-Ismail 2013; see also Pridham 1985; World Bank 2013). Yemen, 
then, is the poor, dusty, rugged outback of the Arab world whose central 
government maintains tenuous control. All in all, it is just the place to 
hide from enemies.
In 2009, Admiral Dennis Blair, then Obama’s director of national intel-
ligence, reported in a Congressional appearance that “we are concerned 
about their (al-Qaeda’s) ability to move around. It’s kind of like toothpaste 
in a tube” (in Scahill 2013: 255). Curious metaphor: al-Qaeda is the “tooth-
paste,” squeezed from place to place in the “tube,” which is the container 
in which the US seeks imperial domination. The defeat of the Taliban gov-
ernment in Afghanistan after 9/11 might be imagined as Security Elites 3.0 
pressing down on the al-Qaeda toothpaste tube and squishing adherents 
elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, one of the places they went was to Yemen.59
Osama bin Laden’s family originally came from Yemen. He had contacts 
there. Even before 9/11, al-Qaeda took refuge there and began organiza-
tion. Abu Ali al-Harithi appears to have been the earliest leader, operating 
in the mountainous Shabwa Province—east of Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. In 
early 2000, Abu Assem al Ahdal, an al-Qaeda leader operating in Saudi 
Arabia, was captured by Saudi authorities and expelled to Yemen. There he 
joined forces with al-Harithi, and together they planned and implemented 
the attack upon the American destroyer the USS Cole as it was being re-
fueled in the port of Aden. After that they shifted operations to the Marib 
province, also to the east of Sanaa. The Bush II government, in the midst 
of its Iraq War planning, took the time to execute one of the fi rst drone 
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strikes in Yemen, directed at and killing al-Harithi (3 November 2002). 
The strike was successful and, together with other anti-terrorist activities 
that either killed or imprisoned partisans, al-Qaeda appeared vanquished 
(Hull 2011). In fact, it had merely sought deeper refuge.
Thereafter, as Scahill (2013: 130) explains, “The period following from 
2003 to 2006, was notable only insofar as the Bush administration seemed 
to take almost all focus off Yemen and potential al-Qaeda threats emanat-
ing from that country.” In Sanaa in 2006, the years of planning and orga-
nization in deep refuge culminated in a prison escape by a number of jailed 
al-Qaeda including Nasir al-Wihayshi and Qasim al Rayni, who immedi-
ately began further developing their movement. Soon they were conduct-
ing operations throughout Yemen that culminated in a September 2008 
assault on the US Embassy in Sanaa. Several months later, al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was inaugurated, amalgamating the Yemeni 
and Saudi branches in a common rebellion. The Obama administration 
responded by introducing a targeted assassination program to rain Hellfi re 
(missiles) on al-Qaeda leaders (Becker and Shane 2012).
Some al-Qaeda leaders were destroyed by drones. New ones appeared. 
AQAP, for its part, tried to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Interior Min-
ister Muhammed bin Nayyif in January 2009. In December of that year it 
attempted to blow up a Northwest Airlines fl ight over Detroit using Rich-
ard Reid, who had a bomb in his underpants. In the same year, General 
Petraeus, then CENTCOM commander, “approved a plan developed with 
the US Embassy in Sanaa and the CIA and other intelligence agencies to 
expand US military action inside Yemen” (Scahill 2013: 258). The plan 
was implemented and a busy time followed. Drones fl ew. Yemeni security 
forces were trained and sent in harm’s way. JSOC ninjas raided. Unfortu-
nately, al-Qaeda was not eliminated. In fact during the time of Yemen’s 
Arab Spring, AQAP seized a fair amount of Yemen’s land. Thus, between 
2001 and 2013, Security Elites 3.0 engaged in indirect and direct covert 
operations that gradually became less covert, as the press reported them. 
Al-Qaeda persisted. Why did the US fi ght an indecisive confl ict in Yemen? 
This question leads us to the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires.
The Anti-Terrorist Public Délire
From the moment al-Qaeda was identifi ed as the perpetrator of 9/11, the 
Bush II administration considered it by far the gravest terrorist threat. The 
“presidential fi ndings and other directives” decreed in the days immedi-
ately after the attacks directed US Special Operations troops (Spec Ops) 
to eliminate al-Qaeda; with Yemen, the rugged hideout for al-Qaeda par-
tisans, “put on a list of potential early targets” (Scahill 2013: 64). We have 
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seen how rocket attacks, as in the 2002 case of al-Harithi, became the 
favored tactic for hitting al-Qaeda targets in Yemen and elsewhere.
“Less than a year into President Obama’s term, Yemen would be cata-
pulted to the top of the list of trouble spots on the US counterterrorism 
radar” (ibid.: 269). It will be recalled that when Obama became president 
he authorized escalation of the drones and with them the targeted assas-
sination program. In fact, his Security Elites 3.0 employed drone attacks, 
especially in Yemen and Pakistan, fi ve times more than had the Bush II 
administration. Yemen was of especial concern to Obama because some of 
AQAP’s attacks had targeted the US, and because there was worry that 
AQAP imams like Anwar Awlaki, an American citizen and a compelling 
leader, might inspire other Americans to join al-Qaeda.
So, visions of charismatic clerics and ticking bombs in terrorist tighty 
whities danced in liberal hawk heads. Admiral Blair, in that same testi-
mony to Congress in which he likened al-Qaeda to toothpaste, announced 
an “intensifying al-Qaeda presence in Yemen,” stressing concern “about 
the potential for homegrown American extremists, inspired by al-Qaeda’s 
militant ideology, to plan attacks inside the United States” (ibid.: 255).
The preceding observations indicate that in both the Bush II and the 
Obama administrations there was a perception that Yemen was a place 
of activity of the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world, al-
Qaeda, and that the proper way to proceed against such an organization 
was to answer its violence with the empire’s violence via a covert war of 
targeted assassinations, which everybody eventually found out about. Such 
observations suggest that global warring in Yemen has been an implemen-
tation of the anti-terrorist public délire. But US fi ghting in the prophet’s 
land of refuge has not been only about terrorism.
Oil-Control Public Délire
Yemen, as earlier noted, possesses little oil. So the problem of controlling 
it is not that of acquiring access to it. Rather, the diffi culty is one of its 
distribution from Persian Gulf producers to its consumers, many in Europe: 
a disquiet prevails because this oil must pass through the Bab al Mandab, 
which means “Gate of Grief” in Arabic. The “grief” in the Bab al Mandab 
refers to Arab legends of navigating fragile boats in it. The exigencies of 
US imperial control over oil suggest the possibility of another sort of grief 
for American security elites.
The US Energy Information Administration reports:
The Bab al-Mandab is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, making tanker traf-
fi c diffi cult and limited to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound 
shipments. Closure of the Strait could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf 
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from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the 
southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost. In addition, closure of 
the Bab el-Mandab would mean that oil entering the Red Sea from Sudan and 
other countries could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets. 
This oil would instead have to go north into the Mediterranean Sea through 
other potential chokepoints, such as the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline. 
(EIA 2012c: 10)
In 2010 approximately 3.5 million barrels of oil passed daily through the 
Bab al Mandab (EIA 2012b).
AQAP understood the strategic signifi cance of the strait. As reported in 
the New York Post toward the beginning of 2010, Sufyan al Azdi al Shahri, 
who then was the second highest ranking al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, 
stressed “the importance of Bab al Mandab which if we, God willing, con-
trolled it, and brought it back to the house of Islam, would be a great 
victory and would give us great infl uence” because AQAP would be able 
to “close the door and tighten the noose” (in “Al Qaeda Leader in Yemen” 
2010). Likewise, the Iranian government appears to have understood the 
signifi cance of Bab al Mandab by 2013. The Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies, a conservative think tank, responded to information in the 
Middle Eastern press by warning in June 2013 that Iran was attempting to 
ally with the Southern Mobility Movement (Hirak), which was itself still 
trying to re-establish a separate state in the south that would lie along the 
Bab al Mandab. Iran was said to be training Hirak militants. Should the 
Hiraki be successful, an alliance with Tehran would give Iran some ability 
to “close the door” of the Bab al Mandab (Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies 2013). What were US security elites doing about this threat?
They were on the job. Colonel Yadoomi, a Yemeni offi cer, explains how. 
In 1991, while participating in a program at the US Army War College in 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, he wrote a paper documenting US military interest 
in the Gate of Grief. He explained how the strait was already “an important 
base for control and command of petroleum as well as the route for trans-
porting it” (Al-Yadoomi 1991: 16). Colonel Yadoomi’s recognition that the 
strait was “important” for oil’s “control” was probably no surprise to the US 
naval offi cers because, he reports, at that time there were already four na-
val installations (at Massawa, Caneo, Diego Garcia, and Masira) function-
ing to “support free navigation through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, 
and to make sure of continuing the fl ow of the Gulf oil to U.S. allies in 
Europe” (ibid.: 17). By the turn of the millennium, the US had provided 
assistance to train and supply a modern Yemeni coast guard to defend the 
Bab al Mandab (Sharp 2009).
The US government “got it” with regard to the Gate of Grief. If they 
lost control of it, their power to control global transportation of oil was 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 392 –
Deadly Contradictions
reduced. Consequently, security elites classifi ed this waterway as an “oil 
transit chokepoint” (EIA 2012c) and ensured it was directly defended 
by naval bases and indirectly protected through support of Yemen’s coast 
guard. Furthermore, the direct global warring by JSOC ninjas and drone 
attacks maintained the Yemeni government’s client status, thereby helping 
to keep the Bab al Mandab open.
US global warring in Yemen, given the preceding, is a way for the US 
to control oil by maintaining power over distribution of oil production. 
Equally, it is a way of helping the empire pay its strategic rents. Guaran-
teeing unimpeded shipping through the Gate of Grief assures European 
clients they will have the oil supplies they need. US government global 
warring in Yemen would appear to be an application of the oil-control 
public délire. The actions of US Security Elites 3.0 indicate they perceived 
global warring in Yemen as strengthening two sorts of controls over oil—
control over oil’s distribution, and payment of strategic rents. Given this 
perception, the proper procedure was to implement the oil control public 
délire, which they did.
The empire’s warring in Yemen has droned on and on. Has it worked? 
Has AQAP been eradicated? After ten years of combat operations, John 
O. Brennan, Obama’s counterterrorism chief, judged in fall 2011 that the 
AQAP was “gaining strength” (DeYoung 2011). Not only was the AQAP 
ever stronger, but in 2014 the Houthi insurgency captured Sanaa. Houthis 
practice a form of Shiite religion and are suspected of having ties with Iran. 
Perhaps a new jewel has been added to the Shiite Necklace.
In the spring of 2013, in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bomb-
ings, Qassim al Rimi, then AQAP’s military leader, addressed “A Letter to 
the American People.” Rimi taunted, “Have you eliminated the jihadist 
groups that have spread everywhere after they had only been in Afghani-
stan? Today, they are in your land or close to it,” which, he warned, meant 
that “every day you will be hit by the unexpected and your leaders will not 
be able to defend you” (AFP 2013d). Cheeky man! Nevertheless, he has 
a point. US global warring as practiced in Yemen has been a losing prop-
osition. It is time to quit Muhammad’s place of refuge and contemplate a 
place where the New American Empire always wars (if indirectly), wins, 
and in so doing loses. 
Israel: The “Aircraft Carrier”
In a 2006 interview with Noam Chomsky, Khatchig Mouadian (2006: 1) 
reminded him of his (Chomsky’s) frequent reference to Israel as the “cop on 
the beat” and then asked him to explicate this phrase. Chomsky responded: 
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The expression “local cop on the beat” comes from the Nixon administration. 
It was their conception of how the Middle East should be run. There should 
be a peripheral region of gendarme states (Turkey, Iran under the Shah, Israel 
joined after the 1967 war, Pakistan was there for a while). These states were to 
be the local cops on the beat while the US would be the police headquarters.”
A nice trope: a cop is an enforcer and, in the case under discussion, 
Chomsky was claiming that Israel was a client enforcing US interests in 
the Near East and elsewhere. Those who view Chomsky as radical and 
thus biased might look instead to the reactionary Senator Jesse Helms, 
who famously called Israel (in Pipes and Clawson 1995) “America’s aircraft 
carrier in the Middle East.” Here two gentlemen from opposite ends of 
the political spectrum concur in their judgment: Israel does the empire’s 
work. Below it is argued that the US has been involved in indirect, overt 
global warring on the side of Israel because Israel, as America’s cop in the 
Middle East, hurts enemies of the empire who threaten its control over oil. 
Documentation of this claim begins with a discussion of Israel’s wars, and 
the US’s role in them, since the 1990s.
Israel’s Wars in Lebanon and Gaza
Prior to the 1980s Israel had largely, overtly warred against other Arab 
states. There was the Suez Crisis (October 1956) when Israel, allied with 
the UK and France, attacked Egypt; followed by the Six Day War (June 
1967) when it engaged Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq; and then, the Yom 
Kippur War (October 1973), when it again fought Egypt. Since that time 
it has warred overtly, largely in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and covertly 
throughout the Middle East, but especially in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It is 
important to specify the US’s role in this warring.
Israel is the largest recipient of American foreign aid in the world, re-
ceiving $3 billion annually since 1985, the vast bulk of it going to Israel’s 
military. The goal of this investment in violent force is to maintain Israel’s 
“‘qualitative military edge’ (QME)” (Sharp 2012: 3). Israel’s military, the 
Israel Defense Force (IDF), has 176,500 soldiers on active duty and is the 
thirty-fourth largest active military in the world. There are 445,000 troops 
in the reserves. The country’s air force has approximately 600 combat air-
craft. Israel also has 200 attack helicopters, 3,600 tanks, 9,000 armored 
personnel carriers, some 1,400 artillery pieces, 360 ballistic missiles, and 
three nuclear submarines. The country is also suspected of holding stocks 
of chemical and biological weapons. Despite its government’s policy of 
“nuclear ambiguity” regarding nuclear weapons, Israel is known to possess 
between 75 and 400 nuclear weapons (IMEU 2005).
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Most of these weapons systems either are American or were made possi-
ble by American funds and technical assistance. They are the reason Israel 
enjoys QME. Helm’s likening of Israel to an aircraft carrier is appropri-
ate. Such a ship is a technologically sophisticated killing machine. Israel, 
fl aunting its QME technology, is an entire country serving as a killing ma-
chine.60 Make no mistake: when Israel wars, the Leviathan is a major, in-
direct participant, because the US makes it possible. The Israeli aircraft 
carrier and the US Leviathan cruise the oceans, killing together.
Israeli warring in Lebanon emerged from the original fi ghting at Israel’s 
creation in the late 1940s, which entailed an ethnic cleansing of Palestin-
ians (the Nakba), many of whom were driven north and east into Leba-
non and Jordan as refugees. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
headed by Yasser Arafat, formed in 1964 to defend Palestinian interests. 
Fatah, its military branch, having recruited supporters in Lebanon from 
among Palestinian refugees, began cross-border attacks in the late 1960s. 
The PLO leadership, along with many Palestinian refugees, was expelled 
from Jordan in the 1970s and fl ed to Lebanon, intensifying raids into Israel 
from there. In 1978 Israel invaded Lebanon and pushed the PLO north of 
the Litani River. This failed to stop the cross-border attacks. Subsequently, 
Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed 
in grim urban warfare in Beirut. In time the PLO was driven from Leba-
non and Arafat fl ed to Libya. Israel withdrew to a narrow buffer zone in 
southern Lebanon, held with the aid of its proxy, the South Lebanon Army 
(SLA).
A new resistance group, Hezbollah, began to form in the wake of the 
PLO’s departure. Whereas the PLO had been a secular, nationalist orga-
nization, Hezbollah was begun by Shiite clerics in southern Lebanon and 
thus had Islamist roots. It was supported by Iran and Syria. By 1985 Hez-
bollah was strong enough to call for armed struggle to eject Israel from 
Lebanon. By the late 1980s, Hezbollah had taken over where the PLO left 
off and was successfully conducting an insurgency against the IDF. Israel 
had a serious problem on its northern border.
To address this problem the IDF attacked Lebanon in Operation Ac-
countability (25 July 1993–31 July 1993), an operation that displayed 
Israel’s QME. Its aerial bombardments were described as “state terror” 
because much of the bombing targeted civilians (Gordon 1999). Lots of 
Lebanese infrastructure was destroyed, and 300,000 Lebanese were turned 
into refugees and fl ed to Beirut. The IDF lost two soldiers. Still, Hezbollah, 
though weakened, was not destroyed and soon returned to harass the IDF 
and SLA. Three years later Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath 
(11–27 April 1996). Another display of air power and more state terror 
ensued, and infrastructure was destroyed in large amounts in large areas 
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of Lebanon. This time 350,000 to 500,000 Lebanese were displaced. Only 
three IDF soldiers were killed in action. Nevertheless, there was a problem. 
Operation Grapes of Wrath did not destroy Hezbollah any more than Op-
eration Accountability had. Only fourteen Hezbollah partisans were killed, 
and this time Hezbollah managed to strike back, fi ring rockets into north-
ern Israel and displacing 20,000 to 30,000 civilians. Israel had had enough. 
In July of 2000, abandoning its proxy SLA allies, it unilaterally evacuated 
southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah had driven Israel from territory it had conquered. This ced-
ing of territory was a fi rst for the IDF. Hezbollah strengthened and con-
tinued its harassment, this time in northern Israel itself. In July of 2006 
its actions were especially enervating (from the Israeli perspective) as it 
launched rocket attacks and tried to kidnap IDF soldiers. So once more Is-
rael struck, in what was to be called the Second Lebanon War (12 July–14 
August 1996). The IDF infl icted heavy air and artillery strikes throughout 
Lebanon, largely targeting civilian infrastructure (including Beirut’s air-
port) and civilian residential areas. There was a complete air and naval 
blockade. A hundred thousand cluster bombs were dropped, 90 percent 
of them in the last three days of combat. Additionally, there was an IDF 
ground assault on southern Lebanon. Hezbollah stood its ground and was 
not dislodged; meanwhile it launched more, and more sophisticated, rock-
ets into northern Israel, largely against Israeli civilians.
Compared to the previous hostilities, the Second Lebanon War had con-
sequences that were altogether more serious for both parties in the con-
fl ict. More people were killed, more wounded, more property destroyed. 
Israeli hermeneuts claimed, “Hezbollah lost, and Hezbollah knows it” (Tot-
ten 2009). Yet Hezbollah partisans could not be routed, even in facing an 
assault from the IDF. Their rockets forced the evacuation of 300,000 Israeli 
citizens in the north of Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, by then Hezbollah’s head, 
declared “divine victory.” Since 2006 Israel has refrained from assaulting 
its northern neighbor. Rather, it has turned its wrath upon Palestinians in 
Gaza.
The Gaza Strip is a territory on the Mediterranean Sea in the south-
western part of Israel. It is tiny, just 139 square miles, but for its size it has 
a large population, about 1.7 million, almost all of whom are Palestinian. It 
is governed by Hamas, a Sunni group founded as an offshoot of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1987. Hamas contests Israel’s right to exist, though 
in 2006 Ismail Haniyeh announced that if a Palestinian state was formed 
along the borders allotted to it in 1967, then Hamas would be willing to 
declare a truce that could last for up to twenty years.
The year of Hamas’s founding also saw the start of an insurrection against 
Israel, the First Intifada (1987–1991). This involved acts of civil disobe-
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dience, sometimes quite violent, against Israelis in Palestinian operations 
organized by the PLO and Islamist groups like the new Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad. No outside Arab states joined in the uprising. Israel responded with 
what it called its Iron Fist policy of killings, deportations, and beatings of 
its opponents. The First Intifada showed that Palestinians could wage their 
own battles for statehood. The following Second Intifada (2000–2008) was 
a gorier affair. The PLO was less involved in this insurrection, in which 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted insurgency against 
military and civilian targets, utilizing ambushes, sniper attacks, and suicide 
bombings. Remote-controlled landmines were employed against Israeli ar-
mor, as were car bombs and drive-by shootings.
Toward the end of the Second Intifada, Arafat died (2004) and Mah-
moud Abbas was elected to head the Palestinian Authority (2005), which, 
it was hoped, would evolve into a Palestinian state. Abbas, a moderate, 
opted for peaceful negotiations and the end of violence as the way to achieve 
this statehood. His consequent close cooperation with Israeli authorities 
led to confl ict with the more radical Hamas, which held that the Israeli 
government would not allow the Palestinians’ peaceful accession to state-
hood. In 2006 Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative 
Council, designated to be the legislative branch of the Palestinian state. 
Abbas declined to cooperate with Hamas. The US and the EU declared 
it a terrorist organization and refused funding to any Hamas-dominated 
institution. Hamas seized control of Gaza, ejected Fatah, and has governed 
there since June 2007. Israel responded by completely blockading the Gaza 
Strip, seeking to destroy industry, reduce nutritional levels, and exacerbate 
health conditions.
Unsurprisingly, Israel attacked Gaza in Operation Cast Lead (27 De-
cember 2008—January 18, 2009). The casus belli was rockets fi red from 
Gaza into Israel in response, Hamas said, to attacks by Israel. Between 
2005 and 2007, the IDF had fi red 14,600 155 mm artillery shells into Gaza 
(Human Rights Watch 2007). Operation Cast Lead began with air strikes 
followed by a ground invasion. Many Palestinians were killed, especially 
civilians, who after all had no place to fl ee to. Gaza was conquered. Both 
sides declared unilateral ceasefi res, and Israel withdrew from Gaza. Who 
won? Israel claimed a tactical victory. Hamas had withstood the enormous 
violent force of Israel and endured. It continued to govern Gaza.
Three years later, Israel attacked Gaza again in Operation Pillar of De-
fense (14–21 November 2012). Again the Israeli rationale was that the 
Palestinians were fi ring rockets at them. Again the IDF attacked with a 
vigorous air campaign. Again many Palestinians died. The Israelis lost two 
soldiers. This time there was no Israeli ground invasion. Hamas was a bit 
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stronger and was fi ring somewhat more advanced rockets into southern 
Israel. So the Egyptians arranged a ceasefi re. Once again Israel chalked up 
a tactical victory, but Hamas was still there and was, if anything, stronger 
in its military experience. You learn fast, surviving the IDF.
Some in Israel refer to the wars they fi ght with Hezbollah and Hamas as 
“mowing the grass” (Pillar 2012). This may strike some as snide, given that 
the fi gurative blades cut off lives, not grass. However, this trope holds an 
unpleasant truth: grass grows back after being cut. Now, on both its north-
ern and its southwestern borders, Israel has two foes who have fought it 
and grown back like grass, that is, grown in terms of their ability to choreo-
graph violent force. What does all the Israeli warring have to do with US 
global warring? Part of responding to this question is to assess how strongly 
one may assert that Israel has been America’s air craft carrier.
Sailing the High Seas
What evidence is there that Israel is the empire’s “air craft carrier”? To 
respond to this question, Israeli operations in the New World, Africa, and 
the Near East are examined next.
Air Craft Carrier in the New World: Writing in the late 1980s, Benjamin 
Beit-Hallahmi (1988: 107) states, “Israel’s activities in Latin America … 
were part of an American strategy to counter radicalism in the area.” Spe-
cifi cally, starting in the 1970s, Israel supplied weapons and training to re-
actionary regimes that the US government favored in Central America, 
including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Additionally, 
within Latin America, Israel provided weapons and training to the Pino-
chet regime in Chile beginning in the 1970s, to the junta in Argentina 
during its eight years of military dictatorship (1976–1984), and to dicta-
torships in Bolivia and Paraguay. With the end of the Cold War, the US’s 
need to prevent Latin America from going over to the Soviets disappeared, 
and its concerns migrated to other regions that posed new reproductive 
vulnerabilities. Israel made a parallel migration.
Air Craft Carrier in Africa: After the 1970s, Africa became a continent of 
insecurity due to wars, as well as a place with supplies of oil that the US 
délired to control. At this time, “Israeli weapons and trainers … [were] 
observed in numerous African trouble spots” (S. Wezeman 2011: 14). Un-
surprisingly these were not random “trouble spots.” Rather, they were ones 
where the US had its interests.
Consider fi rst Sudan, during the long civil war in what then was south-
ern Sudan (1955–1972, 1983–2005). Khartoum accused Israel of assisting 
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the rebel army in the south, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLA). Later, when civil war erupted in the province of Darfur in 2003, 
Khartoum again accused Israel of aiding the rebels there. US global war-
ring in Sudan is discussed later. Suffi ce it to say that there is oil in Sudan, 
that the US lost control of it during the Clinton administration, and that 
the empire was interested in re-establishing that control. Israeli training 
and weapons to rebels in both the south and the west of Sudan was re-
ported. Support to those rebels helped the New American Empire weaken 
Khartoum’s control over its oil. Since 2003 Chad, Sudan’s neighbor to the 
west, also has oil, whose production ExxonMobil largely controls. It is in 
Washington’s interest to maintain Exxon’s position in Chad. Israel has sup-
plied weapons to the government of President Déby in his struggles with 
rebellions against his rule that could threaten Exxon (P. Wezeman 2009).
Nigeria is the largest oil producer south of the Sahara. Production oc-
curs in the Niger Delta region and is largely done by US or US clients’ 
companies (Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Agip, and Total). Since the early 
1990s there has been armed rebellion in the delta against the central gov-
ernment and the oil companies over the distribution of revenue from the 
oil, almost none of which goes to the people in the delta. Needless to say, 
rebellion threatens the US Leviathan’s oil interests. Israel’s ambassador to 
Nigeria announced in 2008 that the Nigerian Ministry of Defense was “well 
connected” with the Israeli military (Pindiga 2011). These connections in-
cluded Israel’s clandestine provision of training and other services to Ni-
gerian troops deployed to combat the Niger Delta rebellion (ibid.: 2011). 
Israel certainly appears to be policing the empire’s oil interests in Nigeria.
Angola, according to The Economist, had the highest GDP growth rate 
in the world, 11.1 percent per annum, between 2001 and 2010. (The Econ-
omist Online 2011). This is largely because of its abundant petroleum re-
sources. Some predicted that Angolan production could surpass that of 
Nigeria. For a long time the US was suspicious of the Angolan government. 
It seemed too socialist for Washington’s tastes. However, oil began to be 
produced in the 1970s. Nominally, the government went from a one-party 
socialist state to a multiparty democracy in 1992. In 1998 an economic 
reform in the country introduced neoliberal structural adjustment. Angola 
had become a country in which the empire could do business, which it did. 
Angolan oil is largely produced by the US’s or its clients’ oil companies 
(Texaco, ExxonMobil, Total, Agip, BP, and Petrobras). It is important to 
the empire that its oil companies retain their dominance in the Angolan 
oil sector. To this end, the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute observed, “The largest reported Israeli arms deal in Africa is a set of 
contracts worth $1 billion with Angola in 2006” (S. Wezeman 2011: 14). 
Once again, Israel appears to be assisting the US’s Angolan oil interest.
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Consider, fi nally, the case of Uganda. Oil has been discovered in Uganda 
and in Kenya as recently as May of 2012. Tanzania is believed to have oil, 
though no commercially exploitable amounts have yet been located. It is 
known, however, to hold reserves of natural gas. East Africa is thus starting 
to be of interest for its petroleum resources. It also harbors some deter-
mined terrorists, especially al-Shabaab in Somalia. Enter Yoweri Museveni, 
who became president of Uganda in 1986 after proving himself a skilled 
general in African confl icts. Soon after he was inaugurated he began neo-
liberal structural adjustment, to Washington’s delight. Appreciative of the 
military prowess of Uganda’s president, the US designated the country as 
having, according to Wendy Sherman, Obama’s under secretary of state 
for political affairs, a “leadership role” in policing US interests (in Okwir 
2011. Not surprisingly, Uganda receives “signifi cant military aid” from Is-
rael (Pfeffer 2013). It might be said that Israel became the policeman’s po-
liceman in Uganda during the early years of the new millennium. Clearly, 
in Africa and Latin America too, Israel has helped to US to secure certain 
military interests, especially as they pertain to the control of oil. Now, let 
us explore Israel’s role as a US cop in the Middle East.
Air Craft Carrier in the Middle East: Israeli military and intelligence have 
fought for the empire in three major places in the Middle East—Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria. Consider fi rst Iraq. By the advent of the new millennium, Israel 
had been running covert operations in Iraq for well over three decades. 
Perhaps the most signifi cant of these was the 7 June 1981 bombing of the 
Osirak nuclear reactor, which was nearing completion when the Israeli air 
force destroyed it early in Reagan’s administration. The reactor was being 
constructed with the help of the French. Washington was wary of Osirak 
because Security Elites 2.0 believed it would allow Saddam to develop nu-
clear weapons, a destabilizing prospect. However, these same offi cials were 
for the most part averse to terminating it because that would be an act of 
blatant aggression, one likely to elicit criticism in world opinion. So the Is-
raeli air force did the job for the Americans and absorbed the UN Security 
Council’s condemnation of the raid. In principle, Reagan was furious about 
the raid, but in his diary he reported he recognized that Saddam “was try-
ing to build a nuclear weapon” and was a “no good nut” (Reagan 2007). 
Six months later, the US and Israel signed a statement of strategic accord 
(30 November 1981). The communication that announced it stated that 
the “the two countries” would “act cooperatively, to provide each other 
military assistance to cope with threats to the security of the entire region 
(Gwertzman 1981). This strategic accord might be said to have replaced 
the lost twin tower of the shah’s Iran with the cop of Israel. The cop con-
tinued activities in Iraq.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 400 –
Deadly Contradictions
Prior to the founding of Israel, a signifi cant Jewish population in north-
ern Iraq had had affable relations with the Naqshbandi, an important Sufi  
order, as well as with the Barzani family. These good relations continued af-
ter the founding of Israel, importantly with Massoud Barzani, leader of the 
Kurdish Democratic Party. By 1980, Mossad was training the peshmerga, 
the Kurdish military force. This Israeli-Kurdish amity gave Israel the ability 
to operate on the ground in Iraq. This became especially important after 
the US’s 1991 invasion of Iraq, when US offi cials entered a condition that 
Bob Woodward (2006: 96) termed “intelligence blindness,” which was es-
pecially detrimental to Washington as it began to prepare for a second war 
against Saddam after 9/11.
However, Tel Aviv hurried to Washington’s aid. Prior to Gulf War II, 
Israeli agents, especially the Mossad, had moved into northern Iraq. Ac-
cording to Iraqi sources, one of their activities was formation of front com-
panies, supposedly Arab or European fi rms, which operated throughout 
Iraq (Hersh 2004b). Israel, of course, was cooperating with the US and in 
effect provided Bush II’s security elites with on-the-ground information 
that the Americans otherwise lacked.
There were two further ways Israel supported the US in the buildup to 
Gulf War II. First, Israeli covert forces trained “Kurdish fi ghters in anti-
terrorism techniques” (Urquhart and Howard 2005). This created the 
possibility of a northern front against Baghdad. Second, according to the 
retired Brigadier General Schlomo Brom of the IDF, “Israeli intelligence 
was a full partner with the US and Britain in developing a false picture 
of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction capacity” (Lévesque 
2012). As we have seen, once Gulf War II was winding down, Washington 
focused its attention on Iran.
Here too Israel’s stealth operations have been considerable. Of course, 
they have been performed with US cooperation.61 Perhaps the most con-
troversial of them has been a “decapitation” program that uses assassins to 
eliminate “human assets” critical to Iran’s nuclear program (ibid.: 2009). 
A special unit of the Mossad—kidon, “the tip of the spear”—performs the 
murders. There appear to have been four or perhaps fi ve killings of senior 
scientists, which may seem a small number until one imagines what would 
happen if a foreign country was known to have assassinated four or fi ve 
senior US personnel.
Israel has commingled traditional and high-tech sabotage to undermine 
Tehran. The old- fashioned sabotage has included blowing things up. In 
November 2011, the assassination program involved a serious explosion 
at an Iranian missile base that killed the then head of missile development 
(Raviv and Melman 2012). Additionally, Israel has set up front companies 
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to sell Iran goods needed for its nuclear program, including critical items 
that are defective and accordingly hinder its progress.
More novel sabotage tactics have utilized computer-based assaults upon 
Iranian nuclear installations. These were part of the US-Israel collabora-
tion in Operation Olympic Games, which was authorized in 2006 by Bush 
II, reauthorized in 2009 by Obama, and implemented as a collaboration 
between the CIA and the NSA on the one hand, and Unit 8200 of Is-
raeli military intelligence, often called Aman (Vielhaber and Bleek 2012), 
on the other. Operation Olympic Games developed Stuxnet, a computer 
worm that attacked Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant and its Natanz ura-
nium enrichment facility. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagaski 
was the fi rst use of nuclear arms. Stuxnet’s deployment was the fi rst use of 
computer malware in the history of warfare.
 A fi nal area of Israeli covert operations against Iran is espionage. From 
a Kurdish base, intelligence agents launch cross-border operations to fi nd 
“smoking gun” evidence that Tehran is actually building a nuclear war-
head (Lévesque 2012). As of this writing no such evidence has been found, 
though not for want of trying. So much for Israel in Iran; next, consider 
Israel in Syria.
Mahdi Dasrius Nazemroaya (2013), an award-winning sociologist and 
journalist with the Voltaire Network, notes that “the US President told 
the Telemundo network that the Israelis were justifi ed in striking Syria 
and that the United States was coordinating against the Syrian govern-
ment with Tel Aviv.” So it appears that Obama has deployed its Israeli cop 
for missions against Syria. In 2007, Israel did to Syria what it had already 
done to Iraq and bombed a nuclear reactor at Al Kibar that was apparently 
funded by Iran and nearing completion (Hersh 2008). Nazemroaya (2013) 
claims that Israel has sent spies, vehicles, and drones into Syria.
Lévesque (2012) is concerned that there is “a rerun of previous at-
tempts to funnel fabricated evidence into the news chain” about Syria’s 
possession of WMDs. Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff during 
the Bush II administration, speculated more specifi cally that reports of the 
use of chemical weapons in Syria could be the result of an “Israeli false fl ag 
operation” (Edwards 2013). These allegations should be treated with some 
caution. Confl ict is still very much ongoing in Syria. Covert participants 
are still very much hiding their operations, but it does appear that Israel is 
up to old tricks launching stealth missions for the New American Empire. 
Lamentably (from the American and Israeli perspective), as observed in 
the earlier section on Syria, the “dead man walking” is still walking. Israel, 
then, has been a formidable aircraft carrier sailing the violent seas of US 
global warring. Of course, Tel Aviv receives the reward of a strategic rent, 
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which is discussed below in the context of the anti-terrorist and oil-control 
public délires.
Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires
Certain facts from the previous analysis need to be highlighted. First, the 
US’s military supply of the IDF provides Israel with its qualitative military 
edge, which means that when Israel wars, the US is indirectly globally war-
ring because it provides Israel with much of the violent force it needs for 
success. Thus, when Israel fi ghts, the US Leviathan is conducting second-
ary warring, as the term was defi ned in chapter 2.
Second, since the 1990s, when the US turned to Middle Eastern global 
warring against terrorists and for oil control, Israel has participated as a US 
proxy. Because the US is fi ghting in the Persian Gulf to combat terrorism 
and control oil, and because Israel is a US force resource in this fi ght, it 
therefore can be said that the US’s secondary fi ghting in support of Israel 
is implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires. Shult-
zian Permission was granted because Israel functioned as a US proxy when 
hostilities were ongoing, so that peaceful opportunities were effectively 
terminated.
The following is clear: the US has used Israel in global warring during 
the time of coalescence of the cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dom-
inated contradictions; Shultzian Permission has been granted because of 
ongoing hostilities; and global warring has implemented oil-control and 
anti-terrorist public délires—all of which supports the global warring theory.
In the book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, the respected po-
litical scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2007) argue that 
pro-Israeli lobbying, especially by groups like the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, has overly infl uenced US foreign affairs, hurting both 
the US and Israeli interests. Their book provoked venomous criticism 
that branded the authors as anti-Semitics, among other things. Lost in 
the name-calling was recognition of what Israel does for the US. It is the 
cop in rough Middle Eastern neighborhoods, and policing costs a lot. US 
deference to Israeli interests is part of the strategic rent it pays for that 
policing. Mearsheimer and Walt’s argument that US deference to Israel 
may hurt both countries’ interests should be taken seriously. Israel’s covert 
warring in Iraq II was not able to infl uence the outcome, nor has it been 
decisive in either Iran or Syria. However, whenever and wherever Israel 
wars using US weaponry, abhorrence of Tel Aviv and Washington is gener-
ated throughout Middle Eastern peoples and others around the world. For 
many in the Middle East, such antipathy motivates the délire to institute 
terrorist movements like Fatah, the PFLP, Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, and al-
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Qaeda. Thus, the more the US supports Israeli wars against Palestinians 
and others, the more it is a catalyst for terrorism. It is time to conclude 
discussion of imperial world warring in the Middle Eastern Theater.
Conclusion
Recall that Mustafa Alani of the Dubai-based Gulf Research Council ob-
served that “the issue,” concerning US fi ghting in the Middle East, “is he-
gemony in the region” (Sly 2013). He is correct. Since 1991 imperial global 
warring has, in different ways, been about implementing the anti-terrorist 
and the oil-control public délires to dominate the Middle East and control 
its prize, oil, allowing relaxation of the vulnerabilities generated by the 
perfect storm of contradictions. Further, in each of the cases analyzed in 
this chapter—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Israel—the evidence 
supports the global warring theory: it has been a time of intensifying and 
coalescing contradictions; for various reasons Shultzian Permission was 
granted; implementation of the oil-control and anti-terrorist public délires 
resulted in global warring.
The US Leviathan’s War of Middle Eastern Domination was ongoing 
in 2014, so conclusions about it must be tentative. Nevertheless, consider 
Iraq fi rst: the US Leviathan came, warred, and cut and ran. Imperial fi ght-
ing caused enormous harm, stimulating the growth of terrorism and leaving 
the country highly unstable. It has not led to greater imperial control over 
Iraqi oil resources. Next contemplate “Iran,” which Churchill called “fairy-
land.” Pretty tough fairies: no regime change; no real stopping of nuclear 
development; and although US sanctions have hampered Iranian oil pro-
duction, these same sanctions are said by one source to have equally “un-
dermined” US “global power.” Furthermore, US “twilight” warring against 
Iran has strengthened the Shiite Necklace, the alliance formed to resist US 
attempts to control the Middle East. Next, in Libya the “model interven-
tion” left the country’s oil production almost “stopped,” meaning there is 
little oil for the empire to control. The country’s governance is dominated 
by violent paramilitaries, making it something of a “failed state.” The para-
militaries’ violence terrorizes Libyans of all stripes and spreads their terror-
ism to other areas such as Syria. Now remember Syria, where the US, with 
its ally Israel, has been unable to break the Shiite necklace. At the same 
time terrorism has fl ourished. Washington’s proposed direct intervention 
caused friction with its close allies, like the UK and Saudi Arabia, a further 
sign of weakened bonds of empire. Now recall Yemen, where the empire 
has specialized in drones and targeted assassinations. These helped the 
terrorists. The Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda, AQAP, is described as “gaining 
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strength.” Finally, consider US secondary warring for Israel in return for 
Tel Aviv’s acting as an empire cop. Israeli warring has not been decisive 
in the course of any of the confl icts the US has engaged in in the Middle 
East. Rather, imperial support for Israel has nurtured the forces of terror-
ism. Deadly Contradictions is a peregrination, and travelers to the vicinity 
of the empire’s Near Eastern warring observe a Leviathan, accompanied by 
its aircraft carrier, in trouble.
Notes
1. Debate exists about how many world wars there have been. Eliot Cohen (2001), coun-
selor to Condoleezza Rice (2007–2009), insisted the “war on terror” was World War IV.
2. Introductions to Wahhabism can be found in DeLong-Bas (2008) and Commins (2009).
3. The claim that Israel ethnically cleansed Palestine of Palestinians during the creation 
of Israel in the late 1940s is rejected by many Israelis. The case for it is made by Ilan Pappé 
(2007, 2012). Pappé has been criticized (see Karsh 1996; B. Morris 2004), but his argument 
is credible. 
4. There is a hefty literature on the Arab Spring. More conventional approaches can be 
found in the Council on Foreign Relations (2011b), Galvin (2012), and Bradley (2012). More 
leftist takes on these events can be found in Binh (2013), Dabashi (2012), and Petras, Morley 
and Smith (2012).
5. It might be objected that the Kuwaitis did not want unifi cation, because in 1991 Iraq 
was acting as an imperial thug, just as Britain had done in 1921. The House of Sabah had 
Iraqi roots, having emerged from a clan within the Bani Ulbah, a tribal confederation with 
ties to Basra in Iraq. Nevertheless, by the late twentieth century the Kuwait royal lineage and 
merchants resisted returning to Iraq. Both had thrived by collaborating with the English and 
later from acquiring oil revenues (Crystal 1995). It is far from clear what ordinary Kuwaitis felt 
about Iraqi occupation. After all, in 1939 they had revolted in favor of reunifi cation with Iraq.
6. Mary Fawzi and Sarah Zaidi in an Food and Agriculture report estimated the child mor-
tality due to sanctions at 567,000 (in Crossette 1995). The US government and much of the 
American press has tended to either disregard or challenge this fi gure. Fawzi and Zaidi were 
professionals who utilized standard estimation methods. 
7. The actual invasion plans were formulated by General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM 
head, and went through a number of iterations described by Bob Woodward (2004). The plans 
actually called for shock and awe “lite”; as destruction of infrastructure was emphasized less, 
in part because much of it had not been rebuilt after Gulf War I.
8. The shock and awe doctrine has been subject to criticisms. One is that all aerial attacks 
involve shock and awe (Correll 2003). Perhaps the most serious criticism is that such a strat-
egy is not applicable to counterinsurgencies. When the enemy has no infrastructure, their 
location is a mystery, and they will not stand up and fi ght, where does a diligent commander 
shock them? 
9. The insurgency developed in part due to the incompetence of the US occupation, es-
pecially during Bremer’s time (2003–2004). The decision to ban the Baathists was important 
in igniting it. Where this decision originated has been unclear. Wolfowitz appears to have had 
a hand in it. He scrawled, on the margins of a memo suggesting reconciliation with former 
Baathists, “They are Nazis” (in Crist 2012: 421). Patrick Cockburn (2006), who was in Iraq 
at the time, provides the fullest account of occupation horrors. Even Bush recognized in his 
memoirs that there was “chaos” (2010: 259). The Defense Department was charged with 
managing the occupation, even though much of the planning for it had been done in the State 
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Department. Secretary Rice blamed the occupation’s failure on post-invasion turmoil, saying, 
“Unfortunately, the Pentagon had minimal ability to manage the elaborate [postwar] plans 
given the chaos on the ground” (2011: 210). The Rand Corporation performed a detailed 
evaluation of the prewar occupation planning, concluding, “The evidence suggests that the 
United States had neither the people nor the plans in place to handle the situation that arose 
after the fall of Saddam Hussein” (Bensahel et al. 2008: xvii). 
10. Gates was a member of the ISG and has described its workings (2014: 27–38), remark-
ing “how much fun” it was (2014: 30). Gates does not say that the ISG supported “cutting and 
running.” Rather he emphasizes that important committee members, including himself, were 
interested in a short-term surge. However, the surge was conceived as an operation that would 
allow reducing American combat forces; i.e., cutting and running.
11. Ricks (2009) and Fred Kaplan (2013) describe the rise of Petraeus and COIN. Two 
others arguing for COIN were David Kilcullen (2010), who originally served in the Australian 
military and held a doctorate in anthropology, and John Nagl (2005), from the US military, a 
tank platoon commander during Operation Desert Storm. A key problem was to account for 
the debacle of COIN in Vietnam. Petraeus offered an explanation in his PhD (1987) disser-
tation. Nagl (2005) did the same. Kilcullen (2010) explained how to win with COIN, using 
the British handling of the Malayan insurgency as a model. Arrequin-Toft (2002) has offered 
a critique of US COIN.
12. The Human Terrain System, a project designed to integrate anthropologists into the 
US Army, was condemned by the American Anthropology Association in 2007 (AAA 2007).
13. Scahill (2013) provides the most complete account of the JSOC. It was formed out of 
the debacle of the failed mission to rescue the American hostages held in the US embassy in 
Tehran in 1979 and modeled after the British Strategic Air Services (SAS), and includes Navy 
Seals, the Delta Force, and the 75th Army Rangers.
14. Some believe that Petraeus’s 2003 pacifi cation of Mosul was a “just so” story. A US 
army report analyzing the success of counterinsurgency in Gulf War II found that around Mo-
sul, “insurgent organization and violence increased throughout” 2003 (Broemmel, Nielsen, 
and Clark 2006: 27), and that the same was so during 2004 (ibid.: 52), the time of Petraeus’s 
command there. Mansoor (2013), who was Petraeus’s executive offi cer during the Surge, has 
written an account of it that is favorable to his commander.
15. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not approve of COIN. Eight retired senior admirals 
and generals called for Rumsfeld’s resignation on grounds of incompetence in early 2006. He 
resigned his position on 6 December of that year. His replacement, Robert Gates, quickly 
approved the surge with its adoption of COIN.
16. The neoconservative think tank The American Enterprise Institute took credit for 
suggesting the “surge” (Kagan 2007). 
17. Perhaps, the commander Petraeus most resembles is Civil War General George B. 
McClellan. Petraeus, like McClellan, never really won a decisive battle. Like McClellan, he 
“never missed an opportunity to make a friend in the media” (W. Stern 2012). There was a bit 
of the intimidator in Petraeus. Once, when he and Defense Secretary Gates were in disagree-
ment, Petraeus threatened Gates: “You know I could make your life miserable” (Gates 2014: 
68). Gates was not amused.
18. The most complete analysis of the role of oil in Gulf War II is Muttitt (2012b).
19. Mraz (1997) discussed the dual containment policy and its problems. The United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was in charge of inspecting Iraq’s disarmament 
and WMD development. Just prior to Operation Desert Fox, Baghdad refused or hampered 
inspections, claiming that the US was using UNSCOM to spy on it. It was on the basis of 
these debates over inspections that Clinton ordered the 1998 bombing. The US was using 
UNSCOM to spy on Iraq (Everest 2004: 202–203).
20. Linda McQuaig (2004: 84–85) has suggested there is evidence to believe the Vulcans 
intended to war against Iraq by February of 2001. 
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21. Franks, in consultation with Rumsfeld, would end up revising the war plan several 
times. Initially there was a plan called 1003V, left over from the Clinton administration. It was 
replaced by a “generated start” plan, a “running start” plan, a “hybrid” plan, and in the end, 
the plan actually used, Cobra II, which was fi nished only in February 2003, a month before 
the onset of hostilities. 
22. The Future of Iraq Project documents were originally secret. Their publication date 
is given as 2005, the year they were declassifi ed. Most appear to have been drafted between 
2002 and 2003.
23. Other major planning for postwar Iraq was done in the Defense Department offi ce of 
Undersecretary for Defense Policy Douglas Feith, who created an Offi ce of Special Plans that 
issued guidance papers. There was little cooperation between the Offi ce of Special Plans and 
the Future of Iraq project, which hindered postwar planning. Bensahel et al. (2008: xvii) pro-
vide an account of the imperfections of the planning for postwar reconstruction, which they 
declare to have been “unprepared” for the situation after Saddam’s fall.
24. The proposal that PSAs should be introduced in Iraq is discussed in Muttitt (2006). It 
was fi rst suggested in 2002 by the Oil and Energy Subgroup of the Future of Iraq Project (Oil 
and Energy Working Group 2005: 4, 5).
25. The quotation is the fi rst “Comment” to the PRWatch piece (Center for Media and 
Democracy 2005).
26. The Washington Post revealed in November 1999 that US intelligence used UNSCOM 
to spy on Iraq (Gellman 1999). In 1996 the CIA mounted a failed coup attempt against 
Saddam using UNSCOM information. 
27. Clinton’s condemnation of Saddam’s use of poison gas was hypocritical. During the 
Iran-Iraq War the US had provided the Iraqi military with information on the disposition of 
the Iranians, which the Iraqis needed in order to gas them. As one US intelligence offi cer 
noted, the Pentagon “wasn’t so horrifi ed by Iraq’s use of gas. It was just another way of killing 
people” (in Everest 2004: 104). 
28. What Tenet actually meant by his “slam dunk” remark is open for debate. Bob Wood-
ward (2004: 440) reported that Powell “knew very well that Tenet had told the president 
‘in brash New York language’ … that the case on WMD was a ‘slam dunk.’” Being from the 
Bronx, Powell would have known such language when he heard it.
29. Seymour Hersh (2003) was instrumental in revealing the activities of the OPS. Feith 
(2008: 294) defends the OPS and fulminates against Hersh in his memoirs. One whopper 
certainly came out of OPS: the claim that Iraq was ultimately responsible for 9/11 (Isikoff and 
Corn 2006: 111). Feith (2008: 295) outlined the distribution network of his work when he re-
ported that one “paper” was sent to Rice, “who then distributed it to Cheney, Powell, General 
Myers, and Tenet (and to the White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and the Presidential 
Counsel Alberto Gonzales). … She also sent copies to all the Deputies.” 
30. I was unable to access the 2006 and 2009 NIE reports and have relied upon accounts 
of them. 
31. Bush II’s Cheney “love” had faded by the end of his presidency (Calabresi and Weiss-
kopf 2009).
32. Burke (2005), who evaluated Rice’s profi ciency as NSA, judged that by reporting to 
Bush what he was disposed to hear, she failed to alert him of the dubious quality of the Iraq 
intelligence he was actually hearing.
33. There is debate over the degree to which the CIA warned the White House of 9/11. 
Tenet (2004: 151) contends he warned Rice at a 10 July 2001 meeting of the possibility of a 
“spectacular” al-Qaeda operation. Rice (2011: 67) has replied, “My recollection of the meet-
ing is not very crisp.”
34. The exact history of the Bush administration’s instituting of torture remains unclear. 
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo in the Offi ce of Legal Council (2001–2003) is identifi ed 
as having written “torture memos” legitimating CIA and military torture of their captives. He 
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has been said to have had “strong working relationships” with White House and Pentagon 
offi cials (Golden 2005). 
35. Gordon and Trainor (2006: 577)—Trainor being a retired general—judged Franks and 
Rumsfeld’s plans “unrealistic.” Ricks (2006: 3) called them “fl awed.” 
36. Powell seems disingenuous in this quotation. The State Department certainly knew 
that Cheney and the Defense Department were presenting suspicious evidence of Saddam’s 
WMDs.
37. Rice does not discuss the 5 August meeting in her memoirs. Neither Cheney nor 
Rumsfeld discusses in his memoirs, except en passent, the 5 August or any other meeting that 
led to the 7 September decision to go to the UN. However, Bob Woodward (2004) gives a full 
account of these meetings. Bush (2010: 238) mentions the 5 August meeting briefl y and does 
not contradict Woodward’s version.
38. Powell reports that Pottery Barn stores did not have a so-called Pottery Barn rule and 
were angry that the attribution was bandied about in the press. He also claimed that neither he 
nor Armitage used the term and that it was the media that invented it (C. Powell 2012: 212).
39. In the year prior to World War I’s onset, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 
BP’s forerunner, negotiated with then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, who 
sought to modernize Britain’s navy by replacing coal with oil as the British navy’s fuel. He also 
sought to free the UK from dependence upon foreign oil companies. In exchange for secure 
oil supplies for its ships, the British government injected new capital into APOC and in doing 
so acquired a controlling interest in it.
40. The 18–20-million-dollar fi gure for covert funding of anti-Iranian operations is prob-
ably low, as it does not take into account the US intelligence and military “black budget” for 
secret operations. The size of the black budget is never offi cially revealed. However, Edward 
Snowden released information that placed the 2012 US black budget at $52.8 billion, with 
roughly $14.7 billion going to the CIA (Gellman and Miller 2012). During the Clinton admin-
istration some CIA money was likely directed against Iran.
41. Gates (2014: 182) is clear that after he replaced Rumsfeld as defense secretary he 
attempted to keep the US out of overt, direct warring with Iran; Cheney, however, “talked 
openly” of using “military force” in Iran.
42. General James Cartwright appears to have overseen development of the Stuxnet virus. 
Problematically, it attacked more than just Iranian installations and as of 2010 had bedeviled 
over 100,000 computers in 115 countries (Cole 2013b).
43. Ironically, it was the US, during the Shah’s rule in the 1970s, that fi rst suggested to Iran 
that it initiate a nuclear program (Kinzer 2008)
44. The nickname “fuzzhead” may have been a racial attack upon Gaddafi . A person with 
“fuzzy” hair is racially classifi ed as “black” in Chad and Libya. 
45. Chorin (2012: 2, 4), a former State Department employee, portrays Gaddafi  as “a 
despot” who ran a government with the “markings of a totalitarian state.” “One thing that 
struck” him during his two year Libyan assignment, he tells readers, “was how many times 
people … would take me aside and insist that the ‘US government should know’ what they 
are dealing with in Gadaffi ” (ibid.: 5). According to his own estimates, Chorin worked “12 
to 15 hour days” in a “5 star hotel” (ibid.: 5). Such a work environment and schedule would 
inhibit getting out to systematically discover what people actually believed. McKinney (2012) 
and Forte (2012) offer less Washington-centric discussions of the Libya revolution. Pargeter 
(2012) has a useful account. 
46. There was only a single major case of human rights abuse during the Gaddafi  years. 
This was a massacre at the Abu Salim prison, where perhaps 1,200 were executed in 1996 
(Human Rights Watch 2009). 
47. The east/west divide in Libya extends back to ancient times. Starting roughly in 600 
BC, eastern Libya or Cyrenaica consisted of Greek cities, while the west, Tripolitania, consisted 
of Punic cities under Carthaginian domination.
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48. The Telegraph, a centrist UK newspaper, reported that US and UK Special Ops were in 
Benghazi and Tobruk by 24 February 2011(Iqbal 2011). 
49. Forte (2012) has rebutted the propaganda claims of the Obama administration, includ-
ing the claim that Gaddafi  armed his soldiers with Viagra. 
50. Keenan (2009) discusses AFRICOM’s introduction into the Sahara. Maximilian Forte 
(2012) has analyzed the impact of Gaddafi ’s opposition to AFRICOM. 
51. Hinnebusch and Schmidt (2009) discuss the political economy of Syria and its neolib-
eral reforms immediately prior to the onset of the rebellion. Landis (2012) has an account of 
Syrian politics through the beginning of the popular rebellion in 2011. Pipes (1990) provides 
a conservative background to modern Syrian history. Ajami (2012: 10), originally from Leb-
anon but currently at the Hoover Institution, offers an Orientalist understanding of govern-
ment under the Al Assads, dismissing it is as “a drab … dictatorship.” Seale (1990: 441) offers 
an understanding of Hafez al Assad as “an Arab de Gaulle.” Assaf (2012) and Sustar and 
Khalil (2012) analyze the course of the rebellion against Assad. Landis operates a blog, Syria 
Comment, which provides an English-language account of Syrian events.
52. The local protests that began the Syria civil war did not originate in sectarian politics. 
They arose from a conjuncture of a deteriorating climate and an intensifying contradiction 
pitting a governing/business class against rural and urban poor. In the new millennium, Bashir 
and his regime had implemented a number of neoliberal policies “in the service of a new 
stratum of crony capitalists” (Hinnebusch and Schmidt 2009: 4). These policies impoverished 
the rural poor, many of whom migrated to cities where, unable to secure employment, they 
became urban poor. Drought, which was especially grave in 2008–2010, deepened the rural 
distress (Kelley et al. 2015). Bashir did nothing to address rural and urban impoverishment. 
Rebellion began among the rural and urban distressed (Assaf 2012).
53. Reports estimated that between early 2012 and the middle of 2013 the CIA had facil-
itated airlift of at least 3,500 tons of arms from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the rebels (P. Scott 
2013).
54. The Financial Times reported that as of mid 2013 Qatar had given Syrian rebels over 
$3 billion (Khalaf and Smith 2013).
55. There are fi ve imaginable perpetrators of the Ghouta attack: Syrian government 
forces, rebels, US military/intelligence units, Israeli military/intelligence units, and coordi-
nated US/Israeli military/intelligence units. The Secretary of State Kerry did not appear to 
think evidence was necessary to back his assertion of Assad’s evil. The document Kerry used 
to justify charging the Syrian government with Ghouta is a list of unsubstantiated assertions 
(White House 2013). The Eurasia Review reports that Turkish prosecutors have indicted Syr-
ian rebels for seeking the components of chemical weapons (RT 2013). Seymour Hersh (2013: 
1) published the news that “American intelligence agencies” knew before the Ghouta incident 
that the al-Qaeda–affi liated Al Nusra, “had mastered the mechanics of creating sarin and was 
capable of manufacturing it in quantity.” Both the Americans and the Israelis have a penchant 
for false fl ag operations. Both have the technology, organization, and fi nances to perform gas 
attacks. Sepahpour-Ulrich (2013) explains how the US might have done it in collaboration 
with Israel. As of this writing, a dense propaganda fog obscures the perpetrators’ identity.
56. Some suggest Obama has approached Syria with “extreme caution” (P. Scott 2013) 
and that the monsterization of Bashar in 2011 and 2012 was relatively restrained. Perhaps 
this was in part because Obama’s offi cials sought to avoid the swaggering rhetoric of Bush 
II’s security elites, and in part because they hoped, at least through June 2013, to resolve the 
Syrian problem covertly. 
57. Syrian pipeline politics are discussed in Peter Scott (2013) and Dinucci (2013).
58. Dresch (1994) and Al Dawsari (2012) discuss tribe-government interactions in Ye-
men. The Harak Uprising, which is Sunni-dominated and found in southern Yemen, struggles 
to secede from the Republic of Yemen and reinstitute South Yemen. It began in 1994, turned 
to peaceful means to achieve its goal, and appears to be returning to violence. The Houthi 
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Rebellion, for the most part confi ned to the extreme northwest of Yemen, is a Shia movement 
that seeks overthrow of the Yemeni government. 
59. Discussion of al-Qaeda in Yemen can be found in Johnsen (2012) and Hull (2011). 
The former provides a background that leads al-Qaeda from Afghanistan to Yemen. Hull, who 
was US ambassador to Yemen (2001–2004), provides detailed discussion of the weakening of 
al-Qaeda following the attack on the USS Cole.
60. I have Sephardic and Ashkenazi relatives. Partisans of the Israeli state, on the basis of 
the discussion of Israel in the text, may label me as either an anti-Semitic or a self-hating Jew. 
Hurling insults is an illegitimate form of argument. 
61. Raviv and Melmen (2012) discuss covert operations in Iran from an Israeli perspective.





“I believe America is exceptional.” (President Barack Obama, speech to the 
UN General Assembly, 2013)
This chapter continues the work of the last by investigating the US Leviathan’s exercise of violent force in four theaters—Central Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, and the Pacifi c—to complete the account of how 
global warring became world warring between 1990 and 2014. As in the 
previous chapter, the concern is to evaluate the role of the anti-terrorist 
and oil-control public délires in the warring as well as to document the con-
sequences of these hostilities. The chapter ends by contemplating those 
results; which indicate that the New American Empire is indeed excep-
tional, though in a way unsuspected by the president. Attention turns fi rst 
to Central Asia.
The Central Asian Theater
Much of Central Asia was part of the USSR until its end in 1990. The 
region stretched from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east and 
from Afghanistan in the south to Russia in the north. The former Central 
Asian Soviet Republics were Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Oil had been produced around Baku in Azerbaijan since the 1890s. By 
the 1980s oil and gas had been discovered in other areas in Central Asia 
around the Caspian Sea, especially Kazakhstan. US oil company executives 
came to believe these deposits were considerable. Representative Doug 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
World Warring 1990–2014: The Other Theaters
– 411 –
Bereuter, at a 1998 session of his House of Representatives subcommit-
tee, gushed that “phenomenal resources of oil and natural gas” in Central 
Asia offered “signifi cant new investment opportunities for a broad range 
of American companies” (Bereuter 1998: 6–7). So US energy and security 
elites came to see Central Asia as offering a way to reduce the empire’s 
energy vulnerabilities by diversifying its supply.
To achieve this goal, US oil companies organized a loose cartel, the 
Foreign Oil Companies Group (P. Scott 2005), whose members sought to 
wrest control of the region’s oil from the Russians. The companies—espe-
cially Amoco, Unocal, Chevron, and ExxonMobil—participated in a lively 
“scramble” to sign deals between 1995–1998 (Guan, 2001). Brzezinski, so 
important in the Carter administration, again became a player. He had 
participated in the 1950s in missions to the Caspian as a consultant for 
the Amoco oil company and, early on, had recognized the region’s petro-
leum resources. As earlier noted, he had mentored Madeleine Albright, 
and when she rose in Clinton’s foreign policy hierarchy, she took with 
her Brzezinski’s recognition that there was potential in Central Asian oil 
(Rutledge 2005: 105). Sandy Berger, who was fi rst Clinton’s deputy NSA 
(1993–1997) and then his NSA (1997–2001), owned stock in Amoco Oil 
(Baer 2002: 243–244). He headed an inter-agency group that facilitated 
government support of US oil companies in their “scramble” for Caspian 
black gold. Specifi cally, one CIA offi cer remembered Berger’s NSC em-
ployee Shelia Heslin as working to “carry water” for the Foreign Oil Com-
panies Group (in P. Scott 2005).
Another aspect of the Clinton administration’s Central Asian policy 
was military. By the mid 1990s the US recognized it needed to increase its 
violent force in the region (K. Butler 2001). Russian and Chinese fi rms 
were already competing for this oil (discussed in Fouskas and Gökay 2005: 
147–165). In order to strengthen US military options in this competition, 
Clinton’s “department of defense established military ties” with Central 
Asian states, “and US aid began to fl ow to their armed forces. From there it 
was a short stop to the deployment of American military advisors, the sale 
of American arms, and the initiation of joint training operations” (Klare 
2004: 1333). CENTCOM was given responsibility for the region.
What a difference a few years can make. As the 1990s wore on, and 
as oil geologists’ understanding of the Caspian area deepened, it became 
clear that its energy resources were hardly “phenomenal.” Estimates of oil 
reserves were whittled down from 200 billion barrels to 40 billion barrels, a 
pittance compared to the 674 billion barrels estimated in the Middle East. 
Sarah Emerson, an energy industry specialist, wrote in a report to the new 
Bush II administration, “The trouble with diversifying outside the Middle 
East,” for example into Central Asia, “is that it is not where the oil is. One 
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of the best things for our supply security would be to liberate Iraq” (in Rut-
ledge 2005: 102). We saw in the previous chapter that Bush II’s Vulcans 
took Emerson’s advice to heart. Nevertheless, acquiring access to 40 billion 
barrels would still help the New American Empire diversify its oil supply.
A fi nal geographic fact of signifi cance to the global warring that follows: 
Central Asia was a landlocked area, so moving oil to market was challeng-
ing, making “exploitation” of Caspian oil resources “conditional on the 
timely construction of a network of pipelines” (Rutledge 2005: 103); it 
being understood that these pipelines had best not run through the US Le-
viathan’s opponents’ territories, especially Russia and Iran. This has meant 
that Central Asian wars have actually been fought outside the Caspian 
Basin in areas suitable for pipelines, which brings readers to global warring 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and then Kosovo.
Afghanistan II, 2001–2013: 
“Digging Bullets Out of the Women’s Bodies”
Date: February 12, 2010
Place: Paktika Province
Circumstances: In a night raid, U.S. forces attacked a home where 25 people, 
3 of them musicians, had gathered for a naming celebration. A newborn was 
being named that night. One of the musicians went outside to relieve him-
self. A fl ashlight shone in his face. Panicked, he ran inside and announced 
that the Taliban were outside. A police commander, Dawoud, the father of the 
newborn, ran outside with his weapon. U.S. forces opened fi re, killing Offi cer 
Dawoud, a pregnant mother, an eighteen year old, Gulaila, and two others.
U.S. / NATO initial response: February 12, 2010—U.S. forces claimed that the 
women had been killed earlier, in an honor killing. Nato’s initial press release 
bore the headline: “Joint Force Operating in Gardez Makes Gruesome Dis-
covery.” The release said that after “intelligence confi rmed militant activity” 
in a compound near a village in Paktika province, an international security 
force entered the compound and engaged “several insurgents” in a fi refi ght. 
Two “insurgents” were killed, the report said, and after the joint forces entered 
the compound, they “found the bodies of three women who had been tied up, 
gagged and killed.”
March 16, 2010—The UN issued a scathing report, stating that the U.S. had 
killed the women. Villagers told Jerome Starkey, reporting for the Independent, 
that U.S. troops tried to tamper with evidence by digging bullets out of the 
women’s bodies and out of the walls. (Fragment of narrative of US military 
operations, Afghanistan. Kelly and Pearson 2010)
The above account taken from reports of American military maneuvers 
in Afghanistan is laconic. Just the facts: JSOC ninjas on the evening of 
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12 February 2010 butchered a civilian family in Paktika province, on the 
border with Pakistan in southeastern Afghanistan. Those killed included 
a pregnant woman. In an attempt to hide their work, the ninjas dug the 
bullets out of the women’s bodies. Jeremy Scahill, while investigating this 
incident, asked General Hugh Shelton, the former head of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, whether there ought to be an internal review of the killings. The 
general responded, “I’m sorry that they got killed,” but added, “our guys 
were doing what they thought they should do. … I don’t think it ought to 
be investigated; I write it off as one of those damn acts of war” (in Scahill 
2013: 347). Why “write it off”? Why not investigate Afghanistan II as a 
whole? The story begins after 9/11.
The Afghanistan War II
Bush II vowed terrible vengeance on the perpetrators of 9/11. This meant 
the central questions immediately after 9/11 were who and where the ter-
rorists were.1 Rather quickly—even though Cheney and Wolfowitz délired 
Iraq—it became clear that the attack was the work of al-Qaeda. Equally 
clearly, al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, were supported in Af-
ghanistan by the Taliban, who were a largely Pashtun group formed in 1994 
and led by Mullah Mohammed Omar to bring about an Islamic funda-
mentalist Caliphate.2 Rumsfeld (2011: 367) is clear: when “President Bush 
decided to confront Afghanistan” the Vulcans “wanted to not only destroy 
al-Qaida in Afghanistan, but to cause al-Qaida and its affi liates every-
where to scramble.”
Of course, to get the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan they had to get the 
Taliban. The Taliban were not one of the mujahideen groups armed and 
trained by the US during Afghanistan I, though they resembled them and 
had benefi ted in at least one way from US activities in Afghanistan I. 
During Afghanistan I, USAID had awarded a contract to the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha to produce propaganda books for distribution to talibs 
(students) in madrassas (Koranic schools) to encourage madrassa students 
to wage jihad against atheist Soviets. The Taliban largely recruited talibs 
out of madrassas, and they too employed the Nebraska textbooks. Lamen-
tably, “once in power” they used them “as instruction manuals in militant 
Islam” that was directed against American kuffar (unbelievers) (Tremblay 
2004: 50–51). However, we are getting ahead of the story. Let us return to 
the end of Afghanistan I.
Following Soviet withdrawal, the 1990s were a time of Afghan war-
lords competing for control of the state, a competition made bloodier by 
the CIA’s funding and arming of the competitors during Afghanistan I. 
Eventually, the Taliban defeated its adversaries, with the exception of the 
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Northern Alliance.3 Olivier Roy has argued that the Taliban seizure of 
power “was largely orchestrated by the Pakistani secret service (the ISI) 
and the oil company Unocal” (in P. Scott 2007: 166). UNOCAL, Union 
Oil of California (now merged with Chevron), and the Inter-Services In-
telligence (ISI), would be big players in events in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.4 Additionally, the Taliban were allied with the Haqqani Network 
and Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whom we met in the section 
on Afghanistan I. Hekmatyar was a “leading mujahideen drug traffi cker” 
and the recipient of approximately a billion dollars in armaments from 
largely CIA sources (ibid.: 74, 75). The Haqqani Network was led by the 
Jalaluddin Haqqani and then his son, Sirjuddin Haqqani, who were from 
the Zadran Pushtun tribe. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 
the Haqqani received “signifi cant support from the CIA and from Paki-
stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)” (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2011a). There was a lethal irony in the CIA’s support of Jalalud-
din, for it was he who recruited Osama bin Laden to fi ght in Afghanistan. 
In 1996, the Taliban and their allies created the Islamic Emirate of Afghan-
istan, which controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan, leaving the remaining 
10 percent largely under the Northern Alliance’s infl uence.
A few days after 9/11, the Vulcans knew who had done it and where 
they were: al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan. An impatient Bush II demanded that 
the Taliban hand over bin Laden along with other al-Qaeda leaders. The 
Taliban acquiesced to the idea that bin Laden should leave the country 
voluntarily, but declined to extradite him in the absence of evidence of his 
involvement in the attacks. The US refused to provide evidence or even 
to negotiate. Instead it began Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 
2001 in alliance with the UK, later joined by France, Australia, Canada, 
Poland, Germany, and others. This was the start of the global war against 
terrorism (GWOT). The aim, Wolfowitz said, would be “ending states who 
sponsor terrorism” (in Diamond 2001).
In response, Mullah Omar,leader of the Taliban at that time, advised 
that the Taliban, “would just retreat to the mountains” (in Frantz 2001). 
By the end of 2001 the empire and its allies, employing US airstrikes in sup-
port of Northern Alliance ground operations, had routed the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda; which both did what they had said they would do: they retreated. 
The US Leviathan’s forces captured all the country’s urban areas, and the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan appeared fi nished. The UN Security Coun-
cil established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in De-
cember 2001 to oversee security and train an Afghan National Army. This 
meant there had to be an Afghan government for the army to be part of.
At this point Hamid Karzai enters the story. A scion of an elite family 
in the Popalzai Pushtun tribe, he had opposed the Soviets during their 
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occupation of Afghanistan, during which time he became “a top contact 
for the CIA and maintained close relations with CIA Director William 
Casey, Vice President George Bush, and their Pakistani Inter Service In-
telligence (ISI) interlocutors” (Madsen 2009: 1). At some point, “Karzai 
and a number of his brothers moved to the United States under the aus-
pices of the CIA,” where they “continued to serve the agency’s interests, 
as well as those of the Bush family and their oil friends in negotiating the 
CentGas deal.” (ibid.). The entrepreneurially minded brothers also opened 
a string of three restaurants in the US, but it was the CentGas deal that 
appears crucial to Hamid Karzai’s future fortunes. This was a proposal (in 
the 1990s) that a dual oil/gas pipeline be built from Turkmenistan, on the 
Caspian Sea, south through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea coast in Paki-
stan and eventually on to India. This pipeline was given the acronym TAPI 
(Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India). UNOCAL sought to 
be the major mover in this project. If successful, the pipeline would enrich 
US oil interests and frustrate those of Iran and China. UNOCAL negoti-
ated with the newly installed Taliban regime. Apparently, “according to 
Afghan, Iranian, and Turkish government sources, Hamid Karzai” during 
this time “was a top adviser to … UNOCAL Corporation” (ibid.). Restau-
rateur, CIA asset, and oilman, Karzai was America’s man in Afghanistan.
At a conference in Bonn in December 2001, the US assured Karzai’s 
selection to head the Afghan Interim Administration. This was after a loya 
jirga (grand council or assembly) had been legitimated as the Afghan Tran-
sitional Administration in Kabul in June 2002. In the national elections 
of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the new permanent Afghan gov-
ernment, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In 2003 NATO assumed 
leadership of ISAF and, at its height, included troops from forty-three 
countries, though the US supplied by far the most soldiers. At the end 
of 2002, many in Washington believed Bush II “had smashed the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda” (Isikoff and Corn 2006: 22), though they knew Osama bin 
Laden had slipped away in the mountains of Tora Bora.
“Smashed”? Hardly! Neither the Taliban nor al-Qaeda had been de-
feated. They were where they said they would be, in the mountains. (The 
location of these mountains is discussed in the following section on Paki-
stan.) By the spring of 2003, Mullah Omar, assisted by the ISI, had reor-
ganized the Taliban movement and launched an insurgency against the 
Afghan government and NATO forces (Rashid 2012: 31). US strategy at 
this time might be termed “neo-feudal” because it was to rearm “the war-
lords who ruled the provinces like medieval barons” (ibid.: 95).
Though outnumbered and poorly armed, the Taliban and its allies insti-
tuted guerilla warfare against the “medieval barons” with their amrikaayi 
(American) partners from 2003 through 2005, raiding and ambushing in 
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the countryside while concentrating suicide attacks upon urban areas. The 
“T-men” (or occasionally “sandniggers”), as they were called in American 
slang, were effective. At the same time that the Iraq was snowballing into 
fi asco in 2006 and 2007, this Taliban offensive enjoyed a major upswing (de-
scribed in Rashid 2008: chap. 14), which succeeded in re-establishing the 
T-Men’s control over large swaths of rural southern and eastern Afghanistan.
NATO, under US direction, responded in 2006 by increasing troops and 
weaponry for operations, especially in southern and eastern regions. The 
fi erce fi ghting that occurred between 2006 and 2009 did not go especially 
well for the US Leviathan. By 2008, the International Council on Security 
and Development, a Paris-based research group, estimated that 72 percent 
of Afghanistan was under Taliban control (Alexander 2008). Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said the situation in Af-
ghanistan was “precarious and urgent” (in DeYoung and Weisman 2008). 
When the eight years of the Bush II presidency fi nally ended on 20 January 
2009, Afghanistan became Obama’s problem. The new president, soon to 
win the Nobel Peace prize, embraced it as “the war we must win” (Obama 
2008).
Obama’s choice to lead the “must win” war was Stanley McChrystal, 
fresh from Iraq operations as JSOC head with a reputation, according to 
Newsweek, as “a snake eating rebel, a ‘Jedi’ commander” (Hastings 2010).5 
One of the “snake eating rebel’s” fi rst tasks was bureaucratic: he was to 
write a report outlining the way forward in Afghanistan. He began this 
report, dated August 2009, by pronouncing the situation in Afghanistan 
“serious” and “deteriorating” (McChrystal 2009: 1-1), thereby generating a 
fi ne procedural hermeneutic puzzle for US commanders. Perceptually they 
recognized their position in Afghanistan to be “precarious and urgent” as 
well as serious and deteriorating.
In his report, McChrystal proceeded to procedurally solve the puzzle 
by offering what some military humorists call a “Self-Licking Ice-Cream 
Cone,” that is, a military strategy that exists to justify itself. America could 
triumph, McChrystal judged, with an “integrated civilian-military count-
er-insurgency campaign” that would require a surge of an additional 40,000 
troops (ibid.). This was a reiteration of Petraeus’s COIN, which was unsur-
prising because McChrystal was Petraeus’s sponsor. McChrystal’s solution 
immediately ignited fi erce hermeneutic politics among Obama’s new secu-
rity elite team.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates—a holdover from the Bush II adminis-
tration, where he had replaced Rumsfeld—provides the fullest account of 
the hermeneutic politics over the decision to surge in Afghanistan (2014: 
335–387). Some in the Obama White House feared that the military was 
attempting to “jam” (gang up on and force) the new president to increase 
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global warring in Afghanistan. Vice President Biden, NSA James Jones, 
US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry in Kabul, and a fair number of the NSC 
and White House staff were against it. However, Secretary of State Hil-
lary Clinton, who was “always siding with the generals” (Rashid 2012: 92) 
and General Petraeus, then head of CENTCOM, were for it. Eikenberry’s 
opposition to the counterinsurgency strategy was weighty. He had been 
a lieutenant general prior to becoming the ambassador to Afghanistan, 
where he had served two tours of duty, so he had a greater grasp of Afghan 
realities than did McChrystal. The Bush II administration holdover Gates 
favored a middle position, arguing for a 30,000-troop surge. Obama made 
what Gates called a “tough” decision and sided with his defense secretary 
(Gates 2014: 384).
Remember the two faces of the Petraeusian COIN: on the one hand, 
the nice-guy face tried to pacify civilians by helping them; on the other, 
there stared the creepy-guy face of kinetic killers. McChrystal, of course, 
had been the JSOC commander during much of Bush’s administration, 
and what JSOC had specialized in then, especially in Iraq, was targeted 
killings—kicking down doors, terrorizing families, and assassinating them. 
Gareth Porter, a historian who was in Afghanistan during much of Mc-
Chrystal’s tenure, judged the general “was absolutely unqualifi ed to do any-
thing except carry out targeted killing. That’s all he had done for fi ve years 
from 2003 to 2008” (in Scahill 2013: 331).
Consequently, Special Operations ninja teams increased from four to 
nineteen during his Afghanistan command. These teams, called “meat eat-
ers” because they were used for the most violent operations, were conduct-
ing around twenty raids a month by May 2009, which increased to ninety 
a month by that November. A fair number of mid-level Taliban leaders 
were killed, as were some al-Qaeda. Murdering of innocent victims was 
common. In the fi rst four months of 2010 civilian deaths rose 76 percent 
compared to the same months in 2009 (Hastings 2010). This was due in 
some measure to intelligence hitches. Meat eaters relied on Afghan infor-
mants who took the liberty of settling scores with their opponents, who 
might well not be Taliban. The JSOC team that dug the bullets out of the 
pregnant women’s bodies had probably been duped in such a manner. The 
head of the butchered family was a government police offi cial.
Drones were introduced into the fi ght against the Taliban a bit ear-
lier than the surge, during which their operation increased. One military 
expert said they were “incredibly helpful” in COIN operations, and Mc-
Chrystal declared them “extraordinarily effective” in gathering the intelli-
gence needed for COIN (Drew 2010). The US was reported to have some 
two hundred armed drones at that time, and over 1,200 drone strikes were 
recorded between 2008 and 2012 (Woods and Ross 2012). As in Yemen, 
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these were used for targeted assassinations of Taliban leaders. Just like 
JSOC’s raids, they tended to harm civilians. US offi cials from the president 
on down have claimed that drone raids are precise and cause fewer civilian 
casualties. However, one study using classifi ed military data between mid 
2010 and mid 2011 found drone strikes to be ten times more deadly to 
Afghan civilians than strikes by fi ghter jets (Ackerman 2013).
Did the surge work? McChrystal was relieved of command 23 June 
2010, ostensibly for naughty remarks he and his staff made about Obama’s 
security elites, which were reported by Michael Hastings (2010) in Rolling 
Stone magazine.6 He was replaced by Petraeus, who argued in the spring of 
2011 that the surge was a success because, as he told the New York Times, 
“the momentum of the Taliban” was “halted in much of the country and 
reversed in some areas” (in Gall 2011). Incorrect!
During the surge, there was “a notable rise in support for the Taliban 
and a record number of US soldiers killed” (Scahill 2013: 331). There were 
more insurgent attacks in 2010 than in any other year since the Taliban 
insurgency had begun. By 2009–2010, according to Rashid (2012: 116), 
“many Afghans and Western diplomats realized that the U.S. military surge 
was not working, and that the Taliban were growing stronger and spreading 
into every corner of the country.” Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, who 
made an inspection tour in 2011, reported, “I heard many stories of how 
insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a US 
or … ISAF base” (Davis 2012). 7 The problem became especially acute in 
and around Kabul, the capital: “Large areas (including towns) were under 
Taliban control, and development work had come to a standstill” (Rashid 
2012: 107). At the time of the McChrystal debacle, Obama told his De-
fense secretary: “I don’t have a sense it’s going well in Afghanistan. He 
[McChrystal] doesn’t seem to be making progress” (Gates 2014: 488). Af-
ter a decade of war against the Taliban, the US was not “making progress.”8
On 19 November 2010 at a NATO summit meeting in Lisbon, a deci-
sion was taken to withdraw NATO forces by 2014. The US military does 
not include the term “retreat” in its vocabulary but rather speaks of “tac-
tical retrograde.” In June 2011, the president announced US troop with-
drawal was to begin in the next few months. Of course, Obama announced 
the drawdown would proceed from a “position of strength” (in CNN Wire 
Staff 2011), but the reality was different. After a decade of fi ghting against 
a far smaller, vastly less well-armed enemy, the New American Empire had 
failed to defeat its foe. Consequently, the Obama administration did what 
the Bush II administration had done earlier in Iraq: it began tactical ret-
rograde, or more precisely, it once again cut and ran. Consider the role of 
the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires that put Obama’s regime 
into this position.
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Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: Immediately after 9/11, Bush 
II declared the GWOT, posing a hermeneutic puzzle: Who did it, and 
where were they? Very soon they perceived it was terrorists who had done 
it—Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda—and they were in Afghanistan. Bush II 
demanded to be given Osama, “dead or alive” (“Transcript of President 
Bush’s Address” 2001). When the Taliban refused to give bin Laden up 
either “dead or alive,” they too were perceived as enemy terrorists.
For Americans, 9/11 was a terrible shock. War had always been else-
where. But now it was on Wall Street, the iconic heart of US global capital-
ism, and the towers crumbling in fl ames and smoke were metonyms of that 
capitalism’s vulnerability. That vulnerability was replayed over and over 
again as the world watched on television the towers fall repeatedly in each 
new news bulletin. Bush II and his senior advisors were Vulcans, tough 
guys dedicated to aggressively providing for the national security. They 
had failed, and to a handful of terrorists at that. Bush II is very clear about 
this, recalling in his memoirs that “we would fi ght the war on terror on the 
offense, and the fi rst battlefront would be Afghanistan” (2010: 190). So 
procedurally, Shultzian Permission having been granted because the US 
homeland had been attacked, the Vulcans solved their hermeneutic puzzle 
by doing what the relevant anti-terrorism public délire instructed them to 
do: they took the offensive against Afghanistan. It mattered little that the 
Taliban had nothing to do with 9/11. Above all, then, Afghanistan II was a 
string of events that resulted from Security Elites 3.0’s implementation of 
the anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public délire. But was 
Afghanistan II only about terrorism?
During the 1990s Afghanistan had become a player in the Central Asian 
pipeline competition, which pitted the Iranians, Russians, and Chinese 
against the Americans. An important component of this competition con-
cerned how Turkmenistan’s abundant natural gas would be pumped to mar-
kets. Some of this gas fl owed to Russia through old Soviet-era pipelines. The 
Chinese proposed a Central Asia–China pipeline that would pass through 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, China. Such a 
pipeline challenged Western predominance in the energy market. It will 
be recalled that the Clinton administration had proposed an alternative, 
the TAPI dual oil/gas line (Rashid 2010: chaps. 12 and 13). If successful it 
would enrich US petroleum interests, frustrating those of Russia, Iran, and 
China. Certain US offi cials who had helped the Taliban in the mid 1990s 
were now negotiating with them to support the pipeline. Unfortunately, 
“Unocal unsuccessfully tried to induce the Taliban as late as last summer 
into making a deal for a major oil pipeline across the country. When the 
talks broke off, there were rumblings in Washington that the Taliban would 
have to make way for a more pliable government” (Shor 2001).
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Unable to secure Taliban backing for the pipeline, UNOCAL lobbied 
the US government to aid its search for a way to proceed with its proj-
ect. The new Bush II administration—which, as earlier noted, was full 
of oilmen and an oil woman (Rice)—was sympathetic and in early 2001 
discussed plans to convince “the Taliban in Afghanistan to accept con-
struction of an American (Unocal) pipeline” (Phillips 2006: 83). The Tal-
iban remained recalcitrant. Consequently, according to Chalmers Johnson 
(2005: 176), “Support for this [UNOCAL] enterprise appears to have been 
a major consideration in the Bush administration’s decision to attack Af-
ghanistan.” In 2007, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central 
Asian Affairs Richard Boucher certainly supported Johnson’s claim when 
he said, “One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan, so it can become a 
conduit and a hub between South and Central Asia so that energy can fl ow 
to the south” (in Blum 2012).
It is unclear whether support for the TAPI pipeline was a “major consid-
eration” in the decision to attack Afghanistan in 2001. As noted, 9/11 was 
a terrible shock to the (US imperial) system, and because it had happened 
on the Vulcans’ watch, they had to punish the terrorists. Thus understood, 
the fi ght against terrorism was clearly a key reason for attacking Afghan-
istan. Further, there were geopolitical considerations. Victory in Afghan-
istan could give the US a military presence on China’s western border; 
contributing to the surrounding of China with American military instal-
lations, a repetition of the Cold War strategy of militarily encircling the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, Afghanistan also shares a border with Russia, so 
establishment of US bases in Afghanistan could have the same effects vis-
à-vis that country, aiding then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s pol-
icy of re-surrounding Russia to prevent its re-emergence as a superpower.
Nevertheless, it is clear that had the TAPI pipeline been constructed, it 
would have helped the New American Empire control oil by establishing 
a power over the distribution of petroleum products to market. As the 
oil-control public délire instructs, if it is perceived that war is necessary 
to maintain, establish, or increase control over petroleum products, then 
proceed to war. The Bush II administration—particularly its many oilmen 
informed of the situation by Karzai and UNOCAL offi cials—perceived 
that if they went to war in Afghanistan, they could remove the Taliban ob-
stacle to the TAPI pipeline and increase US control over petroleum. They 
went to war. Plausibly, implementation of the oil-control public délire was a 
“consideration” in the commencement of Afghanistan II. After all, it killed 
several birds with one stone—revenge on the terrorists and assistance in 
maintaining the empire’s “energy security” being two of those birds.
But it was a pipe(line) dream. The presence of global warring through-
out Afghanistan made it impossible to construct a pipeline there. On 13 
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December 2009 President Hujin Tao of China opened the Central Asia–
China pipeline (Lomov 2009), revealing how uncompetitive the US had 
become by being bogged down in a war it fought, at least in part, to secure 
its own pipeline.
The global warring of Afghanistan II occurred during the perfect storm 
of intensifying and coalescing contradiction, Shultzian Permission was 
granted immediately on discovery that 9/11 was authored from Afghani-
stan, and the ensuing hostilities were implementations of the anti-terrorist 
and oil-control public délires—evidence consistent with the global warring 
theory.
So, since 2001 the US has been involved in indirect and direct, overt 
global warring in Afghanistan. It has utilized the most sophisticated drone 
technology, together with COIN tactics, to advance this fi ghting, causing 
many civilian casualties, but all for naught. The Taliban were undefeated 
as of 2014. No pipeline was built. Recall that Rumsfeld had said that in-
vasion of Afghanistan was supposed to “destroy” al-Qaeda there and else-
where. Certainly there have been bad moments for al-Qaeda, including 
bin Laden’s assassination. But although al-Qaeda may have been weak-
ened, it was far from destroyed. Today its affi liates fl ourish throughout the 
world. Perhaps this is because the COIN warfare increased the number of 
terrorists opposing the US and its allies. The JSOC ninjas fl itting through 
Afghan nightscapes and cutting bullets out of pregnant corpses were a fi ne 
marketing tool for all varieties of terrorists. It is time to bring Pakistan into 
the narrative.
Pakistan, 2001–2013: The Ally That Was the Enemy
Where did the Taliban and their allies go after the 2001 US offensive? Peter 
Dale Scott (2007: 135) reported that “in June 2002, Pakistani national po-
lice estimated” that some 10,000 Afghan Taliban cadres and followers and 
about 5,000 al Qaida fi ghters were hiding in Pakistan, “with the full sup-
port of intelligence authorities, as well as religious and tribal groups.” This 
fi gure of 15,000 partisans probably represents a majority of Taliban and 
al-Qaeda soldiers. Most of the mujahideen were either in the mountains of 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Northwest Pakistan, in 
Baluchistan, or in Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir. During Afghanistan II, the 
FATA would become critical for the Taliban’s and its allies’ operations. This 
territory on Afghanistan’s eastern border consists of seven tribal areas—
Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South 
Waziristan—and the six frontier regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki 
Marwat, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan. For Taliban and al-Qaeda, it was a 
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safe area where US troops could not get at refugees. At the hostilities’ on-
set, then, the US Leviathan was fi ghting in a country where, for the most 
part, the enemy was absent. The implications of the preceding for Pakistan 
are explored below.9
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan had generally been a US gov-
ernment client, though the relationship had its ups and downs. The US 
paid strategic rent in military and economic assistance in exchange for 
support during the Cold War. Washington was grateful for this backing 
because India, Pakistan’s powerful neighbor, expressed affection for the So-
viets. Pakistan’s assistance was especially important during Afghanistan I 
(1979–1988), when the US used it as what security elites termed a “sup-
port platform” from which to manage its indirect, covert global warring 
against the Bear.
Afterward, during the 1990s, relations between Pakistan and the US de-
teriorated. Islamabad developed nuclear weapons, and Washington began 
to warm up toward India, which after all was vastly more important than 
Pakistan and in need of new friends now that its Soviet ally was no more. 
By 2001, Pakistan was under US economic embargo and had stopped re-
ceiving American economic and military assistance.
Everything changed when Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was recognized 
as the attacker of the Twin Towers. It was once again urgent that Pakistan 
serve as a support platform for American délires. So, according to the then 
President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf, his country was told by Richard 
Armitage, Colin Powell’s deputy secretary, that it must join the GWOT 
or be bombed “back to the Stone Age.” Musharraf thought it a “very rude 
remark” (in Schorn 2006: 1), he confi ded to his interviewer on the tele-
vision program in which he revealed Armitage’s ultimatum. But he got 
the message, and in exchange for billions of dollars largely allotted to the 
Pakistan military, the US has had Pakistan as an ally in its global warring 
against Afghanistan ever since.
The Friend That Was the “Greatest Threat” 
According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, there 
have been six elements of Pakistani assistance to the New American Em-
pire during Afghanistan II:
First, Pakistan allowed the United States to fl y sorties from the south over 
Pakistani airspace into Afghanistan—vital because of Iran’s unwillingness to 
open its airspace to U.S. planes. Second, Islamabad granted U.S. troops access 
to a handful of its military bases, although insisting that the bases should not be 
used for offensive operations. Third, tens of thousands of Pakistani troops pro-
vided force protection for those bases and for U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean. 
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Fourth, Pakistan provided logistical support for the U.S. war effort in Afghani-
stan, including vast amounts of fuel for coalition aircraft and port access for the 
delivery of vital supplies. Fifth, the Pakistani military deployed 80,000 soldiers 
to its western border in a mostly unsuccessful effort to capture or kill Al Qaeda 
and Taliban leaders fl eeing Afghanistan. And sixth, Islamabad provided Wash-
ington with access to Pakistani intelligence assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
(C. Cohen 2007: 3)
However, maybe Armitage should have been more polite, because Pakistan 
turned out to have been the ally from Hell, as the following text makes 
clear.
The Pakistani military and its intelligence agency, the ISI, enjoy sub-
stantial autonomy vis-à-vis other government branches and since inde-
pendence have staged fi ve coups that led to the installation of military 
dictatorships. They have considerable control over foreign affairs, re-
gardless of whether the government is civilian or military, as it is fi xated 
upon thwarting its perceived enemy, India. Pakistani security elites further 
reckon that in order to frustrate Indian designs, it is vital that Pakistan 
have infl uence in Afghanistan so the latter can be used as a buffer against 
Indian hostile intentions. Critically, creation and maintenance of proxy 
pro-Pakistani military forces in Afghanistan has been the means the mili-
tary and ISI use to achieve this infl uence.
The Afghan Taliban were a project of the ISI. Mullah Dadullah Akhund, 
a senior Taliban military commander under Mullah Omar, reorganized 
the insurgents in Pakistan after the debacle of 2001. The ISI assisted him 
with fi nancial resources, equipment, and training; then helped insert the 
mujahideen back into Afghanistan in 2003; and thereafter helped Mul-
lah Barador, who took over as Mullah Omar’s deputy, fi nd safe havens 
for his guerillas after operations against NATO forces. Those on the New 
American Empire’s side knew of these safe havens. Karzai had warned the 
US and NATO that Pakistan was accommodating al-Qaeda and the Tal-
iban, lamenting, “Year after year, day after day, we have said the fi ghting 
against terrorism is not in the villages of Afghanistan … [but] is in the 
safe-havens” (in Rashid 2012: 10). Obama understood this, declaring on 
the campaign trail even before his election that “the greatest threat to our 
security” in Afghanistan “lies in the tribal regions of Pakistan,” by which he 
meant the FATA (ibid.: 43). Pakistan, then, was an ally that was not only 
an enemy, but the enemy posing the “greatest threat.”
Global Warring in Pakistan, 2001–2013: Engagement of the enemy lurking 
in the FATA led to the two major forms of global warring within Paki-
stan. The fi rst of these is what journalists have come to call the “drone 
war.” To address the “greatest threat,” Obama choose to increase the use 
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of drones that were used to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership largely in 
the FATA, seeking to eliminate it as a refuge and staging area. Further, the 
president allowed the CIA to use a “signature strike” policy to decide upon 
drone operations.
Under this policy it was not necessary to know that a target to be at-
tacked actually consisted of “terrorists.” Rather, a target could be hit if it 
exhibited certain “signatures” of one containing terrorists. One such sig-
nature was that the target contained “military-aged males,” regardless of 
whether these were or were not terrorists (Scahill 2013: 249). Note that 
“the military slang for a man killed by a drone strike is ‘bug splat,’ since 
viewing the body through a grainy-green video image gives the sense of 
an insect being crushed” (Hastings 2012); which means that a signature 
of Obama’s Afghanistan policy was putting US soldiers in the business of 
making “bug splats” from “bugs” that might or might not be the enemy.
According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Woods 2001), 
there were well over 300 drone strikes between 2004 and 2011, the ma-
jority of them ordered by Obama. They killed an estimated 2,300 people 
(ibid.). Initially the strikes were covert, but their secrecy was revealed be-
cause of their tendency to kill just one combatant for every ten civilians 
killed, according to a Brookings Institution account (Byman 2009).
These strikes provoked hermeneutic politics among US security elites 
and ordinary Americans. On one side were those who perceived them as 
immoral and illegal. On the other were a handful of security elites, who 
understood them to be a cost-effective, effi cient way to make bug splats. 
Among the Pakistani—elite and otherwise—perceptions were more inti-
mate, of kin pulped by Hellfi re rockets. John O. Brennan, Obama’s chief 
counterterrorism adviser (2009–2013), insisted that in the year 2011 the 
drones had killed only terrorists, no civilians (Shane 2011). Such wrong 
claims “incensed” Pakistanis scraping up the splats of their loved ones 
(Rashid 2012: 173). Nevertheless, in the hermeneutic politics over drone 
use those Security Elites 3.0 who favored drone utilization won, in large 
measure because President Obama, the person with the authority force 
resource to approve them, did so. On 23 May 2013, during an address 
at the National Defense University, the president said he had authorized 
escalation of drone warfare because it was “effi cient,” “legal,” and “moral” 
(Obama 2013). The Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey, California, 
hired a philosopher to argue their morality (R. Carroll 2012).
A second form of US global warring in the FATA centered on what 
actually were three enemies of the New American Empire in this region—
two we know of, al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban—and a third, the Pa-
kistan Taliban, discussed below. After US forces drove al-Qaeda and the 
Afghan Taliban into the FATA, and as part of Islamabad’s earlier described 
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agreement with the US, Pakistan sent its army into the FATA to fi nish the 
refugee insurgents in July of 2002. 
But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri 
sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them 
into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishan-
dling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected Al Qaeda 
militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the 
rebel tribesmen. (Abbas 2004)
Out of these hostilities there emerged the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (i.e., 
the Pakistan Taliban) under Baitullah Mehsud. They were allied with the 
Afghan Taliban, with whom they nevertheless had their differences. The 
Pakistan Taliban sought to overturn the Pakistan state; the Afghan Tali-
ban were indifferent to this goal. The Pakistan Taliban were more closely 
allied with al-Qaeda than the Afghan Taliban, who never took an oath 
of allegiance to al-Qaeda. The Pakistan Taliban shared with al-Qaeda a 
commitment to global jihad and were willing to train jihadis to attack the 
US. The Afghan Taliban were nationalists and indifferent to calls for global 
jihad. Pakistan Taliban expansion has been especially strong in Bajaur and 
South Waziristan in the FATA and in Swat, the “Switzerland” of Pakistan. 
Rashid (2012: 26) has said that by 2011 the Pakistan Taliban were “much 
more dangerous” than the Afghan Taliban.
Facing three enemies in the FATA, the US obliged Pakistan to live up to 
the terms of its agreement with the US and send its army to rid this area of 
these foes. In 2004, eighty thousand Pakistani troops invaded the FATA. 
Between 2004 and 2006 the Pakistani army invaded the FATA eight more 
times. During these invasions the Pakistani army did not fi ght especially 
hard to defeat the insurgents, who were often allowed to discreetly with-
draw. The results of these incursions were inconclusive. The army invaded 
and the various Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters melted into the hills; then 
the army left, and everybody returned. The inability to root out opponents 
in the rugged FATA was an important reason for the use of drones; one of 
which killed Baitullah Mehsud. Nevertheless, neither drones nor invasions 
were able to “alter the balance of power in the FATA, where the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda still ruled” (Rashid 2012: 45).
In sum, the US warred in Pakistan in support of its Afghanistan global 
war. Its warring was intended to eliminate the FATA safe haven. On the 
one hand, the empire directly warred with drones, at fi rst covertly and then 
overtly, seeking to decapitate their opponents’ organizations by killing their 
commanders. On the other hand, it warred indirectly by using the Pakistani 
army as its proxy to go in with boots on the ground and fi nish off these op-
ponents. As in Afghanistan, both forms of warring failed. What role, if any, 
did the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires have in these hostilities?
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The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: US warring in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan conjoined two countries in a single confl ict. The Obama 
administration seemed to realize this in January 2009 when it appointed 
Richard Holbrooke its special envoy to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
charged with dealing comprehensively with both nations at the same time. 
Thereafter, Obama security elites would speak of the “AfPak” situation 
(Prados 2009). Another way to say it is that ultimately, the US Leviathan 
fought in Pakistan as part of its fi ghting in Afghanistan. Hence it fought in 
Pakistan to eliminate terrorists and to help make possible the TAPI pipe-
line that would run through both Afghanistan and Pakistan. So it makes 
sense to understand the two public délires as having the same relevance to 
the fi ghting in Pakistan as they had in Afghanistan.
The global warring in Pakistan occurred during the intensifi cation and 
coalescence of the cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dominated con-
tradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted because efforts to negotiate 
with insurgents in the FATA were unsuccessful—they were already en-
gaged in anti-US hostilities. The fi ghting, as an extension of that in Af-
ghanistan, involved implementation of the oil-control and anti-terrorist 
public délires—information consistent with the global warring theory.
What were the consequences of these hostilities? Three seem crucial. 
First, the warring, taking place in a context of Pakistan being both enemy 
and friend, strained US-Pakistan relations. The Pakistan military and ISI 
supported the Afghan Taliban, so they could not trust the US. Imperial 
Security Elites 3.0 could not trust Islamabad’s Pakistani counterparts for 
the same reason. Pakistanis of all stripes, like Afghanis, were appalled at 
the drone campaign. Sometimes the ISI was informed of drone attacks; at 
other times it was not. At one point the ISI and the CIA were “fi ghting 
in public,” and by fall of 2011 relations between Pakistan and the US ap-
peared to be “utterly breaking down” (Rashid 2012: 57, 160). At issue was 
whether the US’s global warring in Pakistan would cause it to lose a client, 
perhaps to a rapidly rising China. All this suggested another place was 
threatening the bonds of empire.
Second, the warring grew terrorists rather than diminishing them. Prior 
to the AfPak wars there was no Pakistan Taliban. By 2009 it was a pow-
erful force conducting operations throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
and plotting to conduct them in the US. Equally, the drone wars seem to 
have strengthened both the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban. The tactic of 
turning mid-level commanders into bug splats was never likely to win the 
AfPak wars. Rather, killing insurgents and civilians in ways that seemed 
cowardly and immoral to their kin created recruits for a Taliban motivated 
to seek revenge. To the degree that these tactics were part of a strategy of 
COIN warfare, they suggest the ineffectiveness of such tactics. After all, 
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operations that leave more enemies on the fi eld after hostilities are not 
winners.
Third, the goal of doing something in a war is to help win it. But when 
Washington’s operations in Pakistan failed to reverse the situation in Af-
ghanistan, the empire went into tactical retrograde, leaving more “terror-
ists” in the fi eld after 9/11 than there had been before it. All in all, US 
military operations in Pakistan in support of its Afghan adventures have 
been detrimental to the US Leviathan.
It is time to consider a fi nal Central Asian war that occurred outside of 
the region, in the Balkans—that in Kosovo.
Kosovo 1998–1999: “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do”?
The 1960s heartthrob Neil Sedaka had a hit song entitled “Breaking Up is 
Hard to Do.” The discussion of the Kosovo War, which was part of the Bal-
kan Wars of the 1990s, is in part an inquiry into whether the “breaking up” 
of Yugoslavia was “hard to do.” The investigation begins by observing that 
between 1991 and 2001 in the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, global warring was constant. Two different phases of confl ict 
might be distinguished.
A fi rst phase of warring involved confl icts to the north and west of Ser-
bia: the Slovenian War (1991), the Croatian War (1991–1995), and the 
Bosnian Wars (1992–1995) that pitted Serbia, led by Slobodan Milošević, 
against the breakaway territories of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. These 
were over by 1995 and, in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia, ended in agree-
ments reached at the Dayton Conference (November–December 1995). 
The result was that the rebellious provinces became independent states. 
Thereafter, the second phase of fi ghting escalated to the south, becoming 
the Kosovo War (1998–1999) that resulted in the NATO bombing of Ser-
bia (1999), and fi nally the Macedonia confl ict (2001). The New Amer-
ican Empire, together with its NATO allies, participated in both phases 
of warring, the US conducting extensive bombing operations against Ser-
bia. These wars were a “re-balkanization” that broke the Socialist Federal 
Republic up into micro-polities. The following discussion covers different 
explanations of these Balkan Wars, especially Kosovo, leading to a verdict 
on whether breaking up was hard to do.10
Explaining the Balkan Wars
Explanations of the Balkan Wars seem to fall into two categories. Some 
fi nd their causes within ex-Yugoslavia itself. For example, a number of au-
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thors have stressed ethnic animosity. Robert Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy 
(2001) was important in this regard, arguing that in Yugoslavia and else-
where, the fall of the Soviet Union, together with the weakening of strong 
socialist governments, led to a rekindling of pre-existing ethnic hatreds 
that in turn sparked ethnic civil war. Another such approach understood 
the wars primarily as a result of the rise of intense nationalisms within the 
different provinces of the former Yugoslavia. When the fall of the USSR 
ignited these nationalisms, Slovenes, Kosovars, Croatians, and Serbians 
demanded national sovereignty.
A second approach has emphasized factors that were external to the 
former Yugoslavia. The US and NATO were key external actors in the 
warring. This perspective has emphasized the geopolitical readjustments 
that were consequences of the USSR’s fall. The Bear’s demise meant that 
its Eastern European post–World War II acquisitions were “free” to choose 
their destiny. However, from the vantage of the West these newly “liber-
ated” states needed to be un-liberated, that is, incorporated into the New 
American Empire. This was done in part by expanding NATO eastward, 
allowing former satellite states to the join European Union, and promot-
ing private and public investment in Eastern European enterprise. Most 
of the former Soviet Eastern European client states quickly got with the 
program and joined the EU, became NATO members, and surrendered to 
neoliberalization. What the US Leviathan was doing to Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s, the Soviets had done to it in the late 1940s. The dominos were 
falling to the benefi t of Washington, and Old Molotov must have been 
spinning in his grave.
Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia, proved to be the holdout—the dom-
ino that would not fall. Noam Chomsky’s (2006: 1) account of the Balkan 
civil wars concluded that “the real purpose of the war” was to deal with 
Serbia, which “was not carrying out the required social and economic re-
forms, meaning it was the last corner of Europe which had not subordi-
nated itself to the US-run neoliberal programs, so therefore it had to be 
eliminated.” Chomsky’s opinion might be dismissed as radical. However, 
Vjeran Pavlakovic (2005 1), a European liberal, supports Chomsky, assert-
ing that Serbia after 1989 did not choose “democratization and economic 
liberalization,” and this noncompliance in the geopolitics of post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe had to be eliminated.
The US, in concert with its Western European clients, practiced this 
elimination by using NGOs in what some have called “color revolutions” 
to whip up separatist, nationalist sentiments in Yugoslavia’s different prov-
inces (Johnstone 1998), and by using the IMF to wreak havoc in their 
economies, further fueling demands for independence.11 In November 
1990 the US Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 
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cutting US aid to any province of Yugoslavia that did not declare indepen-
dence within six months. Reacting to this assault on sovereignty, Milošević 
organized a new Communist Party in November 1990 to defend a unifi ed 
Yugoslavia, thereby preparing for war. Washington answered Milošević 
with a total economic embargo, devastating the economy with 70 percent 
unemployment and hyperinfl ation. Unsurprisingly, under these conditions 
Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), and Bosnia-Herzogovenia (1992) declared 
independence. Milošević tried militarily to reverse this, and ugly fi ghting 
followed—the siege of Sarajevo, the massacre at Srebrenica. In 1992 the 
UN sent troops in and the US bombed Serbia (30 August–20 September 
1995). This led to the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) and occupation by 
sixty thousand NATO troops, crowning the success of the re-balkanization 
policy by guaranteeing the sovereignty of the new micro-states like Croa-
tia, Bosnia, and Slovenia, making them virtual wards of the New American 
Empire. Sedaka seems to have had it wrong. Breaking up was a piece of 
cake—when the New American Empire, with a little help from its NATO 
clients, did the job.
A second external explanation of the Balkan Wars has to do with US 
and European security elites’ solution of the hermeneutic puzzle of the 
ugliness of the fi ghting in these Balkan Wars. The solution of the puz-
zle turned upon a perceptual interpretation of Serbian leadership. Serb 
leaders—especially Slobodan Milošević, president of Serbia, and Rado-
van Karadžić, head of the Serbian portion of Bosnia—were constructed as 
monster-alterities, promoters of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and terrorism 
that grossly violated human rights. Liberal hawks demanded the “benign 
imperialism” (the phrase is Kaldor’s [1999]) of military intervention against 
Serbia, whose leaders were so appalling. In this explanation, the US’s and 
its clients’ implementation of a liberal hawk iteration of the anti-terrorist 
hermeneutic was an external cause of the wars.
A problem with this explanation, at least vis-à-vis the attack on Kosovo, 
is raised by David Halberstam, who wrote so perceptively on the Vietnam 
War. Having also examined the Balkan Wars, he observed that “the last 
thing” Clinton wanted prior to the Kosovo confl ict was further “military 
intervention in the Balkans” (Halberstam 2001: 397).12 Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was against it. William Cohen, Clinton’s 
secretary of defense, was against it. His NATO clients were “unsure” about 
it (ibid.). What, then, were the hermeneutic politics that led to the con-
fl ict when such powerful security elites were inclined to forgo it?
At this juncture Kosovo enters the narrative. In 1998 the Kosovo Liber-
ation Army (KLA) was using guerilla tactics to vigorously attack Serbian 
interests in Kosovo, and the Serbs were responding with great energy. Ac-
cording to William Walker, the American head of the Kosovo Verifi cation 
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Mission, organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the Serbians infl icted an “unspeakable atrocity” on Kosovars at 
Raček on 15 January 1999 (in Rowland 1999); in Walker’s interpretation 
it reached the level of “a crime against humanity” (Halberstam 2001: 410). 
The Raček incident led to a peace conference at Rambouillet in France 
(6 February 1999), which failed. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe (SACEUR) of US forces, told Miloševič that if 
he did not withdraw from Kosovo, NATO would “systematically attack, 
disrupt, degrade, and devastate” Serbia with bombing (in Norris 2005: 
5). Peaceful measures had been taken to achieve US goals, but Miloševič 
stood his ground.
Consequently, as the next section shows, Shultzian Permission was 
granted, and a month and a half after Rambouillet, the US and its allies 
were “systematically” bombing Serbia. This continued for seventy-eight 
days, after which Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo. Why did Clinton go 
to war in Kosovo when it was the “last thing” he wanted? I believe that the 
anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires, containing elements of the pre-
ceding four explanations, help answer this question. Let us now look more 
closely at the events leading up to implementation of the anti-terrorist 
public délire, which will bring us to the oil-control public délire.
The Anti-Terrorist Public Délire: It was earlier suggested that US participa-
tion in the Kosovo War was a case of US application of the anti-terrorist 
public délire. Let us examine more closely the case for this understanding 
by examining the actors involved in it. Strobe Talbott, who was close to 
President Clinton and became, as deputy secretary of state, an important 
formulator of his foreign policy, recalled that the Kosovo War occurred 
because, “the West was reiterating a principle that had been taking shape 
for several years: the government of individual states is not absolute; a 
national government that systematically and massively abuses its own cit-
izens loses its right to govern” (Talbott and Chanda, 2001: x). How did 
security elites like Talbott know this? They knew it because hermeneuts 
told them so. The infl uential British political commentator Mary Kaldor 
(1993: 96) told them the Balkan Wars were “grotesque” and “scarcely less 
horrifi c” than “Nazism.” Closer to home, the ex–State Department offi cial 
Louis Sell revealed that Miloševič used “brutal tactics of ethnic cleansing” 
that led to “hundreds of thousands dead” (2002: 5, 8). As already noted, 
William Walker found these “brutal tactics” in the Račak massacre. Made-
leine Albright (1999) insisted Miloševič was running a “campaign of terror 
in Kosovo.” The US Senate declared Serbia “a terrorist state” (K. Talbot 
1999). As reported in chapter 9, Hillary Clinton “urged him [President 
Clinton] to bomb.”
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President Clinton’s security elites, hermeneuts, secretary of state, and 
wife hermetically sealed him into his view: perceptually, the Serb govern-
ment was terrorist; procedurally, the proper course of action was to war 
against terrorists, so long as there was no peaceful alternative. “Clinton 
was adamant that Miloševič had been given every opportunity, and that 
there was simply no alternative to bombing” (Norris 2005: 4), so Shultzian 
Permission was accorded and Serbia was systematically attacked, disrupted, 
degraded, and devastated. All this suggests that in some measure the US 
went to war to implement the anti-terrorism public délire. However, who 
Washington treated as an enemy in Kosovo and who it did not suggests 
that anti-terrorism may not have been the sole factor in its warring there.
In fact, the US also believed the KLA to be a terrorist group. Clinton’s 
Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard stated at a press confer-
ence in 1998 that “we are tremendously disturbed and also condemn very 
strongly the unacceptable violence done by terrorist groups in Kosovo and 
particularly … the Kosovo Liberation Army. This is without any question 
a terrorist group” (in Katulis 2000: 15). A double standard is perceptible 
here: the US attacks one terrorism, yet by doing so it defends another 
terrorism. This suggests that making the world safe from terrorists was not 
the only consideration in the empire’s Kosovo warring. The next argument 
shows that issues of oil control were in the pipeline.
The Oil-Control Public Délire: After the Balkan Wars ended, a literature 
emerged that explains this warring in terms of imperialism (Parenti 2002; 
Johnstone 2002; Collon 2007). Karen Talbot (1999: 18) has suggested that 
“perhaps above all, this U.S.-led NATO onslaught [against Serbia] is about 
oil. It is related to the drive to extend and protect the investments of the 
transnational corporations in the Caspian Sea region, especially the oil 
corporations.”13
The years prior to the Dayton Peace Accords coincided with the earlier 
discussed US oil company investments in the Caspian Basin. Remember, 
Washington recognized that if these investments were to be realized, pipe-
lines needed to be built westward to get the oil to its European allies. The 
now re-balkanized Yugoslavia was an excellent terminus for these west-
ward pipelines. Bill Richardson, President Clinton’s Energy secretary, ex-
pressed this realization in 1998 when he said, 
This [US pipelines in the Balkans] is about America’s energy security. … It’s 
also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values. 
We are trying to move these newly independent countries toward the West. We 
would like to see them reliant on western commercial and political interests. … 
We’ve made a substantial political investment in the Caspian and it’s important 
that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right. (In Rees 1999: 2)
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Richardson was particularly interested in the Albanian Macedonian 
Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO) Pipeline. It was to begin in Burgas, 
Bulgaria, on the Black Sea, where it would receive the Caspian oil; go 
through Macedonia; and terminate at the port of Vlorë in Albania on the 
Adriatic, to be sent to markets in Europe and beyond. AMBO, which was 
founded by Vuko Tashkoviki, an American originally from Macedonia, was 
to build and operate the pipeline. Its CEO and president was Edward Fer-
guson, a former director of oil and gas development at Brown and Root 
Services. The US Trade and Development Agency, (2000:2), believed the 
pipeline was needed because the oil coming from the Caspian Sea “will 
quickly surpass the safe capacity of the Bosphorus as a shipping lane.” The 
scheme, the agency notes, will “provide a consistent source of crude oil 
to American refi neries,” “provide American companies with a key role in 
developing the vital east-west corridor,” “advance the privatization aspira-
tions of the US government in the region,” and “facilitate rapid integra-
tion” of the Balkans “with western Europe.”
A White House spokesperson offered presidential support in 1998, 
insisting, 
The United States, starting with the President, has made this a high object for 
U.S. foreign policy. As the President said the other day, these pipelines are not 
often in the U.S. headlines, but the impact that they can have for world energy 
markets, the impact that they will have for U.S. energy security, the impact that 
they can have for regional security and security on the eastern fl ank of NATO 
and Europe, it’s a profound impact. (In Fisher 2002, 82.) 
Of course, the pipeline the White House preferred was the AMBO.
Kosovo was located along the proposed route of the AMBO pipeline, 
and the US believed it needed to control Kosovo to protect the pipeline. 
For this to occur, Serbia had to be removed from Kosovo. The US acquired 
this control by supporting the KLA terrorists and attacking the Serbian 
ones with US-NATO aerial bombardment of Serbia, which, in the words 
of Strobe Talbott & Chanda (2001: xiii), left Kosovo “a virtual trusteeship, 
and ward of the UN and NATO.” After the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, 
the Pentagon began construction of one of the largest US bases in the 
world, Camp Bond Steel in southeast Kosovo, to permanently house three 
thousand US soldiers and an airfi eld. This gave the US strategic control of 
the oil route from the Caspian to Europe.
Karen Talbot’s suggestion that US fi ghting in Kosovo was “above all” 
about “oil corporations” “investments” may be too strong. However, the 
Clinton administration had made it clear that pipelines from the Caspian 
were “a high object for US foreign policy” because of their importance for 
“energy security.” If such security was provided by control over oil, and if it 
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was perceived that power over pipelines was a way of conferring such con-
trol; then procedurally, warring to achieve pipeline control was warranted 
once other, peaceful ways of achieving such control had failed. We have 
seen that Miloševič’s recalcitrance had led Clinton’s Security Elites 3.0 to 
believe peaceful avenues of control in Kosovo were not possible. In sum, 
the New American Empire fought in the Balkans largely to eliminate one 
sort of terrorism (while advancing another) and, at the same time, advance 
its energy security. In this sense, the Kosovo portion of the Balkan Wars 
might be seen at least in part as an attempt to implement the oil-control 
public délire.
The AMBO pipeline was not built during the Clinton administration. 
The Bush II administration announced in 2007 that Bulgaria, Albania, and 
Macedonia had signed an agreement authorizing its construction, with an 
estimated completion date of 2011 (“AMBO Pipeline Deal” 2007). The 
Obama administration declared in 2011 that the AMBO pipeline was “still 
viable,” even though it had not been constructed, fi nancing for it had not 
been secured, and economic and ecological feasibility studies had not been 
performed (S. Elliott 2011). As of writing, it remains unbuilt.
Again, global warring in Kosovo and the rest of the former Yugoslavia 
was conducted at a time of intensifying and coalescing cyclical, land/cap-
ital, and dominator/dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission was 
granted after the Serbs refused to peacefully acquiesce to the US Levia-
than’s demands, and the global warring involved implementation of the 
anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires. This evidence is all consistent 
with the global warring theory.
In hindsight, the degree to which global warring in Kosovo was about 
defending a never-built pipeline was the degree to which it was folly. The 
old Sedaka song about the diffi culties of breaking up had it both right and 
wrong—wrong, because breaking up Yugoslavia was easy once the empire 
and its NATO clients exercised violent force to do it; and right in the sense 
that breaking up Yugoslavia caused well over a hundred thousand deaths 
while millions endured privation as refugees. For refugees and relatives of 
the dead, breaking up was hard to do.
Africa was another region where development of oil resources was be-
lieved timely for US energy companies’ diversifi cation. It is explored next.
The African Theater
Bush II, during his presidential campaigning in 2000, was asked about Af-
rica’s role in US foreign policy. He responded that it did not “fi t in the 
national strategic interests as far as I can see” (in Servant 2003). Wrong. 
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Within two years, his own offi cials would be explaining why Africa counted. 
Let us see why.
Sub-Saharan Africa was a latecomer to the discovery of oil reserves, but 
since the 1950s there have been numerous fi nds. In the 1960s, Gabon and 
Nigeria went online as producers, and others soon followed. Currently, 
eight producers can be classifi ed as “major”: Gabon, Nigeria, Angola, 
Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea. Afri-
can oil production enjoyed a twenty-fold increase between 1960 and 1971, 
and then doubled between 1981 and 2008 (Fikreyesus 2012). The US im-
ported 15.3 percent of its oil from Africa in 2002, a fi gure that rose to 22 
percent in 2006 and a projected 25 percent by 2015 (ibid.). At the turn 
of the century, Africa’s proven reserves of over thirty billion barrels of oil 
were still dwarfed by Persian Gulf reserves. However, given that only Ni-
geria is a member of OPEC of the African producers, oil stoppages due to 
embargo are less likely. Moreover, much of Africa’s oil is produced near its 
west coast, which is closer to US markets than the Middle East is. By the 
1990s it was clear that African oil represented another way of diversifying 
the empire’s oil supply and reducing America’s dependence on the “rough 
neighborhood.” Finally, at the beginning of the new millennium oil began 
to be discovered in East Africa, in Uganda and Tanzania. African oil was a 
new prize for the US oil industry and Security Elites 3.0 to win.
Accordingly, as had been the case in Central Asia, an oil industry promo-
tion group was formed—the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG)—
to lobby for the Bush administration’s recognition that African oil was a 
“priority” for the New American Empire’s “national security” (Wihbey and 
Schutz 2002). AOPIG, in turn, began another lobbying group, the US-
Africa Energy Association. Walter Kansteiner III, Bush II’s Under Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs, was important in both the US the gov-
ernment and the lobbying groups.14 He appears to have been central in 
getting the Bush II administration to grasp the signifi cance of African oil, 
announcing only two years after Bush II had said Africa was irrelevant to 
the US that African oil was “a priority” for US National Security.
The growing importance of African oil was associated with an increase 
in US military involvement on the continent, justifi ed in terms of terror-
ism. Terrorists had killed the American Special Ops in Somalia and been 
responsible for the destruction of embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. An 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was launched in 1996 to deal 
with such matters. ACRI, consistent with the Clinton administration’s em-
phasis on humanitarian intervention, trained African troops destined for 
peace-keeping missions. Under Bush II, the Trans-Saharan Counter Ter-
rorism Initiative (TSCT) and the Africa Contingency Operations Training 
and Assistance (ACOTA) became operational in 2002 in 2004. ACRI, 
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TSCT, and ACOTA were largely training programs. Under the Old Em-
pires colonial soldiers were trained and organized to fi ght in their respec-
tive empires: the British had their Gurkhas, the French their tireilleurs 
senegalais. The specifi c goal of the New American Empire was to have, by 
the early twenty-fi rst century, twenty African battalions trained to fi ght in 
support of its délires.
Due to the increasing signifi cance of oil, AOPIG and US-Africa En-
ergy Association offi cials believed that US military forces would eventually 
be needed to defend the empire’s interests in Africa. Consequently, the 
associations successfully lobbied for a new military command for the sub-
continent. AFRICOM, created in 2008, was originally headquartered in 
a Nazi-era barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. According to its home page, 
AFRICOM “protects and defends the national security interests of the 
United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states 
and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military opera-
tions, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a 
security environment conducive to good governance and development” 
(U.S. AFRICOM Offi ce of Public Affairs 2013: 2).
In sum, as the years after the 1960s wore on, African oil became increas-
ingly important to the US. By the 1990s prominent Security Elites 3.0 rec-
ognized Africa as a priority for the empire’s well-being, a priority they took 
pains to address militarily. There were numerous wars in Africa during the 
period under consideration. Those in Chad, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda 
appear to have involved the US with its GWOT and quest for oil. Let us 
begin with the Chadian case.
Chad: Fighting Terrorism (For the Terrorists) to Get the Oil
In 1987 President Reagan reassured Chadian President Hissen Habré, 
“Chad knows it can count on its friends” (in Coll 2012: 159). Reagan was 
thanking Chad for aiding his administration in its war against Gaddafi . 
Habré, it will be recalled, became a despot and was indicted for crimes 
against humanity. He was overthrown in 1990 in a coup by his former gen-
eral, Idriss Déby—who, certain Chadians bitterly recall, had commanded 
the operations that infl icted the atrocities that led to the Habré indict-
ment. This section takes up the Chadian story after 1990. It argues that 
US Leviathan remained a “friend” and did so by helping N’Djamena fi ght 
those Deby’s government labelled as terrorists -to help get the oil. All of 
which, it will be clear, has to do with the anti-terrorist and oil-control pub-
lic délires. The narrative begins by explaining why Chad had a friend in the 
New American Empire.




There is a one-word answer to this question: oil. By the 1980s, reserves suf-
fi cient to make the country an oil producer had been discovered in south-
ern Chad at Komé, between the small cities of Doba and Moundou. Chad 
signed an unfavorable production sharing agreement with ExxonMobil in 
1988 (see Coll 2012: 159). Nevertheless, ExxonMobil (hereafter Exxon, 
in a consortium with Chevron and Petronas), supported by a World Bank 
plan to alleviate poverty, developed the oil fi elds through the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Production began in 2003. Three years later 368 wells were in 
production. During the previous year, Exxon had recouped its investments 
through oil sales from Chad, and “the project was now profi table” (ibid.: 
351). The following year it was judged that the poverty alleviation com-
ponent of the project had failed (Reyna 2007a, 2007 b; Coll 2012: 367). 
Meanwhile, China has indicated an interest in Chadian oil and begun op-
erations in the Bongor Basin (Behrends 2011: 92).15 So Exxon fi nds itself 
in a situation of increasing competition.
Exxon made it clear to Security Elites 3.0 that its Chad venture was a 
good deal for the empire, 
Statisticians at ExxonMobil’s … headquarters … prepared Power Point slides 
that emphasized the outsize benefi ts of the corporation’s activities in Chad 
… one thousand American jobs per year … two hundred expatriate jobs for 
Americans in the country generating about $70 million in total revenues; a 
projected 24 million barrels of direct oil exports to American refi neries annu-
ally; and more than $1 billion in profi ts to American shareholders over about 
six years. (Coll 2012: 353) 
The point here is that Exxon had secured access to Chadian oil. It was 
bringing in a tidy profi t. But there was worrisome competition from the 
Chinese. US security elites got the message. As Chris Goldthwaite, US 
ambassador to Chad at the time, expressed it, “the U.S. has one specifi c 
interest in Chad, the oil project …” (ibid.: 175). Chad had a friend in 
Washington because the US wanted its oil. Friendship, however, imposed 
a burden on the US due to the nature of the Chadian state, discussed 
next.
A Repressive State
A recent anonymous, brief piece in the Chadian online journal Tchad Ac-
tuel ended with the sentence “And dictatorship still has beautiful days” 
(Anon. 2013a); an ironic ending because the note had been about the 
repression of Idriss Déby’s dictatorship. Elsewhere I have discussed the na-
ture of Chad’s government (2003b). Nominally, Chad has a republican 
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form of government. Actually, democracy is extremely restricted. Gover-
nance tends toward a dictatorial patrimonialism in which the head of state 
seeks to remain so, less by winning elections than by organizing networks 
of patrimonial followers—rent seekers who have been rewarded with force 
resources drawn from the state. These rewards have been either govern-
mental positions or favors in the private sector that can be awarded by the 
state. Patrimonial followers, then, are typically offi cials or private persons 
awarded government contracts to do something for the state (e.g., building 
roads or sports stadiums).
Consequently Chad, which is among the world’s poorest countries, has 
had a dual opportunity structure: either you are a benefi ciary of the gov-
ernment’s patrimony, or you are not. This means the vast bulk of Chadians 
have really only two possibilities in life. Either they somehow get onto the 
government’s payroll; or they are desperately poor, terribly underemployed 
urban laborers or rural peasants subject to hunger with each new drought. 
On becoming a patrimonial follower of the state, one enters a world of 
villas, automobiles, servants, large bank accounts, and other pleasurable 
things. The exact population of Chad is unknown. Probably there are be-
tween nine and eleven million persons, of whom perhaps only a few thou-
sand are patrimonial followers of any signifi cance.
This means there is fi erce competition to become and remain an im-
portant patrimonial follower. The competition has been violent. Chadian 
governments have typically changed in violent coups that usually pit gov-
ernment forces against paramilitary organizations styling themselves lib-
eration armies, often organized by former followers. Chad has had three 
presidents. The fi rst, François Tombalbaye, was killed in a violent coup 
(1974). The second, Hissen Habré, was removed by his former follower 
Idriss Déby (1990). Since that time, some fi fteen national liberation armies 
have formed and operated in southern, northern, eastern and western 
Chad, all seeking to do unto Déby what he did unto Habré. To be clear, be-
tween 1990 and 2014 there was continual confl ict in Chad as Déby fought 
to remain president, just as between 1963 and 1990 he had waged contin-
ual confl ict to become president. Since independence, the presidency has 
been awarded by violence.
Repression has been a response to violent attempts to remove heads of 
state. It has taken two major forms: either the army is deployed in opera-
tions to eliminate rebel paramilitary organizations; or security services are 
used to intimidate rebellious individuals, often by torture or death. During 
Habré’s presidency such repression became extreme. His especially infa-
mous security service, which was known colloquially as “the vultures” and 
offi cially as the Documentation and Security Directorate, tortured and 
executed large numbers of its victims.16 Déby’s repressive measures have 
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been less spectacular than those of his predecessor but more effective, as 
he has governed for over two decades.
Recently, an article in Tchad Actuel informed readers that “for some 
time, M. Idris Déby Itno has drummed … alerting international opinion 
of a possible menace to Chad from the jihadists, seeking in consequence 
exterior assistance, above all from the West, which is very sensitive to all 
that bears on Islamist movements, and their corollary, jihad-terrorism” 
(Al-Abassy 2013). If “the West” is understood to be the US and its allies, 
then what the journal was reporting is that Déby was charging his imperial 
“friend” a strategic rent. Payment of the rent would come in the form of 
defense of the dictator against those he labeled adherents of “jihad terror-
ism,” though others might claim that those labeled terrorists were merely 
those resisting repression. All this allowed Déby to continue enjoying his 
“beautiful days,” and the US Leviathan to continue controlling Chad’s oil.
“Beautiful Days”: The Empire Pays Its Rent to the Dictator
There have been two sets of rebellions against the Déby regime. The fi rst, 
during the 1990s in the south, directly threatened oil production. The sec-
ond was largely in the 2000s, mainly in the north and east along the Chad/
Sudan border. The narrative moves south.
Southern Rebellion: As noted earlier, the non-Muslim south had controlled 
the central government until 1979, when Muslim rebels from the north, 
ultimately led by Habré, seized the state. Denied their share of the state’s 
patrimony, former southern politicians and military rebelled against it 
throughout Habré’s regime. They were brutally suppressed by troops di-
rected by Déby, who then was commander-in-chief of the Chadian army. 
Two southern rebellions followed Déby’s seizure of the presidency.
The fi rst was that of the Comité de Sursaut National pour la Paix et le 
Démocratie (CSNPD), active between 1991 and 1994. The second rebel-
lion, by the Forces Armées pour le République Fédérale (FARF), lasted 
from 1994 through 1998. The CSNPD was formed by Moïse Ketté, who 
had served in Habré’s security forces. Operating in the extreme southeast 
of Chad, he explicitly made oil part of his military strategy, warning that 
“oil would not fl ow from Doba’ unless his conditions were met” (Buijten-
huijs 1998: 39). In 1992 and 1993 Déby responded by invading the south 
with the Guarde Républicaine of the Armée Nationale Tchadienne. They 
“roamed the land in Toyata pick-ups holding six or seven, seeking victims” 
(Verschave 2000: 165) in “an uninterrupted series of massacres, rapes, and 
village burnings” (ibid: 152). The CSNPD responded to this campaign by 
threatening to “sabotage government-supported oil exploration” (MAR 
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2004: 10). Déby urgently needed tranquility because the “oil giants” were 
“all investigating oil resources” (ibid.: 11). So in August 1994, the govern-
ment and the CSNPD signed a fi nal peace agreement. Ketté ended his re-
sistance, and the government agreed to remove its troops from the south.
Some in the CSNPD regarded Ketté’s fi nal peace accord with Déby as 
a sellout and formed FARF under the leadership of Laokin Bardé in 1994. 
FARF made no secret of its fi ghting for oil—as one leader put it, “I’m 
ready to die for oil” (Petry and Bambé 2005: 101). Government troops and 
FARF engaged in sporadic fi ghting from the end of 1994 though 1995. 
In the spring of 1996, the intensity of the fi ghting increased into what 
one observer labeled a “regime of terror” (Verschave 2000: 166). On 30 
October 1997 Bardé’s headquarters were attacked in Moundou in yet an-
other round of fi ghting there, and many FARF leaders were killed. One 
account of this fi ghting reported: “They killed local personalities passing 
by, they molested a bishop, kidnapped children, killed their parents. Forbid 
burial, throwing bodies to the pigs” (in Verschave 2000: 166). Thereafter, 
security forces numbering an estimated fi ve thousand “spread the terror” 
in an offensive throughout southwestern Chad (ibid: 167): Fighting lasted 
until 1998. Peace accords were signed in May. Bardé chose exile but was 
betrayed by his own kin and killed, after which FARF effectively ceased to 
exist. Armée Nationale Tchadienne troops remained in the south, which 
became effectively an occupied territory. Déby had defended Exxon, as-
suring his control over the oil-producing region of Chad and of any wealth 
it might provide to his government. There would be future fi ghting, but it 
would be over who got the oil spoils.
Northern Rebellion: Almost immediately after the defeat of the south, a 
number of rebel movements formed and began operating in the north 
and east of Chad. Their acronyms were a changing, confusing alphabet 
soup as they formed, died, and/or combined with others. All relied upon 
partisans from Muslim ethnic groups, all were opposed to Déby, and all 
had leaders who came from or wanted into the Chadian central govern-
ment with its growing oil revenues. Among the more important of these 
groups was the Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC), founded in 2005 as 
an alliance of eight different movements and led by Mohammed Nour Ab-
delkerim. There was also the Union of Forces for Democracy and Devel-
opment (UFDD), founded a year after the FUC. Though it was headed by 
Mahamat Nouri, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, it was unlikely to 
fl ourish in Deby’s administration because Nouri was an Anakazza Gorane, 
the same ethnic group as Habré. There was also the Rally of Democratic 
Forces (RDF), which was headed by Tom and Timan Erdimi. Either cous-
ins or nephews of Déby, they had held posts in his government but broke 
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with him to occupy higher positions. At times the Sudanese government 
has supported some of these movements.
Since 2005 these groups have been especially active against Déby’s gov-
ernment. By and large their operations have been in the extreme east, 
where the town of Adré has been attacked twice. There have been two 
extraordinary campaigns against N’Djamena, Chad’s capital in the ex-
treme west. In April of 2006, the FUC set out in Toyota pickups loaded 
with soldiers, weapons, food, and water, and drove 1,000 kilometers from 
the Sudanese border to N’Djamena, which they attacked on 13 April. 
They were quickly driven off. This came to be known as the First Battle 
of N’Djamena. Thereafter, the FUC signed a peace treaty and Moham-
med Nour Abdelkerim achieved his dream of becoming Chad’s defense 
minister, a post he held for only seven months before slipping back into 
opposition. Then in 2008, UFDD and RFC forces did it again, attacking 
N’Djamena on 2 February. This time the fi ghting was more intense. For a 
while it was touch and go. France offered Déby asylum if he wanted it. By 
4 February the battle had swayed to the government’s side, and the rebels 
drove back to the Sudanese borderlands.
In 2009, Chad and Sudan signed a peace accord. Since that time Déby 
has successfully eliminated Sudanese support for the rebels. They have 
weakened, divided, and signed peace treaties. In 2013 Chad’s Communi-
cations minister announced, “There is no Chadian rebellion. … In Chad 
there is calm, peace, and stability” (AFP 2013a). On 21 May 2013, Timan 
Erdimi, now a leader in the United Resistance Forces, announced from 
Qatar that hostilities against Déby had recommenced.
One may ask why the civil wars in Chad are being discussed, as they 
appear to have nothing to do with the US and everything to do with the 
violent politics of African patrimonial states. This is partially, but not en-
tirely correct. Déby and his foes are fi ghting for control over state-derived 
force resources. But the New American Empire is a participant conducting 
covert global warring in ways that are consistent with the oil-control and 
the anti-terrorist public délires. This assertion is justifi ed next.
The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: Consider fi rst the oil-con-
trol public délire. The US Leviathan, through the good offi ces of Exxon and 
its PSA with the Chadian government, largely controls Chadian oil. Déby, 
in turn, has made it clear he defends Exxon. However, the continual civil 
war makes it equally essential that Déby be defended. The US Leviathan 
does this, projecting violent force into Chad in two ways: either directly or 
indirectly, through a proxy.
There are both CIA and JSOC Special Ops in Chad. Their exact num-
bers are unclear. At some point General Stanley McChrystal was in Chad, 
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presumably to either initiate or strengthen JSOC there. He is said to have 
run some missions with Mel Gamble, the CIA head of the Africa Division, 
Directorate of Operations (Coll 2012: 173). The full range of US Chadian 
operations is unknown. It was reported in 2003 that the Americans were 
building an airstrip in the desert just north of N’Djamena. The US con-
ducts training, especially in COIN tactics.17 It equally provides military 
equipment and intelligence. Under some conditions it provides logistical 
support, as well as certain types of operational assistance. By 2007, accord-
ing to a diplomatic cable from the American embassy in N’Djamena, Dé-
by’s military had two battalions of US-trained troops, twenty of whom were 
killed that year in fi ghting in the east (N’Djamena 933 2012: 2). These bat-
talions were the neo-colonial iteration of the colonial tirailleurs senegalaises.
The US is also supported by a proxy, one the most powerful client states in 
its empire. This is France, the former colonial power in Chad. Upon Chad-
ian independence, France and Chad signed a defense accord to defend the 
government in power. France has not always honored this agreement but 
has continually used the accord to project military force into Chad. Paris 
has two permanent bases in the country: a larger one in N’Djamena, next 
to the airport; and a smaller one in Abeché in the east near the Sudanese 
border. Each base has a complement of air force personnel and commandos 
(sometimes the Foreign Legion).
France militarily participated in both the southern and northern rebel-
lions during Déby’s rule. The same French units that are held to have 
trained the militias that conducted the massacres in Rwanda are reported 
to have trained the Guarde Républicaine. Chadian police and soldiers in 
the south, “trained by French instructors, continued the assassinations: 
local offi cials, high school students, peasants … torture was made banal” 
(Verschave 2000: 167). Certain scholars of French politics might scoff at 
the idea that France has acted as a US proxy in Chad. Such skepticism is 
unwarranted. France and the US do coordinate security concerns. After 
all, what is good for Washington is good for Paris. So Chad provided the 
soldiers, and the US and France trained them, armed them, provided them 
with intelligence, and helped out when the situation required.
The oil-control public délire is one where US security elites perceptually 
identify a threat to US oil control, and procedurally act to eliminate that 
threat. In the 1990s and early 2000s, US Security Elites 3.0 perceptually 
interpreted the Chad case as one where armed rebels were seeking to de-
stroy Déby, who was defending the US’s control of oil there. This meant it 
was procedurally appropriate to expend violent force in support of Déby, 
that is, in support of the empire’s control of oil. US exercise of violent 
force, understood in this context, appears consistent with application of 
the oil-control public délire. What about the anti-terrorist public délire?
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A paragraph concerning Chad in the 2013 State Department document 
“Country Reports on Terrorism” provides some insight into this topic. The 
document announced that for the year 2012, 
Countering terrorism threats in Chad was a priority at the highest levels of 
Chad’s government, with a particular focus on countering potential terrorist 
threats from across the Sahel region. Special Operations Command Africa, 
through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahara, maintained a 
Special Operations Forces Liaison Element in Chad to support Chadian coun-
terterrorism forces with training and logistical support. (State Department 
2013) 
By the second decade of the new millennium, this quotation indicates, both 
Déby’s government and that of the US had come to perceive Chad’s ene-
mies as terrorists. Procedurally, then, Chad had come to have a “particular 
focus on countering” this menace, which the US military, in the form of the 
Special Operations Forces Liaison Element, supported. In other words, the 
US Leviathan’s military force projection into Chad was to combat terrorism.
How this came to be can be speculated upon: Chad has had a friend in 
Washington since the Reagan administration, and N’Djamena had had a 
CIA presence since well before Reagan. In the earlier days of national liber-
ation movements’ rebellions against N’Djamena, the Chadian government 
largely called its opponents bandi (bandits). However, in the days following 
9/11 and the onset of the GWOT, the US recognized that Africa was ripe 
for terrorist activity, especially in more rugged areas like the Sahara. Thus 
the CIA and JSOC “charged into African capitals long neglected” (Coll 
2012: 173). Recall that AFRICOM was created in 2008 to address con-
cerns over terrorism. Half of Chad is in the Sahara, where US anti-terrorist 
military programs and personnel began to be increased so as to include 
the JSOC. US anti-terrorist offi cials like Stanley McChrystal would have 
informed Chadian offi cials that the enemy were no mere bandi but some-
thing far more sinister—terrorists—but that their “friend” was there to 
help them. In this sense, US military operations in Chad were an imple-
mentation of the anti-terrorist public délire.
In Chad as in other countries, the US Leviathan conducted its covert 
indirect and direct global warring at a time of a perfect storm of the three 
coalescing and intensifying contradictions. Shultzian Permission had been 
granted because the Chadian government was already experiencing vio-
lent insurgency, and Déby could only be helped with violence. The global 
warring involved implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control pub-
lic délires. These facts are supportive of the global warring theory.
Finally, consider the actuality of US military operations in Chad. First, 
the US Leviathan is Déby’s “friend” because Déby supports Washington’s 
control over N’Djamena’s oil. Second, Déby’s rule—his “beautiful days”—
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proceeded via terrorization of his people, especially in the southern portion 
of the country. Thus, by fi ghting to support Déby, the New American Em-
pire has fought terrorism to support the beautiful days of an undemocratic, 
authoritarian terrorist. The narrative now turns to the Sudan, a country 
that is not a friend of the Security Elites 3.0.
Sudan: The Humanitarians’ Blunder
Good afternoon. Today I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related 
facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they pre-
sented to our national security. (President Bill Clinton, 1998a)
In a televised 1998 presidential speech to the whole country, President 
Clinton looked his fellow citizens in the eye and, in the middle of the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal, announced that the US had attacked “terrorist-
related facilities in … Sudan” because they threatened “national security,” 
an assertion that strained credulity. Sudan, after all, was an impoverished 
African country, often derided as a failed state and a humanitarian disaster, 
whose military lacked any ability to strike America.
Some interpreted the president’s announcement as a ploy to divert at-
tention from his sexual indiscretions. Others were concerned that the Su-
danese government had given refuge to Osama bin Laden, even though 
Khartoum had expelled him three years prior to Clinton’s attack and had 
offered to deliver him to the US (Baer 2002). Whatever else it was, the 
Sudanese situation was consequently the reverse of that in Chad: it was an 
enemy of Washington and by the 1990s a declared terrorist state. Clinton’s 
liberal hawks’ bungling in Sudan would allow its anti-terrorism délire to 
wreck its oil-control délire.
The Blunder
Sudan is a bigger oil producer than Chad, producing 514,300 barrels per 
day in 2010, and may actually hold Africa’s greatest unexploited oil re-
serves (Hennig 2007: 1).18 Oil was found in the non-Muslim, southern re-
gion of Sudan, and it was further possible that it might also be found to the 
northwest in southern Darfur. Muslim northerners dominated the central 
government; meanwhile, southerners, largely from the Dinka and Nuer 
tribes, violently contested the central government’s authority in the south, 
as they have done since the mid 1950s.19 There were two periods of war in 
the south—the First (1955–1972) and the Second (1983–2005) Sudanese 
Civil Wars. Led by John Garang, the south won the Second Civil War and 
became the independent Republic of South Sudan in 2011.
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The New American Empire was not indifferent to the control of the oil, 
as it was a way of diversifying the American oil dependence beyond the 
Persian Gulf. Originally, US oil companies fl ourished in Sudan. Chevron 
was granted an oil concession in 1974 and began prospecting. By the late 
1970s and early 1980s it had discovered considerable deposits in the Mug-
lad and Melut Rift basins in the south. Chevron was pumping by the late 
1990s; hence, a US oil company effectively controlled much of Sudanese 
oil production at this time.
Then, according Don Petterson (2003: 225), US ambassador to Sudan in 
the 1990s, “To help forestall legislation pending in the Congress that would 
have applied sanctions against Sudan in a way that would have limited the 
executive branch’s options … the administration issued an executive order 
curtailing U.S.-Sudanese commerce and trade.” So, due to legislative and 
executive branch haggling over their authorities, in 1997 Clinton signed 
Executive Order 13067, effectively embargoing trade with Sudan. This an-
gered President Bashir, who denounced the US “as a thief plundering and 
robbing Sudan’s wealth” and threatened “holy war” (ibid.: 225). Now that 
it was illegal for US oil companies to operate in Sudan, Chevron left. Cur-
rently, Sudanese oil is produced largely by the China National Petroleum 
Corporation, as well as by certain Malaysian and Indian companies.
Thus, during the Clinton administration the US Leviathan largely lost 
control over Sudanese oil, and Clinton’s security elites did it to themselves 
with Executive Order 13067. This blunder is the focus of the following 
analysis, which pays attention to the role of the oil-control and anti-terrorist 
public délires. While attempting to implement an anti-terrorist agenda, a 
group of liberal hawk humanitarians that called themselves “the Council” 
interpreted what was happening in the 1990s Sudan, and in so doing were 
in large part responsible for the blunder. Documentation of this assertion 
begins with an exploration of the fl uctuations in relations between Khar-
toum and Washington since President Reagan.
President Carter, whose Carter Center has worked in the Sudan since 
1986, remarked that “the U.S. government has a policy of trying to over-
throw the government in the Sudan” (in Shillinger 1999). The problems 
began during the Clinton administration, when the empire’s relations with 
the Sudanese government deteriorated precipitously. Earlier relations had 
been better. Gafaar Nimeiry, a military offi cer, seized control of the country 
in a 1969 coup. For a portion of his rule, Nimeiry was an “important … cli-
ent” of the US, who during the Reagan years allowed the US Leviathan to 
use Sudan as a base for its operations against Libya (Schmidt 2013: 204). 
Sudan went so far as to allow a CIA outpost to operate in Darfur.
However, Nimeiry was overthrown in 1986 and replaced by Sadiq al-
Mahdi, the great-grandson of the Mahdi who had led the Mahdist Revolt 
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(1881–1899) against Anglo-Egyptian rule. In 1989 he was replaced in an-
other coup by Omar al-Bashir, a military leader who was strongly supported 
by Hassan al-Turabi, head of the National Islamic Front. Bashir and Turabi 
were both Islamists from the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and their Islamism alarmed Washington: it seemed tainted with terrorism 
because Turabi had invited Osama bin Laden to reside and conduct his 
affairs in Sudan. He came in 1991. More ominously, the 9/11 Commission 
Report, the offi cial government account of why 9/11 occurred, claimed that 
Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and 
join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan 
between al-Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to co-
operate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out 
primarily against Israel and the United States. (Kean and Hamilton 2004: 61)20 
Doubtless, the new Clinton administration was privy to this intelligence, 
which provoked a hermeneutic puzzle: how to deal with a Sudan appar-
ently turning toward the dark side of terrorism? It is at this juncture that 
the Council enters the story.
The Council
The African bureau was the primary locus of policymaking for Sudan. (Petter-
son 2003)
Don Petterson, the US ambassador to Sudan during the early 1990s, had it 
wrong in the above quotation. The “primary locus” for policymaking vis-à-
vis Sudan during those years was an Italian restaurant near Washington’s 
Dupont Circle. Here “the Council”—a cabal of six men and a woman—
met and deliberated the fate of Sudan.21 They regarded themselves as good 
folk and righteous humanitarians, and they—not the ambassador roasting 
out in the backwater of Khartoum—were the ones with disproportionate 
infl uence on US Sudanese operations during the Clinton administration.
The fi rst Council member was Brian D’Silva. He had met with John 
Gaurang in 1978 when the two were graduate students in agricultural eco-
nomics. Charismatic to many who met him, Gaurang would lead the Su-
danese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the military arm of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Gaurang was a hybrid elite who 
attended Iowa’s Grinnell College and then Iowa State University, as well 
as Advanced Offi cers Training in Fort Benning, Georgia. D’Silva became 
Gaurang’s champion in the United States. Francis Deng, a Dinka from 
southern Sudan, Sudanese diplomat, and scholar who had lived for a long 
while in the US, was a second member of the Council. He offered other 
Council members connections to southern Sudan.22
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Two other members, Roger Winter and John Prendergast, came from 
humanitarian work, especially in the Sudan. Winter, whom one admirer 
called “a Saint” (E. Griswold 2008), had worked in the Carter adminis-
tration but “vowed never to work in the government again, preferring the 
less bureaucratic non-government sector” (R. Hamilton 2012: 4). So in 
1981 he became the executive director of the US Committee for Refugees. 
One document described Prendergast as a “rockstar” (Bealy 2013). He 
was identifi ed by his speakers’ bureau as a “human rights activist” and a 
“friend” of George Clooney (APB 2013).
Ted Dagne was another Council member. He was an Ethiopian refugee 
who had worked in a variety of positions in the US Congress, and estab-
lished an “intense friendship” with Garang (R. Hamilton 2012: 2). At some 
point in the mid 1990s, Susan Rice, who then was rapidly rising within the 
State Department ranks, became an occasional member of the Council; as 
did Eric Reeves, an English professor at Smith College, an elite women’s 
school. Rice would turn out to be the most powerful member of the group. 
Reeves, a Shakespeare and Milton expert, would turn out to be its puritan-
ical scold. Playfully, the group had nicknames for each other. Dagne was 
the “Emperor,” Reeves was “Deputy Emperor,” Winter the “Spear Carrier,” 
Prendergast the “Councilor in Waiting,” and Deng the “Diplomat.” Rice 
and D’Silva do not seem to have had nicknames. The nicknames had an 
imperial ring—Emperor, Deputy Emperor, Spear Carrier. These humani-
tarians were not play-acting during their restaurant trysts. They were plot-
ting imperial outcomes.
“Too Deformed to Be Reformed”: A way of grasping the nature of their in-
trigues is to reveal the hermeneutic the Emperor and his Council brought 
to their interpretations. First and foremost it was a narrow one. Though 
different members of the Council operated in other African countries—es-
pecially Rice, Winter, and Prendergast—the reality the Council members 
focused on when acting as Council members was the hermeneutic puzzle 
of the Sudan. Specifi cally, they perceptually understood Sudan as a place 
with a civil war pitting Muslim north against Christian south. As Winter 
put it, according to New York Times correspondent Eliza Griswold (2008), 
in Sudan “there’s a good guy and a bad guy.” The “bad guy” was the Su-
danese government in Khartoum that terrorized its own populations. The 
“good guy” was the SPLA, and its political arm the SPLM, in the south 
(who also terrorized their own populations). Perhaps the affection for the 
SPLA/M existed because the Council “was united by its respect for Ga-
rang” (R. Hamilton 2012: 4). Winter put the good guy/bad guy matter 
as follows: “You have these well-trained guys in Khartoum who are mur-
derers and never keep an agreement” (in ibid.: 4). Of course, members of 
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the Council acknowledged that SPLA “fi ghters committed horrifi c crimes 
during the war” (ibid.: 4). Different factions within the SPLA battled 
each other. Perhaps the most enduring strife pitted Riek Machar against 
fi rst Garang and then his successor Salva Kiir.23 Additionally, there were 
southern factions outside the SPLA that fought each other and the SPLA. 
All this confl ict tended to utilize terrorist tactics. Prendergast’s own book, 
Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-AIDS in Sudan and Somalia (1997), ex-
plicitly announced that the SPLA/M “terrorized the southern population” (in 
Hoile 1999: 50). So the Council’s perceptual interpretation of Sudan as 
divided into good and bad guys was a misinterpretation. Both sides in the 
civil warring terrorized, so the country was actually divided into bad guys 
and bad guys.
Just how bad did the Emperor and his followers think the Khartoum 
bad guys were? Prendergast was expressing the Council’s views when he 
told Rice that Bashir’s government was “too deformed to be reformed” 
(in R. Hamilton 2012: 3). Reeves (2004) went further, labeling Bashir’s 
government “a serially genocidal regime”—strong words implying either 
that Khartoum should undergo regime change or that Sudan should be 
dismembered by providing backing to SPLA “good guys” to do the job. 
When Bush II was implementing violent regime change in Iraq, Reeves 
jumped at the idea of doing the same in Sudan; but most Council members 
supported the latter possibility. Backing the south, they believed, should 
come in many forms, ranging from propaganda monsterizing the “Arab” 
north to assisting the SPLA in its fi ghting. Council members believed that 
Shultzian Permission should be granted for US Sudan operations because 
the US was facing a government that was “serially genocidal.”
Thus, the Council’s hermeneutic was perceptually that Sudan was 
divided into good guys and bad guys; and procedurally that support, up 
to and including military intervention, should be accorded to the good 
guys but covertly, so the US could be viewed as humanitarian good guys 
(Autesserre 2002). There was nothing especially humanitarian here. It was 
a clique of Washington security elites pursuing an imperial goal of con-
trolling a world region.
It might be asked who the Council members really were—humanitarian 
bons vivants chowing down at a DC watering hole, or something more 
ominous? Keith Harmon Snow, a progressive war correspondent who cov-
ers Africa, thought he saw something darker. He notes that Rice, Winter, 
Prendergast, and Dagne operated in other areas of Africa too, especially 
the Horn and Great Lakes, “supporting and covering up” Western low-
intensity military operations (K. Snow 2012). He identifi es them as “intel-
ligence operatives” (ibid.), quoting Jean Marie Higiro, an erstwhile offi cial 
in the Rwanda government, as saying, “Roger Winter is an intelligence op-
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erative” (in ibid.). Spain’s Juan Carrero Saralegui, a human rights activist 
with expertise in Rwanda, has also identifi ed Winter as an intelligence of-
fi cer (in ibid.: 9). It is not unusual for the CIA to covertly insert personnel 
into private institutions and NGOs functioning in areas where the intelli-
gence community has an interest. Winter’s position as executive director 
of the US Committee for Refugees would be just such a position. Alan 
Boswell (2012), reporting for McClatchy, observed that in 2012 Dagne, 
while working in the new Republic of South Sudan, was “an embedded 
go-between, and source of intelligence.” If he was an intelligence “source” 
in 2012, it is not improbable that he carried out the same function during 
the 1990s.
The Council members’ power derived from the positions they held in 
the Clinton administration, and it is time to discuss these. The most pow-
erful person, that is, the one with the biggest window of authority, was 
Susan Rice. As was said of her in chapter 8, she “grew up with … privilege 
and … connections.” During the 1990s those “connections” paid off. Rice 
received her doctorate in 1990. Three years later she joined the NSC. In 
1995 she became the NSC director for Africa, a post she held for two years. 
Then, in 1997, she switched to the state department—nine months after 
her lifelong family friend, Madeleine Albright, became secretary of state—
and was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the highest US 
government position dealing with African affairs. Privilege has its plunder: 
seven years from her doctorate, Susan Rice, age 33, was the security elite 
who ran Africa for the US government. Some State Department profes-
sionals, according to a Washington Post article, charged she was “not truly 
an ‘Africanist’” (Parker 1998). Another source reported that “the poverty 
of her knowledge of Africa … shocked the Africa diplomatic corps in 
Washington” (EIR Investigative Team 1998).
No matter the extent of her ignorance, Rice had her advisers, among 
whom John Prendergast, her council compatriot, was key. In 1996 she 
brought him into the NSC, and when she left he replaced her as the Africa 
director. Roger Winter remained with the US Committee for Refugees at 
this time but was believed to be her “closest advisor on Africa” (ibid.). 
Rice, Prendergast, and Winter were a “team,” Winter said in September of 
1997, “to lead the United States into support of a war against the govern-
ment of Sudan” (in A. Hassan 2009). They would, we shall see, lead the 
US not only to support a war against Khartoum, but to conduct it covertly.
D’Silva and Dagne played supporting roles on the Council “team.” 
D’Silva went on to a career in USAID, specializing in the Sudan, from 
which position he argued the case for southern Sudan. Dagne worked 
for the US Congress, where for much of that time he was employed by 
the Congressional Research Service, an institution whose function is to 
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provide Congress with the “objective” information it needs to legislate. 
Dagne wrote reports on Sudan, several of which were notorious for their 
bias in favor of the SPLA (see Dagne 1997, 2002). He went on to work 
for the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, where, with 
the assistance of Representative Donald Payne, he created a network of 
pro-southern Sudan representatives.
The Emperor also had something of an intelligence role within the 
Council. This was because, as Herman Cohen (2000: 83), Bush I’s assistant 
secretary of state for Africa, remembered, Dagne was a “good friend” of 
SPLA leader John Garang and hosted meetings for him in his Washington 
home. Rebecca Hamilton (2012: 2–3) describes “an intense friendship” be-
tween Garang and Dagne; in the course of which “they spoke on the phone 
every day.” These phone calls clearly provided considerable SPLA/M in-
telligence, which was certainly shared with other Council members and 
allowed them to coordinate their southern Sudanese politics.
By the mid 1990s, Rice and Prendergast occupied the two highest posi-
tions concerning Africa in the NSC and the State Department. Their su-
periors—fi rst Anthony Lake and then Sandy Berger in the NSA, and fi rst 
Warren Christopher and then Madeleine Albright in Foggy Bottom—were 
not Africanists and were distracted by more pressing events, especially in 
the Balkans. D’Silva and Dagne gave the Council strong representation in 
USAID and Congress. Dagne gave them the best, latest inside information 
on what was happening in Sudan from the perspective of the SPLA leader. 
Therefore, if the Council did not hermetically seal off all but their own un-
derstandings during the hermeneutic politics of Sudan in the 1990s, they 
certainly tried to do so. It was hard to be pro-Khartoum when the Council 
told everybody, as Prendergast had, that Bashir’s government was “too de-
formed to be reformed.” What was the consequence of the Council’s near 
hermetic seal on Sudanese politics?24
Losing the Oil: Washington’s relations with Khartoum remained relatively 
strong through the end of Bush I’s administration (H. Cohen 2000). How-
ever, as we have seen, concerns began to arise about Khartoum’s Islamist 
terrorist connections.25 The Clinton era began on 21 January 1993. A 
month later (26 February 1993) the fi rst bombing of the World Trade Cen-
ter occurred. On 12 August 1993 Sudan was placed on the list of countries 
that supported terrorism. Of the Council members, only Susan Rice was 
at this time in a position to have had any role in this decision. What her 
role was is unclear. However, as the ex-president Jimmy Carter recalled, “In 
fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state” what evidence they 
possessed to place Sudan on the list, “he said they did not have any proof, 
but there were strong allegations” (in Hoile 1999: 9). Certainly Susan Rice 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 450 –
Deadly Contradictions
was in a position to make “strong allegations” of the terrorist nature of the 
Khartoum government.
The years 1996 and 1997 would be the most important for the Coun-
cil’s infl uence on Sudanese affairs. In 1996 the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act went into effect. This congressional legislation was not 
directly aimed at the Sudan, but it affected Sudan because it barred US 
individuals and companies from dealing with terror-sanctioning countries. 
Sudan was on the list of terror-supporting countries, so US companies 
were forbidden to operate there.
At this point oil enters the picture, and with it some hanky-panky. Oc-
cidental Petroleum, founded by Armand Hammer, was one of the larger 
US oil and gas multinationals. Ray R. Irani was Occidental’s chairman in 
1996. Both Hammer and Irani had been friends of Senator Albert Gore Sr., 
whose son Albert Gore Jr, was the US Vice President in 1996. Occidental’s 
chairman slept in the Lincoln Room of the White House on 27 March 
1996. Two days later Occidental’s PAC gave $100,000 to the Democratic 
National Committee. Five months further on, the Antiterrorism Act (23 
August 1996) took effect. On the very same day the Treasury Department 
created an exception to the act and allowed Occidental Petroleum to pur-
sue an oil deal with the Sudan (“More Information on Sudan” 2013).
The year 1996 was also important because by this time “the Clinton 
administration” had embarked on “a policy of assisting the SPLA militar-
ily” (Hoile 1999: 7). Specifi cally, the administration “openly and unambig-
uously encouraged the governments of Eritea, Ethiopia and Uganda not 
only to afford the SPLA safe rear bases, but also to spearhead and support 
rebel incursions into the Sudan” (ibid.: 8). Further, in order to encourage 
these countries, which the US called the “front line,” Washington decided 
in 1996 “to send over $20 million of military equipment” to them “to help 
the Sudanese opposition overthrow the Khartoum regime” (A. Hassan 
2009a). Clearly, the US was fi ghting in the Sudan through its proxies, es-
pecially Uganda and Eritrea, though there appear to have been “several 
Operational Detachments—Alpha teams (also called A-Teams) of the US 
army … operating in support of the SPLA” (Hassan 2009a).
Who was responsible for this violent turn? By 1996 both Rice and Pren-
dergast were in place in the NSC. Both desired support of the SPLA. Pren-
dergast, as we have just seen, was in direct contact with rebel leaders. 
Anthony Lake, who at the time was the NSA and their boss, was involved 
in a failed bid to secure nomination as the CIA head. Lake needed NSC 
members’ backing to lend credibility to his CIA bid, so it is likely that he 
acceded to Rice and Prendergast’s desires. Of course, Sudan’s government 
was not oblivious to the fact that it was involved in a proxy war with Wash-
ington, and it did a number of things. Most signifi cantly, in November 
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1996 it barred Occidental from any oil deal in Sudan. Chevron stayed, but 
Occidental was out. The US suspended embassy operations in Khartoum.
In 1997, Rice was promoted to assistant secretary of state for Africa. 
Prendergast was in charge of Africa in the NSC. Khartoum was trying to 
reconcile with the US, but Prendergast and Rice were arguing against rec-
onciliation (D. Rose 2002). Late in 1997, Prendergast announced that the 
US government viewed the Bashir regime as “the principle threat to US 
security interests on the Continent of Africa today” (in Hoile 1999: 8). On 
5 November 1997, Clinton issued Executive Order 13067, which echoed, 
and upped, the rhetorical level of Prendergast’s words. Khartoum was said 
to “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national secu-
rity and foreign policy of the United States” (Executive Order 13067: 1). 
Transactions between US businesses and Sudan were prohibited. There 
were no exceptions. Chevron left. This was the blunder: in fi ghting one 
terrorism (that of Khartoum) in support of another (that of the SPLA), 
they had lost the oil.
What Happened Next? If the US Leviathan wanted Sudan’s oil, the forego-
ing events put it in the position of having to fi ght on to defeat Khartoum, 
thereby winning independence for the south. Only then, because the oil 
was in the south, might US oil companies be allowed to return. This was 
exactly what occurred, and as Julie Flint (2009) has remarked, “the war for 
oil was terrible.”
Bush II became president in 2001. Prendergast and Rice lost their po-
sitions, but the Bush administration continued support of the SPLA/M. 
There is evidence that the Vulcans sought to further militarily weaken the 
Khartoum government by exacerbating rebellion in Darfur, where anti-
Bashir guerilla movements (the Sudanese Liberation Army [SLA] and Jus-
tice and Equality Movement [JEM]) emerged and in 2003 began attack-
ing government military installations in Darfur (Reyna 2010). Khartoum, 
already militarily occupied with the situation in the south, responded by 
encouraging an Arab militia, the janjaweed, to attack the SLA and JEM. 
One reason the Khartoum government may have been so eager to assert 
control in Darfur was the prospect of oil there.
There had been rumors of oil since the 1990s. Julie Flint (2009) re-
ports, “In April 2005, Energy Minister Awad al-Jaz grabbed headlines by 
announcing discovery of a giant oilfi eld in southern Darfur that he said was 
expected to produce 500,000 b/d within months. … But announcements 
of success were premature and proved illusory.” The reality of oil in Darfur 
is unknown. What is real, however, is its possibility, in the minds of both 
the Khartoum government and American offi cials. The US military’s hand 
in the fi ghting that ensued in Darfur was covert. However, “it is … well 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 452 –
Deadly Contradictions
documented that the US through its closest African allies, helped train the 
SLA and JEM Darfuri rebels that initiated Khartoum’s violent reaction” 
(Hennig 2007: 1). Information gathered during fi eldwork bears upon two 
aspects of US intervention in Darfur. First, the Israelis were involved in 
preparing SLA members for combat, and some of them were taken to Israel 
for training. The Israelis are unlikely to have operated without US collu-
sion. Second, one account I obtained insists that US training of Darfuri 
militias—which seems to have been performed by US proxies—occurred 
prior to their attacks on the Khartoum government’s military installation. 
It was these attacks that provoked the government to organize the jan-
jaweed counterattack, and it was the ferocity of this counteroffensive that 
allowed propagandists like Reeves to proclaim Khartoum’s Darfur policies 
to be “genocidal.” If my sources are correct, then US global warring in 
Darfur helped incite Reeves’s “genocide.”
The Second Sudanese war was grim. An estimated 2 million persons 
died. By 2003 both sides were exhausted. Peace talks were begun and 
advanced so that in 2005 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, 
whose terms were for six years of southern autonomy, followed by a refer-
endum on the question of whether the south would become independent. 
Garang was killed in a plane crash in 2005 and did not see the fruits of his 
leadership.26 The referendum vote went for independence, and in 2011 
the Republic of Southern Sudan was born. In 2013, Barnaba Marial Ben-
jamin, South Sudan’s Information minister, announced, “We need your 
[the US’s] technology and fi nancial support to boost our private sector,” 
further clarifying that “the US stood with us during the diffi cult period 
of our liberation war. Now we need American support to develop that 
new nation” (UPI 2013). High on the minister’s development wish list 
was “support” for the petroleum sector. It is time to tie the US Levia-
than’s conduct during the Second Sudanese War to the anti-terrorist and 
oil-control public délires.
The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: Usually, the two délires 
have worked hand in hand to help the US pursue imperial designs. In the 
instance of Sudan, however, they got in each other’s way. The Council 
sought to implement its hermeneutic, and in doing so it was implementing 
the anti-terrorist délire. At the same time, private US oil fi rms, especially 
Chevron, had quite successfully acquired control in the southern oil fi elds 
and in so doing were peacefully implementing the oil-control délire. But 
then the security elites in the political system fl oundered. In trying to fi ght 
the state terrorism of Khartoum, they initiated indirect, covert warfare 
against Sudan, warfare that was not covert to Bashir. President Clinton, 
acting as an agent of the anti-terrorist délire, forbid all US business in Su-
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dan, obliging Chevron and Occidental to cede the Sudanese oil to the 
Chinese. The New American Empire did it to itself.
A good question to ask at this point is, why did operations to support 
the anti-terrorist délire get in the way of those to support the oil-control 
délire? Three reasons come to mind. The fi rst is the existence of the Coun-
cil. In no other case of global warring at this time was there an institution 
like the Council. It predisposed the executive-branch hermeneutic politics 
concerning Sudanese affairs during the Clinton years, and its predisposi-
tions were to destroy the monsters in Khartoum, no matter what.
Second, at the same time that the Council fl ourished, fundamental-
ist Christians who ran missionary operations in southern Sudan began a 
monsterization campaign against the North. Khartoum was full of “Arabs” 
with “heathen” practices like Islam, who even enslaved good Christian 
southerners. Groups like Christian Solidarity International (CSI) set out to 
“redeem” the slaves. Little matter that, as Declan Walsh (2002) reported, 
CSI was pretty much a “scam.” Some southern villagers said to have been 
enslaved lined up to have their freedom purchased—again and again. 
Conservative US media outlets like Fox News trumpeted CSI’s and other 
Christian groups’ good work in the anti-slavery campaign (Espinoza 2011). 
Together missionaries and media advanced the Council’s interpretation of 
the Khartoum government as a lair of monsters, thereby strengthening the 
Council’s hand.
Third, there was the question of fear. The rumor was out: Sudan’s ter-
rorists were gunning for US security elites. At one point, US intelligence 
indicated that Sudanese terrorists intended to assassinate NSA Anthony 
Lake (Gay 2013), who then was spirited away and hidden for a while. I 
knew of a Foreign Service offi cer, nominated for a high position in the US 
embassy in Khartoum, who had heard that the terrorists were going to go 
after Americans. She had a family with young children and turned down 
the nomination, fearing for her family. The Council’s operations, then, re-
inforced by those of the Christian missionaries and by fears of becoming 
targets of terror, pushed Clinton’s liberal hawks to fi xate upon the anti-
terrorist délire at the expense of its oil-control counterpart.
So it was a war between good and evil. “Good guy” Council humanitar-
ians fought the “bad guy” Sudanese terrorists; and after killing the US oil 
business in Sudan they had to fi ght longer to try to make a new country 
in which oil was found so that the US might again win Sudanese oil. Of 
course, money, weapons, training, and A-team operatives provided by the 
humanitarians intensifi ed the warring.27
The covert indirect and direct US global warring in Sudan occurred 
during intensifying and coalescing cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/
dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted because the 
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Council was convinced that Khartoum was perpetrating genocide, and 
that violence was the only way to deal with such monster terrorists. The 
security elites’ global warring was a way of implementing the anti-terrorist 
and oil-control public délires—information that is consistent with the global 
warring theory. Lamentably, from the perspective of Washington, opera-
tions to implement the anti-terrorist public délire blocked those to imple-
ment the other délire.
What were the consequences of this US intervention in the Second 
Sudan Civil War? Sudan has suffered the same fate as Yugoslavia—it is 
Balkanized. Now there are the old Sudan, still with an authoritarian gov-
ernment, and the new Republic of South Sudan, with an authoritarian 
government that just might help US oil giants regain control over Suda-
nese oil. By 2014, however, oil production looked compromised: not only 
was the Republic of South Sudan authoritarian, but it had also begun a 
civil war with troops of Riek Machar, who was now the vice president, 
fi ghting those of Salva Kiir, now president. John Prendergast, now co-
founder of Enough, a human rights NGO, told the New York Times, “This 
was a fi re waiting to be ignited” (Kulish 2014: 1). What he neglected to 
tell the Times was that he and his Council compatriots, inasmuch as they 
helped create South Sudan, were responsible for piling up the combustibles 
burnt in the fi re.28
A fi nal point, it turns out, is that the “terrorist-related” facility that 
President Clinton attacked in 1998 was a pharmaceutical factory that pro-
duced half of Sudan’s medicines (Scahill 2013: 126). The focus now turns 
to the Horn of Africa.
Somalia: Growing Terrorism the CIA and JSOC Way
Siad Barre was the longtime (1969–1991) president of Somalia, which had 
been a place of complex civil war long before the 1991 rebellion that over-
threw him.29 The UN intervened in the fi ghting after Barre’s downfall in 
response to the ensuing insecurity and famine. Bush I elected to allow the 
US Leviathan to lead the intervention and then, within weeks of this de-
cision, left offi ce, to be replaced by Clinton. On 3 October 1993, a heli-
copter carrying JSOC Special Ops in pursuit of Mohamed Farah Aidid, a 
rebel leader, was shot down. Thus began the Black Hawk Down incident. 
The commandos were killed; the dead body of one was dragged through 
the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital; and the Clinton administra-
tion withdrew its troops, recognizing that Somalia was the very model of a 
modern major “collapsed” state. The question was what the US Leviathan 
would do next, and why. I will argue that délires about oil and terrorism led 
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to military operations—spearheaded by the CIA and JSOP after 2001—
that helped grow terrorism in Somalia not once but twice. The argument 
begins with Siad Barre, the collapse of the Somali state, and fi ghting for oil 
that had not yet been found.
Fighting for Oil They Had Not Yet Found 
Siad Barre came to power in 1969, the same year as Gaddafi , in a military 
coup. Like Gaddafi , Barre was infl uenced by socialist ideas. Comrade Siad 
(“Jaalle Siyaad”) declared that he would rule through a Supreme Revolu-
tionary Council, adjusting scientifi c socialism to Somalian realities with a 
touch of the Koran and a strong dose of Somali nationalism. Assisted by 
the Soviet Union, Barre sought to modernize the economy on socialist 
lines. Private enterprise was nationalized, attempts to stimulate industry 
followed, and considerable effort was put into export banana cultivation. 
The nationalism took the form of an invasion of the Ogaden (1976) in 
Ethiopia, an attempt to wrest this Somali-populated region away from the 
Ethiopians.
By the end of the 1970s, however, nothing had worked. Economic per-
formance was poor. By 1978, manufactured goods exports were almost 
nonexistent. Earnings from livestock exports were insuffi cient to prevent 
foreign debt from increasing rapidly. The Ogaden War (1977–1978) col-
lapsed after the Russians switched sides and backed the new Communist 
government of the Derg in Ethiopia, and high military spending was al-
ready further constraining development. This obliged the Barre regime to 
negotiate with the IMF, which ended in Somalia being obligated to im-
plement structural adjustment during the 1980s. This further harmed the 
economy, so much so that by 1989 and 1990 Somalis were suffering nation-
wide commodity shortages (Abdi 2011).
Comrade Siad governed not only as a modern socialist, but equally as 
an African patrimonialist. Order in his regime was maintained, in part, 
because public and private persons were rewarded in different ways with 
portions of the state’s patrimonial pie. Worsening economic conditions 
meant that this already meager patrimony became even scarcer. Further, 
suspicions generated by the defeat in the Ogaden led to onetime patrimo-
nial allies being dismissed or worse. These conditions led certain offi cials 
to form paramilitaries that sought Barre’s ouster by force. At the end of 
the 1980s, the Derg aggravated this situation by supporting certain rebel 
movements. Siad fought to curb these rebellion but failed, and in 1991 he 
was driven from power.
Then, the state collapsed. Together, different rebel paramilitaries had 
exercised enough military force to oust Barre, but now that the hated des-
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pot was gone, they turned on each other. Some called it anarchy, but the 
fi ghting followed a logic in which warlords fought other warlords to capture 
control over the central government, none having suffi cient violent force 
to defeat all the others. Added to this was the fact that by the early 1990s, 
Somalia was beset by drought and famine. It was a humanitarian quandary.
The UN acted to ameliorate the situation: UNSC Resolutions 733 and 
746 (1992) authorized United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) 
to deliver humanitarian assistance and help reinstate the state. UNSC Res-
olution 794, also passed in 1992, provided the military muscle, the Unifi ed 
Task Force (UNITAF), to allow UNOSOM to do its job. Bush I, as we have 
seen, decided that the US would lead UNITAF, whose mission was called 
“Operation Restore Hope.” Bush I explained his rationale for intervention 
to the American people in a televised address on 4 December 1992: 
I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission 
that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the shocking 
images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, 
over a quarter of a million people—as many people as live in Buffalo, New 
York—have died in the Somali famine. (In Yearman [2007] 2011) 
So Bush I saw to it that the US took command of UNITAF and contrib-
uted roughly 25,000 soldiers to it, including JSOC ninjas.
Bush I was a successful oilman, and at the time, according to Keith Year-
man ([2007] 2011), “Nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to the 
American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips.” These “gi-
ants” were prospecting for oil because Somalia’s geomorphology was prom-
ising, though none had yet been found in suffi cient quantities to pump. 
Bush’s security elites were well aware of the US oil exploration. Conoco 
in particular had been courting the State Department, helping it out and 
supplying information about the prospecting. Arrangements were made for 
President Bush I to send a letter of appreciation to the head of Conoco, 
thanking the company for all its assistance. There is no direct proof that 
Bush I committed US troops to UNITAF in order to better protect the em-
pire’s oil interests. Still, it is plausible that that idea of securing oil interests 
while earning humanitarian merit played a role in his decision to send the 
25,000 troops, which is what suggests that the empire was at least partly 
fi ghting for oil, even though it had not yet found any.
Unfortunately, fi asco loomed. Bush I exited the presidency in 1993, 
leaving the US soldiers sweltering in Somalia, where gradually their mis-
sion evolved from purely assisting humanitarian operations to taking sides 
in the warlord wars. Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the most formidable of the 
warlords, challenged the UN and found himself opposed by UNISOM. 
JSOC meat eaters were sent to capture him. As we already know, this 
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provoked the Black Hawk Down incident, precipitating withdrawal from 
Somalia. The Clinton administration formally ended its mission to Somalia 
in 1994. The UNISOM mission likewise ended in failure the next year.
Humanitarian intervention had ended with the humanitarians bolting 
for the exit from Somalia. The following years witnessed further prolifera-
tion of clan-based militias, each holding allegiance to a particular warlord. 
Operation Restore Hope might more aptly have been termed Operation 
Continue Hopelessness. No one warlord or combination of warlords pos-
sessed suffi cient force to form a national government. As a former Somali 
foreign minister recalled, “It was as if the Somali state was over and every-
body wanted to create his little turf to collect money and to become pow-
erful just for personal gains, not for national gains” (in Scahill 2013: 127). 
However, the Americans were to return with the new decade.
With the start of the GWOT after 9/11, Bush II’s people began to worry 
about terrorism in Somalia. As Paul Wolfowitz, then Rumsfeld’s Deputy 
Defense Secretary, put it in late 2001: “People mention Somalia for obvi-
ous reasons. It’s a country virtually without a government, a country that 
has a certain al-Qaeda presence already” (in Scahill 2013: 123). Rumsfeld 
himself said, as reported by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Soma-
lia has been a place that has harbored al-Qaeda and, to my knowledge, still 
is” (Drones Team: 2012b). Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz oversimplifi ed a more 
complex situation.
It was true that there was an al-Qaeda presence in Somalia throughout 
the 1990s. But they had not been especially successful. They tried to ally 
with the homegrown Islamist group al-Ittihad al-Islami, but the alliance 
went sour. Al-Qaeda’s success was so limited that, as one experienced ob-
server concluded, “U.S. intelligence offi cials came up with a verdict that 
Somalia was actually inoculated from foreign terrorist groups, that it’s just 
fundamentally inhospitable, that the clan system is so closed to foreigners 
that there’s just no way that these groups can operate” (in Cohn 2010: 3). 
The Vulcans did not get this message.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has revealed that “the US has 
been carrying out extensive covert military operations inside Somali since 
2001,” executed by the JSOC and CIA, the latter possessing a “secret” 
base at the Mogadishu airport (Drones Team 2012b: 2). These soldiers 
were “routinely” used “for surveillance, reconnaissance, and assault and 
capture operations.” They were supported by “helicopters, airstrikes, AC-
130 gunships,” and, during the Obama regime, by drones (ibid.: 2). Thus, 
starting in 2001 the empire was back, with boots on the ground in direct 
global warring.
One of Washington’s strategies was to seek alliances with warlords, 
paying them and providing them with weapons to attack Islamists—any Is-
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lamists, including al-Qaeda. Regarding this strategy, the previously quoted 
Somali foreign minister commented that Washington “thought that the 
warlords were strong enough to chase away the Islamists or get rid of them. 
But it did completely the opposite. Completely the opposite. It was folly” 
(in Scahill 2013: 129). This was so because Somalis resisted both the war-
lords and their Yankee overlords by creating institutional alternatives to 
the warlords. Al-Qaeda assisted them in this process.
One of these alternatives was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coali-
tion of eleven courts that was forged to provide judicial order in different 
regions of Somalia. The law they used was Islamic (sharia), so they came to 
be called sharia courts. Because ICU used Islamic law, the Americans saw 
them as Islamists allied with al-Qaeda, and therefore as the enemy. The 
US supported the ICU’s rivals, the CIA-backed Transitional Federal Gov-
ernment (TFG). The ICU was popular throughout much of Somalia, as it 
returned a semblance of law and order. It also had its own militias. These 
were largely victorious, and in June 2006 the ICU moved into Mogadishu 
and began to govern.
Somalis look back on this time as one of peacefulness and honest rule. 
Tranquility was fl eeting, in part because even though the TFG was “fee-
ble, faction-ridden, corrupt, and incompetent” (Prendergast in Hanson 
and Kaplan 2008), the Vulcans judged the ICU to be an Islamist regime 
supportive of terrorists. So in 2006–2007 Bush II’s security elites did the 
TFG a favor by enlisting Ethiopian troops, who attacked the ICU. There 
was debate as to whether the Ethiopians would have attacked regardless 
of US support. Carl Bloise (2007) has written, “Forget about all that stuff 
about Ethiopia having a ‘tacit’ o.k. from Washington to invade Somalia. 
The decision was made at the White House and the attack had military 
support from the Pentagon. The governments are too much in sync and 
the Ethiopians too dependent on the U.S. to think otherwise.” The Amer-
icans provided JSOC ninjas, CIA operatives, intelligence, and air support 
to their Ethiopian proxies. The ICU was routed.
Thereafter, the US and the Ethiopians stayed on as an occupying force. 
A spirited violent resistance to the occupiers was mounted, and continues. 
Al-Qaeda helped support the opposition to the TFG and their imperial 
helpers. By the end of 2008, humbled by paramilitaries like al-Shabaab, the 
Ethiopians had had enough. They withdrew, turning over defense of the 
TFG to African Union Mission in Somalia forces (AMISOM) consisting 
largely of Ugandan and Kenyan troops trained and armed by the US.
Al-Qaeda, which overall had been something of a failure in Somalia 
during the 1990s, became “resurgent” during this period (Cohn 2010: 3). 
This upswing was due its support for al-Shabaab (literally “the Boys” in 
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Somali), the ICU’s youth militia. Al-Shabaab had been relatively insignif-
icant prior to the attack by the Ethiopians.30 But after this attack, tutored 
and supplied by al-Qaeda and responding to the US-Ethiopian occupa-
tion, it conquered large portions of Somalia between 2007 and 2009. 
Consequently, Scahill says, “US policy had backfi red spectacularly, trans-
forming a ragtag group of relative nobodies in Somalia in just a few short 
years, into the new heros of al-Qaeda’s global struggle,” so that the US 
Leviathan was strengthening “the very threat it was intended to crush” 
(2013: 229, 494).
In the years following 2009, the JSOC and AMISOM mounted a counter-
offensive. Al-Shabaab was driven from Mogadishu in 2011 and forced to 
return to rural guerrilla tactics. That same year Obama began a policy of 
targeted assassinations by drones. However, al-Shabaab has survived. In 
2012 Obama’s security elites offered a bounty of many millions of dollars 
for information concerning al-Shabaab leaders. Al-Shabaab, for its part, 
offered a twelve-camel reward to anyone who could provide information 
on President Obama’s whereabouts, and a two-camel reward for infor-
mation about the secretary of state (CNN Wire Staff 2009). Al-Shabaab 
attacked a crowd watching a soccer match in July 2010 in Kampala, Ugan-
da’s capital, killing seventy-four. In September 2013 it attacked an elite 
Nairobi shopping mall, killing at least sixty-seven. It struck again in Febru-
ary 2014 with a suicide bombing back in Mogadishu, suggesting, according 
to one diplomat, that it could “strike at will” (Sheikh and Omar 2014). 
Whether this is correct is unclear, as the JSOC and AMISOM offensive 
has been extensive. Nevertheless, some fret that al-Shabaab is a threat to 
the US homeland (Samatar 2013). Consider the implications of what has 
happened in Somalia since 1991 as they relate to the anti-terrorist and 
oil-control public délires.
The Anti-Terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: To Bush II’s Security Elites 
3.0 after 9/11, Somalia looked like a failed state awash in terrorists includ-
ing al-Qaeda, presenting the risk that when the state returned it would be 
governed by those terrorists. So starting in 2001, the Vulcans elected to 
fi ght al-Qaeda there, even though their intelligence told them that it had 
not fl ourished in Somalia. They granted themselves Shultzian Permission 
because ever since the fi asco of the Black Hawk Down incident, Washing-
ton had believed peaceful interactions with terrorists were not possible. 
This, then, was implementation of the anti-terrorist public délire.
The situation with oil was more complex. Two reasons for the empire’s 
warring in Somalia pertained to oil. Recall that prior to Siad Barre’s ouster, 
nearly two-thirds of the country’s territory had been granted as oil con-
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cessions to US oil companies and prospecting was actively pursued. This 
meant that, among other matters, when Bush I sent in US troops he was 
providing military protection to US oil fi rms. This protection, if success-
ful, would have permitted Conoco and other US oil companies to control 
Somalia’s oil production. Unfortunately, the global warring Somalia expe-
rienced after 1993 ended oil exploration. In 2013, though, exploration was 
set to begin anew (Manson 2013).
The second reason for the US’s military interest in Somalia concerns 
the fact that the country juts into the sea lanes by which Persian Gulf oil 
travels from producers to markets. A hostile regime in Somalia exposes 
those sea lanes and could play havoc with the transportation of oil, jeop-
ardizing its distribution and the realization of its profi ts with nasty con-
sequences for both the US and the global economy. So, in waging global 
war on Somalia, the empire fought to control distribution of Persian Gulf 
oil. Thus, global warring in Somalia aided the empire’s global control of 
oil in two different ways and as such was an implementation of the of the 
oil-control public délire.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted before a Congressional com-
mittee in 2013 that Somalia was “a success story” (McCarthy 2013). Re-
ally? US global warring began with the butchering of America’s elite troops; 
led on to CIA and JSOC operations supporting warlordism and growing 
the ranks of two terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, all the 
while contributing to many, many innocent civilians deaths. It seems inap-
propriate to claim operations designed to fi ght terrorism were a “success” 
when what they did was increase terrorism. Now, however, attention turns 
to Uganda.
Uganda: “Beacon of Hope”?
Winston Churchill once called Uganda “the pearl of Africa” (Sseppuuya 
2012). The “pearl”—a small (91,136 square miles), landlocked county— is 
in many areas a high, lush, tropical place of haunting natural beauty. Its 
major advantage lies in the fertility of its soils, which produce subsistence 
crops and some coffee. Compared to African goliaths like Nigeria and 
South Africa, Uganda appears an unimportant place. Nevertheless, during 
a 1997 African tour Secretary of State Albright found it “a beacon of hope” 
(in Lischer 2006: 88). Perhaps this was because by the 1990s, Uganda had 
become the little proxy that could. How this transpired, and how it re-
lates to the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires, are explored next 
in a reconnaissance that begins with a discussion of Uganda’s checkered 
post-independence political history.
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Two Despots and a Lot of People Dead 
Independence was achieved in 1962, when Milton Obote became the 
fi rst president. Seven years later he suffered an assassination attempt, and 
thereafter his regime tended toward repression. Opposition political parties 
were banned. A state of emergency was declared and remained in place for 
much of his rule. A secret police, led by Obote’s cousin, oppressed a large 
number of people. Idi Amin, then commander of Uganda’s army, appeared 
to have saved the day in 1971 when he overthrew Obote in a coup. 
But there was a problem: Amin was an even more forbidding despot. A 
Time magazine article depicted him as a “killer and clown, big-hearted buf-
foon and strutting martinet” (“Amin” 1977). According to one estimate, 
this “big hearted” guy, with the help of his secret police, killed 500,000 of 
his fellow citizens (Keatley 2003). Eventually the US grew weary of Amin. 
The US ambassador to Uganda in 1973 described Amin’s government as 
“racist … brutal, inept, bellicose, irrational, ridiculous, and militaristic,” 
not to mention “xenophobic” (Melady 1973) and shut its embassy.
In 1979 the Tanzanian army invaded Uganda after Uganda threatened to 
invade Tanzania. Amin was driven from power. In the subsequent scramble 
to control the presidency, Obote once again became president, directing 
a repressive policy against Amin’s supporters. This provoked a civil war 
that eventually led to Obote’s defeat in 1985, though not before his regime 
was accused of having killed up to 300,000 people (Amnesty International 
1985). The fi rst twenty-three years of Ugandan independence can be sum-
marized a two despots and a lot of people dead—and then there was Yoweri 
Museveni.
The US Leviathan Finds Its “Beacon of Hope” 
Museveni, like Déby in Chad, has been a consummate military leader. He 
had led a rebel movement against Amin, and when Obote took power Mu-
seveni created a new rebel movement against him, the National Resistance 
Army, which eventually was successful. Additionally, Museveni is a born-
again Christian—one of the few such fundamentalists to have embraced 
Marxism, which he did while studying at the University of Dar es Salaam 
with, among others, Walter Rodney.
However, once in the presidency, Museveni disremembered and disre-
spected Marx, and got along just fi ne with the neoliberal structural adjust-
ment programs that the US was foisting on developing nations at the time. 
This included IMF loans. Initially, the infl ux of IMF capital appeared to 
help the economy. His government appeared to have successfully fought 
the HIV/AIDs epidemic. Further, he turned the Uganda People’s Dem-
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ocratic Force (UPDF) into an effi cient institution of counterinsurgency. 
Museveni represented, and favored, peoples from the southern part of 
Uganda. He harassed peoples in the north, especially the Teso, Kakwa, 
Lugbara, Acholi, and Lango. Unsurprisingly, a number of rebel move-
ments developed there, including the Uganda People’s Democratic Army 
(UPDA) and the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena. 
By the 1990s the UPDF was suppressing these insurgencies, and by 1996 
it had begun forcing northern peoples into camps resembling concentra-
tion camps. The UPDA and the HSM were crushed, but out of the latter 
rebellion came the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. It 
was at this time in 1997 that Secretary Albright celebrated Museveni as 
her “beacon of hope.” Howard French (1997), the New York Times reporter 
who covered this story, noted she did so “largely for security reasons”—US 
security, that is, not the security of occupied northern Ugandans. Musev-
eni might have been a onetime Marxist, a born-again Christian, and a 
failed structural adjuster; but above all else, from the perspective of Secu-
rity Elites 3.0, the man could do COIN.
They Made Him into a Cheap Proxy: Accordingly, Washington security 
elites have courted Museveni’s military prowess, beginning in the Clin-
ton administration. He obliged, and the State Department has designated 
Uganda a “key US partner” and “a leader advancing efforts to resolve 
confl icts throughout the region” (“US Military Involvement in Uganda” 
2012). Richard Vokes (2013), using data from the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute, documents the magnitude of military 
funding, fi nding.
that between the periods 2002–2006 and 2007–2011, Uganda’s arms imports 
increased by 300 percent. During 2006–11, Kampala imported 38,000 small 
arms and light weapons (nearly 20 percent of the total across Africa), whilst in 
2011, Uganda’s total defense expenditure exceeded US$1 billion—by far the 
highest in the region.
It was US fi nancial backing that enabled Uganda to indulge in this arms 
buildup. Baldor (2012) reports that Uganda received $41 million in 2012. 
These fi gures probably underestimate US military support for Uganda. They 
do not include funds coming from the CIA or those supporting UPDF’s 
contingent in the UN’s AMISOM operations in Somalia, where Uganda’s 
has been the largest, on the order of about 6,000 soldiers at any one time.
According to Remigius Kintu (2011), writing from Goma in the Great 
Lakes region, this imperial support has made “Uganda … the headquar-
ters of a sinister U.S. and British military conspiracy to plunder the re-
gion.” Certainly, UPDF soldiers have been active. Since the beginning of 
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the US alliance they have been in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, what is now 
the Republic of South Sudan, Liberia, the Darfur region of Sudan, the 
Ivory Coast, and as far away as East Timor. The Ugandan government has 
embraced its anti-terrorist role. A major Ugandan newspaper expressed 
this in a headline announcing “U.S. boosts Uganda’s fi ght against terror-
ism” (Candia 2012). Moreover, Uganda sees itself as having a regional role 
in eliminating terrorism. For example, as reported in 2013, a Rwandan 
newspaper announced that “Uganda’s Minister of Internal Affairs,” Hillary 
Onek, “called for collaboration of East African nations to fi ght terrorism” 
(“Ugandan Minister Calls for Joint Efforts” 2013).
Here it should be clarifi ed that the amounts of money the US has in-
vested in paying a strategic rent to Uganda to provide military service are 
trifl ing, compared to the amounts invested in other world areas (which run 
from the billions to the trillions). The Security Elites 3.0 got a good deal. 
Museveni and his soldiers are a cheap proxy. UPDF soldiers die so that US 
ninjas do not. The next section will illuminate certain consequences of this 
by considering US policy toward Uganda in the context of the anti-terror-
ist and oil-control public délires.
The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: First, the fact that Wash-
ington has paid Uganda to hunt its terrorists since the 1990s is yet an-
other instance of the implementation of the anti-terrorist public délire. 
But what about oil? For a long time there was no oil. Uganda produced 
coffee, bananas, and proxies. Then, between 2002 and 2007, commercially 
exploitable reserves of oil were located along the Albertine Rift on the 
shores of Lake Albert close to the Democratic Republic of Congo (“Ugan-
da’s Oil” 2010). An estimated 2.5 billion barrels of reserves have been 
found, enough to make Uganda a mid-level producer (EIA 2013). In 2012, 
Uganda signed PSAs with a consortium of Anglo-Irish (Tullow), French 
(Total), and Chinese (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) com-
panies. The oil-control public délire predicts that the US Leviathan will 
move to facilitate establishing some control over this oil. In 2011, in one 
of the fi rst direct interventions by AFRICOM, one hundred JSOC ninjas 
were sent to Uganda. They were there to help hunt down the LRA head 
Joseph Kony, even though the LRA, having been reduced to a few hundred 
followers, was not a credible terrorist threat and certainly not a terrorist 
threat in Uganda, because it was no longer there.
However, the Americans knew, and the Museveni government was 
aware, that oil provokes confl ict. An oil geologist and a Congolese soldier 
were killed in clashes along the border with the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2007. Two years later, the New York Times reported that “con-
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fl icts between rebel militia operating in the region and Congolese, Ugan-
dan and United Nations forces are common” (Browne 2009). Here, then, 
was a reason for the presence of US Special Ops: they were there to help 
ensure that any violent altercations that arose could be attended to by US 
soldiers in the interest of the empire. In other words, they were preparing 
the battlefi eld for implementation of the oil-control public délire.
The use of Uganda in support of imperial délires has had consequences 
for Ugandan governance. Over the years Museveni has become something 
of a despot. According to Charles Okwir (2011), he is a slightly more so-
phisticated version of Idi Amin. His regime indulges in “the harassment 
of … political opponents, detention without trial, torture, extra-judicial 
killings, suppression of protests and homophobic witch-hunts” (Tatchell 
2009). The same 2005 law under which Uganda returned to multiparty 
politics also removed presidential term limits, and as Museveni rigs elec-
tions, it effectively grants him the authority to rule for life, undermining 
democratic processes. This will give him time to continue his most success-
ful development intervention: growing his personal wealth. A Ugandan 
source identifi ed Museveni as the sixth richest world leader, worth $11 
billion (“Museveni Is No. 6” 2008).
More generally, Paul Omach, a professor of security studies at Makerere 
University in Kampala, has said, “The paradox of external military assis-
tance in authoritarian states is that it ends up supporting authoritarianism” 
(in “US Military Involvement in Uganda” 2012). There is an irony here. 
The US opposes Sudan’s Omer al-Bashir, an authoritarian gentleman, but 
supports such rulers as Museveni in Uganda and Déby in Chad. The only 
difference between the former ruler and the latter two is that Museveni 
and Déby, with their neo-colonial iterations of colonial tirailleurs senegalais, 
enthusiastically help the Security Elites 3.0 implement the anti-terrorist 
and oil-control public délires. Let us move from Africa to Latin America, so 
as to consider the circumstances concerning energy resources in the New 
American Empire’s “backyard.”
The Latin American Theater
The “backyard” of course was the Caribbean, Central America, and South 
America, where there is a considerable history of resistance to Yanqui im-
perialismo, sometimes with socialist alternatives. These were everywhere 
violently repressed by Yanqui imperialistas, so much so that by the end of 
the Cold War the US Leviathan “had executed a reign of bloody terror” 
through indirect, often covert global warring “in the name of containing 
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Communism” (Grandin 2006: 4; see also Gill 2004; Brands 2010; Grow 
2008).
With regard to petroleum energy, Latin America was estimated in the 
year 2000 to hold 20 percent of the world’s known oil reserves. Latin 
American oil was easy to transport, closer to North American markets, 
and hence less expensive, which made Latin America a signifi cant oil and 
gas supplier to the empire beginning in the early twentieth century. By 
2010 it provided the US with roughly a quarter of its oil (“Latin American 
Oil Exports” 2010). Through much of the 1990s Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Colombia were major suppliers of oil imports to the US. Additionally, Bo-
livia was an oil and gas producer and Ecuador, a gas producer. Brazil, with 
recently discovered oil fi elds off Rio de Janeiro, is an emerging oil and gas 
giant. Mexico in the 1990s turned to neoliberalism and, through the 1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), integrated itself more 
closely with the US economy. However, by the end of the Cold War—lam-
entably, from the perspective of Security Elites 3.0 and their Latin Amer-
ican clients—leftist politics had re-emerged. This happened in Venezuela 
and Colombia, with strikingly different results. Consider the situation in 
each country, beginning with Venezuela and concentrating upon Hugo 
Chávez.
Chávez, born in 1954, led Venezuela from 1999 until his death in 
2013. Instead of coming from a casa grande (upper-class family), Hugo, 
descended from Native American and black ancestors, was born in a hut 
with a mud fl oor to a poor family from the llaneros (plains). Not a hybrid 
imperial elite, he nevertheless was fascinated by one Yanqui thing: the boy 
from the outback grew up a lover of béisbol, dreamed of playing in Yankee 
Stadium, and joined the military to be able to play the game. Eventually 
he became a paratroop offi cer and a player in his country’s politica, which 
consisted of the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats governing 
in alternation (from 1958 through 1998). Regardless of which party was 
in power, governance was done in corrupt ways that favored the capitalist 
clase dominante.
Chávez developed an antipathy for Venezuelan elites and a desire to 
lead social revolution. He helped organize the Fifth Republic Movement, 
founded in 1997, and led it to victory in the 1998 national elections. As 
president he introduced Bolivarianism, a political ideology that emphasized 
participatory democratic councils, the nationalization of key industries, 
and poverty reduction policies, including those that increased government 
subsidizing of health and education. Once elected, among other matters, 
Chávez leveled a fi erce attack upon Yankee imperialism that culminated in 
his 2006 speech to the UN General Assembly in which he labeled Bush II 
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“the Devil.” Many around the world agreed, though to US Security Elites 
3.0 Chávez was not only an impertinent demagogue but also the fourth 
largest supplier of oil to the devil’s empire.31
After the Soviet Union’s collapse and China’s enchantment with capi-
talism, Venezuela, like Cuba, remained one of the few apparently success-
ful leftist experiments. Hermeneuts in both the US and Venezuela spent an 
enormous amount of energy deriding both Chávez and his socialist project. 
Just how far this derision went is explored below, after a brief consideration 
of Colombia.
Bogotá was a major oil exporter to the US by the 1990s. It was also the 
home of long-standing leftist insurgencies. The fi rst of these was led by 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Peoples’ Army (FARC-EP), 
founded as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party in 1964. 
At its height it had perhaps eighteen thousand soldiers struggling for the 
welfare of rural peasants. As of 2013 FARC-EP had suffered setbacks but 
ultimately remained undefeatable. A second major Colombian insurgency 
was that of the National Liberation Army (ELN), founded in the same 
year as FARC-EP; but a smaller organization, with perhaps four thousand 
soldiers at its height. The ELN, whose leaders were directly inspired by 
the Cuban revolution, has espoused an ideology that mixes Marxism with 
Liberation theology.32
Both FARC-EP and the ELN view Yankee imperialists as the enemy 
and US oil companies in Colombia as agents of this imperialism. At their 
height in the early 1990s, FARC-EP and the ELN controlled an estimated 
30 to 35 percent of Colombia’s territory. Attacks on oil installations fea-
tured prominently in their tactics.33 US Security Elites 3.0 were aware of 
the danger of Colombian insurgency. Marc Grossman (2002: 36), Bush II’s 
Under Secretary of State for political affairs, told Congress in 2000 that 
“FARC and ELN also represent a danger to the $4.3 billion in direct U.S. 
investment in Colombia”—much of which was investment in petroleum 
resources, he might have added.
However, the Security Elites 3.0 did not worry excessively over this anti-
imperialism. As we have seen, the Americas were the region where the 
US had successfully waged indirect, covert global wars. Client militaries 
through the region were well armed and well trained. Between 1950 and 
1979 the US gave $2,252.6 million to militaries south of the border, pro-
viding another $5,071.5 millions from 1980 to 1993 (Klare and Andersen 
1996: 29–30). Some sixty thousand soldiers had been trained at the School 
of the Americas “in combat skills and counter-insurgency doctrine” (Gill 
2004: 6). So the apparatus of indirect global warring was securely in place 
throughout Central and South America. Consider its operation in Colom-
bia and its possible inception in Venezuela.
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Colombia: A War on Drugs to Get Terrorists to Protect the Oil
In 2014 the US was involved in global warring in Colombia, and had been 
for a long time. In principle, this involvement was part of the US war on 
drugs. As in Uganda, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia, in Colombia there was 
civil war between the governing regime and private militias. The US en-
tered this war on the side of the government. Bush II explicitly linked 
US assistance to terrorism in his 2002 National Security Strategy, assert-
ing, “In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist 
groups that challenges the security of the state and drug traffi cking activi-
ties that help fi nance the operations of such groups” (in Marcella 2008: 1).
“Plan Colombia,” originally conceived by Colombia’s President Andrés 
Pastrano in the late 1990s and funded in part by the Clinton administration 
in 2000, was developed to fi ght this war on terrorists who in part fi nanced 
their operations through profi ts from drug sales.34 After 9/11, the Bush II 
administration proposed “an integrated counterinsurgency campaign,” in 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s words (Rumsfeld 2011: 629), that increased US sup-
port to Plan Colombia. Between 2000 and 2005 the Plan, supplemented 
by other forms of U.S. foreign assistance, provided $4.5 billion to Colombia 
(Veillette 2005: 1), of which some 78 percent goes to the Colombian mili-
tary and police. Why has American assistance been so generous?
Doug Stokes (2005) and Francisco Ramirez Cuellar (2005) have both 
criticized Plan Colombia, arguing that it is less a war on drugs than a war 
against leftist guerrillas, and that as such it exhibits a continuity with Cold 
War imperial délires. Colombia’s two most important Marxist movements, 
the FARC and the ELN, were both classifi ed as terrorist organizations in 
1997. Certainly, in part, imperial munifi cence to Colombia pertains to the 
fi ght against communists now interpreted as narco-terrorists. However, re-
call that there is oil in country.
In fact, Bogotá was the eighth largest supplier of oil to the US in the 
fi rst decade of the new millennium (Energy Global 2010). Occidental Pe-
troleum—the same company that had hoped to expand into Sudan—was, 
and is, the major US oil company in Colombia, where it has operated since 
1983 in Arauca Province. The FARC and ELN threatened Occidental’s 
operations there. Between 1986 and 1997, one account has it, around 79 
million barrels of crude oil were spilled as a result of terrorist attacks on 
pipelines, and attacks on pipelines totaled 619 between 2001 and 2004 
(Marcella 2003). Clearly, such “armed confl ict … led to production de-
creases” (Veillette 2005: 10).
The Colombian state had fought FARC and the ELN for decades before 
implementation of Plan Colombia. However, when the plan went into ef-
fect it instituted a major increase in the violent force at Bogotá’s disposal. 
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Between 2000 and 2008, according to the US Government Accountability 
Offi ce (GAO), funds went to 
•  An Army Aviation Brigade, to equip and train helicopter army unit 
with on the order 55 helicopters;
•  The National Police Service, to provide support for the order of 90 
police aircraft; The National Eradication Program, whose function was 
to eradicate coca and opium crops;
•  An elite National Police Commando Brigade, known as Junglas (Jen-
zen-Jones 2011), to train and equip them;
•  A Counter-narcotics Brigade to train, equip, and construct a base for 
about 1,800 soldiers;
•  A Joint Special Forces Command, to train and equip about 2,000 
soldiers;
•  A Police Presence in Confl ict Zones Program to train and equip 68 
squadrons of police, with each squadron composed of 120 police;
•  A Coastal and River Interdiction Program to train and equip navy and 
marine units that included 8 coastal interdiction and 95 river patrol 
boats;
•  An Air Interdiction Program that included provision of surveillance 
planes and radar installations;
•  An Infrastructure Security Program that provided Special Ops training 
and equipment for approximately 1 brigade to guard oil infrastruc-
ture. (GAO 2008)
Of course, this latter brigade has protected the Arauca/Caribbean pipeline 
vital to Occidental. Arauca itself “hosts the greatest concentration of U.S. 
military advisors and has Colombia’s worst human rights situation” (Wein-
berg 2004: 1).
Not only were the Colombian armed forces strengthened by US military 
support in the war against FARC and the ELN, but they were further aided 
in their warring by reactionary paramilitaries. These did not originate as 
a Colombian idea; rather, they were Washington’s suggestion. A US Spe-
cial Warfare team headed by General William Yarborough recommended 
in 1962 that private militias be created to operate in support of the state 
(Livingstone 2004). Colombia accepted the recommendation, and para-
militaries were in operation throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Then, in 
1991, the Colombian Defense Ministry issued the Armed Forces Directive 
200-05/91 based on CIA and US Southern Command advice, which speci-
fi ed the techniques for the dirty war that characterized the 1990s and early 
2000s (Human Rights Watch 1996). Clandestinely, US Special Ops taught 
these techniques.
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Equally covertly, the paramilitaries were aided by certain US businesses 
in Colombia, including Chiquita Brands, Drummond Coal, and Coca-Cola 
(Chomsky and Cuellar 2005). A process of demobilizing the paramilitaries 
supposedly began in 2003. According to Human Rights Watch (2010), it 
was unsuccessful. Through the years, Colombian paramilitaries—whether 
Muerte a Secuestradores, Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguriadad 
Privada, or Autodefensas Forces de Colombia—have practiced especially 
brutal counterinsurgency.35
Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: US military operations in Co-
lombia have been substantial. They are sometimes overt, mostly furtive, 
and normally indirect. The Clinton administration’s embrace of Plan Co-
lombia was an implementation of the anti-terrorist public délire insofar as it 
was directed at the FARC and ELN, which had been designated terrorist. 
However, Plan Colombia also directly helped Occidental Petroleum and 
its subcontractors maintain capital accumulation by literally riding shot-
gun on their pipeline. Thus it helped Occidental maintain its control over 
its portion of Colombian oil and is an implementation of the oil-control 
public délire.
What is the logic of US global warring in Colombia? Security Elites 3.0 
have interpreted Colombia as a “weak state” (Marcella 2003: ix). They 
understand Bogotá as resembling the African central governments whose 
force resources were not powerful enough to eliminate violent competitors 
for state resources. In such a situation, granting of Shultzian Permission 
was advisable because Colombia was already at war with its rebels. Conse-
quently, US security elites adopted the solution applied in Chad, Somalia, 
and Uganda, bolstering Colombia’s violent force. The result was indirect 
warring in Colombia that contributed to grim human rights abuses (Liv-
ingstone 2004; Dudley 2004; Hristov 2009; R. Kirk 2003; P. Scott 2003). 
So in Colombia, the US has been fi ghting a war on drugs, to get the terror-
ists, to protect oil—a string of events whose logic leads toward “state ter-
ror” (Stokes 2005: 57–84). Attention turns now to seven new US military 
bases planned for Colombia with implications for Venezuela.
Venezuela: “All Contingencies Are in Place”
Washington was wary of Venezuela once Chávez took to hurling invectives 
at its security elites—notably calling out in the UN that Bush II was “the 
Devil.” Worse than throwing verbal abuse, Chávez helped raise world oil 
prices, weakened the control and profi ts of the majors, and introduced in-
novative plans to use wealth from oil to assist the poor rather than affl uent 
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elites. For example, in January 2012, the US Congress cut funding to the 
Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program by 25 percent just as the 
winter cold was beginning and heating oil prices were exceptionally high. 
In that same year, Chavez provided free heating oil to 100,000 poor Amer-
ican families through CITGO, a subsidiary of the Venezuelan national oil 
company (Wilkins 2013).
Of course the Devil was in the details. The US needed Venezuela, which 
in 2012 was the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil to the US. It 
had the largest proven reserves in the western hemisphere and perhaps 
the world (Rowling 2012). Oil prices rose in the US when supplies were 
disrupted in late 2002 and early 2003 by a strike at Petróleos de Venezu-
ela, the state-owned oil company. Further, the US has been in competi-
tion with China over Venezuelan oil. Senator Richard Lugar, chair of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2003–2007), said in a letter to 
the GAO that “we must make sure that all contingencies are in place to 
mitigate the effects of a signifi cant shortfall of Venezuelan oil production, 
as this could have serious consequences for our nation’s security and for 
the consumer at the pump” (Webb-Vidal and Cameron 2005). This section 
documents certain of the Security Elites 3.0’s “contingencies” to defend 
against a “shortfall” of Venezuelan oil.
First, consider a coup attempt against Chávez, who on 13 November 
2001 passed a package of forty-nine laws crucial to instituting the Boli-
varian revolution. Two of these especially incensed the Venezuelan clase 
dominante. The fi rst was a law aimed at Petróleos de Venezuela requiring 
that more oil revenues be distributed to the poor. The second, a land re-
form law, provided for expropriation of unused land on large estates, the 
better to equitably distribute land resources. On learning of these laws, the 
bombastic Daily Beast, a US Internet journal, wondered, “Is Hugo Chávez 
Insane?” (Gunson 2001).
Thereafter, certain Venezuelan economic and military elites plotted to 
remove the “insane” guy from offi ce. First there were anti-government pro-
tests; then, on 11 April 2002, a coup was initiated. It may have been the 
world’s fastest failed coup. Chávez was expelled from his presidency on 
11 April but was then restored on 13 April by massive public support and 
a military loyal to him. He was initially detained by members of the mil-
itary and pro-business elites affi liated with the Venezuelan Federation of 
Chambers of Commerce (Fedecámaras). Pedro Carmona, manager of sev-
eral petrochemical companies and head of Fedecámaras, was declared the 
interim president. He immediately voided the country’s 1999 Constitution 
and dissolved the Venezuelan National Assembly and the Supreme Court. 
However, the coup provoked an immediate, popular, pro-Chávez uprising 
that the Metropolitan Police failed to suppress. Moreover, signifi cant ele-
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ments of both the military and the anti-Chávez movement were unwilling 
to support Carmona. The pro-Chávez Presidential Guard eventually re-
captured the Mirafl ores presidential palace, prompting the collapse of the 
Carmona government and Chávez’s return.
What was the Bush II regime’s role in the coup? Unsurprisingly, it de-
nied everything. After all, the Vulcans had their hands full, given that 
they were attacking Afghanistan and plotting the same against Iraq at the 
time. Nonetheless, the evidence, argued vigorously by Eva Golinger (2006, 
2007), suggests that Security Elites 3.0, between other wars and plots, 
managed to squeeze in some clandestine complicity in the failed coup. 
Golinger—who is openly a revolutionary who supported Chávez—has her 
critics (see “El Código Chávez” 2005). Yet in 2009 ex-President Carter 
told a Venezuelan newspaper, “I think there is no doubt that in 2002, the 
United States had at the very least full knowledge about the coup, and 
could even have been directly involved” (in “US ‘Likely Behind’ Chavez 
Coup” 2009). Meanwhile, on the Venezuelan side Admiral Carlos Molina, 
a major coup leader, has said, “We felt we were acting with US support” (in 
Avilés 2009; for information asserting a US role in the coup attempt see 
Taglieri 2002 and Fuentes 2002).
Golinger (2006) asserted that the CIA used the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED) and USAID as a cover for its activities related to 
the coup. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of Washington’s involve-
ment in the coup comes from a document of its own that ostensibly down-
plays this possibility. Senator Christopher Dodd, a member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, requested a study of the US role in the 2002 
failed coup that was conducted by the Offi ce of the Inspector General 
(OIG). The report judged, 
While it is clear that NED, Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. 
assistance programs provided training, institution building, and other support 
to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief 
ouster of the Chávez government, we found no evidence that this support di-
rectly contributed, or was intended to contribute, to that event. (OIG 2002: 3).
The NED was previously discussed regarding its involvement in the Bal-
kans. In principle, it is a NGO; in reality, it is funded by the US Congress. 
In principle, its goal is to strengthen democratic institutions; in practice, it 
has been associated with the “color revolutions” in which existing regimes 
are subverted by agents with NED training, organization, and fi nancial 
support (Chaulia 2006). The string of events involved in such subversions 
is, as Meyssan (2012) explains, to “exacerbate all underlying frustrations, 
blame the political apparatus for all the problems, manipulate the youth 
according to the Freudian ‘patricidal’ scenario, organize a coup, and then 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
– 472 –
Deadly Contradictions
propagandize that the government was brought down by the ‘street.’” 
This is precisely what the DOD and NED offi cials tried to do in Venezu-
ela; which suggests US indirect and covert involvement in the attempt to 
overthrow Chávez, an attempt that involved exercise of violence force on 
the part of the coup plotters. Unfortunately, from their perspective, they 
failed. What has been the US response to the Bolivarian revolution since 
2002?
In its remaining years, the Bush II administration, preoccupied else-
where, largely restricted itself to verbal sparring with Venezuela. Initially, 
the Obama administration’s security elites made comments suggesting they 
would follow Bush II’s lead. Then, seven months after assuming offi ce, the 
Obama administration deviated from the Vulcan policy of verbal scolding 
and announced that it planned to increase military operations in Colombia 
by “constructing 7 new US military bases” and providing additional US 
troops for those bases (Briss 2009). What did these bases have to do with 
Venezuela?
The Obama regime has publicly stated that the bases are for counter-
narcotics operations. John Lindsay-Poland, co-director of the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation’s Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean, has 
suggested another answer to this question. He queries the bases’ proposed 
location, observing that 
none of them are on the coast of the Pacifi c Ocean, where aircraft from the 
Manta base patrolled for drug traffi c—supposedly with great success. … Three 
of the bases are clustered near each other on the Caribbean coast, not far from 
existing U.S. military sites in Aruba and Curacao—and closer to Venezuela 
than to the Pacifi c Ocean. Why are U.S. negotiators apparently forgoing Pacifi c 
sites, if counternarcotics is still part of the U.S. military mission? (In Briss 2009) 
The bases would be on the Pacifi c coast if they were to be used to interdict 
narcotics. But none are on the coast, and three are “closer to Venezuela 
than the Pacifi c Ocean.” Perhaps the new bases are about a new “lily-pad” 
military strategy vis-à-vis Venezuela, discussed further below.
The border area of Columbia and Venezuela, especially where the Co-
lombian department of Arauca borders the Venezuelan state of Apure, has 
become tumultuous. On the Venezuelan side, the “terrorist” FARC and 
the ELN sometimes take refuge. Colombian paramilitaries sometimes go 
after them and stay as enemies of the Venezuelan government. Concern-
ing these Colombia infi ltrations of the borderlands, Eva Golinger (2010 
reported that in 2009,
the Venezuelan government captured three spies from the Colombian intelli-
gence agency, DAS, and discovered several active destabilization and espionage 
operations against Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela. The operations—Fénix, Sa-
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lomón and Falcón, respectively, were revealed in documents found with the 
captured DAS agents. Approximately two weeks ago, 10 bodies were found in 
Táchira, a border zone with Colombia. After completing the relevant investi-
gations, the Venezuelan government discovered that the bodies belonged to 
Colombian paramilitaries infi ltrated inside Venezuelan territory. This danger-
ous paramilitary infi ltration from Colombia forms part of a destabilization plan 
against Venezuela that seeks to create a paramilitary state inside Venezuelan 
territory in order to breakdown President Chávez’s government.
Luis Tascon, a member of the Venezuelan parliament and a Chávez sup-
porter, describes the nature of this “paramilitary state”: “The paramilitaries 
were created to fi ght Colombia’s left-wing guerrillas. But right now, what is 
happening are incursions into Venezuela. The paramilitaries have bought 
large farms; they have relations with fi gures from the opposition, with large 
landowners who pay for the service of providing security.” Additionally, 
Tascon says, they “control the business, principally in Cucuta—with the 
support of the Armed Forces of Colombia [FAC], and the assistance of the 
Venezuelan opposition” (in McIlroy and Wynter 2006: 1). What seemed 
to be developing in the Venezuelan borderlands in the fi rst decade of the 
new millennium was implantation of Colombian paramilitaries, creating a 
space of counterrevolutionary forces aimed at the Bolivarian revolution. 
Whether this was done with Washington’s connivance remains unclear. 
Of course, the US has long used reactionary paramilitaries as its proxies 
in Latin and Central America, an infamous example being the Contras in 
Nicaragua.
The positioning of the proposed bases “closer” to Venezuela may be part 
of a strategy to assist borderland subversion. David Vine (2012), writing 
of the Pentagon’s evolving tactics and strategies following 9/11, observes 
that “Washington’s garrisoning of the planet is on the rise, thanks to a new 
generation of bases the military calls ‘lily pads’ (as in a frog jumping across 
a pond toward its prey). These are small, secretive, inaccessible facilities 
with limited numbers of troops, Spartan amenities, and prepositioned 
weaponry and supplies.” Obama’s proposed Colombian bases would make 
splendid “lily pads.” JSOC ninjas could spring toward their prey, giving 
support to operations by contra paramilitaries in Venezuela.
At present, the fate of Washington’s lily pads is unclear. According to 
Lindsay-Poland (2011), the US military signed contracts to construct the 
Columbian bases in 2010, even though 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court struck down the agreement that would give 
the United States military use of seven bases. … Yet, even after the agreement 
was declared “non-existent” by Colombia’s highest court, the Pentagon initiated 
unprecedented amounts of new construction on bases in Colombia. The con-
tracts place in serious doubt the Pentagon’s respect for Colombian sovereignty. 
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What they do not place in doubt is the Pentagon’s adoption of lily pad tac-
tics as an iteration of preliminary global warring to choreograph sabotage 
of the Bolivarian Revolution.
Even as the US prepares for military operations against Venezuela, it 
continues its support of subversion. Golinger (2010) reports that “the 
FRIDE Institute, a Spanish think tank, prepared with funding from the 
World Movement for Democracy (a project of the National Endowment 
for Democracy, or NED), has disclosed that international agencies are 
funding the Venezuelan opposition with a whopping $40–50 million USD 
annually.” This money is received from the US and its European clients 
and “given to the right wing opposition political parties, Primero Justicia 
(First Justice), Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time) and COPEI (Christian 
Democrat ultra-conservative party), as well as to a dozen or so NGOs, 
student groups and media organizations” (ibid.).
The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: Possibly, the US imagines 
Colombia as a Latin American iteration of its Pakistani operations; that 
is, as a platform for military operations in a bordering country. Whether 
the empire will use Colombian lily pads to attack terrorists in Venezuela 
remains to be seen. If it did, it would be implementing the anti-terrorist 
public délire. The potential prize in this struggle is great. Should the US 
prevail and install a client regime in Caracas, US oil companies would 
benefi t.
Further, returning Venezuela to client status would give the US gov-
ernment an advantage over China in the competition over Venezuelan 
petroleum products. Moreover, if it turns out that Venezuela does have the 
largest oil reserves in the world, then it is a major “prize” to be won in the 
struggle to control hydrocarbons. For the moment, the US might be said 
to be preparing the battlefi eld in Venezuela, fi rst by weakening the central 
government by assisting its opposition, and second by setting up lily pads 
to support the portion of the Colombia-Venezuela border where counter-
revolutionaries are being developed. The focus now turns to the Pacifi c.
The Pacifi c Theater
In the fi rst half of the twentieth century, the vast Pacifi c region stretching 
from the Americas to Asia was where oil was not, or at least was not very 
much. After World War II, the only signifi cant Pacifi c oil producer was 
Indonesia. During the 1970s, however, US oil production was in decline, 
sources of oil and gas were becoming hard to fi nd, and the possibility of 
global peak oil surfaced, all of which prompted the realization that there 
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was an energy “crisis.” It was time to begin prospecting for oil in challeng-
ing places.
Previously, as earlier reported, exploration for oil in diffi cult places like 
the seas had been limited for fi nancial and technological reasons. How-
ever, the conjuncture of improved prospecting and drilling technologies 
and higher petroleum prices stimulated offshore exploration in the late 
1970s and 1980s, triggering a veritable black gold rush in the 1990s. Oil 
and gas were found in the Gulf of Mexico, in the North Sea, offshore on 
the west coast of Africa, and off the coast of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. By the 
1990s offshore oil exploration had moved to the Pacifi c Basin, involving 
China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philip-
pines, often in areas over which there were competing sovereignty claims. 
The prospecting went well. By the early 2000s, at least one source esti-
mated reserves in the South China Sea (stretching from the Strait of Ma-
lacca to the Strait of Taiwan) of about 213 billion barrels, approximately 80 
percent of Saudi Arabia’s reserves (Kashi and Wang 2013). In at least one 
country, the Philippines, oil was discovered in a region where there was an 
anti-government insurgency. This situation is investigated next.
The Philippines: Always There, Always Ready
The history of US imperialism in the Philippines begins in 1898. Following 
the Spanish-American War, the different islands of the Philippines passed 
from Spain to the US and became a formal US colony. Filipinos resisted, 
and from 1899 until 1913 there was brutal insurrection against Washing-
ton. Formal imperialism continued until 1946, when the US granted inde-
pendence but nonetheless retained two large naval and air force bases at 
Subic Bay and the former Clark Field. These bases were a signifi cant part 
of the military underpinning of US informal imperialism in Asia. The Phil-
ippines requested that the US remove the bases in 1991–1992. The request 
was respected, but the US continued to station large numbers of troops in 
the Philippines, with 30,000 to 50,000 reported in 2008 (Flounders 2008). 
At least some of these soldiers were JSOC, specifi cally the Joint Special 
Operations Task-Force Philippines (JSOTF-P), which operates with units 
of the Philippines military to conduct “humanitarian missions” that are 
“are really military operations” (ibid.).
Oil and gas deposits were found in 2005 on the southern Philippine is-
land of Mindanao, which the US considers a “breeding ground” for terror-
ism (Bhattacharji 2009). Rebellion against the Philippine government on 
this and other southern, isolated islands has dragged on for forty years, in 
large part because a large, impoverished Muslim population is struggling for 
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land and political control in their homeland. Unsurprisingly, “the U.S. State 
Department has considered the southern Philippines a ‘terrorist safe haven’ 
since the classifi cation was created in 2006” (ibid.). The Moro Islamic Lib-
eration Front (MILF) has been a major militia struggling against Manila.
With the discovery of oil, these struggles became even more signifi cant, 
now that enormous potential oil revenues were at issue. Unsurprisingly, 
fi ghting fl ared between MILF and the government. Most of the combat has 
been in central Mindanao, which is rich in oil and gas reserves. The fi ght-
ing has been heavy, resulting in approximately 150,000 fatalities since the 
late 1960s and almost three million people displaced since 2000 (McLeary 
2013). Have US troops been involved in this fi ghting?
No Washington spokesperson has announced the sending of US troops 
to the Philippines, so if imperial participation is occurring, it is covert. Nev-
ertheless, it is occurring. A Rand Corporation report describes “…a 14-year 
effort to address transnational terrorist threats in the historically restive 
southern Philippines…” (Robinson et.al. 2016: xi). The U.S. ‘area of oper-
ations’ in the Philippines presently covers 8,000 square miles, including the 
entire island of Mindanao” (Flounders 2008). Further, Miriam Santiago, an 
infl uential member of the Legislative Oversight Committee on the Visiting 
Forces Agreement of the Philippines Senate, has claimed that US troops 
are in combat in Mindanao, asserting that a Colonel David Maxwell, com-
mander of the JSOTF-P, acknowledged this to be the case (Calica 2009).
What can be said about other US interventions in the Philippines? 
Subic Bay on the northwest coast of Luzon, the largest Philippine island, 
was the biggest American naval base outside the continental US until it 
was closed in 1992 and replaced by Subic Bay Freeport Zone. By 2013 
increased US Navy ship visits, especially to Subic Bay, were attended by 
increased joint Philippine-US naval exercises. Defense Secretary Leon Pa-
netta has said that 60 percent of US naval assets will be based in the Pacifi c 
by 2020 (Kashi and Wang 2013). These activities were part of a major shift 
in the US’s military resources, a change President Obama announced to 
the Australian Parliament in November 2011, when he said, “As we end 
today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our pres-
ence and mission in the Asia Pacifi c a top priority” (Obama 2011). This 
shift has been called the “Asian Pivot.” The Philippines, with its superb 
naval facilities at Subic Bay halfway across the Pacifi c, is an important 
element of that pivot.
US Security Elites 3.0 realize China is expanding its military power in 
the region, and the pivot is a way of protecting US security interests in 
the Pacifi c. Obviously, a key security interest is control over hydrocarbons. 
Importantly, as Mikkal Herberg (2013) puts it, summarizing the fi ndings 
of a 2012 energy security workshop, “Asia has become ‘ground zero’ for 
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growth in global energy and commodity markets. The region’s rapid eco-
nomic growth is driving an enormous rise in the consumption of oil and 
liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) to fuel booming motorization and industrial 
growth. This energy boom has been centered in China.” China itself has 
begun extensive exploration for oil and gas in the South China Sea. It is 
in this light that the increase in naval activity in the Philippines should be 
understood, for as Kashi and Wang (2013) point out, “in Subic Bay … the 
U.S. military is trying to protect a vast store of largely untapped energy re-
serves from being monopolized by China or any other country” by defend-
ing “energy shipping routes.” In critical structural realist terms, this means 
that the Asian Pivot has made the Philippines a key place of preliminary 
global warring. What does such information imply for the anti-terrorist 
and oil-control public délires?
The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires: A striking point concern-
ing the Philippines case is how quickly the US Leviathan was on the job. 
In 2005 oil and gas were found in Mindanao. A year later, the State De-
partment declared it a “terrorist safe haven.” In 2009 Colonel Maxwell 
admitted his JSOC ninjas were used “in battle in Mindanao.” Within four 
years, that is, the anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires had been im-
plemented in a new area where terrorists needed killing and oil needed 
controlling. Two years later, in 2011, it was time to take on the Chinese. 
The US naval presence expanded in and about Subic Bay as part of the 
Asian Pivot to better control oil by controlling sea lanes, with the objective 
of either denying hydrocarbons to China or keeping China from denying 
oil to the empire’s clients. The US military, in the Philippines as elsewhere, 
was always there, always ready.
So the empire’s Asian Pivot relies on naval force to control hydrocar-
bons in the Pacifi c. Here it is helpful to call attention to the fact that 
surface naval vessels are vulnerable to technologically astute foes, and 
the Chinese are technologically astute and militarily powerful.36 Deployed 
against a potent foe, the Asian Pivot’s force utilization strategy thus seems 
a problematic choreographing of the US Leviathan’s violence. This ends 
the journey to the US Leviathan’s warring in the years since 1990, a time 
when its masters and commanders elevated global to world warring. Now 
it remains to clarify what has been discovered on this journey.
Conclusion
I begin with consideration of the present chapter, then take note of a ghost 
from the past, and conclude by discussing general fi ndings from both this 
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chapter and the prior one. First, the anti-terrorism and oil-control public 
délires played roles in imperial global warring in all the ten countries an-
alyzed in this chapter. Sometimes the anti-terrorist public délire seems to 
have played the more dominant role, as appears to be the case in Afghan-
istan and Kosovo; but in all the cases there was some form of oil control 
to be potentially won. Usually, the two délires operated jointly, so that im-
plementation of the anti-terrorist délire facilitated implementation of its 
oil control counterpart. The sole exception to this was in the case of the 
Sudan, where implementation of the anti-terrorist délire hindered that of 
the oil-control public délire.
The consequences of US global warring varied from theater to theater 
and from country to country within theaters. Nevertheless, by 2013 two 
general consequences are striking. Generally, and especially in the Central 
Asian theatre, the warring increased the force resources of terrorism by 
creating new terrorists. Similarly, in none of the theatres did the fi ghting 
conspicuously increase imperial control over petroleum resources. Thus, 
the fi ghting largely failed to achieve the implementation of the anti-terror-
ist and oil-control public délires that were the reason for fi ghting.
In March 2014, a ghost from the past reappeared. Vladimir Putin took 
umbrage at the regime change in the Ukraine that had led to the ousting of 
President Viktor Yanukovych (22 February 2014), who favored closer ties 
with Russia. A number of observers believed that the events in the Ukraine 
were due to the country’s “destabilization” (Roberts 2014), organized in 
considerable measure by Washington and its EU clients. After all, Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland ad-
mitted that since 1991 the US had spent $5 billion to infl uence Ukrainian 
affairs (Johnstone 2014).37 From the Russians’ vantage, this was an intensifi -
cation of the inter-imperial contradiction on their western border. President 
Vladimir Putin responded by militarily detaching the province of Crimea 
from the rest of the Ukraine. On 18 March 2014, while the Russian na-
tional anthem played, Putin and Crimean leaders signed a treaty to make 
Ukraine’s region part of the Russian Federation. The Bear was back.
The import of the “Asian Pivot” and the return of the Bear is unclear. 
Deadly Contradictions has voyaged through a medium time frame—that of 
the New American Empire. Perhaps in 2014 a new time frame was emerg-
ing, with China and Russia the targets of the US Leviathan. Regardless 
of what was to come, it is time to draw general conclusions about what 
happened as the New American Empire fought its way through the sea of 
human being from 1990 through 2014.
Six Findings: There are six common fi ndings. First and foremost, imperial 
global warring has spanned the world. The US has been conducting a world 
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war, but of a new type. There is no single set of enemies like the Germans 
in World War I or the Axis powers in World War II. In the current world 
warring, the foe can be any political entity, from a particular organization 
(like al-Qaeda) to a particular country (like Iraq), so long as Washington’s 
imperial hermeneutic politics have targeted that entity as violating the 
anti-terrorist and oil-control public délires and Shultzian Permission has 
been granted. This has happened at least sixteen times since 1990.
Second, the empire has not won the “prize.” If neoliberalism was not 
working, security elites understood, then acquiring power over the world’s 
oil would facilitate the New American Empire’s domination of the global 
economy. But its military operations have not resulted in any clear increase 
in its control over oil. Iraq is running its oil sector with considerable auton-
omy. The empire may have limited the amount of oil Iran sells, but it in no 
way does it govern Iranian oil. Imperial attempts at pipeline politics have 
been something of a pipe dream. If any country has substantially improved 
its control over oil since 1990, it has been the Chinese. It did so nonvio-
lently, by purchasing oil assets.
Third, imperial global warring has been good for terrorism, perpetrated 
by both resistance terrorists seeking to frustrate the US’s délires and state 
terrorists. Of course, the greatest state terrorist is the New American Em-
pire itself, with its ninja Special Ops tromping about the world making bug 
splats, blowing unborn children from some mothers’ bodies, and carving 
bullets out of other women’s corpses. Consequently, these US ninjas or 
their proxies—and especially their Israeli proxies—have enraged peoples 
throughout the world and turned them in the direction of terrorism. Iron-
ically, what the empire does infl ames terrorism, the very thing it seeks to 
rid itself of.
Fourth, as some have claimed, the US is an empire by invitation. If 
that is the case, then the invitation has begun to wear thin due to global 
warring. US warring in Iraq caused several of its close European clients, es-
pecially France and Germany, to worry about its operations. Saudi Arabia 
is angered by US policies in Syria. US sanctions against Iran have likewise 
strained the bonds of amity with European and Asian clients. Pakistan has 
been turned into a friendly enemy. Even the English “poodle” rebelled at 
US plans to attack Syria. Global warring appears to be fraying the bonds 
of empire.
Fifth, imperial global warring has often left the states is visits less stable. 
From its very earliest days the empire has trumpeted its exceptionalism as 
the “city on the hill’, divinely chosen to bring good things like democracy 
and liberty to humanity. More recently, though, in the name of democracy 
and liberty it has brought more authoritarian regimes. The US is excep-
tional, but its elites are oblivious to the nature of its exceptionalism. It is 
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indeed incomparable in having brought to the world an empire whose invi-
tation is wearing thin—an empire that generates terror, instability, and un-
democratic governance, all of which is disorder in the sea of human being.
Sixth and fi nally, chapter 8 showed how events after 1990 led to a per-
fect storm of intensifying and coalescing contradictions, producing repro-
ductive vulnerabilities and the need for fi xes. Economic elites tried the 
fi x of neoliberalism. The fi x was unsuccessful. Economic elites then froze 
in uncertainty. Fixating upon these same events, Security Elites 3.0 cre-
ated new liberal hawk and Vulcan hermeneutics that strengthened the oil 
control and anti-terrorist iterations of the global domination public délire. 
Crucially, these provided guidance as to how to interpret perceptions con-
cerning when to proceed to war. Chapters 9 and 10 have examined the 
import of these délires by reviewing sixteen hostilities, some small, some 
major. They showed that in each of these events, Security Elites 3.0 arrived 
at perceptions that required they progress to violent operations to control 
oil and/or combat terrorists. The result has been global warring throughout 
the world. President Obama, like many presidents before him, believes the 
US to be “exceptional.” For many people in the world, as the New Amer-
ican Empire sought to fi x its contradictions by conducting World War III 
between 1990 and 2014, what was coming to a theater near them was 
global disorder. This was exceptional indeed!
Notes
1. Discussion of the US’s problems in Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the interconnection 
of the Taliban and Pakistan are in Rashid (2008, 2010), Seth Jones (2009), and Bergen and 
Tiedemann (2013). Hastings (2012), instrumental in the downfall of General Stanley Mc-
Chrystal, takes the confl ict through 2011. McChrystal (2013) has a memoir telling his side 
of the story.
2. The Pushtun (often called the Pathan by the British) are described in Barth (1965) and 
Ahmed (1980).
3. The Northern Alliance was just that, an alliance of northern Afghani, mostly Tajiks, 
with some Uzbeks and Hazaras. Its two original leaders were Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ah-
mat Massoud.
4. The ISI provided the Taliban with weapons and ammunition, paid wounded fi ghters’ 
medical bills, fi nanced and assisted in training camps, and provided intelligence (O. Jones 
2003).
5. Actually, Hastings (2010) made clear that the “snake eater” McChrystal preferred more 
mainstream American cuisine.
6. On 18 June 2013 Hastings died in a fi ery car crash at only thirty-three. The web “went 
wild” over his death (Stebner 2013), as the circumstances of his accident were suspicious. 
He was reported to have received death threats from the military because of his Rolling Stone 
article (A. Newman 2013).
7. According to Rashid (2012: 18), by the end of 2010 “none” of Obama’s White House or 
State Department security elites believed “the war could be won.”
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8. Gates offers a more sympathetic account of the surge in Afghanistan than that pre-
sented in the text (2014: 474–501). However, he offers no evidence that it was a success, nor 
evidence refuting those who said it was not a success.
9. Rashid (2008, 2010, 2012) is most useful concerning Pakistan, the Taliban, and their 
entanglement with the US starting in the 1980s. Owen Jones (2003) and Butt and Schofi eld 
(2007) also offer useful accounts of Pakistan’s geopolitics. Brown and Rassler (2013) and the 
Council on Foreign Relations (2011a) analyze the Haqqani Network. Ahmed (2013: 43–96) 
writes of the fi ghting in Waziristan, which he calls “the most dangerous place in the world.” 
10. Accounts of the Balkan Wars can be found in Glenny (1996), Susan Woodward (1995), 
and Silber and Allan (1997).
11. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, color revolutions occurred in the post-so-
cialist world and the Middle East. They tended to be organized at least in part by American 
NGOs. Perhaps the most important of these was the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED), tasked to bring about capitalism and democracy in targeted countries. The NED 
granted US government funds to NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute for Inter-
national Affairs, International Republican Institute, International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, International Research and Exchanges Board, and Freedom House. These then used 
the monies to help organize civil resistance. The color revolutions were reactionary insofar as 
they sought to create clients for the New American Empire. Slovakia (1998), Croatia (2000), 
and Serbia (2000) experienced color revolutions. Chossudovsky (1997) is useful concerning 
the IMF’s role in Yugoslavia’s re-balkanization.
12. Useful concerning the Kosovo War is the memoir of Wesley Clark (2002), the com-
manding US general. Daalder and O’Hanlon (2001) provide the perspective of US security 
elites. Judah (2002) has an excellent account.
13. Others arguing for the importance of oil in US decisions to war in Kosovo include 
Pilger (1999), Fisher (2002), Ghazali (2008).
14. Kansteiner appears somewhat “shady.” He was an executive chairman of Sierra Rutile 
Limited, a mining enterprise compromised in the Sierra Leone Civil War. Sierra Rutile was at 
one time owned by Max and Jean-Raymond Boulle and Robert Friedland, alleged to be linked 
to clandestine networks of offshore holdings and front companies involved in weapons traf-
fi cking, money laundering, and human rights atrocities. Kansteiner’s involvement with Sierra 
Rutile during the time of Boulle and Friedland is unclear (K. Snow 2008).
15. Schareika (forthcoming) offers an interesting accounting of Chinese oil enterprise in 
Chad, suggesting that it is a strong competitor of Exxon.
16. There was considerable US support for Habré’s Documentation and Security Director-
ate, which is thought to have killed up to forty thousand people.
17. In a 2007 article in National Geographic about Chad’s Zakouma National Park, J. Mi-
chael Fay wrote, “I saw a large helicopter to the southeast,” adding that it “made straight for 
our truck. We could run, but we couldn’t hide. It was a Russian-made Mi-17 with a missile 
launcher, the same type that had mistakenly fi red the day before on a column of Chadian and 
American soldiers north of the park” (in K. Snow 2012: 7). Fay clearly indicates US troops 
were operating with their Chadian counterparts. What the helicopter was up to is unclear.
18. The best account of Sudan’s civil wars is Douglas Johnson (2003). Jok (2007) is also 
useful. Natsios (2012), head of USAID during the Bush II administration, and Petterson 
(1999), who was US ambassador to Sudan in the early 1990s, write from US offi cials’ per-
spective. Reyna (2010), Flint and de Waal (2008), and Mamdani (2010) analyze the Darfur 
warring. Morrison and Cooke (2006) discuss the Clinton administration’s Africa policy.
19. The tendency to divide Sudan existed prior to its balkanization into an Arab, Muslim 
north and a black African, Christian south—which is an oversimplifi cation, as there is no 
“racial” divide even though at times different Sudanese political actors have attempted to 
construct one. Nevertheless, most Arabs tend to be black, as do most non-Arabs. There are 
numerous non-Arab ethnic groups in the north. Many in the south are not Christian, and 
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many of those claiming to be Christian adhere to practices and beliefs that originated in 
southern Sudanese religions.
20. The accuracy of the 9/11 Commission Report’s claim that Turabi was attempting to 
organize terrorists for war against the US is unconfi rmed. A fair amount of early 1990s US 
intelligence about the Sudan has turned out to be unreliable. 
21. Literature on the Council is limited. Rebecca Hamilton (2012), Gay (2013), David 
Rose (2002), Hoile (1999), and Keith Snow (2012) fi ll in parts of the picture.
22. Francis Deng wrote the epilogue of a book edited by Professor R. E. Downs and myself 
(1988). He was not contacted for this section of Deadly Contradictions.
23. In the early 1990s the SPLA split into rival factions—the SPLA-Mainstream, led by 
Garang, and the SPLA-United, led by Riek Machar. The factions warred with each other, 
provoking mayhem and terror among their opponents.
24. The Council did not have a complete hermetic seal over US-Sudanese affairs. In an 
originally secret interview, Donald Petterson (2003: 5) indicated he “believed” that the “pol-
icy espoused” by Rice and Prendergast “was not achieving its goals.”
25. Petterson (2003) documented Washington’s concern with Sudan’s support for terror-
ism in 1992–1993. It is now acknowledged that US intelligence on Sudan at that period was 
defective. It would be important to know how much of it derived from the Council.
26. The circumstances of Garang’s death in an airplane crash seem suspicious to some. Ga-
rang was more disposed to a unifi ed Sudan than other South Sudan leaders, especially Salva 
Kiir, who benefi ted from the plane crash by becoming the undisputed leader of the SPLA/M. 
Garang’s ex-wife and son supported Machar in the 2013–2014 political hostilities between 
Machar and Kiir (Ouga and Baguma 2013). 
27. Some have questioned how signifi cant US support of the SPLA was to Khartoum’s 
defeat. Autesserre (2002: 1), writing prior to the termination of the Second Sudanese War, 
asserted that American assistance was “not enough to enable them to win the war.” Wash-
ington’s backing was largely covert, so its magnitude is unknown. Two main forms of violent 
force resources were supplied. The fi rst was “humanitarian” aid that came in the form of food, 
which was a weapon in two ways. First, the SPLA took a fair portion of it to feed its own 
personnel. If, as Frederick the Great quipped, “an army marches on its stomach,” the US was 
responsible for fi lling SPLA stomachs. The second way food served as a weapon had to do with 
Khartoum’s strategy against the South: to starve it into submission. The provision of food to 
southerners weakened this strategy. The second sort of violent force resources provided by 
Washington was more conventional; it included weapons and training. How important was 
US assistance to South Sudan’s secession? Secessionist movements have usually failed in post-
colonial Africa, implying that US help was substantial. 
28. The Sudanese Civil Wars were already ongoing when the US intervened. Permit some 
speculation on their “root causes” (D. Johnson 2003). These, according to Douglas Johnson 
(ibid.: xvi), were the result of “patterns of violence developed in Sudanic states before the 19th 
century, establishing an exploitative relationship between the centralizing power of the state 
and its hinderland.” Additionally, two structural features in the African postcolonial state are 
relevant to understanding Sudan’s, and other African states’, descent into civil confl ict. The 
fi rst of these features is the frailty of institutional means for addressing intra-elite competition. 
African states try to use patrimonial practices, as described in the section on Chad, to moder-
ate confl ict by building elite alliances. However, such practices often increase competition be-
cause of jealousy at not being a patrimonial ally, anger at being a discarded patrimonial ally, or 
desire to be a more important patrimonial ally. The second structural feature is the weakness 
of the central governments’ violent force resources. Militaries are small, poorly trained, and 
poorly armed. Weapons are widely possessed by civilian populations. This means that states do 
not control the means of violence in any Weberian sense, which makes it easy for disaffected 
patrimonial elites to begin hostilities and diffi cult for central governments to terminate them. 
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29. Harper (2012), Elmi (2010), Marchal (2007), and Hagmann and Hoehne (2009) an-
alyze the intricacies of Somali confl ict. Scahill (2013) provides the most complete account of 
US operations. 
30. The best current account of al-Shabaab is Stig Jarle Hansen (2013).
31. Kozloff (2007) has written of Chávez and the political economy of his time. 
32. Liberation theology, which began in the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America, is both 
a Catholic theological and revolutionary political movement. One advocate terms it “an in-
terpretation of Christian faith through the poor’s suffering, their struggle and hope, and a 
critique of society and the Catholic faith and Christianity through the eyes of the poor” (Ber-
ryman 1987).
33. Brittain (2010) and Stokes (2005) have written about FARC-EP. Little work has been 
done on the ELN, but Craig-Best (2000) allows the ELN leader Antonio Garcia to speak for it.
34. Veillette (2005: 8) reports that “the United Nations estimates that the FARC’s average 
annual income is $342 million of which $204 million comes from the drug trade.”
35. A covert CIA-JSOC program discovered by the Washington Post sought to decapitate 
FARC and the ELN by assassinating their leaders using precision-guided munitions (Priest 
2013). The program appears to have begun early in the Bush II administration and been 
continued by Obama. It is a variation, and perhaps something of a forerunner, of the drone 
warfare practiced in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Africa. 
36. The Chinese have formulated a strategy, called Assassin’s Mace, to destroy multiple 
US aircraft carrier groups at one time (Corpus 2006).
37. One source explains the regime change as follows: “It seems as if Washington and Brus-
sels played in Ukraine … all the techniques for Regime Change the Anglo-Saxons practised 
in Third World countries since Napoleonic times. First, the banks got Ukraine in debt for 138 
billions … which limits independent policies and is always a source of corruption. Second, 
there was fi nancial support for very different political parties in order to convey them toward 
a common political goal. Third, a press campaign to discredit the government and demonize 
its leaders. Fourth, the fi nancing and training of groups to foment violent unrest. Fifth, the use 
of snipers to fi re against the police and the protesters to create rage and violence. … Sixth, the 
same trick practised … [of] Parliamentary Coup” (Mazzei and Zigon 2014).




It is good to have an end to journey toward; but it is the journey that matters, 
in the end. (Hemingway, in Khalid 2016)
Readers of this volume were promised a high-class, intellectual journey, a peregrination from a theoretical highland down to the empirical sea 
in search of the solution to two mysteries, exploring a theory and its val-
idation. Now the trip is over. We are back at the highlands and, like any 
traveler arriving home from a journey, we must unpack our (intellectual) 
baggage and contemplate what Hemingway thought “matters”: the jour-
ney. It has exposed two mysteries: that of why the US has killed so many 
in war; and underlying this fi rst mystery, a second, the enigma of human 
being—what it is and how it works, or does not.
Mystery 1
Jarrett Leplin, a respected scientifi c realist, has presented a list of “claims” 
that characterize an inquiry as realist. The fi rst is that “the best scientifi c 
theories are at least approximately true” (1984:). Whether global warring 
is a “best” theory is not the focus here; it is rather its approximate truth 
that is our concern. Mystery 1 is solved if, during the journey, evidence 
was found indicating global warring theory is approximately true. If it is, 
it accounts for the New American Empire’s prodigious killing. The theory 
was formally presented in chapters 1 and 2. In it, three macro-region con-
cepts—contradiction, reproduction, and global warring—account for the 
power dynamics of empire. Contradictions intensify and coalesce, leading 
to reproductive vulnerability. Vulnerability sets actors into operations in 
meso-regions. One category of actors who respond to contradictions are 
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elites, the tips of the Spear in class warfare. Deadly Contradictions paid espe-
cial attention to security elites, those with authority over imperial exercise 
of violence. Under conditions of vulnerability, elites exhibit social refl ex-
ivity and conduct hermeneutic politics to solve the hermeneutic puzzle of 
the vulnerability, which leads to the instituting of public délires. If peace-
ful fi xes of vulnerabilities go unsolved, Shultzian Permission is granted, 
leading to implementation of violent public délires. Hell is unleashed, and 
global warring occurs.
Thereafter, the peregrination descended to the empirical realm and 
the sea of modernity. Chapters 3 and 4 revealed that the US has been a 
shape-shifting empire since its very beginning: how from 1783 through 
the late 1860s it was a rapidly expanding territorial empire; and how from 
the 1870s until World War II it developed beyond the territorial limits of 
North America, alternating between a more formal empire, like those of 
Europe, to a more informal one, like the UK in parts of Latin America 
during the nineteenth century. Then it was shown how after World War II, 
the “old boy” Security Elites 1.0, “present at the creation,” organized the 
US into a three-tiered rental empire, the New American Empire. Here in 
very late modernity was a social being driven by a global domination public 
délire that fi xated its security elites upon achieving world empire—peace-
fully if possible, violently if not.
Once it was established that the US is an empire, it was important to 
discover whether it is subject to contradictions. Chapter 5 covered two 
general sorts of economic and political contradictions that bothered the 
empire. The US economic system since 1945 has experienced cyclical and 
systemic economic contradictions. The former manifests itself as a cycle of 
boom and bust, argued to be the result of overproduction/overaccumula-
tion brought about by an inter-capitalist contradiction. Systemic economic 
vulnerabilities derive from a land/capital contradiction that involves the 
pushing of energy force resources toward their limits, as manifested in the 
emergence of global warming and peak oil. The systemic contradiction has 
the potential to cause enormous harm, up to and including human being’s 
not being. Likewise, the US political system has exhibited political vulner-
abilities brought about in some measure by an inter-imperial contradiction 
expressing itself largely in competition with the Soviet Union; and a dom-
inator/dominated contradiction manifesting itself in dominated peoples’ 
resistance to the US Leviathan.
Chapters 6 through 10 went to war. They examined a total of twenty-
four global wars pursued over three moments, each moment correspond-
ing to different concatenations of contradictions. The fi rst moment, from 
1950 through 1974, was a period when the inter-imperial contradiction 
was more intense and the various economic contradictions were more re-
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laxed. The Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Iranian and Guatemalan coups, 
and the Cuban fi asco were analyzed. For each of these global warrings, it 
was shown that the inter-imperial contradiction somehow intensifi ed; and 
that US Security Elites 1.0, through their hermeneutic politics, interpreted 
the contradictions in terms of the global domination public délire, granted 
themselves Shultzian Permission, implemented the délire, and as a result 
engaged in a global war.
The second moment of global warring was between 1975 and 1989, a 
time Bob Dylan sensed was “a-changin’.” The change was that the concat-
enation of contradictions was reversing. The inter-imperial contradiction 
had not disappeared but was relaxing and would, by the end of the period, 
collapse upon the Soviet Union’s demise. Meanwhile, the economic con-
tradictions were beginning to be more threatening as cyclical recessions 
started to gain strength. The land/capital contradiction was also intensi-
fying. Global warming became noticeable as CO2 levels climbed. Peak oil 
was recognizable as the US began to import more oil from overseas. And 
the dominator/dominated contradiction began to intensify too, as people 
in the dominated world realized who the dominator was in the post–World 
War II era. It was the New American Empire and, just as anarchists in the 
time of the old empires threw bombs at ruling elites, “terrorists” in the 
post-1974 years resisted the US Security Elites 2.0 by using themselves, 
among other things, as bombs.
Chapter 8 demonstrated how the Security Elites 2.0 instituted new dé-
lires in response to the new contradictory concatenation. These were the 
oil-control and the anti-terrorist délires. These were actually iterations 
of the earlier global domination public délire that were sensitive to the 
new vulnerabilities of the changing times. The oil-control iteration was 
responsive to the worsening economic vulnerabilities and sought to make 
the best of a bad situation by seizing control of the key force resource, 
oil, to insure domination by having what everybody else (economically) 
needed. The anti-terrorist iteration addressed the worsening political vul-
nerabilities caused by the intensifying dominator/dominated contradic-
tion. It tried to relax the “terrorist” problem by killing terrorists.
Three global wars were analyzed during this second moment: Afghan-
istan I, the Iran-Iraq War, and Libya I. Afghanistan I, the war the Soviets 
fought with the Afghans, was a throwback, a fi nal intensifi cation of the 
inter-imperial contradiction. The Security Elites 2.0 responded by grant-
ing themselves Shultzian Permission and implementing the Islamic card 
iteration of the global domination public délire, which led to US global 
warring on the side of Afghans rebelling against the Soviets. US partic-
ipation in the Iran-Iraq War followed intensifi cation of the land/capital 
contradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted, and the subsequent in-
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stitution and implementation of the oil-control public délire resulted in US 
global warring in Afghanistan. Libya I followed upon intensifi cation of the 
dominator/dominated contradiction, whereupon Shultzian Permission was 
granted and the anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public 
délire was instituted.
The third moment of global warring analyzed lasted from 1990 to 2014. 
This was a time of severe contradictory vulnerability. Economic contra-
dictions were at their most intense for the time frame visited in this vol-
ume. The 2007 recession was the most serious since the Great Depression. 
Deaths due to climate change, an indicator of the severity of the land/
capital contradiction, rose from an estimated 300,000 annually in 2009 to 
5 million in 2012 (Levi 2012). The dominator/dominated contradiction 
coalesced with the economic contradictions and came to a head in 9/11. 
The intensifi ed, coalesced cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dominated 
contradictions were a “perfect storm” for the US Leviathan, posing a her-
meneutic puzzle for imperial elites: What to do?
Economic elites tried neoliberalism. It failed. Thereafter, averse to fi xing 
vulnerabilities produced by global warming and the approach of peak oil, 
they froze into uncertainty. Security Elites 3.0, for their part, engaged in 
a hermeneutic politics to fi nd a security fi x to the vulnerabilities. Their 
politics did not range far. Two solutions were found in the realm of violent 
force. Both had initially been instituted during the second moment: they 
were the anti-terrorist and oil-control iterations of the original global dom-
ination public délire. In each of the global or incipient global wars exam-
ined—Iraq, Iran, Libya II, Syria, Yemen, Israel, Afghanistan II, Pakistan, 
Kosovo, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Colombia, Venezuela, and the 
Philippines—confl ict emerged out of the perfect storm of contradictions, 
followed by the granting of Shultzian Permission, which led in turn to im-
plementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public iterations of the 
global domination public délire.
The spatial dimensions of the perfect storm of contradictions between 
1990 and 2014 were so great that global warring became world warring. 
This evidence supports the sixth proposition of global warring theory, 
which states that if the spatial dimensions of contradictions grow, then the 
geographic distribution of global warring increases. World warring has left 
millions dead. This suggests that the peregrination in this text has been a 
postmortem examination through the human being found at the sites of 
warring: “this one died here, due to global warring; that one died there, 
due to global warring; they died next, due to global warring; followed by 
other deaths, due to global warring,” and on and on. Contemplate four 
further conclusions.
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Further Conclusions: First, it is clear the US Leviathan engaged in two va-
rieties of global wars. Initially (1950–1974) its hostilities were largely in 
response to the inter-imperial contradiction; later (1990–2014) they were 
over the perfect storm of economic and political contradictions; and in 
between (1975–1989) there were nineteen years when the New American 
Empire fought for both sorts of contradictory concatenations.
A second conclusion is that the US exercises of global warring violence 
caused considerable unintended powers. The US actu ally did not win, or 
lost, three of the fi ve global wars analyzed between 1950 and 1974. Korea 
was at best a draw. The Vietnam and the Cuban interventions were fi as-
cos. The US was successful in the 1953 anti-Mossedegh coup, which US 
security elites délired. But this success produced anti-US animosity among 
Iranians, who came to regard America as the Great Satan, something se-
curity elites did not délire. US security elites got their délires in the 1953 
Guatemalan coup but created a brutal, repressive, dictatorial state, also 
something they had not intended.
Considering the global wars of the moment of changing contradictions, 
remember that US security elites in Libya I dearly délired to eliminate 
Gaddafi , which they failed to do. These same security elites appeared to 
have better luck in Afghanistan I, which they celebrated as a great victory. 
After all, they had triumphed over the Soviet monster-alterity, a really big 
Washington délire. However, in so doing they created, in the CIA’s termi-
nology, blowback. They, with Pakistan’s assistance, had armed and trained 
Muslim rebels, some of whom would go on to join al-Qaeda or the Tali-
ban, becoming terrorists who would fi ght the US Leviathan tooth and nail, 
something undélired. The Iran-Iraq War deepened Iran’s enmity toward the 
US and created the new, Saddamite monster-alterity in Iraq, which later 
the security elites would have to destroy.
The wars between 1990 and 2014 have similarly produced unintended 
powers. Notably, the US Leviathan lost the two biggest global wars. In Iraq, 
a confl ict that, judged in terms of international law, was a “supreme” war 
crime, the US cut and ran. In Afghanistan II, the end appears essentially 
the same. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the Security Elites 3.0 sought to 
enhance oil control but did not. In both countries they wanted to reduce 
terrorism but did not; in fact they increased it. Both Iraq and Afghani-
stan have been left profoundly unstable and violent after decades of global 
warring.
Global warring in Iran was supposed to achieve regime change. It did 
not. Rather, the covert warring created the unintended powers of increas-
ing burdens upon the US economy, raising tensions between Washington 
and its clients, and strengthening the presence of the Shiite Necklace in 
opposition to the New American Empire—all undélired. US sanctions have 
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hindered Iranian oil and gas production, but that has not given US oil 
companies substantial control over Iranian oil. Global warring in Libya II 
was supposed to facilitate US control over Libyan oil. Instead it has led to 
near collapse of the oil industry. It is not possible to control a production 
that does not exist. At the same time, global warring provoked disintegra-
tion of government authority, leading to reductions in the high levels of in-
come, education, and health produced by Gaddafi ’s regime. In the anarchy 
of this state, Islamist “terrorist” groups are growing stronger. In Syria too, 
US participation in the warring has not led to regime change but rather to 
vastly greater instability, coupled with immense growth of terrorist groups. 
US participation in Yemen’s, Pakistan’s, and Israel’s wars has grown terror-
ism in different ways.
In Africa—be it Chad, Sudan, Somalia, or Uganda—US global war-
ring has supported development of authoritarian, less democratic regimes 
headed by the likes of Habré and Déby in Chad, Salva Kiir in the new 
South Sudan, various warlords in Somalia, and Museveni in Uganda. Such 
states tend to be unstable. Equally, they are places of terrorism. In Chad 
and Uganda the terrorizing has been that of the state brutalizing its own 
citizens. In Somalia it has followed from the growth of terrorist organiza-
tions like al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. US military intervention has allowed 
ExxonMobil to retain considerable control over Chadian oil, but military 
intervention on the side of southern Sudan essentially led to termination 
of US control over Sudanese oil.
US global warring against FARC and ELN “terrorists” strengthened the 
Colombian state’s ability to infl ict terror on its own people. In Venezuela, 
as Washington prepares the battlefi eld to wrest control of the oil, US inter-
ventions in opposition to the Bolivarian revolution increase instability. In 
sum, US global warring has led to increased world insecurity, increased au-
thoritarian polities, weakened bonds between Washington and its clients, 
and the New American Empire’s emergence as an (untried) war criminal.
The preceding has implications for the kinetic power of Washington’s 
global warring. Observe the major wars since 1950: the Korean War was 
no more than a draw; the Vietnam War, a defeat; the Iraq War, a defeat; 
Afghanistan II, the greatest strengthening yet of the Taliban; the Bay of 
Pigs, a defeat. Each defeat was against a country, or countries, of lesser 
kinetic power. Further, as has just been documented for other of its global 
wars, often times the powers achieved were unintended and un-délired. 
Bluntly, the US Leviathan has done poorly at achieving intended kinetic 
powers using global warring. This suggests the ineffectiveness of war for 
fi xing vulnerabilities.
A third conclusion is that US global warring has been hermeneutically 
blind. It is intended to fi x reproductive vulnerabilities brought on by con-
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tradiction. Yet it has done nothing of the sort. The neoliberal iteration 
of the liberal public délire has proven hermeneutically blind to fi xing the 
cyclical contradiction. The oil-control iteration of the global domina-
tion public délire is equally blind to fi xing the systemic contradiction that 
threatens the exigencies of climate change. Even if US elites won complete 
control of the world’s oil, it would do nothing to prevent the consumption 
of oil that adds to global warming. The anti-terrorist iteration of the global 
domination public délire is blind to the actuality that it increases terror-
ism, thereby intensifying the dominator/dominated contradiction. Blind to 
what it does, US global warring spreads the disorder of cyclical economic 
turbulence, global warming, and violent terror across the sea of modernity.
Finally, ponder a fourth conclusion. The US Leviathan has killed and 
wounded a lot of people—bug splats, often civilians, often killed pitilessly 
like Artica, with her unborn child blasted from her womb. The exact num-
ber of casualties due to US global warring since World War II is unknown. 
What is known is that millions upon millions, mostly civilians, have been 
either directly or indirectly killed or wounded. More millions have been 
obliged to live the wretched lives of refugees. Still more millions, those not 
dead or fl ed, have suffered miserable times as their workplaces, transporta-
tion systems, educational institutions, and health care facilities have been 
blasted to smithereens by military operations.
US military elites insist that America fi ghts humanely. They swear in-
cidents of inhumanity such as the massacre at My Lai during the Vietnam 
War or at Hadith during the Iraq War are aberrations. However, “Ameri-
can veterans of the war in Iraq” told a different story, one of “a culture of 
casual violence, revenge and prejudice against Iraqi civilians that … made 
the killing of innocent bystanders a common occurrence” (Harris, Beau-
mont, and al-Ubeidy 2006). Moreover, there is evidence of long-standing 
and systematic US military brutality since World War II beyond that in 
Iraq. Harbury (2005) offers a history of US participation in torture. Falk, 
Gendzier, and Lifton (2006) provide data about US war atrocities in Iraq. 
Rejali (2007: 581–592) has an eleven-page bibliography of US atrocities 
during the Vietnam War. Turse (2013) reports systematic American brutal-
ity during the Vietnam confl ict. McCoy (2006) provides an account of the 
CIA’s involvement in torture. US military assistance programs throughout 
the world have taught torture. The School of the Americas, renamed the 
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation in 2000, has been 
especially notorious for training Central and South American militaries 
in the use of vicious violence (Gill 2004). The worldwide practice and 
frequency of US global warring makes it global terrorist No. 1. US media 
hermeneuts broadcast the monstrosities of resistance terrorists, rightly so. 
They are silent about the US Leviathan’s monstrosities. Thus is created a 
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cuckoo land of violent unreality in which Americans, who see only others 
as terrorists, are the cuckoos.
So, is global warring theory approximately true in the instance of the US 
Leviathan? Not all the data that could bear upon the theory has been eval-
uated, but it never is. However, the evidence adduced is consistent with 
the theory. Consequently, mystery 1 appears solved: Deadly contradictions 
of global warring theory made them do it. Ponder next the second mystery.
Mystery 2
The second, more abstract and general mystery sought the reality of hu-
man being: How it works, or does not. Let us consider next how human 
being works, or does not.
How Social Being Works, or Does Not
Prior to settling in to the work of social being, allow me to offer a meth-
odological admonition suggested by certain observations in Deadly Con-
tradictions pertaining to what is said and written by actors. Ours has been 
a time when a certain idealism prevails in social and cultural theory. Ideas 
are texts, and as Derrida once put it, “Il n’y pas hors de text” (“There is no 
outside to the text”) ([1967] 1976: 158–159). If there is no “outside” to 
the text, then there is nothing to study there. It is as if there is no context 
to the text.
This has meant that idealist thinkers have emphasized gathering texts 
of what people say and write, at the expense of what is “outside”—the so-
cial forms in which actors enact the texts. If the present text has revealed 
anything, it is that what actors say is not what actors necessarily do. US se-
curity elites drone on and on about how they come from this really excep-
tional “city on a hill” that brings “democracy and liberty”; but the reality 
is they drone on and on bringing terror and disorder. The admonition here 
is not that we should forget about the text. What actors say and write is 
part of their culture, and their culture is a force resource that choreographs 
other force resources. Still, the operation of all the force resources provides 
a better approximation of what people really do. So the admonition is to 
put the text in the context to more truthfully know reality. Attention now 
turns to the work of human being, fi rst in general, and then more specifi -
cally in empires.
The Work of Human Being: The Ur-proposition is: Doing work takes force 
to have the power to get the work done. Human structures are termed 
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social forms, which are imagined to work as the result of exercises of force. 
Social forms are built up from actors in practices, practices in institutions, 
institutions in systems, and systems into social beings. The space-time sea 
of human being, then, is full of social beings exercising force, doing work 
while connected with other social beings, as well as other biological and 
inorganic beings. Imperial social forms are just one type of social being.
The preceding suggests a contradictory conundrum, not previously 
identifi ed but of broad relevance to social being: It takes force to have 
power; and if force is fi nite, which at present appears to be the case with 
energy forces, then the more force is exercised, the less force is left to 
exercise. To have a future, it is necessary to exercise force in the present, 
but that consumption of force means that it is not there for the future. You 
may be able to exercise your force today, but maybe not tomorrow. Present 
use of force is necessary for, but in contradiction with, future use of force.
The work of social beings exercising force is to make strings with logics, 
whose powers may sometimes be unintended. Two logics are at play in 
social beings. The fi rst is a logic of disorder, in which contradictions have 
the power to move social beings toward the pandemonium of structural de-
construction. The second logic confronts the fi rst. It is one of social consti-
tution, in which social refl exivity—the human organization of autopoeisis, 
using in actors’ brains their cultural neurohermeneutic systems—moves 
social beings away from the bedlam of deconstruction. Contradiction has 
its concatenations, which may intensify and coalesce. Social constitution 
has its iterations and reiterations, which may fi x the vulnerabilities pro-
voked by contradiction. Social refl exivity involves actors, elite ones in the 
present study, refl ecting upon hermeneutic puzzles and their vulnerabilities 
provoked by contradictions.
Actors’ minds, John Locke notwithstanding, are not tabulae rasae. Far 
from it, their neuronal culture is loaded with technical, ideological, worl-
dview, personal, and positional culture. From the culture come different 
hermeneutics—meanings of what is and what to do about it. Different ac-
tors have different perceptual and procedural interpretations of a contra-
dictory situation, which form the basis of hermeneutic politics. Some actors 
perceive a reality in G way, and believe that people should proceed to Y 
exercise of force to fi x the situation. Other actors perceive that reality in H 
way, and believe that people should proceed to Z exercise of force to fi x it.
Contradicting this tendency to hermeneutic diversity is the actuality 
that actors in similar positions have similar cultures and thus understand 
reality in similar ways. In such situations it is possible for actors to be her-
metically sealed into particular interpretations. Yet it is always likely there 
will be some difference. The antipathy between Colin Powell and Dick 
Cheney had a great deal to do with their understandings of what to do 
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about Iraq. Deadly Contradictions offers no theory to explain who wins in 
hermeneutic politics; but to the victors in these politics go the spoils of 
their interpretation having become the fi x for the vulnerabilities. Social 
being in this optic is subject to a Nietzscheanesque “play of forces” in which 
the forces in the logic of disorder seek to damage the beings’ force, while 
those in the logic of social constitution work to reproduce it. Permit fi ve 
observations expanding upon this perspective.
First, contradictions count: all things break down (though they may be 
transformed). Breaking down is things moving toward the limit of their 
being, which is contradiction. For humans, contradictions can and do turn 
deadly. The systemic economic contradiction is already responsible for 5 
million deaths per year, by one estimation (Leber, 2015). The US global 
warring that resulted from the particular concatenation of contradictions 
in the 1945–2014 time frame has killed millions.
Contradictions count for another reason, which is that they are a basis 
of what actors sense, feel, and think about. Another way of putting this 
looks to Spinoza’s notion that being determines refl ecting upon being (see 
Duff 1903); therefore contradictory being as a particular instance of being 
determines refl ection on itself. However, actors’ refl ection upon contradic-
tions is not direct. Rather, people know contradictions through the already 
noted interpretive device in their I-spaces, the cultural neurohermeneutic 
system, which involves the brain in processing the relevance that cultural 
messages stored in neurons have to events occurring in reality. Most people 
will not know that an event sensed is part of a contradiction but instead 
will interpret the event in terms of the cultural knowledge of that event. 
One of the old boys, if asked whether the events in Eastern Europe in the 
late 1940s were those of the inter-imperial contradiction, would probably 
have responded, “No, those events are about the Soviet spread of com-
munism.” Further, the old boys’ understanding of the event would be part 
of the string of events involved in social refl exivity, which might lead to 
further understandings of it. Hermeneutic blindness and deception may 
lead to complete misunderstanding of contradiction. For example, many 
people believe that the climatic extremes of global warming brought on by 
the land/capital contradiction are just “normal” weather variations. This is 
hermeneutic blindness. A number of people who believe this do so because 
hermeneuts serving the oil and gas industries tell them that climate varia-
tions are “natural.” This is hermeneutic deception.
A second observation bearing on the work of social forms is that the 
strings produced by exercises of force in the logic of social constitution 
tend to exhibit what might be termed a conservation of délires. Recall that 
social refl exivity, operating as part of the logic of social constitution, pro-
duces public délires that choreograph the exercise of force to reproduce. 
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So long as the desires of the powerful remain constant, the public délires 
they institute to ensure their reproduction will remain similar or are likely, 
to use the term introduced earlier, to be iterations of each other. “Conser-
vation of délires,” then, is the principle that social change moves iteration 
by iteration of public délires, with iterations understood as similar ways of 
doing the same thing.
For example, the global domination public délire was instituted in 1950. 
At fi rst there was its NSC 68 iteration. Then there was its Nixon iteration 
during Nixon’s presidency; the PD 18, Islamic card, and oil-control itera-
tions during the Carter administration; and the Reagan and anti-terrorism 
iterations under Reagan. Each of these iterations was an interpretive re-
sponse to changes in conditions infl uencing public délires and their ability 
to help reproduce global empire. The oil-control iteration was about fi ght-
ing to reproduce the empire by having power over its oil and gas energy 
supplies, threatened by the land/capital contradiction. The anti-terrorist 
iteration was about fi ghting to reproduce the empire by having power 
over “terrorists,” who posed a threat because of the dominator/dominated 
contradiction.
The conservation of délires means that social beings, especially great 
and complex ones, like the US Leviathan, change course slowly as they 
glide through the sea of space and time. If a social being’s logic of social 
constitution is having trouble formulating fi xes that relax the logic of dis-
order, then its course is toward the whirlpools of contradictory disorder. 
This perspective of change omits the vectoring and optimism of Hege-
lian dialectics that saddled some of Marx’s thought. Social beings are not 
assured a thesis-antithesis-synthesis directionality. There is no inevitable 
zig-zagging progress from the heights of synthesis to still higher synthesis. 
Rather, social beings inch along according to their public délires; making 
new iterations through hermeneutic politics as new conditions, especially 
those pertaining to their contradictions, arise. Thus understood, change is, 
in Lewis Henry Morgan’s terms, “experimental.”
Fourth, hermeneutic politics does not invariably provide public délires 
that work, in the sense of being successful reproductive fi xes to contradic-
tory vulnerabilities. Enlightenment thought posited humans as rational. 
Fat chance—Shakespeare knew better. Humans are giddy. Hermeneutic 
blindness and deception are always possible. Autopoeisis is not guaranteed. 
Social beings can and do become disordered when they are unable to sail 
courses away from the deconstructions of contradiction. Otherwise put, 
sometimes social beings work, sometimes they do not, and sometimes they 
work themselves into not working.
The fi fth observation begins with a question: if not by rationality, how 
do humans change social forms? Charles Saunders Peirce, in his essay 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Journey’s End
– 495 –
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” articulated what came to be regarded 
as the canonical expression of pragmatist thought. This was to “consider 
what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce 1992: 132). 
Actors involved in hermeneutic politics consider the practical effects of 
each iteration of a public délire in order to attain better practical effects 
in the next iteration of that délire, and it is in this sense that experimental 
change is pragmatic in the play of forces of social beings sailing the sea of 
human being. Next, refl ect upon the work of empires.
The Work of Empires: To consider the work of empires, I pose the question, 
whatever happened to negative reciprocity? One of anthropology’s gifts 
to social thought has been to demonstrate that the market distribution of 
goods and services is not the only way of organizing economic exchange. 
Anthropologists discovered that gift-giving was important, especially in so-
cial forms that were not modern. Two main traditions developed regarding 
gift-giving: one that went from Marcel Mauss ([1924] 2000) to Claude 
Lévi-Strauss ([1949] 1969); and another that went from Karl Polyani 
(1944) to Marshall Sahlins (1972). The latter tradition emphasized that 
there have been three forms of exchange in human history—reciprocity, 
redistribution, and the market. In “On the Sociology of Primitive Ex-
change,” Sahlins (ibid.: 191–210) distinguished three forms of reciprocity: 
generalized reciprocity, where gift return was not immediate and when it 
occurred was a gift roughly equivalent to the original; balanced reciprocity, 
which involved immediate gift return, with the return gift roughly equal to 
the original; and fi nally, the residual category of negative reciprocity, where 
the reciprocity was not one of roughly equivalent gift exchange. In this 
case, one of the exchanging actors sought to get “something for nothing 
with impunity” (ibid.: 195) through measures such as haggling, theft, or 
wife-capture. The fi rst two forms of reciprocity were supposed to dominate 
nonmarket economies. Less was said of negative reciprocity. It was less 
important because it was less frequent in the giving and counter-giving of 
nonmarket economies.
A substantial secondary literature has arisen to discuss and critique dif-
ferent aspects of the original gift-giving and exchange scholarship. One 
strand in this literature is debate over the difference between gifts and 
commodities, with Gregory (1982) insisting upon difference and Appadu-
rai (1986) arguing for similarity. Another strand recognizes that gift-giving 
did not go away when markets emerged (Cheal 1988; Carrier 1992). Ab-
sent from this literature is contemplation of whatever happened to nega-
tive reciprocity.1
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I believe Deadly Contradictions suggests that negative reciprocity has 
exploded in importance since the origin of empires. To explain why this 
is so, let us fi rst defi ne “reciprocity” in terms of fl ows and counterfl ows of 
force resources to parties in an exchange. Implicit here is that gifts and 
commodities are variant forms of reciprocity distinguished in terms of who 
gets how much, when, of force resources in an exchange. Generalized and 
balanced reciprocity remain exchanges where parties to the exchange re-
ceive roughly equal amounts of force resources. “Negative reciprocity” 
characterizes exchanges where somebody “gets something for less” (than 
was given). It is an exchange where the party giving less—and such a party 
may be a social position, such as “capitalist”—can accumulate more in 
force resources than do the others.
It is common knowledge in anthropological literature that for the vast 
bulk of human history, people lived more or less egalitarian lives in their 
social forms. However, when the state was invented in ancient times and 
imperial social beings began their diffusion across the globe, the violent 
force of aristocrats in the empires was used to ensure that they accumu-
lated more force resources than anybody else. This was because: A (the 
aristocrats) took force resources in the form of produce from B (food pro-
ducers) and reciprocated by giving B the force resource of land from their 
holdings. Usually, the land received was about enough to support the food 
producer’s family. Critically, the violent force of aristocrats ultimately al-
lowed them to have large tracts of land, of which portions could be pro-
vided to many producers. This meant that individual aristocrats took force 
resources from numerous producers. Bs received enough force resources 
from their labor on their land to support themselves. However, A received 
vastly greater force resources from the labor of Bs on their land than did 
individual Bs. This was negative reciprocity—a differential accumulation 
of force resources favoring aristocrats. Such negative reciprocity is termed 
“aristocratic.” By the end of medieval times much of the world had been 
subjugated to the tender mercies of aristocratic negative reciprocity.
Then, in early modern times, as capitalist institutions emerged as the 
basis of the economic systems of Europe’s old empires, the military institu-
tions in the political system of those empires warred—not always or invari-
ably successfully, but frequently—to reproduce the conditions for capitalist 
accumulation. The two parties to the exchanges required for such accumu-
lation are capitalists and labor. In their exchanges, A (the capitalist) gets 
surplus value from B (labor), and B (labor) gets wages from A (the capital-
ist). Surplus value and wages are monetary forms of force resources and as 
such are a form of capital. Capitalists always accumulate far more surplus 
value than labor acquires wages. In this optic, capital accumulation is un-
derstood as a logic producing greater negative reciprocity, in the sense that 
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it makes greater numbers of laborers who provide greater sums of surplus 
value to capitalists. By the end of the old empires, imperial domination had 
spread across the entire globe along with the negative reciprocity under-
stood as “capitalist.”2 Hence, the growth of old and new modern empires 
has involved the growth of negative reciprocity through the operation of 
the logic of capital accumulation. The building of a world of imperial social 
beings with their aristocratic and capitalist negativity reciprocity has had 
another effect, considered next.
The Arc of the Moral Universe: On 7 March 1965, some six hundred largely 
African-American civil rights marchers left Selma, Alabama, for Mont-
gomery, the state capital. There they intended to struggle against racial 
segregation by demanding their voting rights. They had gone only six blocks 
when they were set upon by police, who beat them brutally. The event 
became known as Bloody Sunday. A little over a week later, Martin Lu-
ther King led another march from Selma to Montgomery. This time it was 
successful, and before a huge crowd in front of the state capital he stated 
that segregation was “on its last legs” (in Remnick 2010: 13). Then he 
rhetorically asked his listeners how long it would be before it was over 
and responded, “Not long, because the arc of the moral universe is long 
but it bends toward justice” (ibid.: 13). Martin Luther King is one of the 
world’s great moral leaders. I think he was wrong about the arc of the 
moral universe.
To understand why, consider the following: Many elites, and even their 
subjects, in the empires of modernity, helped by their hermeneuts, think of 
history as the growth of civilization. The actuality is different. The US Le-
viathan might be the most powerful empire ever, but in its propensity to vi-
olence it is a typical empire. Ever since the invention of empires some four 
or fi ve thousand years ago, they have developed force resource extraction 
institutions, directly or indirectly supported by institutions of violent force, 
to accumulate force resources for their elites. They have all been the most 
powerful social beings of their epochs. History has been the emergence of 
ever more powerful empires, with ever more extensive and dense powers, 
ever more devastating violence, and ever more negative reciprocity—in 
the sense that ever more persons are actors in logics where some few get 
lots of force resources, and the vast majority get few such resources. Life 
for the vast majority who get a little is not much of a picnic. Life for the 
elites favored by the negative reciprocity is very much a life of privileged 
picnics. Such an organizing of human being is unfair and, accordingly, un-
just. Consequently, and sadly, it is important to recognize that Reverend 
King was wrong. For a very long time, the arc of moral justice has bent 
toward injustice.
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So what is the solution to the second mystery? Human being has been 
the work of a contradictory “play of forces” subject to logics of social con-
stitution and disorder. There is no guarantee that the work works, in the 
sense that social constitution always wins out over disorder. Moreover, this 
play has so far instituted ever grander empires that, all their fi ne monu-
ments, arts and literatures notwithstanding, are moral eyesores. 
Critical Mediations: Utopia or the Sixth Extinction
I have lived inside the monster and know its entrails. (Martí 1895)
The bureaucratic, totalitarian monster grew stronger and spread. (C. L. R. 
James 1969)
Remember from the Preface that Rousseau said anthropology should be 
the discipline that studies other people in the world to better “know our 
own.” Investigation of twenty-four US wars among other peoples all over 
the world has told us something about “our own,” which in the course of 
our travels we have discovered is an interconnected world where we all 
live. Imperial social being was in some measure the reason those wars were 
the way they were. Now reread the two quotations above of Jose Martí and 
C. L. R. James.
They were not hybrid intellectuals, though both had lived in the US. 
Martí was a Cuban patriot and poet who spent time in the US during 
the 1880s and 1890s. James was a Trinidadian political economist, cricket 
commentator, and Marxist who lived off and on in the US in the twentieth 
century. US hermeneuts do not usually take such interpreters’ views seri-
ously. Not American. Not Harvard or Yale. What can they know? Martí 
knew the US when it was fi rst fl exing its muscles in extraterritorial imperi-
alism. James knew it while the New American Empire was being instituted. 
Both knew the same thing: the US was a “monster.” To US hermeneuts 
this is balderdash, the nonsense of two Caribbean cranks. America is “the 
shining city on the hill” whose security elites track and bugsplat mon-
ster-alterities, and even whacked Saddam and bin Laden.
But the “shining city on the hill” claim is unsupported by Deadly Con-
tradictions. The US is an empire—a new sort of empire, but an empire 
nevertheless. In the New American Empire, much of the extraction of 
force resources is done through capitalist negative reciprocity, by capital-
ist institutions with military institutions supporting them. This leads to 
a Rousseauian understanding that Martí and James help to clarify. This 
text’s analysis of the twenty-four wars, despite its focus on other peoples 
where the wars occurred, has led us to “know our own.” Here is what we 
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now know: Rousseau had it wrong, at least for modernity. There is no “our 
own” world and their, other world. Structurally it is a monad. Imperial 
social beings reproduce by connecting with, and thereby becoming part of, 
other social forms. In doing so, the US Leviathan, following a negative rec-
iprocity logic, choreographed by the global domination public délire, sows 
terror and disorder.
I ask my readers not to think this reality abstractly, but to feel it. Think 
of pregnant Artica trying to protect herself and her unborn child. Hear 
the rocket swoosh in to explode. Smell the stench of blood, feces, and 
explosives hanging over her body, blown open with the fetus hanging out. 
Know that this has happened to millions upon millions in different ways 
and times since 1945. Sowers of such horror are monsters. This revelation 
answers the question that President Obama left unanswered in his No-
bel Peace Prize speech, the location of evil. The US Leviathan is a moral 
monstrosity.
Apocalypse Soon: What does the future hold? In the current moment, ac-
cording to Slavoj Žižek, leftist missionary to postmodernists, humanity is 
coming to be Living in End Times (2011). Some Jeremiah is always declar-
ing that end times are just around the corner. But curiously, Žižek was not 
alone: the years from 1990 to 2014 witnessed an upsurge of apocalyptic 
nattering in America. A 1993 poll found that 20 percent of Americans 
believed Armageddon was near (Berlet 1995). By 2011 the fi gure had dou-
bled to 41 percent, with well over half the people surveyed in the Ameri-
can South convinced it was approaching (Pew 2010). There is a tendency 
to poke fun at the interpretations of fundamentalist “rednecks.” Remem-
ber also that Hank Paulson’s wife told him to turn to God as the hard times 
of the Great Recession began. Rednecks and economic elites seem to share 
in apocalyptic angst.
They may be on to something. There have been fi ve mass extinctions 
of species in the history of the globe. Some believe that a sixth is in prog-
ress (Kolbert 2014). It is obvious that no reproductive fi xes are currently 
operating for the systemic contradictions that threaten human and other 
living being. The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has already risen 
to 400 ppm, where it is known to have deleterious consequences. The oil 
companies are sucking up the last dregs of tight oil. Peak oil may be post-
poned, but it is coming. Critically, the oil-control public délire does noth-
ing to fi x the land/capital contradiction. Even if successfully implemented, 
which it does not appear to be, all it can do is increase the New American 
Empire’s power as the key energy force resources disappear and disorder 
sets in. So it is appropriate to talk of very late modernity, in the sense that 
either modernity will change to something else, or the something else will 
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be nothing else. Consequently, all hands are on deck on the US Leviathan 
as the Sixth Extinction gathers force, because its apocalypse is imminent 
and scary. This leads to a grave hermeneutic puzzle: what, in Hell is to be 
done?
Lenin’s Question: What to do, of course, was Lenin’s question. I have sym-
pathy for Lenin’s answer, but my procedural response differs somewhat. 
Perceptually, imperial organizations are monstrosities. Humanity is better 
off without them. So I believe, like Lenin, they need to be eliminated by 
whatever means work. Procedurally, this is no easy matter.
Elimination of imperial monstrosities, as Lenin knew, is not a simple 
matter of having a revolution in which the winners take all and live happily 
ever after. Procedurally, imperial elimination involves two chores: eradi-
cating the empires and instituting a global replacement able to equitably 
divide force resources in ways that allow these force resources to be re-
producible. Instituting such novel social beings at a global level would be 
an extraordinary feat in the building of complex beings. No matter what, 
history will continue. Humans will experiment with different iterations of 
reproductive fi xes. Perhaps some fi x will emerge and enable global social 
beings to continue reproduction with equitable division of force resources. 
At present, however, there are no such fi xes.
Further, remember the principle of the conservation of délires. There 
are hermeneuts working as hard as they can to keep the monstrosity going. 
Economic elites work day and night at the Harvards and Yales of very late 
modernity, fi xated upon discovery of neoliberal iterations of capitalist re-
production to better regulate the fl ow of force resources to capitalist elites. 
They are aided by similarly continuously laboring security elites in the mili-
tary-industrial complex who are fi xated upon discovery of more “shock and 
awe” so as to produce more lethal iterations of global domination public 
délire. But after all is said and done, humans are giddy pragmatists. There 
is no necessity for fi xes to work and save the day.
The average species exists fi ve to ten million years before extinction 
(Lawton and May, 1995, Chapter 1). The human species has been around 
about three hundred thousand years. For 99 percent of this time, as earlier 
noted, human beings sailed the sea of space and time in classless social 
forms. Then the species invented empires, whereupon it went from bigger 
to even bigger empires capable of bigger and even bigger monstrosities. 
The conservation of délires saw to it, iteration by iteration, that imperial 
social beings extracted ever more force to exercise more power to reward 
elites with more prizes. The most recent incarnation of such predatory 
beings, the New American Empire, has generated contradictions whose 
fullest intensifi cation promises complete disorder—apocalypse soon.
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President Reagan, in his farewell address at the end of his presidency, 
said, “I’ve spoken of the shining city all my political life. … And how stands 
the city on this winter night? … After 200 years, two centuries, she still 
stands strong and true to the granite ridge, and her glow has held no mat-
ter what storm” (Reagan 1989). Poppycock! Since antiquity and the in-
vention of empire there have been many imperial monsters on many hills, 
each with their appalling fi res atop “granite” ridges. Perhaps what Presi-
dent Reagan really glimpsed, when he saw the “shining city” glow in very 
late modernity, was the latest, biggest monster’s light in the enormousness 
of the infi nite universe, fl aring in a darkened world.
Here comes the unsatisfying part. Some will complain that I have been 
pessimistic. Critical thought is supposed to liberate. They demand hope. 
Hope is not an answer. It is an opiate. Some demand to know, what is to 
be done? Liberation can be gained only when people know the actuality of 
their social being. This knowledge is what Deadly Contradictions has sought 
to contribute. Liberation begins with the elimination of empire. It ends 
with the establishment of complex, egalitarian, reproducible social beings 
able to operate globally. Liberation will not come merely by altering eco-
nomic systems. Imperial economic systems are fused with their political 
counterparts, bristling with military institutions that control and exercise 
immense amounts of nonviolent and violent force. Elites in these institu-
tions are disposed by their positional culture to solve hermeneutic puzzles 
violently. Unless their force is tamed, contradictions are likely to be deadly. 
Some may be tempted to label the vision of a future human being without 
empire as utopian. The choice may in fact be between utopia and the Sixth 
Extinction.
Notes
1. Entry points into the gift-giving and reciprocity literature would include Gregory (1982), 
Jonathan Parry (1986), and Graeber (2001: 217), who believes that “as currently used,” rec-
iprocity is “very close to meaningless.” Narotzky and Moreno (2002) present the only major 
discussion of negative reciprocity, which they explore in Nazi concentration camps.
2. Piketty (2014: 1) has published an empirically rich and theoretically convincing expla-
nation of why “capitalism automatically generates … inequalities,” which in our terms means 
it generates negative reciprocities.
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